What are Social Norms?

How are They Measured?

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I. Introduction

The perpetuation of harmful practices, such as caregivers not conversing with infants or female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), and the creation of beneficial new practices, such as exclusive breastfeeding or marriage at an adult age may be due to social motivations. They may involve an entire community’s beliefs and actions rather than simply those of individuals and their families (UNICEF 2010). Social motivations, our focus here, can explain why a behavior – harmful or beneficial – is common in a group.

There are many other reasons why population groups might engage in behaviors that are beneficial or harmful to children. Many of the reasons have to do with factors such as the nonsocial environment in which they live or their economic resources. These may determine, for example, their access to health and other services or the availability of clean water. We do not deny the great and often overwhelming importance of these extrasocial influences on behavior of interest. Rather, we focus on the social because it has been somewhat overlooked and misunderstood in development theory and practice.

There are three broad categories of beliefs: one’s beliefs about the nonsocial environment (for example, the belief that colostrum is bad for the newborn), one’s beliefs about the social environment, about others’ minds and actions (for example, the belief that my mother-in-law expects me to discard the colostrum), one’s beliefs about one’s own mind (see Adolphs 2009). Beliefs about one’s self includes one’s self-efficacy (Bandura 1997) or, a similar concept, one’s perceived behavioral control over an action (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). Most development programs give ample consideration to beliefs about the nonsocial environment, and many measure self-efficacy beliefs and their change, but comparatively few consider beliefs about the social environment which are central to the understanding of social norms.

Beliefs about what others do, and what others think we should do, within some reference group, maintained by social approval and disapproval, often guide a person’s actions in her social setting. If a harmful practice is social in nature, programs that concentrate on education of the individual, or increase in the availability of alternatives, or provide external incentives, may not be enough. In addition, a program may need to support the clarification, and sometimes the revision, of social expectations of people throughout the entire community of interest.

Social-norms theory has not been widely examined in development circles (concepts from Fishbein and Ajzen’s Reasoned Action Approach have been used, but not mostly in health and in the developed world). That’s why the first half of this report attempts a primer on the subject. Social-norms measurement is even less examined. In preparing this essay we examined about 200 different publications and articles on social
norms in global development. Most of these studies theorize or detail programming; only about 14% discuss norms-measurements methods. Of these, most discussed qualitative findings or offered baseline and evaluation measures of individual attitudes and behaviors (rather than expectations that members of a group hold of one another, the cement of social norms). Paluck and Ball (2010), reviewing studies of social norms marketing aimed at gender based violence, also find a rarity of specific measurement of social norms change. In the second half of our report we propose some principles for the measurement of social norms and their change, and summarize a variety of ways of doing measurement. Much more work remains to be done by all interested in the topic.

**Extrasocial Influences and Social Norms**

This document offers an account of what social norms and other social practices are, with special attention to child well-being, and especially child protection. It also outlines a number of measurement strategies to identify social norms and measure their change over time. Social ways to change social norms are mentioned in passing and by reference (e.g., Cislaghi, Gillespie, and Mackie 2014), and nonsocial ways to change social norms not at all. Call social any influence on action influenced by social norms, and nonsocial any influence on action caused by economic, legal, political, religious, health or educational services, technology change, or other factors. We acknowledge that people are harmed by forces other than social norms, that harmful social norms can have nonsocial origins, and can be ended by nonsocial causes including nonsocial program engagements. For example, suppose that threats to girls’ honor causes families to withdraw them from school, and that this channels the girls to early marriage. Rather than changing the social norm of honor, school buses could be provided by educators, politicians could improve public order, new cellphone technology could reduce personal danger.

Any human action in the present is determined by causes at multiple levels – individual, family, community, social, governmental, economic – and present causes are determined by past causes at different levels. For example, unequal gender norms, according to Boserup’s (2007) hypothesis, may have originated or worsened with the shift long ago from hoe to plough agriculture in some regions. The new technology reduced the relative value of female labor, and hence reduced women’s bargaining power in the household. The unequal gender norms persist for centuries after plough societies have moved out of agriculture: although originating in technology change they are maintained as social norms. They are solidified, but may begin to erode under the changed political economy of modernity, as people move to the cities and seek education to participate in an economy that demands education, mobility, and skills that women can perform at least as well as men. That process is reported in an ethnography wonderfully detailing changes in traditional gender norms in a rural Andalucian village from 1963 to 1983 (Collier 1997). Even though the change is pulled by large political and economic forces, humans are not colliding atoms, their agency enacts the change, and movements, policies, and programs can hasten it.
The social-ecological model (Bronfenbrenner 2005) directs attention to the multiple levels of causation of an action or practice. Heise (2011), for instance, identifies social norms as one set of causes of intimate partner violence; her evidence-based, ecological model also identifies many more factors at all levels of influence. Other models also open our eyes to multiple causes and multiple ways to respond. The Behaviour Change Wheel (Michie, Atkins, and West 2014) is an example.
Michie and coworkers (2013) have also developed a taxonomy of 85 behavior change techniques, organized into 16 clusters by hierarchical analysis! Techniques relating to social norms comprise no more than 10% of the total.

The following two subsections preview the report. Material is presented in summary form with almost no citations. Full explication with citations is provided as the report unfolds.

What are Social Norms?

As a first approximation, a social norm is what people in some group believe to be normal in the group, that is, believed to be a typical action, an appropriate action, or both (Paluck and Ball 2010). A social norm is held in place by the reciprocal expectations of the people within a reference group. Because of the interdependence of expectation and action, social norms can be stiffly resistant to change.

The actions of an individual range from the highly independent (like remembering one’s purse on the way out the door in the morning), to the dependent (learning from an acquaintance that a radio show is entertaining,) to the highly interdependent (each driving on the right side of the road because everyone else does).

Development thinking has tended to understand individual actions of programmatic interest as being independent; or as being one-way dependent, whereby one person’s action depends on others’, as in the diffusion of innovation. However, there are human
actions where what one does depends on what others do, and what others do depends on what one does (many-way interdependence). The contrast will be illustrated later in the essay by the portrayal of the adoption of oral rehydration therapy by one family from another as a way to prevent a child’s dehydration from diarrhea (one-way dependence) versus the community shift to latrine usage as a way to reduce contagious disease (many-way interdependence). Simple game theory can add to our understanding these distinctions.

The study of social norms builds on research from various disciplines. An economic approach originating in Thomas Schelling’s reinterpretation of game theory emphasizes the connection of social practices to interdependent actions within reference groups. The Reasoned Action Approach (developed by Ajzen and Fishbein) offers a model to predict behavior from an individual’s attitude, perceived subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. Robert Cialdini’s empirical research has shown the importance of a distinction between a descriptive norm (doing what others do) and an injunctive norm (doing what others think one should do). Cristina Bicchieri defines social norms in terms of one’s beliefs about the actions and beliefs of others in the reference group. We sketch in Section II and show in great detail in Appendix II that the bewildering array of social-norms models and their terminologies tend to converge same few elements: a social norm has to do with beliefs about others, that is, social expectations; within some reference group; maintained by social approval and disapproval and other social influence. Approval and disapproval includes covert attitudes and overt positive and negative sanctions; and include approval for doing what

In order to create beneficial social regularities or to change harmful ones, it is important to understand how they differ in structure. Different types require different responses. We distinguish nonsocial, weakly social, and strongly social regularities. Strongly social regularities include social norms of coordination and social norms of cooperation. Legal norms are declared and sanctioned by the state. Moral norms are much more motivated by conscience than by social expectations. It is important and useful to draw these distinctions, as understanding them helps us analyze how to beneficially harmonize moral, legal, and social norms for the well-being of children.

**How are Social Norms Measured?**

We begin by observing that social norms cannot be identified from behavioral observations alone, for three reasons. First, if a proscriptive norm (what not to do) is effective the behavior it proscribes is not observed. Additionally, an effective norm is held in place by people’s beliefs about what would happen if they failed to comply. Finally, people can be motivated to comply not only by their anticipation of overt positive and negative sanctions but also by beliefs about the covert approval and disapproval of others in their reference group. But also by unobserved attitudes of esteem and disesteem.

We propose that to identify a social norm we would want to know:

- Who is the reference group?
What is approved of in the group?
What is typical in the group?

We review several different formulations of these principles suitable for different purposes. Here is one formulation we propose to measure change in social norms:

- Has the reference group changed? [sometimes]
- Over time is the old norm less approved of in the group?
- Over time is the old norm less typical in the group?
- Over time is the new norm more approved of in the group
- Over time is the new norm more typical in the group?

We begin the remainder of this section with general considerations on measuring social norms. Parallel with the central features of a social norm, we want to measure one’s beliefs about others, their social expectations; who they believe the reference group is; and the anticipated reactions of others to compliance or noncompliance with the norm. We show how to recognize social norms and their change in ordinary conversation or in focus groups. We suggest eight (or fewer) simple questions intended to identify social norms and measure their change. They are open-ended questions to be asked in a focus group or informal conversation, but they can be quantified. We move on to DHS and MICS surveys, stating four simple indicators in such data that suggest the existence of a social norm. We cite the multi-level models of Storey and colleagues who use DHS data to identify social norms, and explicate another creative use of these data.

We introduce Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2010) Reasoned Action Approach (RAA), a model of human behavior as determined by social norm and personal attitude. RAA has been applied to behavior-change questions over 40 years, in a thousand studies, and its well-tested methods offer ideas for adaptation. The specific social-norms measurements we found in development studies tend to be partial borrowings from RAA. Next, for concreteness, we review a sophisticated and exemplary social-norms, social-network study, a field experiment on school harassment by Paluck and Shepherd (2012). The study gathered social network data to map the reference group, and measured empirical expectations, normative expectations, personal attitudes, and behavioral outcomes. Finally, we review a method intended to incentive sincere answers to questions about beliefs about others in a population: the matching-game method. In Appendix I we review social norms measurement in practice. We look at some quantitative inquiries used by Soul City, Getting Real About Violence, GEM/IMAGES, and Berhane Hewan; some qualitative inquiries used by SASA and GREAT, and various multi-media and participatory action research methods.

II. What are Social Norms?

The word norm has several meanings. A common meaning is that a norm is merely a statistical regularity: one notices that many people wear white in order to stay cool on a
hot day. Another meaning is what people in a group believe to be typical and appropriate action in that group (Paluck and Ball 2010), such as when one sees in some group that brides wear white at wedding: a social norm. A third meaning is of a prescriptive or proscriptive rule with obligatory force regardless of social expectations, a moral norm: Thou shalt not kill! It’s important to distinguish among these three meanings.

There are many different understandings of what social norms are, but they tend to converge on these elements (these are drawn from our analysis of 17 different definitions of social norms detailed in Appendix II):

- **Social Expectations:** A social norm is constructed by one’s beliefs about what others do, and by one’s beliefs about what others think one should do.

- The relevant others we call a Reference Group (and different norms may be relative to different reference groups); group members tend to hold the expectations of one another.

- A social norm is **Maintained by Social Influence:** approval, including positive sanctions, or disapproval, including negative sanctions; or by one’s belief in the legitimacy of others’ expectations; among enough members of the reference group.

These elements stand out in an early conceptual review by sociologist Gibbs (1965):

A norm...involves: (1) a collective evaluation of behavior in terms of what it ought to be; (2) a collective expectation as to what behavior will be; and/or (3) particular reactions to behavior, including attempts to apply sanctions or otherwise induce a particular kind of conduct.

Finally, most theorists observe that Social Norms are distinct from Legal Norms and from Personal Norms:

- **Legal Norms** are formal and commanded by states, and can be enforced by coercion. Social norms are informal, and are more maintained by approval and disapproval.

- A **Personal Norm** (including Moral Norm) or a Personal Attitude is internally motivated and is distinct from a Social Norm which is, one way or another, externally motivated.

A personal attitude differs from a social norm. The bride may not want to wear a white wedding gown but, knowing expectations in the relevant reference group, will nevertheless comply with the social norm of wearing white. Her personal attitude does not direct her behavior. A boy may not want to hit his girlfriend for flirting with another boy, but does so because the members of the boys’ peer group do so and he believes they would belittle him for not doing so. His personal attitude does not direct his behavior.
A social norm is held in place by the reciprocal expectations among the people in a **reference group**. A reference group is those people whose expectations matter to a given individual in the situation, those to whom the individual refers; such an individual is called a *referent* by some analysts. The interdependency of beliefs and actions within a reference group means that a social norm can be quite resistant to change, and can persist even among those who would rather not follow the norm.

**Shared nonsocial beliefs**, for example, how to grow the best millet, or how bodies work and what causes disease, differ from the shared *social* beliefs – social expectations – that constitute a social norm. A harmful social practice can be caused by shared nonsocial beliefs, by social norms, or both. Shared nonsocial beliefs are learned one from another, what we will call **one-way dependence**, and can change one person at a time. In contrast, social norms require the coordinated change by many in the reference group, what we will call **many-way interdependence**.

Because of interdependence within the reference group, a program that aims to support the establishment of a beneficial new social norm, or a shift from a harmful old norm to a beneficial new one, must help change reciprocal expectations among enough of the people in the reference group. A program that engages with individuals only as individuals could change their personal attitudes towards the behavior regulated by a harmful or a beneficial social norm, but not change their behavior, not bring about the beneficial social norm.

Some actions are largely **independent** of the actions of others, for example, for one person to row a boat. Suppose that it would be safer for a rower to be going west, but instead she is going north not knowing that this leads to a dangerous waterfall. A program would engage with the single rower about changing her personal attitude and behavior such that she shifts from north to west.

Other human actions are **interdependent**, for example, when several people work together to row a boat going north. Here, if a change agent engaged a single rower about shifting to the west, the single rower could come to prefer going west over going north. Her *personal attitude* would change, but she would be unable to change *group behavior* on her own. That is because she believes that if she rows west while the others in her reference group row north, chaos would result, and some of the others would rebuke her for causing it. An external change agent unaware of the interdependence of beliefs and actions among the rowers might be puzzled by the discrepancy between a rower’s attitude favoring going west and her behavior of going north.

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1 We are not talking here about the norm of reciprocity: to return like with like. Rather, we mean that among the people in the reference group each has certain expectations of others, and others have the same expectations of one: the expectations are reciprocal among many in the group.
Independent Action

How do we change an interdependent action? When several people work together to row a boat, a program could succeed at changing the personal attitude of each rower, such that each would prefer going west rather than going north. Would this be enough to change the direction of the group to the west? No, it is not enough on its own. For the group to change direction to the west requires a change in social expectations, such that enough of its members come to believe:

- that enough other rowers would approve of others going west
- that enough other rowers would coordinate on going west
- that enough rowers do coordinate on going west

In an example made extreme in order to illustrate a point, each rower could hold a personal attitude preferring to go north, but each rower instead would actually go west because she believes that others are going west and would approve of going west. In the norms literature, this is called pluralistic ignorance: when many privately reject an extant social norm but wrongly believe that many do accept it (Prentice and Miller 1993). Here, private personal attitudes are divorced from public social expectations (Kuran 1997).

A study of responses to a year of group listening to and discussion of radio dramas on ethnic violence in Rwanda supports the idea that change in social expectations is important to bring about a new social norm. Paluck (2009) found, for example, that contrary to the program’s intention people became less likely to believe that ethnic intermarriage brings peace. Yet, the same people were much more likely to endorse the social norm that ethnic intermarriage should be allowed in one’s family. Her general conclusion was that group discussion of the messages of the violence reduction program did not change participants’ personal beliefs about violence, but did change their social norms about violence and did increase behavior in conformity with the new social norms (see Paluck and Shepherd 2012).
and Zou et al. 2009 for similar findings). The lesson is, to change an interdependent action, although it helps to change personal attitudes, it is necessary to change social expectations.

Yes, in working to bring about a change in social expectations in a group, normally the change agent would also strive to bring about changes in the personal attitudes of group members as well. And a new norm would be more strong and stable if it were held in place by broad changes in both social expectations and personal attitudes. In summary:

- To change the independent action of an individual, work to change the personal attitude and behavior of the individual
- To change an action interdependent among members of a group, also work to change the social expectations of enough group members culminating in a coordinated behavioral change among enough members of the group

**Interdependent human action can – and sometimes must – change rapidly**

Sweden’s change from the social convention of driving on the left to driving on the right in 1967 provides an example of strong interdependence of action. It vividly illustrates how in a case of interdependence of action, bringing about a change – such as shifting from driving on the left to driving on the right -- requires a change in the reciprocal expectations of all individuals at the same time in the reference group. In this case, the reference group is all the people who would use the highways in Sweden.

A common remark is that culture is deeply entrenched and takes generations to change. Swedish humorists at the time joked that, because this is such a big change, it should be phased in gradually: first bicycles, a few months later trucks, sometime after that buses, later cars. Each person in Sweden could have wanted to change to driving on the right, but would not do so unless she believed that a) everyone else wants to do so if everyone else does so, and b) everyone confidently expects others to change to driving on the left at the same time. Precisely because of the reasons for its deep entrenchment, this interdependent action could only change by achieving simultaneous change in practice by all individuals in the reference group.

The keep-right convention is extremely interdependent – nearly all must comply or risk mayhem. Changing from a convention of ignoring traffic signs to a convention of obeying them is somewhat less interdependent. We benefit even if many rather than all shift. Here, for a stable trajectory of change, enough people must believe that enough people are starting to obey traffic signs.

For a beneficial new norm to come into existence, enough members of the group must believe that enough of its members are adopting the new norm. If the interdependent rowers were able to credibly communicate and commit amongst themselves they could organize a shift to the west by changing social expectations, changing their beliefs about others. They would need to have good reasons for changing those beliefs. Values deliberations about what one should do and what others should do can begin in a small
core group, and diffuse in an organized fashion through the remainder of the reference group, until enough are ready to change. A way must be found, for example, a public celebration, so that enough people see that enough people are changing (Mackie 1996; Mackie 2010; UNICEF 2010; Cislaghi, Gillespie, and Mackie 2014).

**Interdependent Human Action**

Human actions range from the highly independent, to the dependent, to the highly interdependent. Remembering my purse as I go out the door in the morning is mostly *independent* of the beliefs and actions of others. Many global development and public health problems lie on the more independent side of the spectrum, and hundreds of millions of lives have been saved or improved by policies and programs intended to solve problems of independent action.² A default assumption is of an individual behavior that can be changed by some intervention. An individual needs better health, education, or physical security, for example, and a program provides information or other services that satisfy the need. Such interventions are of great importance. However, significant barriers exist to reaching the most deprived populations and many barriers, such as discrimination and exclusion, are of a social nature and are not fully resolved by the provision of services. Moreover, there are other problems such as the fear to report acts of sexual aggression that are almost purely of a social nature. Policies and programs that work well to resolve harmful independent human actions may not work well to resolve harmful interdependent human actions. These problems require attention to the actions and beliefs of most people in the reference group and can be more easily understood and more effectively addressed from a social-norms perspective.

³Interventions such as outside agencies draining swamps and killing mosquitoes in order to control disease is a change in the nonsocial environment having little or nothing to do with either the independence or interdependence of choices by individuals among the benefitting population.

Global development policy and programs are quite cognizant of one kind of *dependent* action: the *diffusion of innovations* (Rogers 2003). This line of research originated in the study of the diffusion of the adoption of hybrid corn in the state of Iowa in the USA during the 1930s. A few farmers were early adopters, many farmers were middle adopters, and a few farmers were later adopters. An early adopter plants new seed corn and gets good results. One of his neighbors observes that the first farmer got good results, tries it himself, and also gets good results. Further farmers observe those good results, and try it out themselves. Plotting cumulative adoption of the new corn over a dozen years yields the familiar S-Curve.
shown in the graph: adoption starts out slow, accelerates towards the middle, and then decelerates as adoption becomes widespread. The phenomenon is illustrated in a current news report on a USAID agricultural program in Malawi: “We saw others irrigate last year and were successful, while we didn’t irrigate and went hungry….So, this year, we decided to irrigate” (Kristof, July 11, 2012).

Adoption of hybrid corn is a matter of one-way dependence. My neighbor adopted hybrid corn. I saw that he got good results, so I tried it too. The neighbor did not adopt it because I adopted it. Since hybrid corn gets good results, I would not abandon the planting of hybrid corn if my pioneering neighbor stopped planting it. The diffusion of innovations approach is highly developed and widely applied, for good reason, but it almost always assumes one-way dependence. Another type of dependence is recognized in a systems approach to health behavior change. If the goal is to promote healthy eating behavior, for example, a change agent should take into account whether someone else shops for the food, or cooks the food, for the intended change client (Michie, Atkins, and West 2014, 30).

Compare adoption of hybrid corn to an example of two-way interdependence. If my friend and I benefit from meeting one another regularly, then we would want to coordinate the time and place of our meeting. Our practice is to meet for lunch the first Monday of every month at Arjun’s Lassi Shop. I go to Arjun’s every first Monday because I expect my friend to be there, and my friend goes because he expects me to be there. He goes because I go, I go because he goes. If he didn’t show up at our monthly meeting, I’d be disappointed, and if he stopped going, I would stop going.

Many-way interdependence is illustrated by a local farmers’ cooperative that has a fixed meeting every three months on the first Saturday, at its office, where matters important to business success are discussed and decided. Each farmer goes because he or she expects most others to go. The regular meeting could just as easily be held at some other time or place, and those could be changed, but for now the convention of every three months on the first Saturday at the office stands; that is what everyone expects.

We will further illustrate the distinction between more independent and more interdependent action with two stylized development examples (the point is not to make empirical claims, please just accept the stipulations). Adoption of oral rehydration therapy (ORT), which has saved so many lives, is a good example of a process of one-way dependence. ORT, a simple mix of clean water, sugar, and salt in the right proportions, is an effective way to save children from death by dehydration as a result of chronic diarrhea. One observes that one’s neighbor adopted it and it worked well, or hears from credible health care workers that it’s a good idea, or finds media messages about its beneficial consequences believable, and adopts it. Similarly, I use ORT because I learned it from my neighbor who already uses it. However, my pioneering neighbor uses it because she has found it to be effective, not because I learned it from her.3

3 This is an oversimplification for the sake of drawing a sharp contrast. There are several different obstacles to ORT adoption, among them socially shared causal beliefs about diarrhea and dehydration, and surely in some settings interdependencies of choice. However, the prominence of social marketing in ORT programs suggests that the mechanisms of diffusion proposed in the text are prominent in many settings.
In the next Figure, we show the cumulative change in attitude towards ORT, and the cumulative change in practice. Attitude changes gradually in the group, and practice trails attitude.

![Graph: More Independent Action Adoption of Oral Rehydration Therapy](image)

Community adoption of latrine usage to decrease the incidence of disease is a good example of strong many-way interdependence. Poor sanitation is recognized as a major human-rights problem that needlessly kills millions of people and in many places provision of latrines and even of subsidies for using them, has not prompted wide-scale sustained uptake. Community-led total sanitation (CLTS, Kar and Chambers 2008) and community action for total sanitation (CATS, UNICEF 2009) are programs which mobilize whole communities to shift from a regularity where individuals defecate in the open, to a new social norm of community-wide latrine usage, involving community discussion and decision, plan of action, and plan of enforcement.

Some attribute the dramatic successes of CLTS to the virtues of participatory method. Yet there are features of the situation – namely the **interdependent** nature of the problem – which have at least as much if not more to do with the dramatic change. Unless almost all in the community shift to consistent latrine usage, the benefits of disease and death reduction would not be realized. Any individual acting alone to build a latrine would incur a cost for no benefit; only if nearly all comply would each individual benefit. Each individual may be materially tempted to let everyone but himself make the change. Thus, an individual must come to believe either that compliance with the new norm is a legitimate expectation of others who comply, or believe that some others in the community would punish noncompliance or reward compliance with the new norm. In addition, to be a lone adopter exposes one to the ridicule of others. If all adopt, then ridicule would shift to lone open-defecators.
Attitude towards community adoption of latrine usage might shift cumulatively over some period of time. Due to the necessity of coordinated shift however, the behavior of adopting latrine usage would be delayed until most are ready to change and most decide to change, and then would onset rapidly. Moreover, after the shift to a new norm and its associated sanctions, some with a negative attitude towards latrine usage may nevertheless adopt it. This is shown in the following Figure.

More Interdependent Action
Shift to Community Latrine Usage

Personal belief or attitude differs from social norm. A program could seek to change individual attitudes towards use of oral rehydration therapy. One kind of program could persuade each individual of its advantages; another kind of program could persuade some individuals in the community of its advantages on the expectation that others in the community would learn from the first adopters.

Matters are different with community latrine usage. In a community without latrines, an individual could have a favorable attitude towards their use yet lack the motivation to be the only one to adopt. In a community with a social norm of latrine usage, an individual’s personal attitude could be unfavorable to their use, yet because of the social norm he would adopt. To reiterate, changing only personal attitudes is not sufficient for community latrine adoption. An engagement must also work to change the social expectations of enough group members culminating in a coordinated behavioral change among enough members of the group.

The Theory of Interdependent Action (Game Theory)

Game theory is a method to describe, understand, and explain interdependent human action. The choice made by one player depends on the choice of the second player, whose choice depends, in turn, on the choice of the first. In a larger group, the choice of each

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4 As Janine Schooley of Project Concern International pointed out to Mackie.
depends on the choice of all. The structure of such interdependence can be different in different situations.

Simple game theory systematizes and clarifies intuitions known to all humans about interdependent actions (Schelling 1960, Wydick 2008). Its apparatus can be initially unfamiliar and confusing. Once one becomes comfortable with this way of thinking, insights into social patterns are sharpened.

What is important to know is that game theory can distinguish among different structures of interdependent action, depending on how the several people involved rank the value of alternative actions. Game-theoretic analysis shows that in some circumstances interacting humans find themselves in an equilibrium state from which no individual has an incentive to deviate – even if that equilibrium state does not yield the best outcomes for the people involved. This is of great interest, because it helps us understand how a harmful practice can exist and be stable. It allows us to see that the practices that exist are not necessarily the best practices that could exist.

Here, two “games” of special interest will be explained in story terms. In a coordination game, it is in most people’s interest to coordinate on one way of doing something or on another way of doing it (e.g., Schelling 1960). We can all coordinate on driving on the right-hand side of the road, or on driving on the left-hand side of the road. All-left and all-right are each a pure equilibrium, meaning that for those born into a country where all drive on the left, there is no motivation for any individual acting alone to switch to driving on the right.

One faces the coordination problem anew each time one takes to the road, and as the problem is repeated, drivers rapidly come to expect others to coordinate on the same equilibrium as they did last time. A history of people in a reference group coming to expect its members to coordinate on one equilibrium over another in a repeated coordination game is called a convention (Lewis 1969). Conventions can be a matter of indifference, or one convention can be better for everyone than another worse convention, and people can be trapped by their history in the worse convention. This was so for the Swedes, who were trapped in the convention of driving on the left, even as transportation connections to the rest of right-driving continental Europe increased. Every Swede would be better off driving on the right, but they could only do so by all changing at once.

In a social dilemma the situation is different (e.g. Ostrom 1990). The so-called tragedy of the commons is an instance of a social dilemma (which is what we call the many-person version of the more familiar two-person prisoners’ dilemma).\(^5\) Suppose that we share a common fishery, and for the moment that we have no moral, social, or legal influence over one another. All are better off when each Cooperates on a limited catch, the total not exceeding the sustainable limits of the fishery. In the absence of any regulation,

\(^5\) For information on the prisoners’ dilemma, see the entry at [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner’s_dilemma](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner’s_dilemma), and for more detail see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry at [plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/).
however, each is tempted to overfish, or to Defect. The one equilibrium choice in the game is for all to overfish. No individual would deviate from the equilibrium choice of Defect, but all would be better off if each Cooperated.

Another example, already discussed, is community adoption of latrine usage. Each is better off Cooperating on community-wide latrine usage. In the absence of any regulation, however, each is tempted not to install and not to use a latrine, that is, to Defect. The one equilibrium choice in the game is for all not to install and not to use. In overfishing, or in latrine adoption, when positive social sanctions make the cooperative choice worthwhile, or negative social sanctions make the temptation to defect not worthwhile, or a when there is the belief that choosing to Cooperate if others do is the right thing to do, the situation transforms into a coordination game, adding a new equilibrium of mutual Cooperation to coordinate upon.

It could be important for policy and program purposes to understand how these two types of interdependent action differ. In a situation that is originally a coordination game, change from an old convention in equilibrium to a new convention in equilibrium is stable with no further regulation. Once the Swedes switch to driving on the right, excepting some initial confusion, an individual has no reason to switch back to driving on the left. It is sustainable with no further effort. But in a situation that is originally a social dilemma, it is in each person’s narrow interest not to take part in Cooperative choice. Thus, change to a better new equilibrium requires ongoing moral, social, or legal regulation to be sustained.

The Study of Social Norms

This subsection quickly reviews the history of the study of social norms, and briefly presents some contemporary theories of norms which development practitioners may have encountered in their training or work. These theories arose in different intellectual traditions and use different terminologies, but converge on the three elements we introduced earlier: social expectations (beliefs about what others do and beliefs about what others think one should do); in a reference group; maintained by social influence, chiefly the approval and disapproval of others. In Appendix II. we provide an extensive table comparing the social-norms definitions of 17 authorities in economics, law, philosophy, political science, public health, social psychology, and sociology, accompanied by discussion. Definitions vary greatly in terminology, but most surveyed refer to some or many of the same set of elements.

Social norms are mentioned throughout the historical record, beginning with the ancient Greeks. They distinguished between nature, physis, that which is common everywhere, and convention, nomos, that which varies from place to place. Montaigne’s (1993/1592 122-139) 16th-century essay on custom reports that, “There are countries...where womanhood is rated so low that they kill the girls who are born there and buy women from their neighbors when they need them;...where it is the men who carry things on their heads and the women who carry them on their shoulders;...where the women wear copper shin-guards on their legs;...where they circumcise females;...where they let all their hair grow on the left of the their body and keep all the other side
shaven; ... For the Rule of rules, and the Law of laws, is that each should observe those of the place wherein he lives.”

In the mid-20th century sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951) dominated social science. His theory conceived of societies as if they were individual organisms which function to survive and reproduce. He assumed that all social norms function for the benefit of society, and he explained observed social regularities as being due to social norms, with little explanation of what social norms are, how they work, and how they change. His structural-functionalist theory fell into disuse.

A new approach to social norms emerged from economist Thomas Schelling’s reorientation of game theory (1960, 1978), which generated bounteous hypotheses for the explanation of regularities in human action. Peyton Young (2008) summarizes the approach as follows: “Social norms are customary rules of behavior that coordinate our interactions with others. Once a particular way of doing things becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because we prefer to conform to the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform (Schelling, 1960; Lewis, 1969).” This school of thought blossomed at the University of Chicago in the 1990s. 6 Gerry Mackie (1996), a graduate student at Chicago, applied Schelling’s ideas to the harmful practices of footbinding in China and female genital mutilation/cutting in Africa, arguing that what worked to end footbinding could be adapted to help end FGM/C.

Social-psychology carries on an independent tradition of the investigation of conformity, including social norms. Cialdini (and Trost 1998) is a leading social-psychological researcher of social norms. His investigations greatly enriched our understanding of the distinction between descriptive norms and injunctive norms. Humans have the goal of effective action, say Cialdini and Trost. One important way to do this is to rely on social proof, that is, in novel, ambiguous, or uncertain situations: do what others do (descriptive norm). When in Rome, do as the Romans do, the saying goes. Humans also have the goal of building and maintaining social relationships. Injunctive norms are constructed from one’s belief about what most people approve or disapprove of: do what others think one should do. Additionally, humans have the goal of managing self-concept, according to Cialdini and Trost. They follow personal norms, internally motivated, and consistent with one’s sense of self-worth.

Further, his focus theory of normative conduct hypothesizes that a norm – descriptive, injunctive, or moral – does not direct behavior unless made salient in the situation. According to Cialdini, norms activate behavior when they are salient, and if applicable norms conflict then the more salient norm governs. For example (among many other findings) making someone more self-aware reduces littering by people who have a strong personal norm against littering (by making the personal norm more salient); or hearing stories of people being sanctioned for littering reduced actual littering among

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those with either a strong or weak personal norm against littering (by making the injunctive norm more salient) (Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno 1991).

Ajzen and Fishbein in 1980 originated a theory of human action, including a theory of social norms, meant to account for the oft-observed gap between attitude and behavior. They revised it over decades, culminating in the Reasoned Action Approach (2010). A positive or negative personal attitude towards a behavior (attitude), a belief that relevant others believe one should or should not perform the behavior (subjective norm), and a belief that it is possible to perform it (perceived behavioral control) each make it more likely that the intention and then the behavior will occur. Originally, their subjective norm had only injunctive content, but in their latest work (2010), the subjective norm is split into a descriptive aspect and injunctive aspect, incorporating Cialdini’s insights.

Most conceptions of social norms include the idea that they have to do with one’s beliefs about others in the reference group. We called them social expectations. Fishbein and Ajzen’s subjective norm, for example, is perceived pressure to perform or not perform a given behavior (2010, 130); or the “the total set of accessible normative beliefs concerning the expectations of important referents” (http://people.umass.edu/aizen/sn.html). It is a subjective belief, in that one could mistakenly believe that others do perform a behavior or would approve or disapprove of it.

Indeed, another line of thought and practice from social psychology is based on the concept of pluralistic ignorance (Prentice and Miller 1993). Pluralistic ignorance means that many privately reject a group norm but mistakenly believe that many others accept the norm. Thus the norm is persistent and even publicly favored even though privately opposed. Pluralistic ignorance is a striking and memorable concept, but we caution against unthinking generalization. More typically in development settings harmful norms persist because people correctly believe that most others accept the norm. Pluralistic ignorance is most likely to be found in eras and settings of high mobility or rapid social change.
In public health, Lipinski and Rimal (2005) offer the construct **perceived norm**, roughly the same as what we call **social expectations** or what Fishbein and Ajzen call a **subjective norm**. **Perceived norm**, they say, is made up of subjective beliefs about prevalence of a norm (which they call a **descriptive norm**) and subjective beliefs about pressure to comply (which they call an **injunctive norm**). Storey and Schoemaker (2006) adapted and modified Lipinski and Rimal in an applied analysis of DHS data on contraception in Egypt. The perceived norm is operationalized as 1) **collective behavioral norm** (a proxy for perceived descriptive norm), the prevalence of a behavior as aggregated from individual reports and 2) **collective attitudinal norm** (a proxy for perceived injunctive norm), the prevalence of personal attitudes, aggregated from individual reports. Aggregating individual behaviors and attitudes is not the same as aggregating what subjects believe about others, but it could be a useful proxy when, as with the DHS, norms data are limited.

The “social norms approach” and pluralistic ignorance

Perkins and Berkowitz (1986) found that American college students believe that their peers drink alcohol more frequently and in greater amounts than they actually do, and that their peers are more tolerant of alcohol abuse than they actually are. They suggested that if an alcohol education program credibly corrected such pluralistic ignorance, average consumption would decline in the reference group. Thus was born what its creators call the “social norms approach” to campus binge drinking (and other health and justice issues). The education program presents accurate information about the frequency of alcohol use among peers and about their attitudes to abuse; predicting that corrected perception of the descriptive norm would motivate lowered consumption. Results are mixed (Wechsler et al., 2003; DeJong et al. 2006). Schultz et al. (2007) suggest an explanation for instances of no program effect: over-reliance on descriptive norm. They did a study which showed that providing true information about average household electricity use in the community caused those above the descriptive norm to use less, but those below the norm to use more, yielding no net change in community use. Adding an injunctive message (a smiley face for low users and frowny face for high users) to the descriptive message did work to lower community energy usage.
Resemblance of Some Social Norms Theories Mentioned in Development Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Norm:</th>
<th>Theorist:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One's beliefs about others in the reference group</td>
<td>What they do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cialdini</td>
<td>Descriptive norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajzen &amp; Fishbein</td>
<td>Subjective norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipiniski &amp; Rimal; Storey &amp; Schoemaker</td>
<td>Perceived norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicchieri</td>
<td>Social expectations</td>
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Bicchieri (2006) has developed a theory of social norms drawing from both economic and social-psychological approaches, and she carries out an active program of human-subject research on norms. In recent years she has worked with UNICEF on social norms, applying in development contexts her definition of social norms. Bicchieri (formal, in 2006, 11; informal and quoted below, in Forthcoming, ch. 2) offers a definition of a social norm based on conditional preferences, empirical expectations, and normative expectations. Bicchieri’s (2006, 11) approach revises Cialdini’s distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms. The descriptive aspect is overhauled as the empirical expectations condition, and the injunctive aspect as the normative expectations condition. The expectations reformulations make it more vivid that a social norm is constructed from beliefs and desires of individuals in the reference group. One prefers to conform to a social norm conditional on empirical expectations and normative expectations.\(^7\) Bicchieri says that,

A norm is a behavioral rule that:
1. is known to exist and apply to a class of situations
2. is followed by individuals in a population if
   a. it is believed that sufficiently many others follow it (empirical expectations)
   b. it is believed that sufficiently many others believe the rule should be followed, and/or may be willing to sanction deviations from it (normative expectations)

Cialdini’s descriptive norm has to do with what we earlier called one-way dependence and will later explicate here as social proof, as in the example of adoption of hybrid seed corn in Iowa, USA. Bicchieri’s empirical expectations includes social proof, but also social

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\(^7\) Bicchieri’s full formal definition of social norm is reproduced in Appendix II.
convention (earlier called many-way interdependence, such as driving on the right side of the road).

Bicchieri’s normative expectations are differ somewhat from Cialdini’s injunctive norm. According to her definition, an individual believes that others have a right to expect conformity and the individual an obligation to conform, or an individual believes that some others in the reference group would sanction conformity and nonconformity. In contrast, Cialdini’s injunctive norm is indicated by one’s “perception of what most people approve or disapprove.” (Cialdini, Kallgren, Reno 1991). The possibility that a social norm can be held in place by beliefs about the legitimacy of others’ expectations of conformity is often omitted in both the economic and social-psychological traditions. Bicchieri believes that her definition of social norm in terms of empirical expectations, normative expectations, and conditional preference is more operational and more testable than alternative approaches.

An aside on social norms of group demarcation

Group identity is frequently offered as an explanatory cause for the presence and force of social practices. This would mean that one engages in practice $X$ because one identifies with group $Y$. Identification is some kind of cognitive or affective oneness with other members of the group.

But we must be careful not to confuse description with explanation. Someone speaking Italian is much more likely to be Italian than German. However, do Italians speak Italian because they want to mark themselves as different from the Germans, or do they speak Italian because they want to communicate and normally the people adjacent to them expect them to speak in Italian? Speaking Italian happens to serve as an ethnic marker, but normally that is not its purpose. Italian did not emerge and is usually not maintained for demarcation purposes.

In contrast, the markers of an American outlaw motorcycle gang -- the colors and other signs -- are adopted for the purpose of group demarcation. They are costly to obtain, and anyone who tried to fake them would be severely punished by group members. The markers declare a member’s loyalty to the group, and by group reputation declare to outsiders that harm to a marked member can be retaliated by other members of the group (adapted from Bicchieri 2006). To avoid confusion: One is frequently able to distinguish social groups by the obvious compliance of their members with one or more norms; however, one should not automatically assume that group demarcation is the reason for either the origin or maintenance of the norm.

Social Approval and Disapproval, and Other Social Influence

Approval or disapproval within a reference group often maintains a social norm. Facial expressions are a simple form of social approval or disapproval. Recall that in Schultz et
al.’s (2007) study a smiley face for low usage and a frowny face for high usage on the household electric bill reduced people’s energy consumption. From simple facial expressions we can move inward or outward. Moving outward, approval and disapproval become more conspicuous, including multiple modalities of expression – stance, gesture, emotion, utterance – and multiple modalities of action (and forebearance). The term sanction refers to both positive and negative expressions and actions, and includes admiration or contempt, verbal approval or disapproval, praise or rebuke, compliment or insult, prize or fine, promises of physical reward or threats of physical punishment, actual physical reward or punishment, and in the extreme threats of death or actual death, among other things. Those who do not comply can, for example, be gossiped about; can be forbidden from handling food or gathering firewood, denied adult status in the community; or can be considered impure or untouchable. Approval could rank an individual or a group above others and disapproval rank an individual or group below others; or could be an act of acceptance including someone equally in a group or an act of rejection excluding someone from a group of equals.

Compliance follows not so much from application of sanctions but more from anticipation of them. For example, one is motivated to comply if one believes that others will negatively sanction noncompliance; notice that in this situation one would comply even if one’s beliefs were false. If what a social norm commands is quite clear, and if each believes that negative sanctions would be quite strong, then we would never observe application of negative sanctions in the group: the norm is maintained by what people believe would happen if one did not comply although everyone in fact complies. Thus a social norm can exist and have force even when not behaviorally indicated by the application of sanctions.

An ethnographic study of a group of Bushmen found social norms, transgressions of those norms, and sanctions among them (Wiessner 2005). Praise or criticism of others was found in two-thirds of conversations; but 40% of criticisms were met with no visible response. Criticism was often initiated as joking, and “those who punished too easily or too harshly gained negative reputations.” Surprisingly, known slackers were not much subject to verbal punishment, but instead experienced “low social regard, fewer marriage opportunities, or fewer exchange partnerships.” This suggests that much social-normative regulation is subtle, shifting from light approval to light disapproval and back, or in quiet avoidance of future relationships with transgressors.

Moving inward, one could believe, even in the absence of overt sanctions by others, that others form covert attitudes of approval or disapproval towards one, and these beliefs about others could motivate one’s compliance with a social norm. Economists sometimes model norm compliance as instrumentally valued reputation: one values others’ approval (even covert) in the present because that approval will maintain or create benefit from cooperative transactions with them in the future.

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8 Here we are adapting with our own terminology ideas on esteem developed by Brennan and Pettit (2005), and McAdams (1997).
However, it is not unusual for one also to value intrinsically the approval or disapproval of certain others: not just those one knows face to face, but, for example, and depending on context, strangers generally, people like oneself, or one’s ancestors, deceased parents, or future generations. Intrinsic valuation of approval or disapproval can motivate one to comply even when there are no overt sanctions and no prospect of any relationship with referents in the future.

One could also accept that the expectations of others in the reference group are legitimate, for example that, if they comply, then compliance is due to them. A person could believe that a social obligation is owed to specific others who abide by the social obligation, but is not owed to others who do not abide by it. A strictly moral obligation is different: it is an action required regardless of what others expect or do.

**Typology of Reasons for Behavioral Regularities**

**Overview.** Understanding how observed regularities of action in a group differ from one another in their structure helps us understand how a practice works. If we better understand how practices work, we are better able to propose ways to change harmful ones, or to strengthen or create beneficial ones. The following table by Mackie, borrowing from prior literature including Bicchieri’s (2006) work, displays types of reasons for behavioral regularities.

Of course, reality is much fuzzier than this typology, especially because a specific human action may be motivated by more than one of these reasons. Nonetheless, these focused distinctions provide a useful starting point for categorizing observed regularities in human populations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPOLOGY OF REASONS FOR BEHAVIORAL REGULARITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Attitude</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One's favorable or unfavorable response to an object (independent of other's expectations).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| *I favor exclusive breastfeeding for infants in their first half-year.* | *As a tourist in London, when I exit the underground train I follow the locals to the exit.* | *...Of Coordination*  
I follow the rule of driving to the right because it is in my interest, and because others who would be harmed by my noncompliance would disapprove of me for putting them at risk. | *I do not rob petrol stations, because I respect the law, or I believe I may be punished by the state for doing so.* |
| **Population Regularity** | **...Of Coordination** | | |
| Individual response to a nonsocial constraint, or selection by a force outside the population. | *...Of Coordination*  
I follow the rule of driving to the right because it is in my interest, and because others who would be harmed by my noncompliance would disapprove of me for putting them at risk. | | |
| *On a hot sunny day, I stand in the shade, you stand in the shade, she stands in the shade.* | | | |
| **Moral Norm** | **...Of Cooperation** | | |
| Motivated by an inner conviction of right and wrong (moral norms are much less conditional on what others do or think one should do than are social norms). | *I cooperate in helping keep the village clean, even though tempted to shirk, because others join in the cleaning too, and others who would be harmed by my noncompliance would disapprove of me for not helping when others do.* | | |
Personal Attitude. A personal attitude is a latent disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to some object (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, p. 76), including one’s own action. One’s personal attitude towards one’s action can be independent of important others’ favorable or unfavorable responses. For example, one may favor an action, but refrain from doing it if it would be negatively sanctioned by others: personal inclination can be outweighed by social expectation. There are many theories of individual attitude and behavior change and they are widely applied.

Personal attitude versus social norm

Often one’s personal attitude, say about an action one favors, coincides with the social norm, what others in the group do and approve of one doing. A person might not even notice this coincidence unless, for some reason, she changes her personal attitude and discovers that she is constrained by a social norm that prevents the change in behavior she desires to undertake. Alternatively, a social norm could be adopted by a group, for example, fierce disapproval of drunk driving, that someone complies with even though he’d personally prefer the convenience of continuing to drive drunk. A paucity of explanations for attitude-behavior discrepancy motivated Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) to theorize and measure both personal attitude and social norm. This was once a controversial distinction among psychologists. However, an accumulation of evidence, including experimental evidence, more supports the view that attitude and norm are distinct entities. For example, it has been shown that some behaviors are more influenced by personal attitude, and other behaviors more influenced by social norm. The evidence is summarized by Trafimow (1998).

A recent study in cross-cultural psychology (Zou et al. 2009) provides evidence for the view that cultural consensus of a group is more a matter of what its members believe that others in the group believe than a matter of one’s personal attitude towards items in the cultural consensus. For example, Poles believed that Polish cultural values were more collectivist and Americans that theirs was less collectivist, although there was no difference between Poles and Americans in their relevant personal attitudes. And complying with a social norm activates different parts of the brain than does choosing according to personal attitude (Lieberman 2013, 85).

The term personal norm (Schwartz 1977) is one’s own judgment about whether one should or should not perform an action. It can include a prudential personal rule such as always to decline tequila (one’s own well-being) or a moral personal rule such as not to steal from others (the well-being of others). A personal norm is internally motivated, not externally motivated by the approval or disapproval of others (others may happen to approve or disapprove, but that is not what drives one’s action). A personal prudential rule includes such things as remembering to take one’s purse in the morning, or not relaxing until one’s chores are done. Some personal rules or habits not influenced by social expectations in a reference group, for example, a harmful health practice like a personal rule always to accept an offer of tequila may be of interest to change agents, but a social-
norms perspective has nothing to add to our understanding of behavior driven largely by personal attitude. A moral personal norm we call a \textit{moral norm}, which will be treated separately below.

\textbf{Population Regularity.} One usage of the word \textit{norm} is to refer to a statistical regularity, such as the average height of maize plants in Guatemala in 1949. Looking at human populations, we shall call it a \textit{population regularity}. A regularity is observed in some population, but it has little or nothing to do with the dependence of one individual’s beliefs and actions on the beliefs and actions of others.

The regularity is due to some \textit{cause external to the population}. For example, wherever one goes in the world, in the hot sun people seek shelter in the shade. Because each is observed seeking shade does not mean that each seeks shade because others do. A \textit{selection mechanism} can also cause a population regularity not due to dependence within the group. Students the India Institute of Technology study lots of mathematics. Mostly, they do not do so \textit{because} their fellow students do so (although they may be happy to be among their own kind). It is mostly because the admissions committee had reason to select students of this type.

In program contexts, many regularities observed in a population may be due to causes external to it that relate to something in the larger political, economic, or physical environment. For example, in an area where maternal health services are distant and costly, we may observe that the poorer stratum of the population gives birth at home rather than in the health center. The primary reasons for this may be the distance of the health center, or the cost of the transportation or of the health service. As is done by most programs, \textit{changing those regularities requires addressing these causes external to the population of interest}.

A social cause could also be relevant. Perhaps important people in the community believe that birth should continue to take place at home with traditional birth attendants and would negatively sanction those who would seek to give birth in the health center. Perhaps people in the poorer stratum believe they would be given poor or no treatment if they sought care at the health center. Then, we would also seek to change the cause internal to the population.

\textbf{Social Proof (One-Way Empirical).} This is a one-way dependent action, as in our earlier discussion of the diffusion of innovations, like the adoption of oral rehydration therapy. A tourist to London, using the underground train, doesn’t need to know what route to take to exit the station. She can just follow everyone else, on the assumption that they know where they’re going. Some people are part of a regularity because each expects some others to do so (the tourists, relying on the locals), but some of those others are part of it for reasons other than expecting others to do so (the locals, who already know which way to go).

Why would a person do what others do? We are not proposing a general disposition to conform, or some instinct to imitate. Humans do imitate, better than do other animals including their ape cousins, but from an early age they imitate \textit{selectively} (Hurley and
Chater 2005). When a person does what others do, we should always look for the reasons. Cialdini (and Trost 1998, 152) calls one kind of reason a social proof: in a novel, ambiguous, or uncertain situation, do what others do. For example, the aggregation of many opinions may be more accurate than a single expert opinion. On the television game show, Who Wants to be a Millionaire?, a stumped contestant can choose to consult either an expert friend or the audience. Friends are right two-thirds of the time, the audience is right nine out of ten times (Page 2007, 182).

Depending on the context, one might copy those in proximity, those in similar situations, those with similar characteristics, or similar in some other relevant way; and one might copy the most frequent action, or copy the most successful actors (Boyd and Richerson 2005, 58-97). Many social practices of interest to development policy and programs are of this type. The theory, techniques, measurement methods, and program experiences of the diffusion of innovations approach apply (Rogers 2003).

This type of behavioral regularity is made in part by the one-way empirical expectations of some of its members and is thus weakly social. To change that regularity, one would seek to credibly provide better information to individuals in the group; often, for the sake of efficiency, one would provide that information to early adopters of innovation who would trigger its diffusion further through the group. The positive deviance approach works to make beneficial innovators in the group salient to the remainder of the group (Pascale, Sternin, and Sternin 2010).

In social-proof circumstances, change in attitude and behavior can be gradual through the group. Next, we turn to more strongly social practices, usually more resistant to behavioral change.

Social Norm of Coordination (Many-Way Empirical and Many-Way Normative). Social proof is one-way dependent. A social convention is multi-way interdependent. In Thailand one drives on the left because one believes others will drive on the left, and others drive on the left because they believe one will drive on the left. A reason why someone would do what others do is if they all had a sufficiently common interest, such as to avoid collision. Usually, there is more than one way to pursue a common interest. By coordinating with one another on one way of pursuing that common interest, each does better than if they fail to coordinate. Recall that the history of people in a group coming to expect its members to coordinate on one equilibrium over another in a repeated coordination game is called a convention.

If people have an interest in communicating with one another, they can satisfy that interest by coordinating on speaking the same language. We could call the furry creature that catches mice either a cat or un gatto, so long as we coordinate on the name. If we don’t coordinate on a name we fail to communicate. We can coordinate on U.S. dollars or on dentalium shells as a medium of exchange; if we can’t coordinate on a currency, then we are worse off, having to engage in less efficient barter in order to exchange goods. In these examples, it’s in each individual’s interest to comply. At first glance, there seems to be no normative component to these social conventions. Some authorities (e.g., Brennan et al.
2013) sharply distinguish social conventions from social norms, on the grounds that a convention is about what others do (descriptive, empirical), and not about what others think one should do (injunctive, normative). We agree with Burke and Young (2011) that, “there are numerous gradations and levels of response to norm violation that make this dichotomy problematic.” Thus, we invoke and expand on Ullman-Margalit’s (1977) distinction between social norms of coordination and social norms of cooperation.

Keeping to the left or keeping to the right when driving is the most commonly discussed example of a social convention. One has a strong interest in doing what others do in order to avoid one’s injury or death. The usual discussion omits the social and moral aspects of this rule, however. If the convention is to drive to the right, then driving on the left endangers both the self and others. Surely, many individuals would believe it is legitimate for others to expect them to avoid endangering others, and also many would disapprove and some would negatively sanction someone endangering others by driving on the left for no good reason. Breaching a social convention of mutual interest provokes social and moral reactions as two conditions apply:

- The more regular the convention is, within and between people, the more one is reasonably entitled to rely on it.

- The greater the expected value of loss to others from failing to follow the convention.

Further, although the ideal model assumes for convenience that all in the reference group have a perfect interest to coordinate on an expected convention, in reality some individuals defy the convention. Their failure could be due to weakness of will, negligence, perversity, ignorance of the convention, or even not sharing in the common purpose. Such individuals could be persuaded to comply by the disapproval of others including negative sanctions. In Mackie’s hometown, a well-known business person was convicted for driving north for 38 miles in the southbound lanes of the freeway; he was legally sanctioned but he was also the object of public contempt and social ostracism.9

Sometimes one way of pursuing a common purpose is as good as any other way. Sometimes one way of doing it is better for almost everyone than another way of doing it. Sweden was the only country in continental Europe to drive on the left. Over time, road, bridge, and ferry connections increased with the rest of Europe. Before the increase in connections, whether Sweden had a convention of driving on the left or driving on the right was a matter of indifference: either would do. After the increase in connections, it would be a better convention for all to drive on the right. To shift from an old convention to a new one, enough members of the group must believe that enough members of the group will coordinate on the new convention. As the change from left to right becomes more socially feasible, the more people accept the legitimacy of a proposed convention

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shift, and the more people would have reason to approve of those who are ready to change to driving on the right, and disapprove of those not ready to make a change. Additionally, upon the convention shift from left to right, there would be moral and social reactions to those who fail to keep to the new right-driving convention.

Mackie (1996) argued that footbinding in China was, and female genital mutilation/cutting in Africa is in many groups, a social convention. Generally (with significant exceptions), completing the action means that the daughter will be marriageable, and foregoing the action means that she is unmarriageable. Just as speech and writing has conventional meaning, an action can have a conventional meaning. When an action has conventional meaning to others in the reference group, standing for something valued by those in the group, such as politeness, virginity, marriageability, equal respect, or courage; not to perform the action means impoliteness, harlotry, unmarriageability, disrespect, or cowardice, regardless of the nonperformer’s intention or the truth about her. One failing to comply with a convention that stands for something valuable in the reference group conveys a meaning that would elicit disapproval including negative sanctions from others.

Social conventions are often social norms of coordination: when others rely on the convention and noncompliance would harm them, when shifting to a better convention, and when an action stands for something that is valuable to the group.

**Social Norm of Cooperation (Many-Way Empirical and Many-Way Normative).** Another reason why one would do what others do is if one has reason to reciprocate positive action with positive action or negative action with negative action. In some interdependent situations (exemplified by the social dilemma) one may cooperate if and only if one expects enough others to cooperate, or cooperate now in response to others’ past acts of cooperation. One would do one’s fair share if one believes others would. My cooperation is conditional on yours, yours is conditional on mine.

In the social dilemma, the original interests of the parties are such that each is motivated to Defect even though all would be better off to Cooperate. The empirical expectations and normative expectations that compose a social norm can be sufficient to motivate a cooperative choice by all. One expects that a) enough others Cooperate, and b) that enough others believe that one should Cooperate (and that their expectations are legitimate, that others would sanction, or both). This transforms the game from a social dilemma to a coordination game. In the resulting coordination game there is now a better equilibrium (All Cooperate) and a worse one (All Defect).

This type of behavioral regularity is made up of normative and empirical expectations among many members of the group. It is strongly social and it is a social norm. Suppose that in a community there is a social norm of using violence to discipline children. Most individuals do use corporal punishment, and most individuals believe one should use it to discipline children. **To change that social norm, one would seek to change the normative and empirical expectations among enough members of the community.** They would need to believe that enough members of the community now believe that one
should not use violence to discipline children (because it is right, there are positive sanctions for compliance and negative sanctions for noncompliance, or both), and that enough members of the community do use non-violent forms of discipline.

**Legal Norms.** Social norms exist relative to some reference group, are informal, often implicit, and enforceable by approval and disapproval. Legal norms are commanded by the state, formal, often explicit, and legitimately enforceable by coercion. Important reasons for obeying a legal command are belief in the legitimacy of the authority (respect for the law), and the authority’s negative sanctions such as fines and imprisonment. The literature mostly neglects that in a country there can be strong *social* norms of general or particular legal obedience, or strong *social* norms of general or particular legal disobedience. If there were a strong social norm of legal disobedience, most individuals could think it morally right to eschew corruption, could prefer general probity, and could even fear punishment for engaging in corruption, but would engage in corruption anyway because it is the only way to obtain necessities of life in circumstances where most people expect transactions involving the state to be corrupt. The change of legal norms by citizens, elites, or international organizations is outside the scope of this essay. How to better enforce legal norms can have social aspects, which we discuss in the subsection below on harmonization of norms.

**Moral Norms.** When is an attitude a personal norm and when is it a moral norm? Appiah (2006, 21) informally contrasts a *taste*, what one wants, with a *value*, what one wants and wants everyone else to want. One might have a taste for ski vacations, and value governments that uphold the rights of their citizens. One follows a moral norm because one believes it is right to do so, conscience requires it. Social norms are more conditional on the beliefs and actions of others and moral norms are much less conditional. One tends to follow a moral norm regardless of one’s beliefs about what others do or think one should do. Nado, Kelly and Stich (2009) summarize the views of Turiel and his coworkers, on the difference between the moral and what we here call the social, as follows:

- Moral rules are held to have an objective, prescriptive force; they are not dependent on the authority of any individual or institution.
- Moral rules are taken to hold generally, not just locally; they not only proscribe behavior here and now, but also in other countries and at other times in history.
- Violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been subject to an injustice.
- Violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of social rules.

Yes, one learns many moral norms socially: through doing what others do and through wanting the approval of others. And the action commanded by a moral norm is usually one that is done by others and is approved of by others. One is internally motivated to comply with a moral norm, however, even if others do not comply or even if others are indifferent or disapproving of compliance. In a neural imaging study of people hearing vignettes of moral and social transgressions, a strong neural response to a moral transgression was present whether or not an audience was imagined, but a strong response to a social transgression was present only when an audience was imagined (Finger et al. 2006).
Turiel (2002) studied schoolchildren who, for example, said it was impermissible to pull a schoolmate’s hair whether or not that act was against the school rules (moral); but impermissible to chew gum in a school with a rule against it and permissible to chew gum in a school with no rule against it (social).

**Changing a harmful moral norm** is not easy. One way is to show that an action thought to fall under a reigning moral norm actually does not. Footbinding in China fulfilled the moral norm *always do best for one's child* when the population expected the social norm of footbinding to mean that a girl is suitable for marriage. After it was discovered that an intramarrying group could coordinate on abandonment of footbinding, to do so retained both the girl’s marriageability and her natural feet, which would do even better for one’s child. Another way is to show that a harmful moral norm is outweighed by a more important moral norm or larger web of such norms. For example, suppose there is a moral norm that prohibits husband violence against the wife unless it is for the good of the family. Perhaps new understandings in the community of peace, security, and equality would motivate revision of the norm so as to prohibit violence altogether (Cislaghi, Gillespie, and Mackie 2014).

**Religious Norms.** Religious norms are distinctive because of their reference to divine command, but otherwise they function as social, legal, or moral norms. A religious norm can be a social norm, held in place by empirical and normative expectations and informally enforced; or can be a legal norm, held in place by the formal enforcement of a religious or state authority; or can be a moral norm motivated by conscience.

**Harmonization of Moral, Social, and Legal Norms.** Carefully distinguishing among moral, social, and legal norms can be important for program design and measurement. For example, a baseline survey carried out by Project Concern International for USAID in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (Parker and Makhubele, 2010) disclosed the following moral norms. Only a small percentage of male and female respondents think it is okay for a husband to hit his wife over a disagreement; most think this would be bad for the children to see, and there are further findings showing that people report the belief that such violence is morally wrong. There are empirical expectations of normality, however: about half of respondents say that men in this community often hit their girlfriends. If the data correctly reflect reality, the challenge here is social, not moral. A program engagement could appeal to widely held moral beliefs in order to motivate creation of new social norms supporting community regulation of spousal violence. This would be the harmonization of an existing moral norm with a new social norm that would better realize the moral norm.

In Senegal, a legal norm prohibiting FGM/C is not strong enough on its own to end the practice, but strengthens the new social norm of no cutting adopted by some communities (UNFPA-UNICEF, 2010). Where this happens, legal norm and social norm are in harmony.

In the 1990s Bogotá, Colombia was one of the most violent cities in the world. An innovative municipal administration, led by mayor Antanas Mockus, designed a Citizenship Culture program based in large part on the idea of the harmonization of moral, social, and
legal norms. Mockus distinguishes three regulatory systems, and the main reasons to obey in each. The following table is an adaptation of his scheme (e.g., Mockus 2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legal Norms</th>
<th>Moral Norms</th>
<th>Social Norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Reasons</strong></td>
<td>Legitimacy of authority, respect for the law</td>
<td>Good conscience</td>
<td>Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Reasons</strong></td>
<td>Authority's penalties</td>
<td>Bad conscience</td>
<td>Disapproval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A typical emotion in a violator</strong></td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>Shame</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The idea is to agree, under conditions of political pluralism, on a few basic moral norms. For enhancing citizen culture in Bogotá it was: human life is sacred. Legal norms should reflect the moral norms, that is their main purpose. Social norms should support correct moral and legal norms. For example, in Bogotá, many did not obey traffic laws, and in part of the population there was a social norm of legal disobedience: one should not follow the law and those who did were looked down upon. In that context, adopting harsher legal penalties for traffic violations would have made no difference. Instead the city government made vivid to the public that traffic regulation is meant to reduce injury and death (moral conscience). In the city center, a corps of mimes ridiculed traffic violators (social disapproval). Hundreds of thousands of thumbs-up (social approval) and thumbs-down (social disapproval) cards were distributed to drivers who used them to manifest their approval or disapproval of the actions of other drivers. Normative expectations about traffic compliance changed, and as they did, injuries and fatalities went down. As injuries and fatalities went down, the city publicized the fact, changing empirical expectations in the population, leading to further decline. Due to a number of such initiatives respect for the law increased. Compliance with law generally and with specific laws can be motivated by moral and social reasons, as well as by anticipation of the state’s material rewards and punishments.

**Other Shared Beliefs**

A harmful social practice is held in place by a web of beliefs, attitudes, social expectations, and actions, within the individual and within her group. Schema theory in psychology seeks to describe and explain these webs (themselves strongly, weakly, or not at all connected to other schemas, for example, as FGM/C is connected to female gender). Schemas are called cultural models or personal constructs in other research traditions. Schemas organize one’s knowledge about objects and events, other people, and oneself. People have three kinds of beliefs (Adolphs 2009), about:
• the nonsocial environment, objective beliefs, for example, that a tree exists or the sky is blue, how to grow the best millet, or how bodies work and what causes disease

• the social environment, intersubjective beliefs, what one believes about the minds of others, their beliefs, desires, and their actions

• the self, subjective beliefs, what one believes about one’s own mind, one’s own beliefs, desires, intentions, and one’s conception of oneself

A harmful social practice can be caused, in whole or in part, by harmful false beliefs about the nonsocial world. FGM/C, for example, is in part maintained by such beliefs: immediate health harms of cutting are caused by bad spirits, uncut girls would become promiscuous and disobedient, uncut girls would not be able to bear children, would become both unmarried and pregnant, would end up prostitutes, or would have a bad odor, or that to mention the practice would bring death (Mackie 2009).

Beliefs are formed roughly in one of three ways:¹⁰

• by personal experience, direct perception, observation

• by reflection, forms of inference such as deduction, induction, analogy, dissonance reduction

• by testimony, social proof (as an information shortcut to believe what others believe), inherited tradition, credible authority, divine revelation

The elements of a schema are more or less coherent, and schemas are more or less in networks of coherence with one another. Coherence, or dissonance reduction, is one source of belief formation and maintenance. Testimony is another.

Because it is a comparatively immediate source of knowledge checkable by others we tend to think that most of our beliefs about the nonsocial world are based on direct experience. But many of those beliefs are based on the testimony of others: the height of Mt. Everest, that the Milky Way is made of stars, that viruses cause colds. Very few of us have made the observations or worked through the inferences that establish such beliefs; instead we accept as credible the testimony of certain individuals, institutions or just people in general. One knows by direct experience her immediate environment, but beyond that no one has the resources to investigate every question anew. Thus, much knowledge is acquired by social proof: one believes what others believe, one does what others do, one inherits the beliefs and practices of one’s cultural settings. Relying on social proof is rational in novel, ambiguous, or uncertain situations (Cialdini and Trost 1998).

¹⁰ Collating similar categories from traditional Hindu epistemology (Rajah 2014); the Anglo-American philosophy of belief (Steup 2005); the sociology of belief formation, Rydgren (2009); and the social psychology of Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 221-222).
In our highly simplified model, a belief about the nonsocial world upheld by social proof and coherence can be overcome only by direct experience, more credible testimony, or both. The story of the positive deviance approach as first applied to child malnutrition in Vietnam is a good example of both. Foreign food aid was not a sustainable solution to the postwar malnutrition crisis. The Sternins recruited the participation of the whole community in weighing children under three, and found that two-thirds were underweight. Newly formed village health committees of self-selected members conducted focus groups throughout the area, but more importantly visited and observed the practices of very poor families with better-nourished children. These families did not well know what they did differently, but the committee investigators saw what they did differently. They added locally inappropriate foods to rice (sweet potato leaves, shrimp and crabs from the paddies), washed children’s hands more frequently, and fed three to four times a day rather than the traditional two. This minority deviated from local practices but in a beneficial (positive) way. The observed actions of a local minority were more credible to the larger community than the messages of an external change agent.

The Sternins encouraged community members to design a program that would help families with malnourished children form groups to learn the new practices. The Sternins later summarized this experience with the principle: “It’s easier to act your way into a new way of thinking, than to think your way into new way of acting.” Another important factor in attaining sustained change was for people to see the results of their new behaviors. Every two weeks the members of a learning group would together weigh their babies and chart their growth; and village-wide weight-monitoring sessions were held every two months. Credible testimony and direct experience, in the framework of public action and discussion, overcame past practices that had contributed to malnutrition in a time of food shortage. One of the peasants remarked, “A thousand hearings aren’t worth one seeing, and a thousand seeings aren’t worth one doing.”

Beliefs about the nonsocial environment originating in social proof are resistant to change because it’s reasonable to believe that what many people believe is more likely to be true than what a few people believe. The social-proof presumption can be overcome, however, by credible testimony or direct experience; and an individual can change a belief on her own. Also, harmful false beliefs held in place by social proof can be changed from one person to the next through the group as people see the benefits of a change. Social norms are even more resistant to change because it can be quite difficult for any one individual to abandon an interdependent social norm on her own.

Harmful practices, we said at the beginning of the essay, originated in and are maintained by many causes. Among them are beliefs about the nonsocial world; beliefs about the social world – about what others do and approve of – that constitute social norms; and beliefs about the self. A crucial belief about the self is individual self-efficacy or collective self-efficacy: whether I have or we have the capacity and autonomy to enact change. In order change harmful nonsocial beliefs or social norms people have to believe that they can do so. Increased self-efficacy is often a program goal and its change is often measured.
Review

These points can be simplified. From the game-theoretic tradition, when we observe a regularity of action in a group, we know to ask whether an individual’s action is:

- Independent of the beliefs, desires, and actions of others, or
- One-way dependent on the beliefs and actions of others, or
- Many-way interdependent with the beliefs, desires, and actions of others

From the social-psychological tradition we know to ask:

- What are the descriptive (empirical) aspects of a norm? (What do others do?)
- What are the injunctive (normative) aspects of a norm? (What do others approve or disapprove of)

From the philosophical elaborations of the game-theoretic tradition, we know to ask:

- What are an individual’s beliefs about what others in the reference group do (empirical) and her beliefs about what others believe one should do (normative)?

From norms-change efforts at large scale, we know to ask:

- How do moral, social, and legal norms influence the individual? Are the different regulatory systems in harmony or conflict?

From social epistemology we know to ask:

- Is a social practice maintained by shared beliefs in the group about the nonsocial world?
- Is it maintained by shared social expectations in the social world, a social norm?
- Is it maintained by people’s beliefs about their inability to change the practice?

Measurement of change in individuals’ independent actions could be as simple as counting up how many engage in the harmful behavior before and after the program intervention. To identify interdependent social norms and measure the progress of their change, however, requires inquiry into an individual’s desires and their beliefs about others, a more demanding task. In the next section we offer ideas on how to do so.
III. How to Measure Social Norms

How to identify an individual’s attitude and behavior and their change with respect to an independent action is easier and much more well established than how to measure individuals’ changes in social expectations with respect to interdependent change within a group. It is difficult to identify social norms and measure change in them from behavioral observations alone. Rather, we have to measure beliefs, individuals’ beliefs about who the reference group is, beliefs about what others do, and beliefs about what others approve of.

**Behavioral Observations.** Generally, for purposes of measurement, observations of actual behaviors are preferable to individuals’ reports of desires and beliefs. A change in population regularity can be identified after it occurs by behavioral observation. However, it is difficult to infer from behavioral observations alone that a social norm is in place or that a change process is underway in a reference group. There are three different reasons for this. First, as Bicchieri (2006, 8) points out, some norms are proscriptive, they tell us what *not* to do, and it is difficult to observe what people do not do.

Second, a social norm can be held in place by the beliefs of individuals within a reference group about the negative sanctions one would suffer for noncompliance. If the threat of negative sanctions is credible then one would rarely *observe* what happens in the event of noncompliance. In other words, anticipation of sanctions can motivate compliance just as actual sanctions do.

Third, earlier we observed that people can be motivated to comply, not just by beliefs about the prospect of overt sanctions, but also by beliefs about the covert attitudes of approval or disapproval by others. One could care about the covert attitudes of others instrumentally, in order to benefit from future relations with them, for example, to be invited to the best social events. Or one could care intrinsically, about certain others because of their wisdom or importance. The covert attitudes of others are not behaviorally observable. As well, one could comply in the absence of overt sanctions because one believes the normative expectations of others are legitimate, which belief is not easy to infer from behavioral evidence.

In contrast, if feasible it is easier to measure the behavioral outcomes of a process of social-norms change. For example, Schultz, et al. (2007) measured changes in norms of water consumption by comparing rates of actual water use, rather than relying on respondent self-reports.

**Identifying a Social Norm.** Much program evaluation practice, due to ease of collection or conceptual habit, inquires into personal attitude and personal behavior, as if one were studying the actions of an independent rower going west. But suppose we are studying the actions of what turns out to be an interdependent team of rowers going west. At the beginning of our investigation, at a minimum we would want to know:
• Who is the reference group?
  o The rowers.
• Is rowing west typical in the group?
  o Yes.
• Is rowing west approved of in the group?
  o Yes.

If an individual in a reference group believes that her action is approved of by enough members of the group, and is done by enough of them, then she is guided by a social norm.

If data were limited or difficult to obtain, we could,

• Externally identify a distinct group, for example, by ethnicity or territory
• Aggregate reports of individual personal attitudes towards the behavior
• Aggregate reports of individual performance of the behavior

Storey and colleagues, working with limited DHS data, do just that. For example, Storey and Kaggwa (2009) consider sample clusters to be groups, and aggregate individual reports about personal attitude into a *collective attitudinal norm* and individual reports about personal behavior into a *collective behavioral norm*. They are able to usefully show social-normative influence (empirical and normative) on contraceptive use, in addition to influence by personal attitude and by exposure to mass media family planning messages, controlled for other factors. The 2009 study considered the 1995, 2000, and 2005 DHSs, and thus was able to track change from 1995-2000 and 2000-2005.

Depending on research goals and available resources, an investigator may want to more exactly identify a social norm. Aggregating individual attitudes and behaviors is an approximation. An individual can believe that what others expect she should do and what others do are contrary to what her personal attitude would direct. For instance, if there were pluralistic ignorance in a population then aggregating individual personal attitudes would fail to identify a social norm that actually exists. An individual does not comply with a social norm due to the objective incidence of what others do or think she should do, she complies with a social norm due to her subjective beliefs (right or wrong) about others do. Thus, we might ask:

• Who does she believe to be her reference group?
• What does she believe about how much others approve of compliance (normative expectations)?
• What does she believe about how much others in the group do the behavior (empirical expectations)?

**Measuring Change in a Social Norm.** Next, measuring change in an independent action differs from measuring change in an interdependent action. If a single rower would be
better off to change from going west to going north, a program would want to know an individual’s:

- Personal attitude, how much she favors or disfavors the old behavior and the new behavior
- Personal behavior, how much she performs the old behavior and the new behavior
- How her attitudes and behaviors change over time

What would a program want to know about an interdependent group of rowers who would be better off to change from going west to going north? In addition to personal attitude and personal behavior, it would want to know what individuals believe about:

- Who is the reference group?
  - In relevant contexts: Does the reference group change over time?
- The social expectations of others in the reference group
  - Normative expectations with respect to the old behavior and the new behavior
  - Empirical expectations with respect to the old behavior and the new behavior
  - How social expectations change over time
- More objective measures of the old behavior and new behavior in the reference group

Often the reference group will remain much the same over the duration of a program engagement. But sometimes a beneficial new norm is established by people shifting into a new reference group, and this is when measurement of change in the reference group is relevant. For example, in India, to reject the practice of dowry can damage one’s marriage prospects. There are now websites where families who reject dowry seek mates from one another (idontwantdowry.com, SimpleNikah.com). These families have left old reference groups which require dowry for marriage formation and entered a new one which eschews it.

A simple way to measure the change in social expectations might be to inquire:

- Over time is the harmful norm less approved of in the group?
- Over time is the harmful norm less typical in the group?
- Over time is the beneficial norm more approved of in the group?
- Over time is the beneficial norm more typical in the group?

If one is only abandoning a harmful old social norm, then the first two questions apply. If one is only adopting a beneficial new social norm to overcome some harmful nonsocial regularity (e.g., if open defecation were simply done by individuals as a matter of convenience), then the second two questions apply.
Social Desirability Bias and Social Norms Measurement. It is well known that respondents may be inclined to give the answer they think the questioner wants to hear, rather than providing a true reflection of their belief or behavior. This inclination to give the socially desirable answer may be driven by a general desire to please, a desire to impress prestigious or powerful outsiders, a desire to continue or attract beneficial programs, or a reluctance to share attitudes or behavior that run counter to the locally prevailing social norm.

Cloward (2014) shows how social desirability bias can affect results. In a survey experiment, she asked respondents about their perceptions of FGM/C and early girl marriage. Questions were identical except that respondents were randomly assigned to one of two frames – they were informed that the study’s results would be shared either with a local audience or with a remote international audience. Those believing that the audience was international were 11% less likely to state that they plan to circumcise a daughter in the future, and 18% less likely to admit having a married daughter under 18. However, there were no meaningful differences across the two conditions in people’s reports about their attitudes towards or experiences with the two practices. Across both conditions there was much more reported practice of each behavior than reported attitudinal support of it (probably indicating social norm). Qualitative interviews suggest that the treatment effect was due to ease of misrepresentation, desire to please (including a sincere desire to please) the international audience, and desire for material support.

The finding suggests several reflections. It vividly illustrates how responses can be biased by social desirability. It also may show the power of shifting the believed reference group, for example, through exposure to edutainment and parasocial expansion of the reference group. Finally, it raises a conceptual issue in social-norms measurement. A norms engagement seeks to shift beliefs about what is socially desirable, and we have seen that social expectations can change in advance of personal attitudes. We would want to avoid response bias that seeks to please those outside the reference group such as researchers or donors, but responses intended to please the reference group are exactly what we want to see.

Preview. In the remainder of this section we examine:

- General considerations on measuring social norms
- Noticing social norms and their change in ordinary conversation
- Eight simple questions to ask about social norms
- Identifying social norms by simple inspection of DHS and MICS data
- The Reasoned Action Approach and its norms-measurement methods
- An exemplary social-norms, social-network study
- Adapting KAP stages-of-change to social-norms measurement
- A community-level stages-of-model: Community Readiness
- The matching game method of identifying social norms
- Future research
General Considerations in Measuring Social Norms

A social norm has to do with what one believes others do and what others think one should do; in some reference group; maintained by approval or disapproval. Thus, to measure social norms and their change we would investigate these three elements.

Beliefs About Others. Suppose that use of contraception is a social norm in some group. Standard survey research would develop a measure of contraceptive use, perhaps self-report in a survey, or some more objective measure. From that the researchers would make a population-level estimate of the prevalence of contraceptive use. The social-norms researcher has a different interest: What are the respondent's empirical expectations? What does the respondent believe is typical? Does she believe that hereabouts none, few, some, many, or all use contraception?

Standard survey research would probably ask what the respondent's attitude is towards contraception. The social-norms researcher, however, wants to know, What are the respondent's normative expectations? What does she believe about how many others in the reference group believe that she should use contraception? The accuracy of the respondents' estimates is not the point. The purpose is to uncover what the respondent believes about the expectations of others in her reference group with regard to contraceptive use. If she believes, rightly or wrongly, that many do use contraception and that many believe one should do so (and prefers to comply with such empirical and normative expectations), then she is under the influence of a social norm.

For the measurement of empirical expectations and their change over time, the number of others she believes engage in the behavior of interest, the frequency with which she believes they engage in the behavior, and the salience or importance of each of those others to the individual being surveyed could be relevant. For normative expectations and their change over time, the number of others that she believes expect her to comply, the importance of each one of those others to the individual being surveyed, and the individual's expectations regarding the strength of those others' expectations of her could be relevant. Paluck and Shepherd (2012), discussed below, use social network analysis to identify more influential and less influential members of the reference group. Simple measures, however, would often be both more practical and sufficient for useful results.

Table 1: Standard Measure of Behavior and Attitude

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Self Believes About:</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>What Others Believe About Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>What I do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>What I think I should do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Social Expectations

<table>
<thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What others think I should do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measuring personal attitude and behavior differs from measuring empirical and normative expectations. The tables above illustrate the difference.

Should we ask “should” questions to identify social norms?

Social norms theorists sometimes describe the injunctive aspect of social norms as one’s beliefs about what others think one should do (Cialdini and Trost 1998, 157; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, 131, 133; Bicchieri 2006, 10). This is a conveniently brief description, but it requires immediate qualification because it might mislead research design. It is important not to confuse the prudential should, the social should, and the moral should (Bicchieri 2006, 14, 31, distinguishes between the prudential should and a normative should). The prudential is what I should do in order to pursue my own best interests and perhaps those of my family and friends. I can say, “I shouldn’t have eaten that huge dessert,” a friend could say, “for your own good, you should quit smoking,” and a nurse could inform, “if you care for your daughter’s future, you should get her vaccinated.” The moral is what is owed to all humans regardless of what group they’re in, such as, “you shouldn’t kill or injure people without an acceptable reason.” The social is what is expected by others in one’s group, “around here, you should not drink from the fingerbowl at dinner,” “we marry our girls here around age 12.”

If a researcher asks and a respondent replies that others in her group believe she should vaccinate her baby, the question and answer are ambiguous among the prudential (if someone wants her child to be healthy she should get her vaccinated), the social (others in the group approve of families here getting their children vaccinated and disapprove of those who don’t), and the moral (of course everyone in the world believes that no parent should harm her child, it would be morally wrong to forego vaccination). It may be better to distinguish the social should with less ambiguous formulations, for example, whether others in the group socially approve or socially disapprove of one for doing the action, whether there are social sanctions, and the like.

Identify the Reference Group. The reference group includes everyone who matters to an individual in a certain situation. Some people can matter more than others. It could be those with whom one has repeated face-to-face relations, as in a women’s microfinance
group. More likely than not it also includes indirect relations, friends of friends so to speak. It could include everyone whom one might encounter in a town. For anyone in Thailand, the reference group for the practice of driving on the left-hand side of the road would include all those whom one would expect to encounter on the roadways of Thailand. It could include fictional characters from stories, live skits, radio dramas or telenovelas (so long as the audience finds them sufficiently relevant in culture and context), so-called parasocial interactions. As we said above, it could include one's beloved ancestors, a dead parent, total strangers, or future generations. It could be as small as one's household, depending on the practice.

The structure of ties in a network, and possibly their strength, shape the course of a change. With the advance of social network analysis, we are able to describe exact social relations among individuals, how the structures of relations vary, how the diffusion of social learning or social influence varies in different structures, what counts as a group, and more. Mackie (2000), for example, found that the spread of FGM/C abandonment in Senegal from village to village was catalyzed by overlapping horizons of marriageability between villages. Social network analysis can be used to indicate the reference group; or identify who is most influentially located in the group; or help track the process of change in a group.

The simplest and most informal type of network analysis is just asking people who relates to whom with respect to a particular practice. For example, if supporting the organization of a community to shift to a new social norm of universal latrine usage, one can ask people in a village, Who defecates where? and Where does contamination spread? In total sanitation programs those inquiries are usually collaborative and quick. If one's interest is to identify opinion leaders who would most efficiently catalyze change, Valente and Pumpuang (2007) list ten methods of doing so, roughly in order of least effort to most effort.

For more formal research Valente (2010, 41-60) outlines the basic types of network data, and the methods by which they can be collected. The most elementary level, a simple survey method, can be utilized within any basic quantitative survey by simply asking with whom respondents have recently interacted, discussed a specific topic, or received some sort of assistance (Valente 2010).
Simple survey method for basic reference group information

A study by USAID Guinea wanted to know the reference group for the FGM/C decision among urban Guineans (CRDH 2008). The study was a simple survey of people in the major cities of Guinea, gathering descriptive data, and it asked whom the respondent consults about more important issues. They found that lower-income individuals lived in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods, that for more important decisions the respondent was oriented to the rural community of origin and its notables, and they were less exposed to communications media. Higher-income individuals lived in ethnically mixed neighborhoods away from extended families; for more important decisions were oriented to friends, coworkers, media figures, and house of worship; and were much more exposed to media messages. Thus, in urban Guinea, a FGM/C abandonment program should be oriented to one kind of reference group for lower-income individuals and another kind of reference group for higher-income individuals.

Valente also details ever more costly but more insightful levels of social network analysis: egocentric data collection, the relationships of a single respondent; snowball collection, starting from one person follow the network nominations of individuals across a network; and sociocentric or complete data collection from everyone in a group. There is a less exact but less expensive method, however, that can be used if one is hoping to identify the most central in the network. This “friends of friends” method capitalizes on an interesting social phenomenon that has been noted in network research: for any random person chosen from a network, that person’s friends on average will have more friends than the original respondent (Feld 1991; Christakis and Fowler 2010). This is the logical result of the fact that the people with more friends make up a larger proportion of the overall friends of those in the network.

Simple methods of reference-group identification are appropriate in many practical settings. However, more comprehensive social-network analysis, where feasible, can considerably advance our concrete understanding of social norms. In a particular community we can better understand the structure of reciprocal expectations and as norms change who influences whom in the network. An accumulation of such studies across practices, communities, and cultures will inform useful generalizations about norms and their change under varying conditions.

To illustrate, a study of the social network predictors of latrine ownership in rural India by Shakya, Christakis, and Fowler (2014), applied social network analysis to identify normative reference groups. They applied a community detection algorithm (rather than respondents’ subjective reports) to detect sub-groups of people within villages who were connected together beyond the direct friendship ties that were measured in the study. Their result showed that these sub-groups were strong predictors of latrine ownership. They also found that when the density of connections in these sub-groups was high, individuals were less likely to own latrines. This suggests that these sub-groups were acting as normative reference groups for latrine ownership, and that latrine ownership within these communities was not normatively endorsed. Tightly connected social groups will often have more deeply entrenched norms. The more closely connected the people are
within a group, the more powerfully the group norm will work against individual adoption of behaviors that are not normatively reinforced.

The figure shows a network depiction of one village in the dataset. Network subgroups are differentiated by color. Those who own latrines are depicted with squares and those who do not own latrines are depicted with circles. Note both the clustering of individuals and the varying distribution of latrine ownership by community. For instance, the pink community near the right side of the figure has no one with a latrine. The dark blue community towards the top however has a latrine ownership proportion of approximately 50%. If latrine ownership within the community was determined solely by geography, we would expect the distribution of latrines to be uniform throughout the communities.

**Anticipated Reactions of Others in the Reference Group.** Strictly speaking, the anticipated reaction of others is included in the construct *normative expectations*. But thinking in greater detail about the content of those reactions can inform research design. A social norm is maintained by social approval, including positive sanctions; and social disapproval, including negative sanctions; or in some instances by one’s belief in the legitimacy of others’ normative expectations. One might propose that we identify social norms and measure their change by behavioral observations of overt sanctions. But, we have seen, that would be a mistake. Instead, we should ask people what they believe about the anticipated reactions of others in the reference group.

When people are asked by outsiders why they do something, especially, when asked about a social practice, they often say: that’s the tradition, that’s our custom, that’s how we
do things around here. But what matters for compliance with a social norm is not just the believed consequences of what would happen if one were to comply, but especially the believed consequences of what would happen if one were not to comply.\footnote{In earlier presentations we called this idea “investigating counterfactuals in order to discern causality.” “Anticipated reactions of others in the reference group” refers to the same idea, but is easier to understand. For a friendly exposition and applications to real examples of social action, see Tetlock and Belkin (1996).}

If a social norm is effective and thus all or most comply, then what happens to someone who complies is plain to the observer. However, anticipated reactions to noncompliance may be clear to the insider, but be much more obscure to the outsider. This is because the more effective the norm is, the less the outsider sees or hears about what happens to occasional deviators; or because the insider is motivated by what she believes to be the covert attitudes of others. If we only ask why a family marries the daughter at age 12, we would be likely to hear many explanations in the appreciation-of-tradition category. However if we ask what would happen (specifically for a social norm, how would referents react) if the family were to delay marriage of the daughter until she reached age 18, a more complete picture emerges.

Someone could answer, “She would marry at an older age, and nothing else,” and if this answer were common, one would tend to the conclusion that there is little social about the practice. Similarly, a response of, “She would suffer materially because there are no education or employment opportunities outside of marriage,” highlights reasons that are not directly related to the behavior or beliefs of others but are more of a political-economic nature. Likewise, a response of, “She might get pregnant and burden our family with an unplanned addition,” indicates a practical family concern, not a social one.

The responses “She would be seen as undesirable, the worst girls are married the latest, we may not find a husband for her,” and, “We would have to pay a higher dowry if she were older,” suggest that the reasons for the practice are social. Both imply an interdependent interest insofar as they relate directly to the behavior or beliefs of others in the group. It is worth noting that with both these reasons, if everyone in the group shifted the behavior – no girls were married before 18 - the objection would no longer apply.

“She might get pregnant and bring shame to the family,” also indicates social motivations: anticipation of negative social sanctions from other group members. “People here would think poorly of us for doing so” demonstrates sensitivity to normative expectations, which would reverse upon shift to a new social norm of marriage at 18. People can be motivated to comply with a social norm because they intrinsically value the covert attitudes of approval and disapproval of others in their reference group. The belief that others would think poorly of us can motivate compliance even if not overtly expressed by others, and even if it is false that others would have that covert reaction. There are also likely combinations of the foregoing motivations.

Since direct questions put the respondent on the spot, indirect questions about how referents would react to someone who did (or did not) do the action of interest could elicit
more informative responses. Some individuals and populations may not usefully respond to questions about anticipated reactions. An alternative may be to tell a culturally compatible story about someone who had transgressed a local norm and faced a consequence, and to ask if the same thing would happen here.

Social approval and social disapproval can be useful indicators of social norms. The terms include both overt sanctions and covert attitudes. They are also more simple to inquire about than one’s belief about what others believe one should do.

**Identifying Social Norms and their Change in Conversations**

In qualitative research, reference to social norms and their change is quite identifiable in response to open-ended questions, and indeed in everyday conversation if one is alert to what to listen for. We report the results of one qualitative study (Cislaghi, Gillespie, and Mackie 2014) to illustrate the point. The example also shows that although social-norms terminologies can seem abstruse, the elements of the concept quite naturally appear in human interactions.

The researchers studied the content of human rights education sessions that are part of the West African NGO Tostan’s Community Empowerment Program, and the content of post-session interviews. They found that the phrase “everyone agrees” occurred with regularity, and that about 80% of the time the phrase flags social norms.

A statement of “everyone agrees” is associated with statements about what other people do (empirical expectations) and what other people think one should do (normative expectations). In our terminology, it indicates a belief that the speaker believes enough people in the relevant reference group hold such expectations. A stark change in gender norms among participants in a Tostan class can be seen between Session 3 and Session 13. In Session 3 “everyone agrees” that women work in the domestic sphere and that is at should be, and in Session 13 everyone agrees that women should be treated equally and women can do anything a man can do.

Tostan’s education program goes through the basic human rights. The pedagogy includes skits where small groups rehearse and present about a village human rights issue. Conversations were most vivid about these skits; to replicate that catalyst one might arrange for the group of research interest to observe or hear recorded or live dramas, or present culturally appropriate vignettes. Although people are not accustomed to originating abstract principles, on specific issues in social context, participants are quite familiar, or rapidly become familiar, with what considerations apply. For example, participants act out a quarrel in which a man says that a woman is not doing enough work in the house, and she counters him. When asked what was most memorable about the session, respondents frequently mention one of the skits. After Session 3, a participant from Village C recalling a memorable skit, reports:

- “Another woman said her job is to cook and clean and she accepts that. Everyone agreed because that is what women do.”
Her role is to cook and clean, and she accepts that expectation of others as legitimate (normative expectation). Everyone agrees (enough others in the reference group). That is what women do (empirical expectation).

- “One woman said her job was to have babies and nurture. We all agreed with what she said because everyone appreciated how she accepted what she was in life.”

- All agreed (enough others in the reference group). She accepts (normative expectations of others are legitimate) and everyone (enough others) appreciates that (would positively sanction).

Ten sessions later, after Session 13, a participant from Village A reports, recalling a memorable skit:

- “One woman said it is important for women to work hard and strive to do anything a man can do. The whole class agrees with this.” And a man thinks it memorable that, “One woman said, the best thing for a man to do is treat his women equally. Everyone agrees with this.”

These reports suggest a pronounced change in gender role expectations among class participants (although a change among the class is not sufficient, initially, to shift expectations in the village beyond).

The Tostan CEP also supports participants’ aspirations to become public actors, and helps them learn ways to do so effectively. Preparing and performing skits are part of that learning. These remarks follow Sessions 13 and 14. Over time we see that people go from concern with personal and family bad habits to concern also with community bad habits (social norms).

- A woman resolves to stop her own bad habits: “I have talked about all the habits I have had and I will stop those habits from this day forward.”

- Another woman talks about working to end our bad habits: “We talked about our good and bad habits and solutions to our bad habits. We are learning the best way to live our lives and be honest, healthy, and happy”

They also go from acting alone to change those bad habits, to acting together to do so. Notice the commitments to sanction others, and the indication of a social norm among class members to bring about norm reform in the larger community.

- A man says: “My role in the village is to be honest and if I see someone doing bad things I will tell them to stop.”
• A man says that we will do the same: “We are not afraid to tell people the truth, if they do something that is good we will say so and if they do something wrong we will tell them also.”

• Everyone in the class expects that others should work to promote abandonment of bad habits, an emerging social norm: “N said the women should work hard and work together and if they had any bad habits drop them. Everyone agrees with what he said.”

Notice that these remarks indicate a social norm among participants of working together to end harmful social norms in the community.

Simple Inquiries

A simple way to identify social norms could be to focus on social approval. We don’t want to ask respondents what others merely approve of, because one can approve of one’s own prudential action, approve of another’s moral action, of a work of art, or an argument. Rather, we should ask them what is socially approved or disapproved of, here in the context of this reference group. Alternatively, one could ask the whether an action is socially appropriate or inappropriate, or leads to social acceptance or rejection in the reference group.

In surveys offering structured lists of possible reasons for continuing or discontinuing a practice, include social approval (or as appropriate, social disapproval) as one of the reasons. That approximates the injunctive norm or normative expectation. Also consider asking about reasons that approximate the descriptive norm or empirical expectation, for example, that’s what we do, or that’s what others whom I know do. Most surveys will already gather data on one’s own attitude and one’s own behavior. An aggregation of responses to the question on one’s own behavior, or some more objective measure, could be a proxy for empirical expectation.

A repeated survey would show change over time. For an action interdependent among members of a reference group, we predict that change in beliefs about social approval would tend to precede actual change in group behavior. Thus declining social approval for a harmful old behavior, increasing social approval for a beneficial new behavior, or both, short of actual behavioral change, can indicate real progress towards eventual behavioral change. This inference would be stronger if, with respect to the practice under study, there were prior evidence from elsewhere that cumulative change in social approval by individuals in the group culminated in eventual behavioral change among them.

As appropriate, one could ask open-ended questions such as these (Shell-Duncan et al. 2010):

1. Who is it important to consider when thinking or talking about whether or not to do (target behavior)? [Reference Group]

2. Is (target behavior) typical among them? [Descriptive/Empirical]
3. Is *(target behavior)* socially approved of among them? [Injunctive/Normative]

4. What do people say are the advantages of *(target behavior)*? [Reasons, Context]

5. What do people say are the disadvantages of *(target behavior)*? [Reasons, Context]

If of research interest, ask about individual self-efficacy, collective self-efficacy, or both.  

6. How easy or how difficult would it be for an individual to abandon/adopt *(target behavior)*? [Self-efficacy]

7. How easy or how difficult would it be for the reference group to abandon/adopt *(target behavior)*? [Self-efficacy]  

If a respondent answers #1 with something like No One, then the behavior lacks a social component. If someone says Yes to #2, the typicality question, but No to #3, the social approval question, that means that the person believes there is a population regularity, social proof, or social convention. To determine which, the researcher would consider the reasons offered by the respondent in answers to questions #4 and #5 – advantages and disadvantages.

If someone answers Yes to #2, the typicality question, and Yes to #3, the social approval question, that means the person believes there is a social norm. To check further whether it is a social norm, the researcher would consider the reasons offered in answers to questions in #4 and #5. Answers to questions #6 and #7 might, in addition to information on self-efficacy, provide information on whether the practice is individual or social in nature.

8. Is *(target behavior)* performed mostly by people like those in our reference group or is it performed by most people in the world? [Social or Moral]

A behavior could be done by many and approved by many in the reference group, yet be a moral norm rather than a social norm. If respondents believe that the practice is more local than global that suggests it is a social norm. However, in traditional settings where people know of little variation in human ways, respondents could mistakenly infer that their local norm is a global one.

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12 We borrowed ideas and questions from Shell-Duncan et al., and added a few. In a later revision we noticed Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2010, 327) recommended list of questions for qualitative formative research: advantages and disadvantages; approval and disapproval; what makes it easier or more difficult to do the behavior. Their list prompted us to add questions 6-7.

13 These questions might be more informative for program design by further breaking them down into a SWOT inquiry: strengths and weaknesses (capability) and obstacles and threats (opportunity).
Questions #2-#7, and as appropriate also #1 and #8, can be repeated over time to track changes. Again, changing social approval in the group can predict eventual behavioral change in the group. Change can be further monitored and understood by repeating questions #6 and #7 about the ease and difficulty of change, and with these questions:

9. Do others still do (target behavior)? Why? [Change & Reasons for It]

10. Have others stopped doing (target behavior)? Why? [Change & Reasons for It]

Questions #9 and #10 are simple ways to determine if a harmful social norm is being adopted or a beneficial social norm is being adopted as a result of program engagements. It is probably more effective to ask whether others have changed than if the respondent has changed.

**Why focus on others’ change?**

Ethiopia UNICEF commissioned a research team to do qualitative and quantitative evaluations of four different organizations using a community dialogue approach to bring about the end of female genital mutilation/cutting and other harmful practices (studies cited in UNICEF 2010). From the entirety of evidence, two of the programs were judged quite effective, and two were judged much less effective. Most respondents in all four programs were aware of a new criminal prohibition of FGM/C, and in each of the four programs most individual respondents said that the respondent’s family had abandoned the practice. In response to more indirect questions, however, the most effective program differed sharply from the two least effective programs. In the most effective program, individual respondents reported cessation of negative community sanctions for going uncut, that cutters mostly no longer cut, and most importantly that others in their group no longer practice FGM/C. In the least effective programs, respondents reported that negative community sanctions for going uncut continued, that cutters still cut, and that a good number others in their group still practice FGM/C. This experience suggests a lesson on the measurement of norms change in a community. Respondents’ answers to queries about their own action will be less informative than their answers about the actions of others in the community and their answers about the cessation or continuation of negative sanctions in the community. Finally, one simple question – has the convention of FGM/C changed here? – seems to capture most of the variation in the effectiveness of the programs, and may yield as much information as all the other inferences put together.

**Simple Indicators in DHS or MICS Suggesting the Presence of a Social Norm**

Most research surveys have not collected data specific to social norms, requiring researchers to attempt to identify and measure them by creative adaptation of data gathered for other purposes. Ongoing conversations among those working with UNICEF on
social norms have identified some simple indicators suggesting the presence of social norms. They are based on inspection of Demographic and Health Surveys, and of UNICEF’s parallel Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys. These indicators do not establish the presence of a social norm. Rather, they suggest that a more rigorous inquiry be undertaken. A more formal way to use DHS and MICS data to measure social norms is multilevel modeling, discussed below. Also, we report on new ways to use old data to investigate social norms.

The suggestive indicators are: High spatial or ethnic variation in a practice (reference group), high discrepancy between behavior and attitude (social norm prevailing over personal attitude), comparative persistence of the practice or comparatively rapid shift in the practice (highly interdependent action).

1. **High spatial or ethnic variation in the practice.** If prevalence of a practice is very high in one place or ethnic group, and very low in another one “nearby,” that suggests the possibility of a social norm. The more fine-grained the data, the more suggestive the indication.

DHS and MICS collect data on the location and ethnicity of respondents, but not data about social relations. Colocation and ethnicity are rough proxies for actual social relations among people. In the Figure below, we see subnational prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting in Africa, and subnational prevalence of child marriage in India.

![Sub-national mapping shows areas of geographical concentration and high variations (hot spots/leopard skin)](image)

Statistics and Monitoring Section, Child Protection, UNICEF
Again, these results are not intended as scientific measures. Data at this meso level are hardly a proxy for the actual relationships of people at the micro level in reference groups of reciprocal expectation. The variations observed could easily be due to any number of other factors: climate, political economy, income, education, and so on.

2. High Discrepancy Between Attitude and Behavior. If many people personally oppose a practice, but nevertheless follow it, that suggests the possibility of a social norm.

For example, a UNICEF study on child disciplinary practices suggests the presence of a social norm of inflicting physical punishment on children. It shows that in the preceding month anywhere from about 55% in Kazakhstan to 95% in Algeria of mothers or primary care-givers who support physical punishment of children used physical or psychological violence to punish a child aged 2-14 (the median across countries is about 85%). For them attitude and behavior are consistent. However, it also shows that among caregivers opposed to physical punishment, 20% to 90% (the median across countries is about 50%) nevertheless punish children. For them attitude and behavior are inconsistent.


Attitude-behavior discrepancies are frequently observed, and could be the result of any number of causes. Respondents may want to give an answer that pleases researchers. The discrepancy could also be due to any number of other reasons explored in the social psychology literature (detailed by Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, 53-63). One possibility is that individuals engage in the behavior because they see others engage in it (empirical expectations) and think that others believe they should engage in the behavior (normative expectations). They do so even though they personally are against the behavior and would
stop if the expectations were absent. If this is the case, a social norm is the cause of the discrepancy.

3. **Comparative Persistence of the Practice.** Lengthy persistence of a practice can also be determined by simple inspection of DHS and MICS. Longer persistence could be defined by comparison to the shorter persistence of other practices, especially those which normally change rapidly with other “modernization” variables. For example, the 1995 Demographic Survey of Egypt shows no meaningful variation in the prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting among ever-married women across seven 5-year age cohorts from 15-19 to 45-49: prevalence trembles between 96% and 98% (171). In contrast, the prevalence of no education among household females across seven 5-year age cohorts from 15-19 to 45-49 increases positively with age cohort, from 19.4% to 54.7% (20). Again, this contrast could be due to many other factors (maybe the government worked to expand education, but not to discourage FGM/C), and this finding is merely suggestive.

4. **Comparatively Rapid Shift of Practice.** Footbinding in China lasted for a thousand years, but ended in a single generation, at the beginning of the 20th Century, and never revived. This pattern indicates strong reciprocal expectations, causing both sturdy maintenance and rapid demise. Again, DHS and MICS data may indicate both lengthy persistence and a sudden shift. For example, data indicating a rapid increase in the percentage of population using improved sanitation in certain districts suggests that a social norm of ending open defecation may have been established there.

**Multilevel Modeling.** Researchers who would like to understand to what degree community level norms are associated with individual level outcomes are increasingly using multilevel modeling. Answers to questions reflecting the norms of interest are aggregated at a community level reflecting the mean value for that community (Storey & Kaggwa, 2009). These measures are then included in statistical regression models, with the addition of cluster level random intercepts for each cluster in the analysis. If the community level variables are significant in the model, then there is support for the fact that a community effect is actually correlated with the outcome of interest.

Multilevel modeling of social-normative influence based on DHS and MICS data has been used in a variety of studies, spanning outcomes as diverse as female genital mutilation/cutting (Hayford, 2005), domestic violence (Boyle et al., 2009), sexual violence against women (Peterman, Palermo, and Bredenkamp 2011), youth aggression (Bernburg & Thorlindsson, 2005), alcohol abuse (Barrientos-Gutierrez et al., 2007), and adolescent smoking (Wiium et al., 2006).

Aggregate measures of attitudes and behaviors are created from which norms are inferred. This use of DHS and MICS data to identify and measure social norms is limited in several ways, including the absence of standard questions measuring the respondent’s beliefs about what others do and what others think one should do, and the definition of community units for the analysis that may not coincide with actual communities of reciprocal expectation. Nevertheless, it is a good way to deal with the limitations of existing data, and the results of such analyses might prompt more targeted investigations.
New Indicators in Old Data. Finally, potential social norms indicators may be lurking in existing survey data, even though they previously have not been used as such. Women’s bargaining power is not fully explained by individual or household variables; for example, sometimes an increase in women’s income or assets leads to a decrease in her bargaining power or well-being. Mabsout and Van Staveren (2011), in a study based on the 2005 Ethiopia DHS, add an institutional level of variation: more equal and less equal gender norms by ethnic group. The gender norms considered had to do with whether a woman agreed with her husband’s attitude on wife beating, a man thinks women should have fewer rights, and support for continuation of the practice of FGM/C. In a multi-level model they show that adding an institutional level (mostly social norms) explains more variation in bargaining power than do individual-household variables. In other words, where gender norms are less equal, increasing individual-household variables such as female age and income do little or nothing to increase a woman’s household bargaining power.

Lessons from the Reasoned Action Approach

Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have long theorized and measured the relationships between belief, attitude, social norm, intention and behavior. Their first model was called the Theory of Reasoned Action, and sought to account for the oft-observed discrepancy between attitude and behavior. The second iteration by Ajzen (1985) was called the Theory of Planned Behavior, presently the most common label for these ideas, which added the concept of perceived behavioral control, an adaptation of Bandura’s (1997) concept of perceived self-efficacy. Leading behavioral theorists including Fishbein and Bandura in 1991 collaborated on unifying their theories in an Integrated Behavioral Model (Head and Noar 2014, 37). Finally, Fishbein and Ajzen joined forces again, building on the IBM to create the Reasoned Action Approach (RAA, 2010). The RAA and its forebears are the leading conceptual framework in health behavior research and are still used by the majority of researchers (Schwarzer 2014). The theories have been applied over 40 years by multiple researchers in a thousand studies about a wide variety of behaviors in health and beyond. The approach is firmly in mainstream social psychology and psychometrics, has been repeatedly tested and refined in application, provides immediate guidance, and is a promising source of ideas about how to measure social norms and social-norms change. Generous background material including on questionnaire design and intervention design is available at Ajzen’s website. The details of the theory, its justifications, its methods, and measurement and intervention advice are available in their 500-page magnum opus (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). Because it is the lead theory, we present and examine it at length.

The theory aims to delineate the main determinants that drive the decision of an individual to engage in a certain behavior. Three determinants influence intention towards a behavior: attitude towards it, perceived or subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. Attitudes are a function of an individuals’ behavioral beliefs about the outcomes of

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14 Many listed at http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpbrefs.html
15 http://people.umass.edu/aizen/index.html
an action and about her evaluation of those various outcomes. Subjective norms in the TPB are a function of *normative beliefs*, that is, how much one believes others want one to perform the action (injunctive norm) and now much one believes others do the action (descriptive norm). Perceived behavioral control in turn is the result of *control* beliefs. The aim of the theory is to be able to use the measurement of these determinants to successfully predict behavior. The theory predicts that if behavioral, normative, and control beliefs were to sufficiently change, then behavior would change.

**Reasoned Action Approach.**\(^{16}\)

The RAA is not without critics. Dutta-Bergman (2005), from an avowedly critical-theoretic perspective, reviews three leading theories of health communication campaigns, including Fishbein and Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). We think most of his observations are apt, and agree with him further that his criticisms supplement and amend an approach like the TPB rather than negating it. The three theories, says Dutta-Bergman, have an individualistic bias, neglect structural determinants, ignore cultural context, are biased towards controlled cognition, and are external rather than internal to the community and its culture.

There is a tendency to overlook the interdependent, the social, in the TPB model. This is shown in TPB’s more recent addition, perceived behavioral control (PBC), about the capacity and autonomy to act. PBC was adapted from Bandura’s self-efficacy construct, which includes both individual self-efficacy (what I believe I can do) and collective self-efficacy (what we believe we can do). Although in 2005 Dutta-Bergman called for the inclusion of collective self-efficacy in the TPB, Fishbein and Ajzen continue (2010) to

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discuss PBC entirely in individualistic terms. The sample questions they offer measure perceived behavioral control only by first-person-singular questions. To change an interdependent action, however, an individual’s self-efficacy is necessary but not sufficient. There is a further issue of collective self-efficacy, whether we have the capacity and autonomy to change an interdependent action.

Similarly, the intention variable is measured only with first-person singular questions (e.g., “I will try to engage in the behavior,” 38). One could have an intention, be ready to change an interdependent behavior, but the intention would not result in corresponding behavior unless enough other people in the interdependent reference group are ready to make the change as well. Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 59-63) scrutinize the intention-behavior gap in detail (59-63), but the obstacles of coordinating on intentions with others on change, and coordinating with others to act on change, are unmentioned.

The TPB/RAA approach does have an individualistic bias, but we think that this bias is not intrinsic to the approach. The subjective norm has to do with one’s beliefs about others in the reference group: that is a social theory, not an individualistic one. The approach can be amended to include the collective aspects of PBC, intention, and behavior. The individualistic bias in health program design also mistakenly biases program action against operating at the community level, Dutta-Bergman says, and we agree. He is right that community practices should be reviewed and changed with community-based and culturally friendly methods.

Dutta-Bergman continues that when the TPB is applied in health communication as a theory of change it can mistakenly focus on isolated beliefs rather than the webs of beliefs that make up a culture. The full TPB model would elicit all salient beliefs associated with a behavior, better than other survey approaches; but in practice it might elicit only a few, a defect of application not of theory. Nevertheless, the TPB does not consider how a series of behaviors and beliefs about them can interlock with one another. We also agree with Dutta-Bergman that the TPB as practiced obscures structural determinants of action. The TPB/RAA theorizes that structural factors determine behavior only through attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control, which even if it were wholly true would work to distract the researcher from investigation of structural factors (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, 224-235, do urge researchers to consider structural variables).

The TPB/RAA in standard application relies on self-report surveys which neglect cultural context. But in part that is an error in application of the theory: Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 326-331) urge thorough formative research, including the qualitative; Ajzen himself (2014, 4), says that few RAA investigators do sufficient formative research and “often take a rather cavalier approach, relying on intuition...” Nevertheless, in discussions with practitioners we heard repeatedly how difficult and even inaccurate it is to try to extract beliefs from traditional populations by means of cognitively demanding quantitative surveys. More culture-friendly methods, even when indirect, might yield more accurate inferences about beliefs.
A recent issue of the *Health Psychology Review* (Vol 8. No. 1, 2014) contains a critical symposium on the RAA from within social psychology. The lead editorial is titled, "Time to Retire the Theory of Planned Behavior" (Sniehotta, Presseau, and Araújo-Soares 2014). A lead article is a case study of RAA as a health theory, followed by eight vigorous commentaries on the editorial or lead article including one from Ajzen. Anyone planning to engage with the RAA can gain critical balance from this source. Our purpose is not to declare a global judgment on the approach, but rather to point readers to it as a resource, especially its long record of measuring social norms. Thus, we will mention only briefly a few illustrative points of controversy expressed in the symposium.

As usually applied, the RAA is correlational, based on self-report, and is cross-sectional; rather than testing causal hypotheses by controlled experiment, seeking objective behavioral outcome data, and measuring over time (Schwarzer 2014); although these problems are shared with other major health behavior theories (Head and Noar 2014). It does well in predicting intentions, explaining 47% of variance in one meta-analysis, and somewhat less well in predicting behavior, explaining 27% of variance (Head and Noar 2014): there is an intention-behavior gap (Sniehotta, Presseau, and Araújo-Soares 2014). It may be a better theory of intention than of behavior (Kok and Ruiter 2014, Schwarzer 2014). It is imperfect at predicting behavior from intention, yet its claim to explanatory sufficiency discourages inclusion and testing of other possible determinants of behavior, especially those that would translate intention into behavior (Sniehotta, Presseau, and Araújo-Soares 2014). We observe that the RAA’s neglect of the collective aspect of PBC, intention, and behavior could contribute to the intention-behavior gap. It is a theory of behavior prediction, relating change in attitudinal, normative, and control beliefs to changed behavior; but is not a theory of behavioral change, it does not advise how to change those beliefs (Kok and Ruiter 2014, acknowledged by Ajzen 2014). The fiercest critics, Sniehotta, Presseau, and Araújo-Soares (2014), say that intention, PBC, attitude, and subjective norm should continue to play a role in understanding and changing behavior, but call for a broader theoretical approach. Thus, most of these worries about the RAA have little to do with its subjective-norm construct.

However, meta-analyses of the correlation between subjective norm and intentions have shown that this relationship is even less robust than that of intentions with attitudes or with perceived behavioral control (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003). A meta-analysis by Armitage and Conner found that the subjective norms construct was particularly weak, although this appeared to be the result of poor measurement (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Many of the studies they analyzed used only one question to assess subjective norms. When subjective norms were measured using multi-item scales, its predictive value considerably increased.

Literature on descriptive norms has suggested that a problem with the subjective norms-behavior correlation may also be because the subjective norm construct in the RAA was formerly limited to injunctive norms, and descriptive norms were long omitted. Later research by Ajzen and Fishbein, however, began to include descriptive norms as an important construct to be measured, with empirical evidence suggesting that the direct effect of descriptive norms on behavior may be stronger than that of injunctive norms (Manning, 2009; Rivis & Sheeran, 2003), as descriptive norms account for a significant
proportion of the variance in intentions to perform a behavior (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003). Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 185-190) themselves argue that predictive validity is improved by inclusion of descriptive norm and perceived behavioral control. They also say that many TPB studies are done only with simple belief indices rather than with the full model, and say that studies using the full model tend to have more predictive power.

Another issue, so far as we know not prominently discussed in its literature, is that the TPB seems often to be applied to decisions that are strongly influenced by personal attitude, what we called more independent decisions, where social influence is weak. For example, a sample injunctive norm question (2010, 133) concerns whether or not to get a mammogram. Interaction with important others on this question could result in pressure from them for one to comply; but it could also more have to do with revising behavioral beliefs that determine personal attitude towards an independent individual decision (which would be channeled through behavioral beliefs and corresponding attitudes). We would expect that the social-normative factor would be more powerful in TPB studies applied to more interdependent decisions, where social influence can be decisive. All behaviors of interest to change agents will be influenced by attitudes and with some variation by perceived behavioral control; yet only some behaviors – the more interdependent – will be importantly influenced by subjective norm. Additionally, social norms generally have more influence in “collective” societies where action is generally more interdependent than in “individualist” societies where action is generally less interdependent (Gelfand et al. 2011), and the RAA studies tallied in meta-analyses were more carried out in individualist societies.

Finally, we hypothesize that if an RAA application centers on should questions to identify subjective norms that could be an unreliable measure, because should may be ambiguous among prudential, social, and moral norms.

**Measuring the Reference Group.** Here we evaluate two options offered by TPB. First, we can ask a respondent what she believes about other “people who are important to me,” either generally, or with respect to the specific practice. A problem with that strategy is that the researcher does not know how each respondent conceptualizes “people who are important to me,” obscuring comparisons between individuals. However, if our primary research interest is how strongly the social norm exists, if at all, in sampled respondents then there is no problem.

Second, we can ask a respondent what she believes about named individuals or role occupants. They suggest a pretest to find out modal beliefs about referents:

If you considered [target behavior] in the next two weeks, there might be individuals or groups who would think you should not perform this behavior. If any such individuals come to mind when you think about [target behavior], please list them below. (135)
Recall our worry about using the *should* question. Fishbein and Ajzen also suggest, all those who would approve of [target behavior], or all those who would disapprove, or all those one might want to talk to.

A problem with asking the respondent for named individuals is that in some contexts it could severely underestimate the reference group, because only a few individuals stand out to the respondent but the reference group for a social norm can include not only named individuals, but deceased ancestors, role occupants, fictional characters in popular narratives, and a generalized other. The list of influential role occupants can be supplied by the researcher based on formative research or can be supplied by each respondent.

Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) say that results using the two methods are about the same and that the “people who are important to me” strategy is more streamlined, but other researchers have emphasized to us the importance of anchoring these questions using specific roles or people in the reference group. Pre-testing might help to decide what is best in a given context.

**Measuring the Injunctive Norm (Normative Expectation).** To measure a woman’s injunctive norm with respect to getting a mammogram in the next few weeks, (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010, 131-148) suggest asking:

*Most people who are important to me think*

`I should :____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: I should not
get a mammogram in the next few weeks.`

We could also ask, whether *most people important to me want me to get a mammogram...", or* *most people whose opinions I value think that it is appropriate/inappropriate...", or *most people whom I respect and admire would support/oppose...".

We add that for any of the questions mentioned here, we could use pictograms rather than words to represent points on the chosen scale. Also for simplicity we could reduce the scale to two points, *should* and *should not*, or *do and do not*.

Next, the motivation to comply is measured:

`I want to do :____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: I don't want to do
what most people important to me think I should do.`

Responses are tallied to identify modal normative beliefs. Injunctive norm is the product of the extent to which I believe others want me to perform the action, times the degree to which I care about the opinion of those others.. However, it has been found in practice that including motivation to comply adds almost no explanatory power (perhaps because the most salient referents are those already likely to motivate compliance, pp. 142-143). Thus, if the reference group is “most people who are important to me” *there would be little point in seeking information about motivation to comply*. In another context, the researcher might externally define the reference group as, for example, an ethnic or territorial group. If so,
then it might make sense to ask whether the individual wants to do what most people in the externally defined group want her to do.

**Measuring the Descriptive Norm (Empirical Expectation).** To measure a descriptive norm, they suggest asking:

*Most people who are important to me do:___:___:___:___:___:___:___: do not perform behavior X.*

We could also ask, *how many people whom you respect and admire perform behavior X...*, or *most people like me perform behavior X...*, or *how many people similar to you perform behavior X...*. Finally, as with injunctive norm, a measure about how many people in a reference group do the behavior in question is multiplied by a measure about how much one wants to do what people in the reference group do.

**Measuring Personal Attitude.** Most TPB research measures attitude directly with a semantic differential (for example, a seven-point scale from Favorable to Unfavorable). Fishbein and Ajzen also devised the expectancy-value approach to attitude, which elicits the salient beliefs about a behavior in order to better understand the determinants of the attitude. This more indirect measure of attitude consistent with their full model is detailed in their volume (2010, 75-125).

**An Exemplary Social-Norms, Social Network Study**

Paluck and Shepherd (2012) conducted a “field experiment on collective norms and harassment behavior in a school social network.” Harassment (sometimes termed *bullying*) can be pervasive in schools and can be the result of social norms deeming it typical and appropriate. Harassment behavior is not strongly related to students’ personal attitudes towards it, and even those who oppose harassment engage in it, because of a belief that it is socially accepted and that to stand up to it would not be socially accepted. The intervention program, among other things, involved salient social referents in a skit performed at a school assembly illustrating the adverse consequences of the practice, reinforced by some follow-up events later in the school year.

The researchers were able to do full-school surveys, repeated in three waves over time, collecting data on demographic characteristics, social networks, injunctive (normative) social norm, descriptive (empirical) social norm, personal beliefs and experiences, close-friends norms, and cognitive salience and endorsement of the program. Paluck and Shepherd did a complete social network analysis of students at the school, and distinguished between two types of referents: those nominated as high status in the school (school wide influence) and those who are leader of a clique (local influence). They hypothesized that the mechanism of influence was frequent and personally motivated interaction with salient social referents. Among the salient social referents they identified, they were able to randomly assign a subset to the intervention and assign another to control.
They measured change in injunctive norm and descriptive norm among those with social interaction network ties to intervention social referents. After the assembly intervention, students with more ties to referents perceived a significant decrease in the general norm of harassment and three related injunctive-norm measures. Although the intervention changed the perceived norm, it did not change their personal beliefs or attitudes. Over the whole year there was a perceived increase in the descriptive norm of harassment, however (the researchers say they cannot tell why from the study but suggest that the effect of the assembly intervention faded over time). Their three behavioral measures (see below) also showed significant improvements. Finally, it turned out in this setting that there was no difference in influence between the high-status and clique-leader referents. There were many other hypotheses, measures, and findings of interest in this exceptionally sophisticated and rich study.

Who are the salient social referents in the reference group? Paluck and Shepherd asked six social network questions. Four had to do with behavior indicating friendship ties, for example, “With whom did you spend time in the last week?”, and two had to do with high status, those “who you really respect” and “who you think are most popular.” High status and clique leaders were identified from social network data matrices.

These are the questions they asked about perceptions of injunctive norms, or the students’ normative expectations (note: in American high school English, *normal* is more an evaluative than descriptive term). How many students at [school]:

- believe it’s normal for when students start drama or any other kind of conflict with other students?
- believe it’s wrong, or would criticize you,
  - if you tried to stop other students from starting drama?
  - if you did not defend your friends when someone else was making drama for them?
  - if you ignored rumors about you, rather than defending yourself?
- believe it’s normal to mind your own business when other students are starting drama for people
- believe it’s important to defend your friends when someone is making drama for them?

For “how many,” the questionnaire offered a collection of pictograms of six outlined stick figures, with one, two, three, four, five, or six filled in; for example, zero filled-in figures indicating almost none, three filled-in indicating about half, and six filled-in indicating almost everyone.

Here are the questions they asked about perceptions of descriptive norms, or the student’s empirical expectations: How often do students:

- spread rumors about students at [school]?
• forward or send emails, IMs, or texts to other students to gossip about or
threaten someone?
• threaten [one another] with physical violence
• act as a negotiator to calm down a conflict or break up a fight?
• stand up for someone when they are being insulted or harassed?

The descriptive-norms questions had a four-point scale, from Never to Several Times a Week.

The researchers asked about personal beliefs (attitudes). Do you:
• think that there is a problem of too many students gossiping, spreading rumors, or making drama for you?
• personally have a problem of too many students gossiping, spreading rumors, or making drama for you?
• think that students are seriously emotionally affected when people gossip or spread rumors about them or when people make drama for them?

The personal belief questions also had a four-point scale.

They also independently measured behavioral outcomes, whether a student was:
• nominated by teachers as one who defend others from harassment or as one who does not harass
• formally disciplined by the school for harassment
• purchased an anti-harassment wristband

The reference groups studied were the whole student population (well-bounded) and local cliques of friends (identified by social network data). Empirical expectations, normative expectations, personal attitudes, and other items were measured at three points in time; and behavioral outcomes were independently measured. Salient social referents were randomly assigned to the intervention. The research effort was well endowed, and took place in field conditions less strenuous than the typical development setting. But the underlying principles of the study can be applied elsewhere.

**Adapting Individual-Level Stages-of-Change to a Social-Norms Context**

The stages of change, or transtheoretical, model (Prochaska and DiClemente 1984) is widely applied in behavior change programs, especially those concerned with health. Kok and Ruiter (2014) state that the transtheoretical model has declined in popularity, many researchers suggesting that there are only two stages of change: motivation and action, citing Brug et al. (2005). One of its attractions is that the stages – precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance – allow for periodic monitoring, showing progress on the way to final behavior change, thereby justifying continuation of program effort. The stages of change model, however, almost always assumes independent individual action; the stages are described entirely in terms of individual deliberation and action. Yet some researchers, programmers, and surveyors involved in behavior change are familiar with its precepts, and may find it comfortable to adapt the model to

interdependent actions among members of a group. If this were possible, their data collection on changing of independent individual action and changing of interdependent group action would be more unified. A preliminary step in such a scheme might be to determine whether the behavior of interest is that of an independent individual or an interdependent group.

Shell-Duncan (et al. 2010) adapted the stages-of-change model to social-norms change in their study of the practice of FGM/C in Senegal and The Gambia. This scheme, or something like it, could be useful for measuring social-norms change in other settings. Personal attitude or preference can differ from social-norm compliance or behavior. Hence, categories are needed which cross three states of attitude (supportive of FGM/C, ambivalent, opposes FGM/C) with three states of being (practitioner, undecided, abandoner).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Preference</th>
<th>Ambivalent</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practitioner</td>
<td>Supporters</td>
<td>Contemplators</td>
<td>Reluctant Practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Willing Abandoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoner</td>
<td>Reluctant Abandoners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assigned stage of change algorithm for categorizing stage of change among Senegambian respondents. Source: Shell Duncan et al. (2010, p. 38)

This yields five meaningful stages of change:

- Willing practitioner (and noncontemplator)
- Contemplator
- Reluctant practitioner (no behavior change but attitude change)
- Reluctant abandoner (behavior change but no attitude change)
- Willing abandoner (behavior change and attitude change)

This was a mixed methods study, integrated in three phases over a three year period. Following initial ethnographic research, survey questions were designed and tested. Three survey questions were agree/disagree statements indicating Support of FGM/C, another three indicating Ambivalence, and another three indicating Opposition. Three survey questions were about behavior, whether uncircumcised girls in the immediate family will be circumcised in the future: Yes, Not Sure, No. Researchers used answers to these questions to assign a respondent to one of the five stages of change. Also respondents were asked to assign themselves to one of the five stages. There was high concordance between the assigned and self-described stages of change. The original transtheoretical change model posited a progressive sequence through the stages of change. Shell-Duncan et al. suggest that their respondents may move back and forth between stages.
We saw that with a one-way dependent practice, change in individuals’ behavior tends to follow changes in their attitudes. But with a strongly interdependent practice, individual attitudes can accumulate without much behavioral change until enough people in the population are ready to make the change. An adapted stages-of-change model (devised by research assistant on this project, Elaine Denny) could track change in a social norm across time with a few standard KAP questions roughly along the following lines:

- Are you aware of the new behavior?
- Do you practice the new behavior? The old behavior?
- Do you approve of the new behavior? The old behavior?

If one considers the primary dimensions of change to be shifts in attitude and behavior, these stages of change can be mapped according to the following matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD ATTITUDE</th>
<th>NEW ATTITUDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-contemplation (unaware and support old)</td>
<td>Non-contemplation (aware and support old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant abandonment (unaware and support old)*</td>
<td>Reluctant abandonment (aware and support old)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*may not occur often; involves unthinking mimicry of other abandoners in network

Change in attitude and behavior may not be progressive, and may follow different pathways depending on context and timing. Attitude may change before behavior, behavior may change before attitude, and periods of contemplation may indicate higher likelihood of transition or possibility for backsliding. The figure below illustrates two primary pathways of social norms change:

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\[17\] This scheme was devised by PCA Research Assistant Elaine Denny.
Progress towards change would be indicated by increases in the number of respondents in the matrix cells along either arrow. Maintenance of a new social norm would be indicated by the greater part of the population being willing abandoners for a sustained period of time. This simple method relies on personal attitude to approximate change in social norm over time rather than on a more exacting measure of empirical and normative expectations.

**Community-Level Stages of Change: The Community Readiness Model**

The Community Readiness Model (CRM) assesses a community's readiness to change. It was developed by the Tri-Ethnic Center for Prevention Research at Colorado State University by researchers and practitioners with active experience in supporting community action to prevent substance abuse, violence, and victimization in the American Indian, Anglo, and Mexican-American populations (Edwards et al. 2000). The Center’s view is that, “Efforts by local people are likely to have the greatest and most sustainable impact in solving local problems and in setting local norms” (292). An original research motive of the CRM was to match treatment and control communities in experimental interventions such that they were at the same level of readiness to change. At one point the Center trained teams from ten communities in drug abuse prevention, but when programs were implemented there was high variation in the progress of change across the ten communities. The researchers wanted to find a way to describe and explain that variation. They were aware of Prochaska and DiClemente’s (1984) model of stages of individual readiness to change. However, that model was only suggestive, because individual processes of change are different in kind from group processes of change. They wrote up many descriptions of critical incidents and events having to do with change of attitudes and behavior at the community level, and in a disciplined process of evaluation sorted them into five dimensions and eight stages of readiness. They also consulted with community members about the scheme which resulted in the addition of an additional dimension and an additional stage. Next, a disciplined process using expert raters selected anchor statements descriptive of each stage, a key element of the CRM scoring procedure.

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18 The CRM was brought to our attention by Hazel Barrett, REPLACE2, University of Coventry.
The CRM process provides guidance in identifying the issue, defining the community, conducting key respondent interviews, scoring of readiness levels, and developing strategies appropriate to each readiness level. A complete manual is online at [http://triethniccenter.colostate.edu/docs/CR_Handbook_2014.pdf](http://triethniccenter.colostate.edu/docs/CR_Handbook_2014.pdf); theoretical background can be found in Edwards et al. (2000) and other references listed at the Center website. The CRM asks a set of 36 (20 of them essential) semi-structured questions, taking 20-60 minutes to administer, to about 4 to 12 key respondents from different elements of the community. The semi-structured questions are grouped to elicit information relevant to evaluating readiness to change in each of six dimensions, which are:

- Community Efforts
- Community Knowledge of the Efforts
- Leadership
- Community Climate
- Community Knowledge of the Issue
- Resources Related to the Issue

At least two researchers study each transcribed interview and independently rate it according to readiness of change on each of the six dimensions. Next, they discuss their scores of a given interview per dimension until consensus is reached on each. There are nine stages of community readiness, scored 1 to 9:

- No Awareness
- Denial/Resistance
- Vague Awareness
- Preplanning
- Preparation
- Initiation
- Stabilization
- Expansion/Confirmation
- Community Ownership

Raters are provided an anchored rating scale for each dimension, for example, for Community Knowledge of Current Efforts, if “Some community members have at least heard about local efforts, but know little about them,” that would be rated 4. The raters’ consensus score of each interview, per dimension, is averaged. This is the readiness to change score for that dimension. For example, if the average of scores is 6 on the Leadership dimension it means that, “Leadership plays a key role in planning, developing and/or implementing new, modified, or increased efforts...” Finally, the average score for each of the six dimensions is averaged for an Overall Community Readiness score.

A community’s scores may differ across dimensions, and a program should direct attention to those dimensions with lower readiness scores. Each dimensional readiness score and the overall readiness score can guide a program to the most appropriate response. For example, if the community is at the Stabilization stage, the goal is to support
stabilization, perhaps to: plan community events to maintain support, conduct training sessions for community professionals and members, introduce program evaluation, increase media exposure, hold recognition events for active supporters and volunteers.

REPLACE 2 is a European Commission Daphne III funded consortium led by Professor Hazel Barrett and Dr. Katherine Brown at University of Coventry and involves six other partner organizations in the European Union. The REPLACE 2 program integrates individual behavior change with a participatory community-based approach to the abandonment of female genital mutilation/cutting among diasporal communities in the EU (http://www.replacefgm2.eu/). It seeks to investigate social beliefs and social norms among practicing communities, to understand obstacles to change and mechanisms for changing social norms (Barrett 2014). REPLACE 2 adapted the Community Readiness Model to the problem of FGM/C and the communities they work with, and are refining the approach. One community they found to be at CRM stage 2, community denial/resistance, and in response they started a project to form community groups to raise awareness of the issue; another community is at CRM stage 4 – preplanning and a sense that something should be done – and in response they developed teaching materials for Koranic school teachers on Islam and FGM/C (Barrett 2014). REPLACE 2 says that the CRM helps target interventions and to track change, and could be a proxy measure of the progress of FGM/C abandonment.
The Community Readiness Model was devised by researchers and practitioners organizing community change of social norms. The Tri-Ethnic Center and REPLACE 2 each say that the method is easy and affordable to use. The readiness assessment is not a blunt tool: readiness can differ across six dimensions and the interviews with key respondents can be consulted for further detail. It is a useful guide to assist the design of program content and sequencing so that it is matched to the readiness of a given community. REPLACE 2 is trialing and refining its application to the social norm of FGM/C, a new setting for the model. For program evaluation it would be desirable to add a behavioral measure of the valued change, or to document that in comparable circumstances reaching a stage increases the probability of reaching the next stage and ultimately the valued outcome. A recent review essay declares that the measurement of collective readiness to change constructs is in its infancy (Casteñada et al. 2012); and critical insights from additional theoretical perspectives and new settings would be welcome.

**The Matching-Game Method of Identifying Social Norms**

This might be a simple and practical method to identify social norms in the field. Response bias occurs when a respondent gives an answer she thinks the investigators want to hear rather than reporting her true beliefs, and is always a concern when collecting self-report data from respondents. Krupka and coworkers (Krupka, Weber, and Croson No Date; Krupka and Weber 2008; Burks and Krupka 2011) propose what might be a more incentive-compatible method for identifying social norms. Despite its apparent appeal, it might be unsuitable in a program evaluation context.

Krupka, Weber, and Croson (No Date) recruited University of Pennsylvania students for the following exercise. The subjects read a scenario, in which two students agree to meet in the library, and the first student arrives either exactly on time or 20 minutes late. Subjects rate each action as Very Socially Inappropriate, Socially Inappropriate, Socially Appropriate, or Very Socially Appropriate. Subjects are told that if their ratings match that of another randomly selected student at the university, they will be paid extra. Thus, each respondent has an incentive to report her belief about what others believe. Then, the subject is asked to report her own personal rating, with no incentive. In another rating, subjects were asked to match their responses with another randomly selected student from the same country, and again they would be paid extra for an exact match. Another scenario is about a person tipping for a $10 meal. The subject rates the appropriateness of leaving no tip, 5%, 10%, 12% 15%, and 20%, again attempting to match either other students, or someone from the same country. Again, she is asked her own personal rating as well. The researchers find that the subjects can accurately match appropriateness ratings, that matching ratings differ according to reference group (student-student or same country-same country), that matching ratings differ from personal ratings, and that personal ratings do not vary by country.

Any number of respondents can be queried. So that the respondent believes she has a chance of winning the coordination game, one would reward her based on whether her estimate matches the estimate of another randomly drawn respondent. The method could
be used to elicit both empirical and normative expectations, and also perhaps to disclose pluralistic ignorance. A respondent could take part in a matching game about whether, with respect to the appropriate reference group, people believe that almost none, some, many, or almost everyone does X, and separately whether the respondent does X. The respondent could be asked whether people believe that almost none, some, many, almost everyone approves of one doing X, and separately whether the respondent approves of doing X. The respondent could be asked whether others would positively sanction X or negatively sanction non-X. There are further possibilities. These matters require more thorough examination. Repetition of measures over time could track change in attitude, behavior, empirical expectations, and normative expectations.

Burks and Krupka (2011) adapted the method to the identification of ethical norms in a large financial services firm. The study's theoretical framework, especially the construct ethical norm, is unclear. If theoretically clarified it could be of use in investigating social norms within and between dominant and subordinate groups, such as caste or gender hierarchies. The study was about the reciprocal ethical expectations among the rank-and-file Financial Advisers in the firm. But there was also research interest in the relationship between the actual practices of the Financial Advisers and the ethical expectations of the Corporate Leaders above them. Thus, four different coordination games (with rewards for matching) were played. One between Financial Advisers and Financial Advisers, about the actual norms held by advisers. A second between Financial Advisers and Corporate Leaders on the beliefs of Financial Advisers about the norms desired by Corporate Leaders. A third between Corporate Leaders and Financial Advisers on Corporate Leaders' beliefs about the actual norms held by advisers. A fourth between Corporate Leaders about their expectations of Financial Advisers.

Corporate Leaders strongly agreed on what they required of their subordinate Financial Advisers, and Financial Advisers clearly knew what the Corporate Leaders expected of them. Financial Advisers strongly agreed about what they expected of one another: more nuanced and less zealous response to ethical problems, unlike the black-and-white expectations of the Corporate Leaders. And Corporate Leaders reasonably understood what the actual norms of Financial Advisers were. For our purposes, the content of the study is of no interest, but the structure of its inquiry is. In this study we have assumed that the reference group is what Coleman (1990) called conjoint: those who approve (or disapprove) are the same people as those who are approved (or disapproved). But caste or gender hierarchies could be disjoint; those who approve (or disapprove) are a different set of people than those who are approved (or disapproved). It is straightforward to extend the analyses of this report to the problem of disjoint norms, but it is work that remains to be done.
Belief and Norm Identification Using the Coordination Game Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who are the targets of the match?</th>
<th>Financial Advisers</th>
<th>Corporate Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Advisers</td>
<td>(Cell 1)</td>
<td>Beliefs of financial advisers about norms desired by corporate leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Leaders</td>
<td>(Cell 3)</td>
<td>Desired norms for financial advisers held by corporate leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual norms held by financial advisers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate leader’s beliefs about actual norms held by financial advisers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Burks and Krupka (2011, 37)

A possibly fatal problem is that if there is a community-level norms-change program, then there could be community-level response bias. That is, if there has been much community attention to the behavior that the program praises and rewards, then an actually unchanged individual could easily state that she has changed, accurately predict that another actually unchanged individual would state that he has changed, and collect the reward!

Conclusions and Future Research

We summarized and synthesized social-norms theory from a wide variety of perspectives. We conducted a search of the development literature for instances of social-norms measurement, but no doubt we missed much, especially what was published in informal reports. We have made the point that to measure attitudes is not to measure social norms. We found that attitudes are routinely measured, social expectations rarely are. When social expectations are measured, it is usually by means of partial adaptation of Fishbein and Ajzen’s Reasoned Action Approach or by a more spontaneous method.

As this report is disseminated, we hope to learn more about how people measure social norms, about how any of the ideas in this report have been tried and how that turned out, and new ideas about how to measure the constructs in various settings.

We introduced the basics of social-norms measurement: descriptive and injunctive beliefs about others, in a reference group, and anticipated reactions of the referents. We showed how our constructs manifest in ordinary conversation if one is alert to them. We devised eight (or fewer) simple questions to ask about social norms and their change in
KAP or focus group, and four simple ways to notice possible social norms in DHS and MICS data.

We hailed Paluck and Shepherd (2012) as an exemplary model, given high resources in an easily managed context, for conducting a social norms study. We critically scrutinized the leading Reasoned Action Approach, a well-developed theory and practice with an active and diverse community of followers and critics. It is a resource even if one does not apply the approach. If used, the RAA probably requires supplementation of theory and measurement about mechanisms that close the gap between intention and behavior, such as plans, planning, and self-regulation (Sniehotta 2009). Its individualistic bias needs correction. Its cognitively demanding quantitative survey, especially if applying the full model, may limit its use in routine development program evaluations or among traditional populations. Its exclusive use of self-report surveys is also a limitation; measurement of behavioral outcomes (as in Paluck and Ball 2012), controlled behavioral experiments in the field intended to reveal normative beliefs and actions (Ensminger and Henrich 2014, Habyarimana et al. 2009), methods that reduce response bias (Graeme, Imai, Lyall, 2014), qualitative methods that more reliably and fully get at people’s reasons for beliefs and actions (Cislaghi, Gillespie, and Mackie 2014), and even hormonal or neural methods (Lieberman 2013) are options to pursue.

Social norms, we showed, are difficult to identify and measure because they are constituted by beliefs and desires rather than by behaviors. Dutta-Bergman (2005) objected that “behavior change” theories and programs mistakenly focus on isolated beliefs rather than the webs of beliefs that make up the culture in a community. We pointed out that harmful social practices are complex schemas of individual beliefs, socially shared beliefs about the nonsocial world, reciprocal beliefs in a group about its social world, beliefs about the self including personal attitudes and self-efficacy, moral norms, actions, structural constraints – resistant to change and almost impossible to change without an accurate model of the causal forces that maintain them. Our concern should shift from social norms to social schemas.

We know how to gather better quantitative data on social norms. What most needs work are more and better ways, many of them likely qualitative, to understand and change for the better social schemas: methods like projective tests, Q-sorting, repertory grid, semantic network, hearsay ethnography, iEAr, and other innovations.
Appendix I: Norms Measurement in Practice

In choosing examples of norms measurement strategies in practice, we reviewed approximately 200 different reports related to social norms. These reports included presentations from conferences co-ordinated by UNICEF in late 2012 and spring 2013, as well as 173 journal articles and published policy documents generously shared with us by UNICEF staff.

We found that the large majority of published studies and reports on social norms to date have focused on theory or in-depth description of the social norms programming itself. Only about 14% of the documents we reviewed provided a substantial discussion of social norms measurement strategies. Of these, the majority emphasized qualitative inquiries or simple pre/post measurement of personal attitudes and behaviors. Both of these strategies are discussed below. We include the examples from our review of conference and journal reports which contained the most content on social norms measurement strategies, including those which represent creative and innovative worth further attention.

We did not individually examine the thousand articles in the tradition of the Reasoned Action Approach. Many of those are about health behaviors in the developed world, and many are about more independent practices where social influence is weak. There are many valuable lessons and insights in this literature, but much of that is authoritatively summarized in Fishbein and Ajzen’s comprehensive book on the RAA (2010). The studies we report below that are more specifically measuring social norms seem to be applying measurement ideas from the RAA approach.

Quantitative Methods

Soul City. Soul City, based in South Africa, uses edutainment – television and radio drama, and mass distribution of booklets – to address empowerment of women and girls, gender-sensitive men, violence against women, masculinity, women’s self-efficacy, and all aspects of HIV and AIDS. It seeks to change the broader social and community environment, for example to increase access to services, increase debate, increase collective efficacy, and facilitate community action and community norms. It also seeks to shift social norms and decrease peer pressure, increase support-giving behavior, and stimulate interpersonal dialogue and debate (Ndondo 2013).

Relevant to our inquiry here, they find that the impact of edutainment is not just on the individual but also on the individual’s perception that the community’s normative and empirical expectations are changing. For example, they collected data on both personal attitude and subjective social norm concerning the statement, “A man is right in expecting

19 Ajzen maintains an extensive bibliography here: http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpbrefs.html
to have sex without a condom.” They found that with increasing exposure to Soul City edutainment more respondents believed that others in the community disagreed with that statement (that is, more believed that others in their community thought men had no right to expect sex without a condom). Roughly 50% thought men had no such right or no exposure to Soul City, increasing to about 75% for those with four exposures.

They also found that perceiving a change in normative expectations in the reference group was not necessarily mediated through interpersonal dialogue, and did not directly translate into positive behavior. Over nine months, perceived change in normative expectations was associated with change in personal attitude. For example, concerning the statement “people with AIDS should be moved away,” 33% of those who believed that normative expectations in the reference group had turned against that view also turned against that view in their personal attitude. In contrast, less than 2% of those who believed that normative expectations were unchanged or even more stigmatizing turned against that view in their personal attitude, a statistically significant difference.

Similarly, 38% of those who believed that normative expectations of their friends had turned against the view that men had the right to refuse condoms turned against that view in their personal attitude. That compares to 11% of those who did not think their friends’ expectations had changed, and 1% of those who thought their friends more believed one has the right to refuse a condom, a statistically different significance. More exposure to Soul City edutainment was associated with more self-reported condom use, asking partner to use condom, and HIV testing.

They asked the above two and below three questions at baseline and later at evaluation among those exposed to Soul City edutainment (Soul City 2001):

- Would most of your friends agree or disagree that a man is right to have sex with their girlfriends if they buy them gifts?
- Would most of your friends agree or disagree that women need to depend on their husbands or boyfriends for a better life?
- Would most of your friends agree or disagree that if a person really loves their boyfriend or girlfriend, they will have sex with them?

Soul City also constructed a peer-pressure variable by categorizing respondents according to whether their personal attitude is – more negative than /as negative as / as neutral as / as positive as / and more positive than – what they believe their community’s or friends’ attitudes are. Suppose that at baseline one reports a belief that the reference group agrees with the statement, “Boys/men have the right to have sex with their girlfriends if they buy them gifts,” but one reports that one disagrees with the statement: that indicates peer pressure on one to change from disagree to agree. At evaluation, if one now believes that the reference group disagrees with the statement and one still disagrees with the statement, then there is an imputed reduction in peer pressure. They find that at
evaluation, peer pressure is reduced across the five questions of interest mentioned above (Soul City 2001).

**Getting Real About Violence.** *Getting Real about Violence®* is a curriculum designed to reduce verbal and physical aggression, including secondary behaviors among one’s peer group that may increase the likelihood of aggression (watching a fight, spreading rumors about a fight, etc.). The program focused on junior high youth in an unnamed city in the U.S. Midwest. Program content included a multimedia curriculum shared with 293 male and female seventh graders over the course of twelve lessons. The curriculum used videos, role play, discussions, panelists, and other interactive strategies to convey messages about four target behaviors: fighting, watching a fight, spreading fight rumors, and verbal aggression.

To evaluate the program’s efficacy, *Getting Real about Violence®* evaluators developed questions about past personal behavior, anticipated personal behavior, perceptions of others’ expectations, personal norms, and beliefs/opinions. Disaggregating an issue in this way allows for more nuanced assessment of how personal behaviors align with social expectations (Meyer et al. 2004). The questionnaire structure drew heavily from the work of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), discussed previously in this document. Worth noting though is that the emphasis in the *Getting Real about Violence®* assessment still focuses more on individuals’ personal behavior and beliefs, rather than on those of the reference group. Examples of each of the types of questions are provided below:

- **Personal behavior:** Respondents were asked to report how often they fought, saw a fight, and spread rumors about a fight, as well as how often they exhibited different kinds of verbal aggression. Each behavior was assessed by asking, *During the past 30 days, how many times did you ____?* Responses were categorized by frequency (“0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more” for fights; “0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21 or more” for each type of verbal aggression).

- **Anticipated personal behavior:** Intention to engage in verbal aggression or get into a fight was assessed by asking *How many times do you think you will ____ in the next 30 days?* Four distinct types of verbal aggression were again assessed including *make fun of someone, swear at someone, yell at someone,* and *insult someone.* Responses were categorized by frequency (“0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more” for fights; “0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21 or more” for each type of verbal aggression).

- **Normative expectations:** Individuals’ perceptions of others’ normative expectations were also assessed. These expectations were measured by asking *Do most of the kids you know think you should ____?* Response categories were *definitely yes,* *probably yes,* *probably no,* and *definitely no.*

- **Personal attitudes:** Respondents were asked to complete the statements, “*For me, ____ is/are:***. A scale was developed to assess attitudes for each behavior under investigation. It included six semantically different items, each along a five-point scale. The spectrum for each item was: *very uncool to very cool,* *very boring to very cool,* *very important to very unimportant,* *very easy to very difficult,* *very safe to very dangerous,* and *very helpful to very unhelpful.*
fun, very bad to very good, very dumb to very smart, very harmful to very helpful, and very punishing to very rewarding (i.e., higher scores meant more positive attitudes).

• Belief and opinion items: The survey also measured five global beliefs and opinions about fighting (i.e., “It’s o.k. to walk away from a fight, whether or not you think you’d win,” “Fighting usually solves a problem,” etc.) and seven global beliefs and opinions about violence in general (i.e., “Violence can happen to kids my age,” “Violence in television and movies encourages violence,” etc.). In all cases, the response categories were strongly agree, agree, don’t agree or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.

In Getting Real about Violence®, these questions were asked to students in both the program and control schools before and after the program. The questions allowed for assessment of different behaviors linked to aggression (both past behavior and anticipated behavior), as well as enabled measurement of attitudinal change. Paired-sample t tests of responses within each of the above categories were used to compare changes over time within both program and control schools.

The study found that in the school that received the program, students showed statistically significant improvements in specific attitudes and behaviors compared to the control school. The program school showed nine times more changes in positive behavior and nearly one third fewer negative changes in behavior. The largest impact was seen in the area of verbal aggression, with less verbal aggression reported over the past thirty days, and less reported intent to engage in verbal aggression over the coming month. A large change was also measured in reported behavioral intent, with the program school outperforming the control school on measures assessing planned engagement with three of the four target behaviors.

The evaluators also created two composite indices to measure aggregate changes in norms around fighting and verbal aggression; in both cases they also found statistically significant improvements in the program school.

**GEM/IMAGES.** The Gender Equitable Male (GEM) Scale developed by ProMundo and Population Council offers field-tested examples of questions that measure social norms and their response to program activity (Pulerwitz and Barker 2008). This measurement tool supports the larger work of ProMundo, which strives to shift norms related to gender violence, conceptions of masculinities, and gender power dynamics. A unique aspect of ProMundo’s work is its emphasis on male empowerment and the need to shift what types of behaviors are perceived to lead to social approval for men.

The GEM scale questions offer an example of a methodologically rigorous approach to social-norm assessment that can be incorporated into a broader KAP assessment. In the GEM case a set of these questions measuring individual behavior as well as attitudes has been built into ProMundo’s larger IMAGES survey (“International Men and Gender Equality Survey”). IMAGES is a comprehensive household survey covering a wide range of gender equality topics, and it has been administered to more than 8000 men and 3500 women in
Brazil, Chile, Croatia, India, Mexico, and Rwanda. The adaptability of this question module to different survey contexts allows for multi-faceted analysis of where gender-related social norms exist and how they have changed over multiple iterations of the survey’s administration in a given location (Barker et al. 2011).

The GEM Scale’s questions were determined by first asking a larger pool of questions and then identifying which items generated the most reliable responses and proved most fruitful for analysis.\(^\text{20}\) Survey designers found that responses varied based on whether a question was worded positively or negatively, and that in general positive wording with respect to a target behavior yielded more consistent and reliable answers than negative wording (Barker 2013).

Questions below are those used in the final GEM Scale. Answer choices included the following: agree (3), partially agree (2), do not agree (1), and do not know (4). To create the GEM Scale, responses were coded 1-3 according to the level of agreement indicated, with numbering flipped where questions were asked in the negative. Then, the values were summed to create a scale, or a composite measure that indicates an overall level of gender-equitable attitudes and behavior. Within the scale, there were two sub-factors which allowed for separate analysis of inequitable and equitable schemas. The sub-factors encompass questions about empirical expectation, normative expectation, and social norm.

**Factor 1: Inequitable Gender Norm**

- A couple should decide together if they want to have children. [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]
- In my opinion, a woman can suggest using condoms just like a man can. [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative] men demand
- If a guy gets a woman pregnant, the child is the responsibility of both. [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]
- A man should know what his partner likes during sex. [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]
- It is the man who decides what type of sex to have. [descriptive/empirical]
- A woman’s most important role is to take care of her home and cook for her family. [injunctive/normative]
- Men need sex more than women do. [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]
- You don’t talk about sex, you just do it. [descriptive/empirical]
- Women who carry condoms on them are “easy.” [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]

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\(^\text{20}\) Barker and Pulerwitz (2008) note: “As recommended by Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991), all items were written in one language by a bilingual person and then tested through back-translation by a second individual. Double negatives were avoided (Doak, Doak, and Root 1996), and items were worded both positively and negatively (DeVellis 1991).”
The third question (men need sex more than women do) could be construed as a belief about the nonsocial environment. But it carries the connotation that men demand (do) and are entitled (should have) more sex, and the question is asked of both men and women. The “you” in the fourth question (you don’t talk about sex) is in the third-person singular, referring to people in general. The fifth question says that carrying condoms means that a woman is easy, what we called a social norm of coordination where an action conveys a social meaning regardless of the intention of the actor.

**Factor 2: Equitable Gender Norm**

- A couple should decide together if they want to have children.  
  [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]
- In my opinion, a woman can suggest using condoms just like a man can.  
  [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative] men demand
- If a guy gets a woman pregnant, the child is the responsibility of both.  
  [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]
- A man should know what his partner likes during sex.  
  [descriptive/empirical & injunctive/normative]

Each of the elements of Factor 2 could be construed to be a moral norm. However, each is about expectations of reciprocity that men and women have of one another, not just specific couples but couples generally, and could be construed as social.

The scale serves its purpose of distinguishing between an inequitable gender *schema* and an equitable gender *schema*. If the goal were to understand causes of those schema, consideration could be given to asking questions that are unambiguously about nonsocial beliefs, personal attitude, empirical expectations, normative expectations, and moral norms.

Of the countries where GEM was used as a component of ProMundo’s IMAGES household survey (Brazil, Chile, Croatia, India, Mexico, Rwanda), the instrument found that Rwandan and Indian men “consistently supported the least equitable norms” (Barker et al. 2011). On average, unmarried men reported the most inequitable attitudes, and gender-equitable attitudes increased with educational attainment.

**Berhane Hewan.** Berhane Hewan was a two-year program aimed at reducing early child marriage in Ethiopia. In addition to questions about the main behavior focused on by the initiative, monitoring questions included additional metrics for measuring norms around sexual and reproductive health. The study asked questions specifically targeting knowledge, attitude, and practices, similar to techniques discussed above. A valuable additional dimension is the study’s method for assessing contemplation.

In a social norms version of the Stages of Change, contemplation of the new norm can be indicated by periods of movement back and forth between behaviors, or increased contemplation of the new behavior. Contemplation can indicate increased openness to the
new behavior, even if behavior has not yet changed, or can signal a possible time of uncertainty where one is susceptible to norm reversion. Thus, measuring the amount of deliberation or discourse about a norm can be informative both for program monitoring and evaluation. In Berhane Hewan’s evaluation, the survey took a useful and easily replicable approach to measuring contemplation (Erulkar and Muthengi 2009). The study asked:

*How frequently did you discuss each of the following topics in the last year with your closest friends?*

- HIV/AIDS
- STIs
- Family planning methods
- Condoms
- Violence in community
- Problems in marriage
- Kind of spouse desired

Results showed a significant increase in the frequency with which marriage-related topics were discussed in the post-program period, suggesting an increase in deliberation around local marriage norms. Inclusion of non-program themes in the assessment list can act as a control to help link increased contemplation to the program itself.

**Mixed-Methods**

A recent meta-analysis of UNICEF child protection programs indicated that relatively few programs employed mixed methods in their assessment strategies (Ager, Akesson, and Schunk 2010). This indicates that there is much potential for expanding social norms measurement tools, particularly since it is becoming increasingly common to take a “mixed methods” approach to survey research. In social norms work especially, qualitative and quantitative data each have their respective advantages and disadvantages. Employing a combination of the two incorporates the benefits of both while minimizing the drawbacks of either (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).

**Qualitative data** can provide more detail or nuance regarding a group’s practices, clarify complex relationships, or reveal general attitudes. **Quantitative data** provides concrete numerical data on a practice, belief, or norm’s prevalence. Such data allows for statistical analysis of change over time.

Focus groups plus individual surveys is a particularly useful combination for social norms measurement. Experience in Senegal indicates that – if facilitated properly – focus groups are more successful than individual questionnaires in encouraging people to share information about a targeted practice, even for a sensitive subject like FGM/C (Shell-Duncan 2012). This information can be used to inform question design in individual surveys, and it can also be used later in the program as a temperature check on what current attitudes and beliefs are within the community. Qualitative results can also
improve evaluators’ understanding and interpretation of quantitative results during the program evaluation phase.

Survey questions, then, offer a statistically sound way of ascertaining a sample group’s attitudes and being able to extrapolate these findings to the beliefs of the population as a whole. Furthermore, the use of a control group gives a rigorous method for understanding when and where programming has changed beliefs, even before behavior changes (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).

**Qualitative Methods**

**Focus Groups.** The subsection on Simple Inquires earlier in the report suggests open-ended questions in focus groups. The prior subsection on Identifying Social Norms and their Change in Conversation is also relevant.

A main challenge when dealing with qualitative research is how to extract analyzable data from a large volume of text or other materials. SASA! is an awareness and empowerment campaign in Uganda which emphasizes long-term community engagement and mobilization as core strategies for preventing violence against women and the spread of HIV (Michau 2013). SASA! blends a stages of change model with theory about the circles of influence that surround an individual; it uses this theory to shape local activism, media outreach, and training tools. Core to the SASA! model is the concept of power, and how different individuals in a group perceive and use this power – a concept that lends itself well to qualitative assessment strategies.

To test the efficacy of its work, SASA! designed the rubric below to code statements made in focus groups. This rubric approach may be a valuable tool in other contexts as well for translating qualitative research into numeric data.
SASA! example for coding focus group responses

If appropriate after pretests, social norms issues such as who is the reference group, is the behavior typical among them, is it approved of them, could be included on the coding sheet.

While the results of the SASA! evaluation are still forthcoming, the program also emphasizes how these outcome tracking tools have allowed program implementers to incorporate participant feedback in real time to better calibrate the program to participants’ needs and perceptions.

**Multi-Media Methods.** Depending on the norm, question-driven focus groups may not be the most fruitful means of gathering qualitative data. In some cases, respondents may have a difficult time discussing in the abstract a norm, its negative sanctions for non-compliance, and its alternatives. Many NGOs have developed creative methods for stimulating discussion and for collecting information about prevalent beliefs and practices based on totally different types of interaction.

The Kishori Abhiyan initiative in Bangladesh (Amin 2011; Sood 2012) strives to reduce child marriage. As part of its ongoing assessment of norms surrounding marriage and self-esteem, Kishori Abhiyan conducts a number of written exercises with its teenage participants. They are asked to journal in response to prompts such as “I AM...”. The response of Shumi Akhter, age 13, provides an illustrative insight into how these responses can indicate changes in attitude and behavior as a result of programming:

*I am thankful that I could get away from all this safely. I learned about early marriage, dowry, birth registration, gender, child rights, HIV/AIDS,*
etc. in the ‘kishori club’. I have also learnt to protest. I will take my own decisions when I grow up. No one can force decisions on me. I know my rights now, and how to fight for them (EuropeAid 2011).

A main source of material demonstrating norm change is the “Stories of Change” exercise, where respondents write how the program has changed their ways of thinking and operating in the world. In addition, Kishori Abhijan also asks participants to draw (combination of image and text) their ideal husband – changes in these images over time also lend themselves to content analysis. Over the course of the program, evaluators found that participating young women formed a stronger sense of self-worth, confidence, and connectedness. They felt more comfortable going out in their community and had acquired increase health, nutrition, and family planning knowledge.

The GREAT project targeting gender roles and reproductive health also adapts ethnographic research strategies to generate insights into perceived roles and norms in the community (Adams 2013). In one exercise, each participant is asked to choose and animal and describe why that animal best represents an ideal man or woman. The following response exemplifies how such exercises can provide concrete ways for individuals to articulate concepts that may be harder to express as fully in the abstract or in a close-ended survey:

I have selected a cow for an ideal woman; because a cow is used by human beings; it cannot do anything until its owner says so, just like a woman who waits for information from her husband. A cow is a hard working animal and when a task is given it carries it out, although it doesn’t want to. In a home sometimes there is misunderstanding and just like a cow is beaten when it fails to do tasks so is a woman beaten by her husband...and also a cow gives birth and feeds its own on milk just like a woman does. She also takes good care of her children. (Female, Age 18, Newly Married).

GREAT also uses spider mapping, which identifies the immediate reference group. The focus group is asked to identify and diagram different people’s relationship to themselves as individuals. Questions include “Who influences you?” and “Who are you close to?”, and responses are drawn as part of the exercise (see below) (Adams 2013).
There may be creative ways also to visualize more distant or general influence on the self. The data collected through a spider mapping technique can then inform answer choices on subsequent reference group questions. Additionally, the roles or individuals consistently identified as being closest to the self can be piped into the focus-group questions about what is typical among them, do they approve of an action, as we discussed earlier in the report.

Because GREAT is a five-year program that is still in progress, findings are not yet available from the program's monitoring and evaluation data. Overall, though, GREAT responses suggest how similar activities can shed light on the characteristics or behaviors valued valuable by individuals and perceived to be valued by a group as a whole.

Skits and radio dramas may also be used to ground a particular norm in a concrete example. Then, these performances can serve as the basis for focus group discussions about the norm, its alternatives, and the advantages and disadvantages of compliance. This approach is exemplified in the work of Elizabeth Levy Paluck, who used radio soap operas in Rwanda to communicate new norms about intermarriage, open dissent, trust, empathy, cooperation, and trauma healing (Paluck 2009). Analysis of program effects was achieved through both survey (quantitative) and focus group (qualitative) methods.

Strikingly, the program found that community discussion of the programs were key to catalyzing behavior change – an outcome that makes sense in the context of social norms theory, where collective knowledge about others’ beliefs and expectations is key for catalyzing personal behavior change. The program also found that individuals’ behaviors changed (toward more cooperative, less prejudiced action) before personal attitudes did, suggesting that social norms had a stronger influence on behavior than personal prejudice.
**Participatory Action Research.** The above measurement strategies provide an entry point for further consideration of creative, interactive measurement strategies. Participatory action research lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative research given program needs, although often on smaller scale due to time and resource requirements. Some examples of participatory action research are provided below, along with the relevant social norms application.

**Community Mapping.** Currently used by UNICEF in Community Led Total Sanitation initiatives, community mapping engages village members in physically drawing a map of their community. Facilitators can prompt participants to identify the location of key actors in the village, areas of particular threat, safe spaces, and/or places particularly relevant to the program to be implemented (such as areas of open defecation or spaces available for latrine construction). GREAT also uses community mapping in a gender violence context, with participants identifying safe spaces and places where boys and girls feel comfortable going (Adams 2013).

**Interactive Sorting Exercises.** Thought Partners have developed many interactive adaptations of the Q-methodology, which social scientists use to analyze shared ways of thinking among respondents. A typical Q sort approach asks multiple respondents to rank statements, and then factor analysis is performed to identify correlations in prioritization between individuals. An advantage of this kind of method is that it can be visual, tactile, and more engaging than simply numbering options in order of preference.

In one variation, participants are asked to sort cards (either created collectively or ahead of time) by categories of relevance to the researcher. For example, the CHOICES initiative (Save the Children 2011), which targeted gender roles in young adolescents, asked participants to play a card game where they sorted cards into piles of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors.

The GREAT program used a similar technique to assess perceptions of violence/insecurity, as well as acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. For the latter, Post-it notes containing different behaviors were mounted on the wall, and respondents were asked to collectively arrange the behaviors on a continuum from acceptable to unacceptable. Thus, not only did the exercise generate a ranked list of normatively acceptable behaviors, but it also stimulated discussion with rich qualitative content.
Photographs and Drawings. Participants can be asked to create a photo diary, either documenting subjects of particular relevance to them on a regular basis, or making images that fit with a pre-specified theme. CHOICES (Save the Children, 2011) asked children to make photographs that represented their hopes and dreams, and they also used photography as a way of documenting perceived gender roles and existing gender inequalities.

Minga Perú, a Peruvian NGO which strives to empower local women, used photography and drawings to assess the impact of its popular radio program Bienvenida Salud (Welcome Health). Listeners (with an emphasis on women and children) were given pencils and cameras, and they were then asked to visually document changes they observed to health, gender, and social conditions in their villages. The analysis of these images showed Minga’s direct and indirect influence in program communities, including how new forms of production were adopted by villagers, how men became more involved in projects like fish farms, and how parent-to-child communication improved (Singhal and Rattine-Flaherty 2006).

Video. In research by Lunch and Lunch (2006), participants were asked to use video to document issues of particular relevance to their lives. This was an iterative process, allowing researchers to understand how themes changed over time. In this case, participants were also able to view each other’s videos, enabling wider discussion about issues affecting the group as a whole.
Appendix II: Comparing Different Conceptions of Social Norms

We examined 17 different definitions of social norms offered by scholars in economics, law, philosophy, political science, public health, social psychology, and sociology. The definitions are compared in tabular form following this discussion. It might help to review the table first.

Although terminologies differ, the understanding of social norms tends to converge on these elements:

- **Social Expectations**: A Social Norm is constructed by one’s beliefs about what others do, and by one’s beliefs about what others think one should do.

- The relevant others we call a *Reference Group* (and different norms may be relative to different reference groups).

- A social norm is *Maintained by Social Influence*: approval, including positive sanctions by others in the reference group, and disapproval, including negative sanctions, or, according to some, also by acceptance of the legitimacy of others’ expectation.

These elements stand out in an early conceptual review by sociologist Gibbs (1965):

A norm...involves: (1) a collective evaluation of behavior in terms of what it ought to be; (2) a collective expectation as to what behavior will be; and/or (3) particular reactions to behavior, including attempts to apply sanctions or otherwise induce a particular kind of conduct.

Additionally,

- Most theorists consider a social norm to be a *Behavioral Rule*, although some consider it to be a regularity of behavior.

Finally, most theorists observe that Social Norms are distinct from Legal Norms or Personal Norms:

- *Legal Norms* are formal and commanded by states, and can be enforced by coercion. Social norms are informal, and are more maintained by approval and disapproval.

- A *Personal Norm* (including Moral Norm) or Personal Attitude is internally motivated and is distinct from a Social Norm which is, one way or another, externally motivated.
Definitions of social norms in the theoretical and practical literatures vary greatly in terminology, but most of them refer to some or many of the same set of elements. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein, pioneering theorists of social norms, refer to the subjective norm, perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform a given behavior. Lipinski and Rimal (2005) and Storey and Schoemaker (2006) call this the perceived norm, again because it is about the subjective beliefs of an individual about others in the reference group. Bicchieri calls much the same entity social expectations, again, beliefs about others (social psychology and public health mean by perception approximately what economics and philosophy mean by belief).

Cialdini (and Trost 1998), another pioneering theorist of norms in social psychology, developed an earlier distinction between informational influence and normative influence (Deutsch and Girard 1955) in an experimental research program carried out over many years. Gibb (1965) called these, respectively, collective expectation as to what behavior will be, and collective evaluation of behavior in terms of what it ought to be. Cialdini called the first a descriptive norm and called the second an injunctive norm, and these terms are common across several literatures. Ajzen and Fishbein originally conceived of their subjective norm as having only what Cialdini dubbed injunctive content, but late in their careers Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) split subjective norm into descriptive and injunctive elements. Bicchieri names her somewhat different constructs empirical expectations (descriptive) and normative expectations (injunctive); social expectations is shorthand for both empirical and normative expectations.

What we call here a reference group, is also called a collective, group, referents, population, community, bounded group, or set of persons.

Social norms are maintained by social influence, a wide concept (much social influence has nothing to do with social norms). Social influence includes the approval and disapproval of others for one’s actions, probably the easiest way to understand and explain social norms. The motivator most often mentioned across accounts is sanction, which can be either positive (reward) or negative (punishment), or, better, anticipation of such sanctions. A few authors (Fishbein & Ajzen 2010, Bicchieri 2006) also, correctly in our view, posit that in some circumstances some individuals may be motivated to comply with a social norm because they believe it is legitimate for others to expect it of them, that there is a social obligation (rather than a moral obligation) to comply. The anticipation of approval or disapproval by others is a convenient indicator of social norms. More exactly, we would want to know one’s beliefs about others, if one anticipated either overt sanctions or covert attitudes, or believed that social expectations of others are legitimate in this instance.

Fishbein & Ajzen’s (2010) model of behavior influenced by a social norm is the most detailed model, and is the most tested and refined in many studies by them and their followers (bibliography at http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpbrefs.html). It may include inessential elements, or elements not needed in some practical applications. For example, these theorists used to measure how strongly a respondent was motivated to comply with
what referents expect of them. They found across many studies, however, that this variable
did not add explanatory power, probably because their definition of referents is people who are important to me (142-143). One would likely be motivated to comply with the
expectations of those one picks out as important on the question. Rimal and Real (2003) in
an empirical study found that stronger group identity (proxied as similarity to others in a
group and wanting to be like them) was associated with stronger compliance with the
descriptive norm.

The variation across theories in this element of norms conceptions may be largely due
to differences in who the theorist counts as being in the reference group: if the reference
group is defined as a distinctive group only some of whom actually influence one’s action,
then the researcher wants to know whether one is actually influenced by a given individual
in the reference group. If the reference group is defined as a population all of whom
actually influence one’s action, then there is no need to inquire whether a given member of
the reference group actually influences one’s action. Which definition is appropriate
depends on the research context. If one knows from the respondent who is important to
them in deciding on and action regulated by the norm, then the reference group is
identified. If the respondent is known to be part of a distinctive group, such as resident in a
particular village, one might inquire how important the villagers’ expectations are to the
respondent. Bicchieri’s conditional preference requirement is different: one prefers to
conform if she has the requisite empirical and normative expectations. Elster intends
something similar in his discussion of quasi-moral (social for Bicchieri) norms: in
situations of reciprocity, some individuals would comply only if others would comply.

A social norm is called a rule, behavioral rule, standard, perceived standard, definition,
normative principle, or behavioral regularity in the population. There is a split, more calling
it a behavioral rule and some calling it a behavioral regularity. It is probably more apt to
consider it a behavioral rule, since many can be aware of a behavioral rule that is only
followed by a few in a population. Also, one cannot distinguish, solely by behavioral
evidence, a social norm based on interdependent beliefs among people in a reference group
from a mere population regularity of aggregated independent actions of individuals In
Coleman’s analytic sociology, whose primitives are actions and rights to control actions, a
social norm is a particular kind of assignment of rights-to-control in the population. For
Young it is an equilibrium in a coordination game.

Many authors distinguish personal norm, moral norm, personal attitude, personal
evaluation of the outcome, ego involvement from social norm (and social convention). The
term personal norm typically includes a prudential personal rule such as always to decline
tequila or a moral personal rule such as not to steal from others. A personal norm is
internally motivated, not externally motivated by the approval or disapproval of others
(others may happen to approve or disapprove, but that is not what drives one’s action). A
personal attitude is one’s pro or con attitude towards one’s own behavior; one’s attitude
independent of the expectations of others. One may favor an action, but refrain from doing
it if it would be negatively sanctioned by others: personal inclination can be outweighed by
social expectation. Fewer authors, probably because the distinction is more obvious,
emphasize that legal norms differ from social norms. Legal norms are commanded by the
state, formal, often explicit, legitimately enforceable by coercion; social norms are expected by a public, informal, often implicit, usually enforceable by approval and disapproval.

Some brief definitions of social norms are appealing, even though they do not include a wide range of elements, for example, Paluck’s “Socially shared definitions of they way people do behave and should behave,” or her “Individuals’ perceptions about which attitudes and behaviors are typical or desirable in their community.” One popular understanding of social norms is that they are complied with due to group identity. But of those reviewed in the table, only one definition of social norms, by Hogg and Reid (2006) attributes compliance primarily to group identification. The remaining definitions of norms include mention of a reference group of one kind or another, they recognize that a social norm is always relative to some group, but all locate motivation for compliance in approval and disapproval of others, anticipation of sanctions, or acceptance of social obligation.

**Conditions for a social norm to exist (Bicchieri 2012)**

Let I be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where S can be represented as a mixed motive game. We say that R is a social norm in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset P_streaming $\subseteq P$ such that, for each individual $i \in P_streaming$

1. **Contingency**: $i$ knows that a rule $R$ exists and applies to situations of type $S$;  
2. **Conditional preference**: $i$ prefers to conform to $R$ in situations of type $S$ on the condition that:  
   (a) *Empirical expectations*: $i$ believes that a sufficiently large subset of $P$ conforms to $R$ in situations of type $S$;  
   and either  
   (b) *Normative expectations*: $i$ believes that a sufficiently large subset of $P$ expects $i$ to conform to $R$ in situations of type $S$;  
   or  
   (b') *Normative expectations with sanctions*: $i$ believes that a sufficiently large subset of $P$ expects $i$ to conform to $R$ in situations of type $S$, prefers $i$ to conform, and may sanction behavior.

A social norm $R$ is followed by population $P$ if there exists a sufficiently large subset $P_f \subseteq P_streaming$ such that, for each individual $i \in P_f$, conditions 2(a) and either 2(b) or 2(b') are met for $i$ and, as a result, $i$ prefers to conform to $R$ in situations of type $S$. 
## Comparison of Elements of 17 Different Conceptions of Social Norm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements: Theorists</th>
<th>One’s beliefs about what others do</th>
<th>One’s beliefs about what others think one should do</th>
<th>Others within some reference group (r.g.)</th>
<th>Maintained by social or other social influence within r.g.</th>
<th>Whether one is motivated by the social influence</th>
<th>Rule, behavior, etc.?</th>
<th>Personal Attitude, Personal Norm, Moral Norm: distinct from Social Norm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gibb (1965)</td>
<td>Collective expectation of what behavior will be</td>
<td>Collective evaluation of what behavior should be</td>
<td>Expectation or evaluation by collective</td>
<td>Reactions by others to one’s behavior Sanctions or other social influence in response to it</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rules, conventions, morals, mores, law, customs...</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cialdini (&amp; Trost, 1998)</td>
<td>Descriptive Norm: perception of what many others do</td>
<td>Injunctive Norm: perception of what most people approve or disapprove of</td>
<td>Understood by members of a group</td>
<td>Descriptive Norm- evidence of most effective action Injunctive Norm – desire to maintain social relationships</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rule or standard</td>
<td>Personal Norm: internally motivated - management of self-concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishbein &amp; Ajzen (2010): 1) Personal Attitude, Subjective Norm, and Perceived Behavior Control (PBC) influence Intention 2)</td>
<td>Subjective Norm: perceived social pressure to perform (or not) a given behavior</td>
<td>Referents: people who are important to one</td>
<td>Social Influence: 1. Positive sanction; 2. Negative sanction; 3. Legitimacy; 4. Expertise; 5. Identification</td>
<td>Motivation to comply with referents</td>
<td></td>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td>Personal Attitude: positive to negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive: one’s perception of behavior of</td>
<td>Injunctive: one’s perception of what others</td>
<td>Particular individuals</td>
<td>General society</td>
<td>4-5: Influence on Descriptive 1-5 Influence on Injunctive</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>One’s beliefs about outcomes</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bicchieri (2006)</td>
<td>Social Expectations</td>
<td>Social expectations about enough others in a population $P$</td>
<td>One considers others’ normative expectations to be legitimate; or anticipates sanctions by some others</td>
<td>Conditional on conformity by others (on empirical and normative expectations)</td>
<td>Behavioral rule $R$ (and one is aware of $R$)</td>
<td>Personal Norm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimal and Real (2003); Lipinski &amp; Rimal (2005)</td>
<td>Perceived Norm - subjective beliefs about prevalence of norm and pressure to comply</td>
<td>Group or community</td>
<td>Perceived threats or benefits Maintained by communication in group</td>
<td>Strength of identity with reference group moderates descriptive norm</td>
<td>Ego involvement moderates influence of descriptive norm</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>Injunctive norm moderates descriptive</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Collective Norm – objective actual prevalence and pressure to comply</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>Injunctive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storey and Schoemaker (2006)</td>
<td>Perceived Norm</td>
<td>In bounded group</td>
<td>Prevalence of group communication (proxy)</td>
<td>Additional variables considered, including ideal family size (personal attitude)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective behavioral norm – prevalence of behavior, aggregated from individual reports</td>
<td>Collective attitudinal norm – prevalence of personal attitudes, aggregated from individual reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coleman (1990)</td>
<td>What actions are regarded as proper &amp; correct (or not)</td>
<td>In a set of persons</td>
<td>Ordinarily enforced by sanctions: rewards or punishments</td>
<td>Patterned assignment of rights: e.g., those holding a norm claim a right to apply sanctions and recognize the right of others holding the norm to do so</td>
<td>Sanctions not absolute determinants but elements which affect one’s decisions about what actions to carry out</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exists when socially defined right of action is held not by the actor but by others in the group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pettit (2010)</td>
<td>Known among most of the population and known that it’s known, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sustained in a population by acceptance or approval of those who conform, or rejection or disapproval of those who don’t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elster (2009)</td>
<td>Quasi-moral norm of fairness: observing others comply motivates one to comply</td>
<td>Shared and known to be shared with others</td>
<td>Maintained by sanctions that others impose on norm violators Observer feels contempt, and sanctions violator, who feels shame</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not an equilibrium in a repeated game</td>
<td>Moral Norm, internally motivated by guilt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke &amp; Young (2009)</td>
<td>A standard, customary, or ideal form of behavior to which individuals in a social group try to conform</td>
<td>The equilibrium holds at the population level, inducing common expectations and behaviors for an interaction that is repeated over time by members of a social group.</td>
<td>Three different mechanisms variably hold norms in place</td>
<td>A pure equilibrium of a coordination game; an equilibrium may involve punishments for deviation.</td>
<td>3. Some are sustained by internalization of proper norms of conduct Some people make choices that are warped away from the choices they would make if there were no norm</td>
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<td>Paluck</td>
<td>Socially shared definitions of the way people do behave or should behave (Paluck 2009) Individuals’ perceptions about which attitudes and behaviors are typical or desirable in their community (Paluck and Ball 2010)</td>
<td>Others within some reference group (r.g.)</td>
<td>Maintained by social (dis)approval or other social influence within r.g.</td>
<td>Whether one is motivated by the social influence</td>
<td>Rule, behavior, etc.?</td>
<td>Personal Beliefs (Paluck &amp; Shepherd 2012)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ellickson (2001)</td>
<td>Rule governing an individual’s behavior that is diffusely enforced by sanctions applied by third parties other than state agents</td>
<td>Rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>McAdams &amp; Rasmusen (2007)</td>
<td>Behavioral regularities supported at least in part by normative attitudes; such regularities in the absence of normative attitudes are conventions</td>
<td>Behavioral regularity</td>
<td>Behavioral regularity</td>
<td>Behavioral regularity</td>
<td>Behavioral regularity</td>
<td>Behavioral regularity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hogg &amp; Reid (2006)</td>
<td>Shared cognitive representations that characterize the behavior of members of relevant out-groups and describe and prescribe the behavior of ingroup members including ourselves</td>
<td>No, not individual or generalized others, but identification with a distinct group</td>
<td>Norms serve an internalized self-definitional function. They are known from interaction and communication within a group</td>
<td>Strength of group identification, centrality to group, etc.</td>
<td>Regularities in attitude and behavior</td>
<td>No, unless self does not identify with group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brennan et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Can include expecting others to do X, or believing that others must do X, or that X is appropriate, or that others have the right to sanction one about X, or that one has the right to sanction others</td>
<td>A significant proportion of the group has normative attitudes about X &amp; a significant proportion knows that a significant proportion has such attitudes.</td>
<td>One’s (dis)approval of others’ actions and others’ (dis)approval of one’s action.</td>
<td>One’s (dis)approval of others’ actions and others’ (dis)approval of one’s action.</td>
<td>A normative principle</td>
<td>A social norm creates accountability to a social group; a moral norm creates accountability to all humans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Works Cited


-- END --