The PRIME System:
Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform

Ylber Bajraktari, Arthur Boutellis, Fatema Gunja, Daniel Y. Harris, James Kapsis, Eva Kaye, Jane Rhee

3 January 2006
Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 3
Acknowledgments 4
Executive Summary 5
Summary of PRIME Findings 7
PRIME Indicators at a Glance 8
Introduction 10
Section I: Current Performance Measures 13
Section II: PRIME Methodology 17
Section III: Findings 30
Appendix A: Methodology Justifications 35
Appendix B: Data Sources 39
Bibliography 43
Annex I: The Case of the Kosovo Police Service 53
Annex II: The Case of the Sierra Leone Police 78
Annex III: The Case of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste 100
Annex IV: UNPOL in Action: Experiences and Challenges from Missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste 124
## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>US State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>US National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIME</td>
<td>Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLIX</td>
<td>Rule of Law Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWS</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

This report would not have been possible without the active support of numerous people and institutions. First, we would like to extend our gratitude to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Reconstruction Partnership at Princeton University for this opportunity. The Woodrow Wilson School invested significant resources, including administrative/organizational support and funding, to get this project off the ground. We would like particularly to recognize Regina Burke, Melissa Lee, Professor Jennifer Widner, and Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter for their support.

In addition, we would like to thank our clients, Mark Kroeker, Civilian Police Advisor of the United Nations Police (UNPOL), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and J. Clint Williamson, Director of Stability Operations of the United States National Security Council (NSC), for entrusting us with such an important and timely task. The current police reform challenges facing the international community in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and beyond are immense and deserve careful study.

UNPOL was invaluable in providing us access to contacts, transportation, and office space, particularly in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. We would like to recognize the many people who facilitated our field research in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. These individuals are listed within each field annex at the end of this report. We cannot thank them enough for their support, time, and energy.

We would also like to thank Robert Perito from the United States Institute for Peace; Edward Rees, Isabel Hight, Stephane Jean, and Renata Dwan of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Professor Otwin Marenin of Washington State University; Eric Scheye; Andrew Michels from DynCorp International; and Professor Dennis Smith of New York University for their expertise and assistance.

Finally, we would like to recognize our instructor, Gordon Peake of the International Peace Academy, who was instrumental in launching and leading this project.

We take full responsibility for any mistakes or omissions in this report.
Executive Summary

As the number of armed conflicts around the world has increased in the aftermath of the Cold War, so too have the size and scope of international efforts to bring order and stability when those conflicts end. A large part of these efforts have focused on reforming and, in some cases, creating security sector institutions, such as a police service and military. Without the order and stability that effective security institutions provide, it is difficult for the conditions for sustainable peace to take root. While all security sector institutions have an important role in keeping and maintaining peace in a post-conflict context, the focus of this report is the police.

Post-conflict police reform a subject of increasing importance to the international community. Donors, especially the United States, have contributed billions of dollars towards post-conflict police reform efforts through the United Nations Police (UNPOL), a division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and other bilateral and multilateral channels. However, police reform is a complicated process and requires more than just financial assistance to succeed. Whether in a modern metropolis like New York City or in a post-conflict environment like Iraq or Kosovo, the cultural, institutional, and political challenges to effective reform are immense.

Further complicating police reform is the inherent difficulty in measuring the impact of police performance. As a result, UNPOL and international donors currently rely on a mixture of anecdotes and ad hoc reports to measure progress. Such measures, however, are unreliable proxies of success. They do not provide a systematic analysis of the police service as a whole, and they do not tell donors about outcomes. In other words, neither the UN nor the donor community has a systematic measurement tool to effectively monitor the successes and failures of the police reform efforts they support. To remedy this problem, UNPOL has begun developing a Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) to help measure the progress of security sector institutions in their work to establish the rule of law. As a contribution to the development of the ROLIX, this report looks at the role of the police and how it can be strengthened through systematic measurement and performance evaluation.

This report proposes a new, evidence-based police measurement system called PRIME (Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation). PRIME is a forward-looking diagnostic tool that will give UNPOL and the donor community a more comprehensive and systematic way to assess police reform outcomes in post-conflict environments. It is a qualitative assessment of 16 core indicators divided into four main pillars of outcomes:

I. Performance Effectiveness
II. Management and Oversight
III. Community Relations
IV. Sustainability

We believe that PRIME can be used to improve police reform efforts at the various levels at which reform takes place: UN headquarters in New York City, mission management in the field, and local police services. PRIME gives the UN and other international police managers...
a practical, systematic way to identify areas of concern in their police reform efforts and make timely, evidence-based adjustments to their reform strategies. Rather than a confining, one-size-fits-all model, PRIME gives managers a menu of measurement options from which to choose. It is designed to be flexible enough to be adapted to different environments and mandates, yet comprehensive enough to give policymakers a way to examine results in a common language and framework across time. It is created to help managers establish a baseline assessment of a police service against which to compare future progress as well as take a snapshot of police performance at a given moment in time. Local police services themselves can use PRIME as an internal accountability and planning mechanism.

Consistent documentation from PRIME will also provide managers with a longer term learning tool by building institutional knowledge and preserving institutional memory of all international police reform efforts. As the UN and other police managers strive to complete and improve police reform efforts in the future, they will be able to draw upon a vast reservoir of information solicited by PRIME from all over the world.

PRIME was developed by Princeton University graduate students based on academic and exploratory field research that evaluated police reform efforts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste in the fall of 2005. These three missions were chosen because they share a similar international timeline (1999-2005/2006) and multi-faceted levels of international involvement. These cases were also useful to study because many of the conditions found in these areas, such as weak local governance, lack of security and stability, and historically unaccountable and repressive police services, are likely to be found in future post-conflict missions. At the same time, these three environments were geographically and historically diverse enough to allow a rigorous testing of PRIME and its applicability to different types of situations.

With the help of PRIME, this report includes the first systematic, outcomes-oriented evaluation of police reform efforts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste.
Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation
PRIME Indicators at a Glance

The following chart summarizes the core set of PRIME indicators considered essential for effective police reform in post-conflict settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Performance Effectiveness</strong></th>
<th>Considers the extent and quality of the police service’s efforts to produce law and order and respond to all levels of crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Adequate manpower, training, and equipment to currently be effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Authority and Reach</strong></th>
<th>Political/legal authority to enforce internal security throughout the territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime</strong></td>
<td>Collection and use of crime statistics to set and achieve crime-fighting and crime prevention goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Coordination</strong></th>
<th>External coordination with criminal justice system (e.g. prisons, courts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Management and Oversight</strong></th>
<th>Assesses the police service’s basic management structure for carrying out operations and being accountable to the community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission and Procedures</strong></td>
<td>Clearly defined and understood mission, code of conduct, operational procedures, and chain of command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Strategic Planning and Monitoring</strong></th>
<th>Existence of goals and performance measures that regulate current and future professional conduct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Oversight and Accountability</strong></th>
<th>Presence and strength of external and internal oversight mechanisms that ensure accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Personnel</strong></th>
<th>Transparent and merit-based recruitment and promotion systems and level of retention rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Community Relations
Considers the police service’s relations with the local community in securing the public’s support and trust

**Human Rights**
Level of commitment to democratic policing standards, respect for all people, and readiness to protect minority rights

**Cooperation**
Evidence of public involvement in ensuring internal security and in solving crime investigations

**Corruptibility**
Degree of police corruption and public perceptions of police honesty

**Public Acceptance**
Acceptance of the police as the main legitimate source of internal security

Sustainability
Evaluates the ability of the police service to sustain itself and its capabilities without international donor support and guidance

**Budget**
Long-term budget planning that secures sufficient funding for the development and maintenance of the police service

**Training and Equipment**
Existence of local capacity to train officers and maintain necessary police equipment into the future

**Political Independence**
Adequate insulation from political influence to maintain neutrality and protect all citizens

**Compensation**
Sufficiency of salaries and other benefits to encourage high retention and discourage corruption
Summary of PRIME Findings in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste

I. Performance Effectiveness

While the police in Timor-Leste and Kosovo are capable of handling low crimes, such as petty theft or traffic violations, this capability is still limited in Sierra Leone, which has been facing an increasing crime rate. In all three cases, the police lack the capacity to handle high-profile crimes of a political or transnational nature. Political and organized crimes are particularly prevalent in Kosovo where police training in these areas remains inadequate, and police authority is undermined by illegal external security threats. Police capabilities in all three areas are further limited by weak judicial and penal systems, whose development has trailed behind that of the police sector.

II. Management and Oversight

Clear management structures exist in all three police services, but significant issues remain concerning promotion systems and oversight. The lack of systematic performance measurement raises concerns about the promotion systems in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. There is limited external oversight of all of the police services. Additionally, while Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, to a limited extent, have a professional senior management, this remains a key problem in Kosovo. The Kosovo police are especially vulnerable to political considerations and are still in the process of putting a legal infrastructure in place.

III. Community Relations

While each police service in the three mission areas has made great strides in improving community relations, they all still face considerable challenges in building public trust and fighting corruption. In Kosovo, police relations with minority communities are poor and community cooperation varies according to the type of crime. The police in Sierra Leone have strongly pushed community outreach efforts and seen increased public support, but corruption remains a major problem. Support for the police is strong and fueled by national pride in Timor-Leste, but human rights abuses are a concern and undermine support.

IV. Sustainability

In Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone where physical and financial capacity is extremely limited, sustainability is the major concern, especially since the UN will soon be departing from both locations. In Kosovo and Sierra Leone, the police face a lack of political independence and susceptibility to politicization and corruption. Low salaries and meager benefits are problems in all three cases.
Introduction

Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.
Albert Einstein

In post-conflict environments, there can be no peace building without the police. Without a police service capable of arresting insecurity and restoring trust, a society will not have the stable and predictable conditions necessary for basic economic, political, and social development.

As the number of armed conflicts around the world has increased in the aftermath of the Cold War, so too have the size and scope of international efforts to bring order and stability when those conflicts end. The United Nations, through its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), has led many of these efforts with a global deployment of nearly 9,000 international police officers since 1992.\footnote{UNPOL was formerly known as the United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL).} As of October 2005, over 6,300 UN Police (UNPOL) officers from some 80 nations were involved in at least 13 of the UN’s 18 peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

The United States, in particular, spends billions of dollars on police reform efforts, primarily through UNPOL, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program (ICITAP), and the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). The US involvement in UNPOL operations is particularly significant. The US is the largest contributor of police officers to the largest UN mission to date – the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – averaging about 16 percent of the total UNPOL force for the past six years. In October 2005, the US was the second largest contributor of civilian police officers for UN missions, alongside Nepal and Pakistan, trailing only Jordan. US financial contributions average around 25 percent (\$887 million\footnote{This amount is separate from the over \$900 million that the US has pledged to contribute towards a multiyear program of building the Afghan National Police and the billions of dollars in security assistance to Iraq.}) of the total \$3.55 billion DPKO budget for 2005-2006.

Whether in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, or Timor-Leste, building sustainable peace requires having local police services that can provide and maintain security once international forces leave. Building capable and effective police institutions, however, is a difficult and complex undertaking. Efforts to reform the police face daunting historical, political, financial, and logistical obstacles. The reform process is further complicated by the inherent difficulty in measuring the impact of police performance. This is particularly true in post-conflict situations where constraints, such as the absence of good data and sufficient resources, render most statistical evaluation techniques impossible.

The result is that donors currently either rely on anecdotes and other ad hoc qualitative reports or on overly simplistic measures of inputs and outputs, such as the number of officers trained or number of police stations built. However, anecdotes and other ad hoc
qualitative assessments are not sufficiently systematic to be useful over time, while input and output measures fail to capture the complexity or nuance of a reform process. Without assessing outcomes, it is impossible to determine how far the police have come in achieving the ultimate goal of reform – the establishment of an effective, responsible, and sustainable police service. Simply put, the international community currently lacks a systematic measurement tool to effectively monitor the successes and failures of the police reform efforts they support.

**Given the importance of police reform, every international policing effort should have a clearly defined method for measuring the performance of the newly established police services at the heart of their reform.**

This report provides police managers, policymakers, and the donor community with a practical tool to measure the effectiveness of police reform efforts in post-conflict societies. “Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation,” or PRIME, is a forward-looking diagnostic assessment tool that focuses on the development of four main outcomes that are fundamental in police reform.

PRIME was developed at the request of UNPOL for the creation of a “Rule of Law Index” (ROLIX) and the US National Security Council (NSC) and made possible through the generous support of the Reconstruction Partnership at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (WWS). It was tested in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste in the fall of 2005. The authors are WWS graduate students studying public policy, international relations, and political science with interest and experience in post-conflict reconstruction.

**This report is split into three sections:**

- **Section I assesses current police reform performance measures**
- **Section II discusses the methodology behind PRIME**
- **Section III presents executive PRIME findings for the police services in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste**

**Additional resources are found at the end of the report, including:**

- Academic justifications behind PRIME
- Suggested data sources for PRIME
- Bibliography of academic literature
- Detailed case annexes on Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste
- Discussion of experiences and challenges for UNPOL

This last resource looks particularly at the role of UNPOL in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. This annex seeks to detail the history, mandate, and the extent of UNPOL’s

---

3 Ylber Bajraktari and Jane Rhee conducted field research in Kosovo; Arthur Boutellis, James Kapsis, and Eva Kaye conducted field research in Sierra Leone; and Fatema Gunja and Daniel Y. Harris conducted field research in Timor-Leste.
involvement and catalogue some of the experiences and challenges that manifested in all three missions collectively and individually. While recognizing the incredible work UNPOL has done under difficult circumstances in all three locations, this annex identifies areas for improvement.
Section I: Current Performance Measures

*What is not counted tends to be discounted.*

*Dennis Smith and William Bratton*

*The Importance of Measurement*

Measurement is important in any organization because it highlights strengths and weaknesses and helps monitor progress towards the achievement of the organization’s goals. When done correctly, performance measures help concretize the achievement of goals in practical terms by systematizing institutional activities into distinct, achievable steps. They determine the sequencing of these steps and help identify the supporting actors necessary for each stage.

In a post-conflict setting, international standards defining progress and success are especially pivotal in correctly assessing the situation on the ground and ensuring the security, stability, and prosperity of vulnerable and victimized populations. Performance measures also act as a magnifying glass for donors, allowing them to see up close the ability of institutions to absorb and sustain reforms in light of a changing political environment. They are the foundation for the development of cost/benefit analyses, which are particularly important for the allocation of scarce resources, and for compiling reliable and useful lessons learned and best practices standards for future missions.

**Most importantly, an effective and useful system of measurement can create incentives within the organization for better outcomes and amongst donors for additional or sustained support in targeted areas.** When an organization can accurately assess its strengths and weaknesses, and use the information to make timely adjustments, it avoids the pitfalls that inevitably result from inflexible and rigid reform strategies. By creating benchmarks and baseline definitions of success, systematic measurement allows organizations to see if they are moving forward, backward, or staying the same throughout the course of a mission. This in turn can be used to justify additional or sustained resources from donors and political constituencies in areas of need.

*Measuring the Police*

The police are one of the most difficult institutions to measure in any society because of the sensitive nature and inherent complexity of their work. From issuing parking tickets and patrolling the streets to arresting murderers and investigating felonies, fighting and preventing crime is one of the core goals of the police. However, even with detailed crime and social data, isolating police impact on fluctuations in crime rates is a statistical challenge. Performance measurement is further complicated because the police interact with and are dependent on other rule of law institutions, such as the courts, the prisons, and the military. A police service might be conducting effective investigations and arresting criminals, but if the courts set them free or if the prisons are full, police effectiveness will be hindered. Finally, police services tend to be large, diffuse bureaucracies of individuals with specialized
functions, considerable discretion and little supervision in the field. This decentralized structure makes introducing overarching accountability mechanisms a formidable challenge.

There has been recent progress in police measurement in the US and other Western countries. For example, the introduction of the CompStat (Computerized Statistics) system in the New York Police Department in the 1990s has revolutionized police measurement in New York and many other American cities. Measurable improvements have been detected in police performance. By using crime statistics to set objectives at the precinct level, CompStat has been able to create a system of incentives that holds police managers accountable for measurable outcomes. CompStat, however, is less likely to work in a post-conflict environment because of the limited availability of reliable crime statistics and the sophisticated information technology necessary to analyze them. That said, the basic assumptions behind Compstat can be applied to any police service: namely, **effective measurement combined with accountability can lead to improved performance outcomes.**

In a post-conflict environment where a police service may be nonexistent or bear many of the negative historical and political trappings of the previous regime, the challenges of civilian policing are enormous. Immediate needs, such as recruitment, training, and the establishment of a functional management structure are carried out against the backdrop of a ticking clock, with little luxury in the short term to consider performance effectiveness or sustainability. International police advisors descend from all parts of the world and represent every permutation of norms, practices, and rules of conduct. The lack of international police standards, continuity of international and local personnel, adequate resources, and donor coordination further complicate an already complex situation. Eventually, however, UNPOL and other international efforts to reform local police services have to begin answering some fundamental questions about whether or not their reform strategies are working.

**Problems with Current Performance Measures**

If and when measurement systems exist at all, they tend to be ad-hoc and focused exclusively on outputs, which consist primarily of quantitative indicators of limited utility. They also often fail to appreciate the quality, rationale, and appropriateness of the initial inputs and external conditions. **In short, current performance measures fail to capture outcomes.** Milestones and performance indicators are not clearly defined, and few benchmarks exist upon which to evaluate progress.

A survey of the literature on international civilian policing highlights the absence of systematic and comprehensive measurement tools and the arbitrary nature in which successes and failures are defined. Part of the problem lies in the fact that missions often substitute quantitative output measures as their objectives. For instance, establishing internal security through the development of local police services is a key outcome in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. However, donors have been measuring internal security by the number of police officers trained and the number of uniforms and equipment issued instead of measuring the quality of the training, improvements in security, or the effectiveness of the
new police in controlling crime and violence. This point is illustrated by the table below of a UN performance review of internal security and law enforcement in Timor-Leste in 2002-2003, in which the measures of progress are almost exclusively output numbers indicating how much has been done instead of assessing how effective these accomplishments have been.


Programme II: Internal security and law enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected accomplishments</th>
<th>Actual indicators of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2.2 Progress towards achievement of a sustainable police service in East Timor | 2.2.1 National police commissioner appointed  
2.2.2 National Police assumed responsibility for policing in 11 out of 13 districts |

Actual outputs

- Trained 2,778 officers of the National Police in general policing
- Trained 300 rapid response team police officers
- Established two joint police community projects to rebuild local infrastructure and improve relations with local community
- Liaised with joint Australian/United Kingdom/National Police capacity-building scoping mission to review resource needs of the National Police in future years

Comments

The Mission has undertaken numerous project activities to train officers of the National Police in all facets of law enforcement. International police worked alongside the officers in order to transfer skills in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and management. Civil disturbances in Dili on 4 December, although lasting only a few hours, have been adversely commented upon by external observers.

In Kosovo, initial measurements of progress on police reforms have largely been concerned with quantitative outputs such as the number and composition of officers trained, deployed, promoted, and retained and the number of police stations and regional commands transferred to local authority. To measure progress towards outcomes, UNMIK relies on proxy criteria such as crime data and public opinion polls. While crime statistics are collected meticulously, it is difficult to discern which crime rate trends have been affected by the performance of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and which by the performance of UNPOL, which retains executive authority in Kosovo. As for the opinion polls, they have consistently revealed high levels of satisfaction with the KPS among the majority Kosovar

---

4 For more detailed analysis on current performance measures in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste, refer to the case annexes at the end of this report.

Albanian population but failed to reveal the extent to which the favorable opinion is based on satisfaction with police performance rather than feelings of patriotism.

Other current performance measures only provide a small glimpse into overall police effectiveness. In Sierra Leone, for example, UNPOL mentors conduct random spot-checks of police stations to examine police notebooks and station diaries. UNPOL regularly reviews these entries, reprimand officers and commanders not following proper procedures, and then follow up by visiting the same station weeks or months later to make sure that the same mistakes are not being made. These types of reports on problems and accomplishments often find their way into UN progress reports and are helpful to the UN in monitoring progress of its missions’ efforts. These types of random methods, however, are too ad hoc and limited in scope to provide donors with a holistic view of police performance and progress.

Overall, because much of international police evaluation is ad-hoc, assessments of progress or failure are subject to inconsistency. Without a standardized measurement system, it is difficult for managers to assess progress within missions over time.
Section II: Methodology

To address the absence of systematic and effective measurement in the field of police reform, we propose a results-oriented police measurement tool for UNPOL and the donor community called Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation, or PRIME. PRIME is a forward-looking diagnostic tool that provides policymakers with a comprehensive means by which to analyze police reform efforts in a post-conflict context. It provides for a qualitative assessment of 16 key indicators divided into four main pillars of outcomes:

I. Performance Effectiveness  
II. Management and Oversight  
III. Community Relations  
IV. Sustainability

PRIME’s Real World Value

The systematic nature of PRIME represents a major advance in police measurement in post-conflict areas. PRIME is a practical assessment tool that can be used in any post-conflict setting, regardless of the specific mandate for police reform. It can be used to improve police reform efforts at all levels: UN headquarters in New York City, mission management in the field, and local police services. PRIME provides police managers, policymakers, and donors with a useful way to identify areas of concern in their police reform efforts and make timely, evidence-based adjustments. With a menu of measurement options, PRIME is designed to be flexible enough to be adapted to different environments and mandates, yet comprehensive enough to produce results in a common language and framework across time.

Consistent documentation from PRIME will provide the UN and donors with a longer term learning tool by building institutional knowledge and preserving institutional memory of all UN police reform efforts. This reservoir of information will in turn be invaluable to both present and future UN managers as they strive to improve UN police reform efforts globally.

PRIME can also have day-to-day utility for the reformed police service by serving as an internal accountability and planning mechanism. With a standardized way to assess progress, police supervisors can more easily highlight both progress and gaps over time. This in turn will help the police create more effective short-term and long-term planning strategies, prepare and negotiate budgets, and make a more persuasive case in securing external support from the government and international donors.

PRIME’s Real World Limitations

The primary limitation of PRIME is that it is not a statistical assessment tool. Indeed, given real world constraints, it cannot be. The difficult conditions in which post-conflict reconstruction efforts take place render it impossible to collect statistical data sources that
are comprehensive and stable enough from year to year. PRIME, therefore, focuses on available and practical data sources that help capture a snapshot of police performance at a given moment in time.

PRIME is also subject to varying degrees of human error, selection bias, and omission bias as a function of being a qualitative assessment tool. Standardized and consistent application of PRIME, however, will help limit these risks. Finally, PRIME may require reworking to adapt to the specific legal traditions of the area where reforms are taking place (e.g. common law versus civil law traditions). In some countries, for example, the police are legally subordinate to the military. Terms like political independence, therefore, may take on different meaning in such a legal context.

**PRIME's Qualitative Nature**

PRIME does not use a generic color-coded or numbered grading system to aggregate and summarize its findings. The simplicity of such a system is alluring, but risks distorting a manager’s understanding of a police service by obscuring important details regarding its performance and the context in which it operates. For example, a police service could receive a positive overall evaluation, a 9 out of a possible 10 because it is performing well in all areas except long-term sustainability. Yet, without achieving sustainability, the police service would either be completely dependent on international support or unable to function. A score of a 9 would disguise this important information and be too simplistic to convey the complexities of police reform.

Furthermore, different indicators may deserve different weights depending on the unique characteristics or challenges of a mission. An aggregation or ranking system risks misrepresenting reality on the ground. Instead, PRIME qualitatively describes progress by first establishing a baseline evaluation of police reform efforts and then allowing future assessments to compare progress on outcomes based on initial findings. Because evaluators use the same tool for future evaluations, the results can be easily compared within each mission over time. PRIME is designed, therefore, more to help managers compare progress within missions than across missions, though the lessons learned and best practices from each missions as discovered by PRIME can be shared among police managers and services around the world.

**Menu of Measurement Options**

Although PRIME presents the UN and other managers with a holistic measurement system for evaluating police reform, it has utility beyond this purpose. Since every UN mission has different mandates and objectives, PRIME was designed with the expectation that UNPOL would choose to use parts of PRIME selectively to measure outcomes that are specifically aligned to its missions’ goals. The UN may also consider assigning different weights to certain PRIME indicators at different phases of the reform process. For example, in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, successful police recruitment and training were more important in the first years of the mission than other indicators because no indigenous police service existed. Without these basic functions, they could not begin to put decent oversight and accountability measures in place. Different indicators also might be less relevant to certain missions because of the unique characteristics of the reform environment.
The UN and other actors should therefore view PRIME as a menu of measurement options from which to choose rather than as a confining, one-size-fits-all model. Because of the flexibility required for evaluating various missions, any UN measurement system, such as the ROLIX, should be careful not to create rigid measurement frameworks that superficially capture progress through a one-size-fits-all model. They should also avoid subjective grading systems that are overly simplistic and fail to capture the complexities of security sector reforms. Instead, tools like the ROLIX should be able to encapsulate the complexities of police reform through systematic qualitative assessments as PRIME is designed to do.

**Beyond the Police**

At its most basic level, PRIME measures the police’s core functions. However, much of PRIME could be modified so that it applies to other public agencies and organizations. Like the police, other public agencies should meet basic management and oversight standards, perform certain functions at a minimum level of efficiency, build relationships with the community, and have a plan for how to sustain its activities over the long term. Within the justice sector, revised versions of PRIME could evaluate reform in the prison and court systems. These organizations share many of the same goals as the police and face similar challenges. In the future, the UN and other international actors with a stake in justice sector reform might consider adapting PRIME to evaluate the progress of the prisons, courts, and even the military.

**Testing PRIME in the Field**

To test the validity and usefulness of PRIME in assessing police reform efforts in a post-conflict setting, we tested PRIME in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste from 30 October to 4 November 2005. We chose these three cases to gauge the medium-term success of international policing efforts in these environments (all three missions began in 1999 and are winding down in 2005-2006) and to establish a baseline from which to compare future civilian policing efforts.

Because many of the conditions found in these environments such as an ineffective state, lack of security and stability, and unaccountable and repressive police services are prevalent elsewhere, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste are important sources of learning for international donors. In each case, UNPOL led international civilian policing reforms, albeit with different mandates. In Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the UN was uniquely mandated with “executive policing authority” whereas in Sierra Leone, the UN role was limited to monitoring and advising. Finally, while the UN has been the lead police actor in all three locations, other actors such NATO forces in Kosovo, the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, and Australia in Timor-Leste have complemented its efforts with significant contributions.

During field visits where we met with police, government, international community, and local community representatives in both urban and rural areas, we used PRIME to evaluate the same set of indicators using similar data sources. Although each location presented unique research constraints, we adhered as closely as possible to our systematic approach.
Upon our return, we shared our findings and debated the utility and practicality of each of the indicators.

Our fieldwork demonstrated that PRIME was a very practical tool with which to evaluate progress on the ground in a relatively short amount of time. By focusing on concrete indicators throughout our interviews, asking for specific data, and having the flexibility to incorporate new and unexpected sources of information, we were able to learn a great deal very efficiently. Moreover, much of the data necessary for PRIME already existed and had been compiled by the local police, UNPOL, local and international NGOs, foreign embassies, etc.

**Methodology behind PRIME**

In developing PRIME, we combed relevant academic literature and consulted with a number of policing experts and practitioners to identify the key ingredients for success in reforming the police in post-conflict situations. In other words, we sought to determine the basic characteristics a police service would need to succeed in the long-term. Success was defined as a police service that can maintain security and stability in a democratic and accountable manner. If a police service is irrelevant to the maintenance of peace and stability, contributes to insecurity and violence, or serves to promote security through undemocratic means, it cannot be deemed a success.

Based on further research regarding successful police practices in the developed world and recognizing the unique constraints in conducting research in post-conflict environments, we drafted and eventually tested a number of indicators deemed essential for police reform success. Following our time in the field, we finalized PRIME to comprise of 16 key indicators, which were then grouped by subject area into four pillars. Taken together, these pillars identify and measure the extent to which a police service has made overall progress on key outcomes.

**Explanation of PRIME Indicators**

The following is a detailed description of the PRIME system. Using various data sources, evaluators can assess each of the 16 indicators in order to judge the overall progress of four principal outcomes: Performance Effectiveness, Management and Oversight, Community Relations, and Sustainability. Justifications for each indicator from the academic literature are provided in Appendix A, and a list of suggested data sources to gather information can be found in Appendix B.

**I. Performance Effectiveness**

This section includes four indicators that measure the extent and quality of the police service’s efforts to produce basic law and order and respond to all levels of crime. Our assumption is that the extent to which a police service achieves these fundamental objectives is a reflection of its overall institutional competence.
1) Capacity
In order to effectively fight crime, the police must have sufficient levels of manpower, equipment, and training. In post-conflict areas, international actors often provide new equipment and training to police services and set goals for police service strength without always providing the rationale for doing so. High levels of assistance, however, do not guarantee that the police have sufficient capacity to fulfill its mission, especially once the international community leaves. Training may be inadequate in providing relevant crime-fighting skills, equipment may be limited and difficult to maintain, and the size of the service may not be appropriate in relation to population size or crime levels. Without acknowledging and addressing capacity problems, a police service will have limited means and effectiveness in combating crime and maintaining internal security.

Evidence of sufficient capacity includes:
- Adequate physical capacity (e.g. manpower and equipment) to solve all types of relevant crime and enforce public order and the rationale for these levels of manpower and equipment
- Effective police training in solving all types of relevant crimes and enforcing public order
- Presence of strategies to deal with capacity problems (e.g. internal budgeting process, donor support, etc.)

2) Authority and Reach
Without the political and legal authority to fight all types of crime in all sections of its jurisdiction, a police service’s ability to provide law and order is limited. Its authority, however, is often challenged by several factors: the absence of legal and political frameworks legitimizing the police’s monopoly on the use of force; the presence of military forces, criminal gangs, and/or tribal authorities, all of whom may encroach on the work of the police; and the lack of adequate infrastructure, such as good roads, or basic transportation limitations that can limit the police service’s reach in less-developed areas. Limited authority and reach circumscribe not only the presence of the police in all areas under its control, but also potentially pose a threat to the public’s freedom of movement.

Evidence of primacy includes:
- Political and legal frameworks that confer authority to the police to effectively combat the entire spectrum of crimes, from petty theft and traffic violations to organized and political crimes
- High percentage of the jurisdiction, both geographically and demographically, under the control of the police versus private security organizations or informal policing mechanisms
- Ability of the public to enjoy freedom of movement

3) Crime
One of the most fundamental tasks of any police service is to prevent and fight crime. Police services in post-conflict areas face a particularly daunting task since the
end of armed hostilities is often followed by an increase in lawlessness. Furthermore, as the police service seeks to restore order and establish legitimacy, crime reporting often increases as community members become more willing to report crimes and the police become more skilled at soliciting and processing crime reports. Therefore, judging a post-conflict police service on fluctuations in crime rates alone will not accurately reflect its crime-fighting effectiveness. Instead, the police in post-conflict situations should be evaluated on how extensively they collect crime statistics and how they apply those statistics to set and achieve crime-fighting and crime prevention goals.

Evidence of crime statistics collection and use includes:
- Presence of detailed crime statistics disaggregated by type of crime, region, gender, and ethnicity of victim and aggressor
- Rates of change over time in each crime category
- Documented links between crime statistics and performance goals and measure outcomes
- Ability of the police to tackle all types of crimes (e.g. ethnic crime, domestic violence, etc.) for all community members

4) Coordination
The police are just one tier of the criminal justice system. Without external coordination with effective judicial and penal sectors, the police cannot have sufficient impact on promoting rule of law. If police investigations and arrests are not followed by appropriate incarceration conditions (e.g. efficient and uncrowned prisons) and fair and timely trials in functional courts, the rule of law and the role of the police in the chain of justice will be undermined. While crumbling prisons and a dysfunctional judiciary are often prevalent in post-conflict areas, the police must still work with these systems as professionally and concertedly as possible to support the development of the criminal justice sector.

Evidence of criminal justice coordination includes:
- Regular collaboration with judicial and penal sectors on investigations, arrests, and transfers of suspects from courts and prisons
- Cooperation and consultation with the penal sector on detention, interrogation, and imprisonment
- Cooperation and consultation with the judicial sector on trials, witness testimonies, and sentencing

II. Management and Oversight

This section includes four indicators that are essential to understanding the depth and functionality of the police service’s management structures and oversight mechanisms. Our assumption is that a police service will under-perform if it does not have a basic managerial skeleton and oversight mechanisms in place.

1) Mission and Procedures
Without a clear mission and procedures, police officers are less likely to know what they are supposed to do and why they are supposed to do it. Successful police organizations have defined rules, procedures, chain of command, and mission that guide their actions and focus their objectives. Rules and procedures help police officers produce predictable outcomes and assist managers and oversight bodies with holding police accountable. An established chain of command helps set the parameters of authority and the division of responsibilities from high ranking officers to the lowest ranking constable. A unifying mission ensures that police officers carry out their duties with a shared purpose. In short, rules, a chain of command, and a mission that is well defined, understood, and accepted by all members of the service are the basic ingredients for successful police management.

Evidence of a clear mission and procedures:
- The following distributed to, understood, and followed by all officers: mission statement, job descriptions, organizational hierarchy chart, handbook of standard operating procedures, and code of conduct
- Ongoing supervision of officers by managers
- Systematic procedures for how to process a criminal investigation, issue tickets, control riots, and other police functions

2) Strategic Planning and Monitoring
Without regularly setting goals and measuring performance, a police department cannot gauge how effectively it is achieving its goals, cannot hold its officers accountable, and cannot adapt to a changing criminal environment. Studies of police in developed countries suggest that information-driven policing methods are likely to have a significant impact on crime rates. Post-conflict environments, however, pose many obstacles to collecting useful data, so it is critical that a fledgling police service create a system for doing so in order to determine appropriate and realistic goals and to monitor officers’ performance in relation to those goals. Strategic planning will keep a new police service forward-looking and focused on addressing problems, while monitoring will allow it to track its progress and make revisions in response to changing conditions.

Evidence of effective strategic planning and monitoring:
- Use of a realistic and clearly defined strategic plan
- Use of a system that monitors the achievement of the strategic plan’s objectives at both the national and local level
- Use of data collection, such as crime statistics, in strategic planning efforts
- Existence of a system that monitors officers’ performance and is tied to consequences and incentives

3) Oversight and Accountability
Mechanisms for police oversight are critical in promoting transparency and accountability to the public and in providing incentives against the abuse of power. Furthermore, in post-conflict societies, such mechanisms are often a symbolically powerful way of helping the community overcome the legacy of previous regimes.
that frequently operated with impunity and little oversight. A lack of oversight may result in a tremendous waste of both domestic and international resources and permit police services to become a threat to public safety rather than a guarantor of it. A police service should therefore have an internal oversight mechanism so that it can assess and remedy its own behavior as needed. Independent, external oversight is also needed to address incidents of unchecked police behavior and give the community a voice in monitoring the police.

Evidence of sound oversight and accountability:
- Use of an internal oversight mechanism (e.g. a professional ethics office) that enforces discipline and investigates complaints of misconduct
- Existence and effectiveness of an external mechanism (e.g. Ombudsperson) that collects and investigates complaints of police misconduct
- Descriptions/statistics of filed complaints and resulting disciplinary measures taken by internal and external oversight mechanisms

4) Personnel Issues
Without transparent and merit-based recruitment and promotion systems and high retention rates, the police service is less likely to be composed of the most qualified officers. Recruitment for police in a post-conflict context must be fair, transparent, and rigorous to build community trust in the service. Where ethnic or sectarian differences have driven past conflict, there should be an appropriate ethnic and gender balance in the service. A merit-based promotional system is important to hold officers accountable to transparent performance standards. It also helps solidify organizational hierarchy within the service by placing deserving and respected officers in higher ranks. High retention rates are necessary to preserve institutional memory and build institutional knowledge in the service. With high rates of turnover, a police service is forced to allocate scarce resources to additional training and faces greater challenges in building up a mature and effective organization.

Evidence of high personnel standards:
- Use of a recruitment process with a set of reasonable and transparent standards for vetting police recruits
- Use of a merit-based promotion system for monitoring and rewarding the performance of individual officers
- Low turnover and high retention rates, disaggregated by rank, region, ethnicity, and reasons for leaving the service
III. Community Relations

This section includes four indicators that measure the quality and depth of the police service’s relations with the local community. Our assumption is that the effectiveness of a police service is limited if it does not have the cooperation and trust of the community it serves.

1) Human Rights

Without respecting the human rights of all citizens, the police are less likely to have the full trust of the public. The underlying principle of democratic policing asserts that respect for human rights is vital to public order and law enforcement, and it entails police sensitivity to majority opinion as well as a readiness to uphold the rights of minorities. Often times, post-conflict societies do not have a history of upholding human rights, and the new police service requires intense and sustained human rights training that is incorporated into training curricula and reinforced continuously on the job. Even then, instilling respect for human rights is a long-term process because it requires a fundamental change in values, but it is also a necessary process if new police services are to be trusted by the community whose safety they are charged to protect.

Evidence of adherence to human rights standards:

- Police training curricula that incorporate international human rights norms throughout training in all subject matters
- Monitoring and performance evaluations that include criteria on human rights
- Standard operating procedures and codes of conduct that emphasize the importance of upholding human rights
- Oversight mechanisms that discipline officers found in violation of human rights
- Decrease in number of complaints of human rights violations over time
- Public perceptions of police applying the law evenly and appropriately

2) Cooperation

Without a high level of public cooperation in achieving safety objectives and solving crime investigations, the police will be hard-pressed to provide law and order for the community. In post-conflict societies, it is often difficult for the police to gain the cooperation of local communities who may have been victimized by previous regimes. Minority groups may also fear persecution and acts of revenge and see the police as a source of conflict instead of protection. Cooperation can further be limited by geography, with rural populations having limited access to police services. Cooperation between the police and local communities, however, can be the difference between success and failure for the police. Local communities play a critical role in providing police with information on local suspects, legitimizing the role of the police, and building confidence within the society in the rule of law.

Evidence of healthy public cooperation:

- Development of a community relations strategy and implementation of resulting initiatives
• Community policing efforts such as joint forums between police and community members
• Descriptions and statistics of public cooperation on police investigations of both low and high-profile crimes
• Existence of public security guarantees (e.g., witness protection program) for assisting the police with its investigations
• Expressions of public willingness to cooperate and of public familiarity with the work of the police

3) **Corruptibility**
Without assurances and evidence that it is not corrupt, the police will have difficulty convincing the public that it is providing law and order in a democratic, egalitarian, and transparent manner. Institutional corruption retards mature management and growth and prevents the service from fulfilling its basic duties. Moreover, a police service that is seen as corrupt jeopardizes its relationship with the local community. In some cases, officers may be corrupt because they receive insufficient compensation to provide for their families or because they are surrounded by corrupt institutions. Officers might also be susceptible to corruption if they are not rewarded for good behavior (e.g., through a merit-based promotion system) or punished for bad behavior (e.g., due to lack of disciplinary action and oversight).

**Evidence of police resistance to corruption:**
• Public perceptions of low police corruption or of positive changes over time
• Police perceptions of low corruption within the service
• Public, police, and government perceptions of low corruption in other government institutions, especially those close to the police service such as the Ministry of Interior
• Officers’ salaries sufficient to support an average size family
• Presence of merit-based promotion system and/or other rewards for good behavior
• Presence and use of disciplinary mechanisms to publicly punish corrupt officers

4) **Acceptance**
In post-conflict societies where the police may have been a source of oppression and violence during previous regimes, earning the public’s trust and acceptance is a particularly difficult and sensitive challenge. Public acceptance means that the community accepts the police as a legitimate institution that protects and upholds the rights of all of the people it is supposed to protect in an even and transparent fashion. Acceptance also entails public recognition and sanction of the police’s monopoly on the use of force to provide internal security, which is difficult if the police is challenged by the presence and actions of informal security actors within its jurisdiction. This attitude of public acceptance is difficult to cultivate in developed countries and even more so in post-conflict societies, but it is especially important in the latter if the public is to move forward and begin to trust the police to enforce law and order.
Evidence of public acceptance:
• Positive public perceptions of the police, its role in the community, and the legitimacy of its authority and reach disaggregated by region, ethnicity, and gender
• Percentage increase in crime reporting disaggregated by region, ethnicity, and gender
• Public differentiation between police and other security actors, both formal and informal

IV. Sustainability

This section includes four indicators that help measure the ability of the police service to sustain itself without international donor support and oversight/protection. Our assumption is that a police service that cannot sustain its capabilities without substantial international assistance cannot function effectively and independently in the long run.

1) Budget
Without careful and long-term budget planning, a police service is less likely to allocate and request the funds necessary to keep up its performance without requiring additional assistance. Matching police service needs to available resources is crucial to the long-term viability of a police service’s structure, organization, and service projection. International actors have generally paid insufficient attention to the financial sustainability of local police services after executive authority has been transferred to local communities. As a result, the police services left behind may be institutionally fragile, find it difficult to support law enforcement operations, and be limited in their capacity to maintain equipment and buildings.

Evidence of proper budget planning:
• Presence and use of a budget plan for the current year and future years that is realistically aligned with the goals of the police service's strategic plan
• Percentage of national budget and GDP allocated to policing that is adequate for the service to effectively carry out its duties
• Responsible percentage of police budget spent annually
• Low or decreasing percentage of police budget paid by international donors
• Acceptable percentages of police budget used for officer salaries, maintenance, and purchase of equipment, and training
• Flexibility of police budget to adapt to changing needs of the police and the resources of the national government

2) Training and Equipment
Without the ability to provide adequate levels of effective training, a police service will be unable to sustain high levels of professionalism. Training should include basic training for new officers along with ongoing refresher courses and specialized
programs for current officers in all relevant areas. The length, quality, and focus of the training should be determined by the needs of the police rather than political pressures to produce officers as quickly as possible. “Train the trainer” programs should begin well before the departure of international actors and seek to train a wide-cross section of officers. Police officers also need access to basic equipment, such as radios and vehicles to do their jobs. They should be trained to use, maintain, and repair such equipment.

Evidence of comprehensive training and adequate equipment:
- Sufficient length and high quality of trainings for new officers, including on-the-job training
- Subject areas of training and their relevance to needs of the service
- Number, length, and quality of refresher courses offered to current officers
- High quality of “train the trainer” trainings
- Adequate number of qualified local trainers trained disaggregated by area of expertise
- High retention rate of indigenous trainers
- High ratio of vehicles purchased to vehicles used.
- Presence of officers specifically trained in vehicle and equipment maintenance and repair.

3) Political Independence
In most post-conflict societies, the police have never experienced political neutrality. They have often been used to pursue politicians’ agendas such as exerting intimidation on political contests, providing personal protective services, or suppressing rivals to power. Without a sufficient degree of institutionalized political independence, a police service in a post-conflict environment is susceptible to becoming a pawn of local and national politics, especially after international actors leave. While a new police service cannot expect to operate in a complete political vacuum, it must be able to isolate itself from external influences, particularly if other institutions are less democratic and/or more corrupt. A new or reformed police service that cannot shed this legacy and remain sufficiently independent of formal politics may become an instrument of oppression rather than of protection.

Evidence of political independence:
- Independence of the police clearly defined in the constitution and/or other laws
- Ability of police to prosecute politically motivated crime evenhandedly, especially those involving local politicians or their support bases
- Ability of police to maintain adequate degree of control over their budget and resources
- Low threat to the continuity of officers’ jobs in the event of political changes and upheavals

4) Compensation
Without competitive and/or livable wages, police officers are less likely to be motivated to perform well and more likely to be corruptible or leave the service. Salaries should be adequate to attract appropriately qualified candidates, provide a decent standard of living, and reduce incentives for corruption and turnover. At the same time, they should not command more of the police budget than is sustainable for the long run and monopolize funds that might be more effective being spent on equipment or training. Assessments of compensation should also include benefits such as pensions or medical coverage.

Evidence of satisfactory compensation:

- Comparison of police salary broken down by rank and region to those of other professionals (e.g. soldiers, teachers, doctors, private security guards) and to the national median salary
- Comparison of police salary to the cost of supporting an average sized family
- Existence of compensation other than wages (e.g. health care, housing, pensions)
- Low percentage of officers who hold a second job
- Appropriate increases in officers’ salaries as they rise in rank
- Timely payment of salaries
Section III: Findings

*Success is a science – if you have the conditions, you get the result.*

*Oscar Wilde*

This section of report uses the PRIME to assess the “police-building” processes in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. The PRIME findings in this report also serve as a baseline from which to compare future evaluations within these locations to gauge degrees of progress. Since PRIME was not designed to compare results across different locations, the findings are best used to compare results within the same location over time. This section introduces the key findings in each pillar from all three locations starting with a brief overview of all three cases. Additional details on each case study can be found in the case annexes at the end of this report.

I. Performance Effectiveness

In all three cases, the police lack the capacity to handle high-profile crimes, such as political crimes. While the police in Timor-Leste and Kosovo are capable of handling low crimes, such as petty theft or traffic violations, this capability is still limited in Sierra Leone, which has been facing an increasing crime rate. Political and organized crimes are particularly prevalent in Kosovo where police training in these areas remain inadequate and police authority is undermined by illegal external security threats. Police capabilities in all three areas are further limited by weak judicial and penal systems, whose development has trailed behind that of the police sector.

Kosovo
The democratizing of policing in Kosovo has not come hand-in-hand with effectiveness. The infancy of the service is still very much evident in its inability to deal with the complete spectrum of crime. The specialized skills required for more sophisticated crimes are still being developed and in instances when the KPS does tackle such crimes, the weak judicial system is unable to prosecute the suspects. Moreover, the overall authority of the KPS continues to be undermined by the activities of illegal Kosovar Albanian intelligence structures and police officers from Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) in Serb-populated enclaves.

Sierra Leone
The better conditions of service, facilities, and equipment have improved the visibility and expanded the reach of the SLP beyond the capital and major provincial cities. However, these better conditions have not translated into improved performance in all areas. The SLP has faced increasing overall crime rates since 2002, particularly in the categories of assault, larceny and housebreaking. This rise in crime may partly reflect increased reporting from the public, but it also seems to reflect critical insufficiencies in criminal intelligence, investigation, and information management. For example, the SLP has no forensics training or equipment. The SLP is still reluctant to conduct investigations against the rich or the
politically powerful. Additionally, a dysfunctional judicial system, out-of-date laws and procedures, and overcrowded prisons have limited police effectiveness.

**Timor-Leste**
While the PNTL is able to fight basic crime, its effectiveness is hampered by its limited capacity and lack of proper human resources. The force is slowly making progress in confronting issues of domestic/sexual violence, which are compounded by difficulties in the judicial and penal systems in prosecuting such crimes. Smuggling of basic goods and trafficking of persons remain key challenges. Although new units like the Border Patrol Unit have been created to address these problems, success is hard to fully measure in the absence of widespread activity, limited reporting, and the PNTL’s anemic capacity. Other units such as the Counter-Terrorism Unit have been set up to address problems that do not yet appear to meaningfully exist. Given scarce resources, this raises the issue of donor versus local priorities. While the PNTL has unquestioned authority in fighting crimes throughout the country, its reach is limited by basic infrastructure problems such as lack of serviceable equipment and roads. While the PNTL increasingly cooperates with the penal and judicial systems, their lack of development hinders the PNTL’s ability to effectively administer the rule of law.

**II. Management and Oversight**

Clear management structures exist in all three police services, but significant issues remain concerning promotion systems and oversight. The lack of systematic performance measurement raises concerns about the promotion systems in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. There is limited external oversight over all of the police services. Additionally, while Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, to a limited extent, have a professional senior management, this remains a key problem in Kosovo. The Kosovo police are especially vulnerable to political considerations and are still in the process of getting its legal infrastructure put in place.

**Kosovo**
The inexperience and weakness among some of the KPS’ senior managers, combined with a lack of legal insulation regarding its independence, renders the police service vulnerable to the highly charged political environment in which it operates. Initial promotions were made hastily, and though now stricter, they continue to be disconnected from any measurement of performance. While internal oversight is relatively robust with the existence of a Professional Standards Unit (PSU) and the presence of UNPOL monitors, external oversight has barely been established. Political considerations delayed for six years the UN’s decision to create a Ministry of Interior, an Inspector General, and a police law. The new police service is only now beginning to get the institutional and legal umbrella under which it can fully operate and be held accountable.

**Sierra Leone**
The restructuring of the SLP that took place under UK interim Inspector General of Police Keith Biddle has proven effective at creating a professional upper management tier. While the management structure and reporting hierarchy are formally clear, discipline among lower ranks remains spotty. The lack of systematic performance measurement by the SLP raises
concerns about its promotion system. Furthermore, while the SLP has an internal oversight mechanism, the Complaint Discipline and Internal Investigation Department (CDIID), there are serious doubts about its effectiveness. Community members do not feel comfortable filing complaints with the CDIID because it is located within police stations and still do not trust SLP officers to hold their peers accountable. External oversight belongs to the Police Council. However, there is a serious concern that the Vice President, who chairs the Council, could use his position to politicize the SLP. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee also provide some external oversight over the SLP.

Timor-Leste
The PNTL has a clear hierarchy of management and reporting structure in place. Moreover, though job descriptions and standard operating procedures exist and are explained during basic training, language complications (i.e. production in English, Portuguese, or Tetum despite 33 dialects spoken in country) and limited distribution of print materials prevent many officers from internalizing PNTL’s mission and understanding how their individual role contributes to the greater goal of stability, justice, and rule of law in Timor-Leste. Internal oversight is developing through the Professional Ethics Unit (PEU), which has a limited mandate and effectiveness. External oversight exists through the Provedor for Human Rights. Recruitment efforts are largely successful and based on a merit system. Retention rates are high, reflecting relatively high levels of satisfaction among PNTL officers and high unemployment rates in country.

III. Community Relations

While the police services in all three missions have made great strides in improving community relations, they still face considerable challenges in building trust and fighting corruption. In Kosovo, police relations with minority communities are poor and community cooperation varies according to the type of crime. The police in Sierra Leone have strongly pushed community outreach efforts and seen increased public support, but corruption remains a major issue. Support for the police is strong and fueled by national pride in Timor-Leste, but human rights abuses are a concern and undermine support.

Kosovo
Through a demonstrated commitment to human rights, a concerted but fragile effort to refrain from corruption, and a number of community policing initiatives, the KPS has built a solid relationship with most communities in Kosovo. The degree of confidence it enjoys among the Albanians and non-Serb minorities is very high, though it remains unclear if it is a product of patriotism, performance, or both. Its overall standing among Serbs is significantly lower and also suspected to be more strongly influenced by political considerations than by KPS performance. Community cooperation with the KPS also varies across different types of crimes. Lack of effective witness protection programs still hinders the cooperation of all ethnic communities for higher profile crimes.
Sierra Leone
The strong emphasis on community relations in the police reform effort has led to a modest increase in the SLP’s support from the public. The SLP’s efforts to improve community relations have included the creation of Community Relations and Family Support Units (FSUs) staffed jointly by police officers and social workers, Local Partnership Boards chaired by community members and, more recently, Local Governing Councils. However, perception polls and interviews with community members still indicate widespread distrust of the police resulting primarily from persistent corruption, including bribery and extortion, which are often attributed to the low wages and a culture of impunity.

Timor-Leste
Community support for the PNTL is largely fueled by patriotism with the police representing the most visible presence of the new state. While community relations are generally positive, there have been domestic and international concerns over human rights abuses. To address these concerns, human rights training is now incorporated into both PNTL training and practice and a PEU has been created. While corruption is not widespread, it could become a problem due to low salaries and the PNTL’s limited political independence from other government ministries.

IV. Sustainability
In Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste where physical and financial capacity is extremely limited, sustainability is the major concern for the police services since the UN will soon be departing from both locations. In Kosovo and Sierra Leone, the police face a lack of political independence and susceptibility to politicization and corruption. Low salaries and nonexistent benefits are prevalent in all three cases.

Kosovo
The fact that the KPS has been funded entirely by the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) since 2001 is a reassuring sign of its financial sustainability. The KPS has also received sufficient general police equipment to carry out its duties for the foreseeable future, and the international staff at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) has trained large numbers of local instructors and staff to take over its responsibilities in the next few years. Officers of all ranks, however, complain of low salaries and the lack of benefits, and it remains to be seen whether increases in compensation can be granted while maintaining an affordable budget. An even bigger concern is the susceptibility of the KPS to politicization and corruptibility, both of which are suspected to be prevalent throughout the Kosovar government.

Sierra Leone
The SLP remains heavily dependent on international donor support (the government’s national budget is 60 percent donor dependent) and is vulnerable to politicization by elected leaders and competition from the military. Although the Sierra Leone National Budget has fully funded the salaries of SLP officers since 2003, the financial sustainability of a 9,500-member police service is uncertain given limited government resources. For example, donors still fully fund all of the SLP’s vehicles and equipment. If Sierra Leone cannot begin assuming greater financial responsibility for the SLP, it may have to consider downsizing its force strength. The political independence of the SLP, particularly of its armed paramilitary
wing (OSD), is also of great concern. There is still considerable risk that political actors, particularly the Vice President, will use the SLP against political opponents in the upcoming 2007 Presidential elections. Finally, the scaled-down Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), which feels that the police are receiving too much donor support, could pose a threat to the SLP’s monopoly over internal security.

Timor-Leste
Currently, approximately a quarter of the PNTL budget is funded through international donors. The PNTL is in the process of creating a 15-year strategic plan. UNPOL subject matter experts have developed a training curriculum that addresses current needs and is forward looking, although training standards are still low and capacity and human resource constraints limit effectiveness. The PNTL lack the necessary equipment, financial resources, and training to maintain and upkeep current equipment. There is a severe shortage of physical capital, including major items such as vehicles, fuel, and weapons and smaller items, such as radios, batteries, and notebooks. The Ministry of Interior and its senior leadership, which maintain a high level of control over the PNTL’s activities, limit the PNTL’s political independence. Salaries are on a par with other professions, but still inadequate to provide for families.
Appendix A: Methodology Justifications

This section briefly references some of the academic literature that emphasizes the importance of the PRIME indicators. Full citations can be found in the bibliography.

I. Performance Effectiveness

Capacity

Basic Policing
On the fundamental needs of a police service see Clegg et al. 48.
For the importance of initial training see Neild 27-29.

Authority and Reach

High and low crimes
For a description of the difference between high and low crimes see Reiner 2.

Police authority
For a discussion of police authority, mandate, and strategies see Manning.
On alternatives to formal policing see Hills 7-8, Bayley and Shearing, Baker, and Scheye 105.

Crime

The importance of crimefighting
Regarding the centrality of crime prevention to police work see Clegg et al. 50.

The role of statistics
See Smith, and Neild 37, on the imperative of statistics-driven crime fighting.

Interpreting crime statistics carefully
On the underreporting of crime in developing countries see Clegg et al. 56.
On the rise of crime in post-conflict areas see Scheye 105-106.

Coordination

Rule of law
See Hurwitz and Studdard i-6 on the value of rule of law to a society in general.

Simultaneous development of criminal justice institutions
Regarding the need for coordinated approaches to criminal justice sector development see Marshall 171, Bayley 42, Neild 31-34, and Clegg et al. 61.

The police in criminal justice sector context
On the need for a full criminal justice sector in order for policing to work see Marenin 2005, 55 and Call and Stanley 168.
On the need for supportive formal and informal ties between the police and other criminal justice institutions see Clegg et al. 2.
Regarding the interrelation of prisons and the rest of the justice sector and the idea that community values are expressed through all criminal justice institutions see Coyle 45.

II. Management and Oversight

Mission and Procedures

Hierarchy and chains of command
Regarding the need for strong police hierarchy see Manning 205 and Neild 29.

Mandates
On mandates and their role in producing consistent policing see Manning 210.

Strategic Planning and Monitoring

Vision
See Scheye 108 on the need for strategic vision of police reform. See also Call and Stanley 152.

Data collection for planning and effectiveness
For discussion of the role of statistics in police planning and crime reduction see Neild 36-27.
Regarding the use of statistics and surveys for effective police planning and prediction see Clegg et al. 51.
Marenin 2005, 36 discusses the need for benchmarking police performance.

Data collection for organizational learning
On the need for self-examination and adaptability in a police service and the role of data and information collection in this process see Marenin 2005, 52.

Oversight and Accountability

Who provides oversight and accountability?
On the need for managerial modeling and enforcement of integrity see Marenin 2005, 29.
On the need for internal service discipline see Neild 30 and Bayley 40.
Stone and Ward as quoted in Neild 34 categorize who should supervise the police: the police themselves, external government bodies, and groups within society.
Hartz 37 discusses the need for external oversight, including oversight by the courts and various civil society organizations.

Lack of mechanisms for oversight and accountability
On the difficulty of overseeing the police, the necessity of doing so, and the failure of international institutions to insist upon it see Clegg et al. 13 and Call and Stanley 169.
Regarding the need for internal and external oversight and reaffirms that international sponsors have failed to insist upon it see Call and Stanley 169.
Personnel Issues

Hiring
On the need for rational recruitment, lustration, and vetting see, for example, Marenin 2005, 53, Bayley 56, and Hartz 33.

Best practices for retaining officers
Marenin 2005, 30 insists that police officers have a right to clear and fair guidelines for hiring, comportment, and promotion. See also Neild 27.

III. Community Relations

Human Rights

What are human rights?
For a discussion of human rights and the principle of human security see Marenin 2005, 9. On the maintenance of order as a pre-requisite for the provision of human rights see Clegg et al. 18.

Human rights and the police
Brewer 116 asserts that the test of a police service is whether it defends minority rights in the face of opposition. Regarding the centrality of human rights to democratic policing see the citation of Call in Neild 23. See Neild 23, 34 for a discussion of the role of respect for human rights in effective policing.

Cooperation

What is cooperation and does it matter?
On the co-production of law and order by police and society see Clegg et al. 40. For a discussion of the effectiveness of local needs based policing and community policing see Clegg et al. 41, 46-7, Buvinic and Morrison 70, Bayley 717-18, and Neild 28. Regarding the limits of cooperation see Reiner 4.

Corruptibility

Corruption and development
Marenin 2005, 13 argues that corruption fosters insecurity and underdevelopment.

Salaries and corruption
Neild 27 addresses the role of low salaries in corruption.

Public Acceptance

The value of public trust of police
On the potential of the good policing to legitimate entire social orders see Marenin 2005, 16-17 and Call and Stanley 151-152.
On the need for public confidence to achieve effective policing see Hartz 37. On the role of (ethnically) representative police services in fostering trust see Neild 23 and Call and Stanley 151-2.
Understanding public acceptance
On the role of police and the media in shaping public perceptions see Manning 205.
Regarding the value of public opinion surveys rather than crime statistics for measuring
public satisfaction with policing see Bayley and Shearing 720.

IV. Sustainability

Budget
Low funding
For evidence that police are frequently under-funded see Brewer et al. 112.

Balancing needs
See Scheye 105, 110 on the tradeoffs between size of the police service, salaries, equipment,
professional development, and institutionalization. See also Marenin 2005, 36.
See Hills 4 and Scheye 122, for example, on the role of the international community in
fostering unsustainable police services.

Training
Readiness
On the need to train trainers and midlevel managers see Marenin 53.
See Scheye 108 on good training as a pre-requisite for handing control of police to the
national service.

Training content
On recommended length and content of training see Hartz 33.
Regarding the need to train police not only in minimal skills, but also in norms and complex
skills see Marenin 2005, 57-8.

Trade-offs
On the trade-offs between equipment, professional development and other police needs see
Scheye 105, 110.

Political Independence
How much is possible, how much is desirable?
On striking a balance between independence and responsiveness see Marenin 2005, 29.
For the argument that the police are inherently political see Hills 3 and Marenin 1996.
On the need for political interest in the police see Call and Stanley 170, Reiner 3, and

Compensation
Compensation levels and regularity of payment
On the need for decent salaries see Neild 27.
On the need for reliable payment of salaries see Marenin 2005, 30.

- 38 -
Appendix B: Data Sources

This section offers a list of suggested resources that may be used to collect information for PRIME.

I. Performance Effectiveness

Capacity
In order to gauge capacity, one should meet with police officers at the local/district and federal level to inquire into the provision of adequate training, resources, and manpower. Additional information should be acquired through police logistics units who keep records on equipment. Such information should be cross-referenced with donor activity in country and interviews with UNPOL and donors to assess capacity and needs of the police service. Also, it is important to visit the police academy and attend trainings as well as examine police equipment (e.g. vehicles, radios, weapons, office equipment) to assess quality and condition. One should examine topics covered during basic training as well as subject areas of advanced professional development. Trainings should be assessed through interviews with UNPOL, local trainers, and officers as well as local and international NGOs.

Authority and Reach
In order to understand authority and reach, one should look for both UNSCR relating to the mandate and mission of UNPOL as well as domestic legislation that outlines the role and responsibilities of the police service. Through interviews with local police and UNPOL, as well as local and international NGOs, one should look to see if the authority of the police is different on paper than in practice. In addition, one should research what other actors might be involved in the security sector (e.g. military, private security, organized crime, militia groups, etc.). In order to examine the reach of the police, one should inquire into police deployments throughout the country to see if certain areas are not available to the police. One should also take visits to field sites to get a sense of topography, road conditions, and quality of vehicles. Moreover, one should look to local and international NGOs as well as embassies to inquire into the reach of the police. Additional information on the reach of police may be found through examining the freedom of movement for all members of society, specifically women and minority groups. This can be collected through focus groups, interviews with members of various communities and NGOs, and reports by local and international NGOs.

Crime
In order to monitor crime-fighting capability, one should look at crime statistics. If police services collect statistics, they should be available at both the local/district and federal level. One can also look for crime rates and trends in weekly and monthly updates and progress reports from both the local police and UNPOL. Some police services may have special units that deal solely with the collection and interpretation of crime statistics. However, crime rates do not adequately reflect the sense of safety and security in post-conflict environments by themselves. Thus, crime rates should be looked at along with public opinion polls on
safety and security as well as human rights and security reports by local and international NGOs and foreign embassies.

**Coordination**
In order to monitor coordination, one should look for legislation or other written guidelines (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding) that define each institution’s responsibilities and relationships with the other. To examine the implementation of the law one should interview members of each rule of law institution to inquire into cross-institutional relationships and problems between them. Additionally, there may be regular meetings between the agencies with meeting minutes and agendas.

**II. Management and Oversight**

**Mission and Procedures**
In order to unearth mission and procedures, one should look and ask for a police service’s mission statement, standard operating procedures (SOP), and organizational chart. However, the presence of such information may not reflect the level of its dissemination and understanding. One should randomly interview officers to inquire into basic knowledge of said organizational chart, SOPs, and mission of the police. In addition, one should inquire into the form in which these items exist (e.g. on computers in headquarters or given in hard copies to all officers or district commands). One should also inquire into reports by internal affairs units or the equivalent to examine levels and trends of police reprimand for failure to comply with mission and procedures.

**Strategic Planning and Monitoring**
In order to track strategic planning and monitoring, one should inquire into the service’s short and long-term strategic plans. Specifically, one should look for the establishment of benchmarks for achieving the goals laid out in the plan and a performance evaluation mechanism for monitoring these goals. Additionally, one should look for the establishment of specific positions with officers charged with developing, monitoring, and implementing strategic plans. Through interviews and examining strategic plans, one should interview officers involved with planning to ask what assessments they use to develop policy (e.g. budget projections, threat assessment, donor funds, etc).

**Oversight and Accountability**
In order to monitor oversight and accountability, one should look to see what internal and external structures exist for police oversight and how they are incorporated into national law. The effectiveness of such units can be examined by looking at their staffing, budgeting, and success in punishing officers who violate rules. Units will likely maintain statistics on both closed and ongoing cases. Interviews should be held with members of these units to inquire into relations with the larger police service, political or logistical constraints, etc. One should examine reports by local and international NGOs as well as foreign embassies on the reach and impact of such bodies. In addition, one should talk with leaders of community groups to inquire into the effectiveness of internal and external accountability units.
**Personnel Issues**

In order to monitor personnel issues, one should look for written procedures from the local police and UNPOL on recruitment and promotion. Additionally, one should look for reports on recruits to assess whether target levels of gender and ethnic balance are rational and being met. Through interviews with recruiters, upper level officers, UNPOL and local and international NGOs, one should look to see if current practices reflect written procedure. Since a good promotion process requires information about the performance of individual officers, it is necessary to find out how individual performance is assessed. Interview officers to find out if, how, and when they report their general activities to superiors. Interview station commanders about whether they collect performance data and how it is used. In addition, one should look for reports documenting retention rates within the service.

**III. Community Relations**

**Human Rights**

In order to monitor human rights, one should look to see if and how human rights are incorporated into the police mission, legislation, and trainings. Interviews should be conducted with officers to see the extent to which they internalize this information. Additionally, reports from internal and external oversight units may document reported cases of human rights abuses. Local and international NGOs and foreign embassies should be consulted on the condition of human rights in the police. Reports from organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International should be consulted to assess the overall human rights conditions in the community.

**Cooperation**

In order to gauge cooperation, one should look in the police structure and legislation for a community relations strategy/unit/program. One should also look to see if meetings are regularly held between the police and community members and if minutes or agendas are available. In addition, one should interview members of the unit charged with public outreach to inquire into their relationship with the larger police service and the constraints they face in the community. One should interview community members and local and international NGOs to inquire into the relationship between the police and the community. Moreover, one should look for evidence that the police incorporate community concerns into police training and practice.

**Corruptibility**

In order to detect the potential for corruption, one should compare police salary rates with average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. In addition, one should interview members of local and international NGOs about the level of corruption in country. One should look for international reports, from groups such as Transparency International, which monitor levels of corruption and openness in country. One should also conduct public opinion polls and/or focus groups to assess public perception on corruption in the police service and among other government institutions.
Public Acceptance
In order to measure public acceptance, one should look at levels of cooperation between the police and the community. One should also look for public opinion surveys on the police and other security actors to the extent they challenge the police monopoly on the use of force. In addition, interviews with members of community groups on their perceptions of the police should be conducted.

IV. Sustainability

Budget
In order to monitor the budget, one should look at current and future budget projections of both the police and the government. These budgets should be examined along with strategic plans and police annual action plans to determine the appropriateness of the budget in regard to police priorities. One should interview members of the finance and budget office in addition to district commanders and senior staff into the development of the budget as well as government officials who deal with approving the police budget and with designing the overall government budget. One should also consult international donors on the appropriateness and sustainability of budget projections.

Training and Equipment
In order to monitor training and equipment, one should look at basic, specialized, and “training of trainers” programs. Specifically, one should look to see whether current trainings adequately meet on-the-ground realities. This can be found through interviews with UNPOL, trainers and officers as well as local and international NGOs. In addition, one should look at personnel files for retention rates among trainer of trainers. For equipment, one should look at curricula dealing with equipment handling and maintenance and interview officers to gauge familiarity and comfort with the equipment they use. Interviews with international police officers on their perceptions of the adequacy of training and equipment should also shed light on this issue.

Political Independence
In order to measure political independence, one should interview police officers at all levels, UNPOL, and local and international NGOs to ask how they believe the police service might change politically when the international community leaves. Additionally, political independence can be examined through looking at the mission and mandate of the police as written in domestic law. Public perceptions of the strength of political independence of the police service and other government institutions may tease out further information.

Compensation
In order to monitor compensation, one should get salary levels and benefits across all police ranks from the human resources office. These figures should be compared to both average GDP per capita as well as figures for other professional occupations (e.g. security guard). One should interview officers about whether they are capable of providing for their families and whether they have second jobs. Research regarding the current state of the economy will help put compensation figures in context.
Bibliography


Annex I: The Case of the Kosovo Police Service

Bennett, Steve. 2005. "Welcome to the Kosovo Police Service School" OSCE Mission in Kosovo slide show


Kosovo Police Service. 2005 (6 July). Interoffice Memorandum: Command and Control System Within the KPS.


Shala, Shaban (Col.), KPS Peja/Pec Regional Commander. 2005 (5 Nov.). Personal Interview.


UNMIK. 1999 (22 Dec.). UNMIK Regulations 1999/27.


UNMIK. 2001 (22 Dec.). UNMIK Regulations 2001/37.


Annex II: The Case of the Sierra Leone Police


Sierra Leone Police. SLP Annual Staff Performance Appraisal/Promotion Assessment of Constable.


Annex III: The Case of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste


Secretary-General, UN. 1999 (5 May). Report of the Secretary General on the ‘Question of East Timor’.

Secretary-General, UN. 1999 (22 May). Report of the Secretary General on the ‘Question of East Timor’.
Secretary-General, UN. 1999 (22 June). Report of the Secretary General on the ‘Question of East Timor’.

Secretary-General, UN. 1999 (20 July). Report of the Secretary General on the ‘Question of East Timor’.

Secretary-General, UN. 1999 (9 Aug.). Report of the Secretary General on the ‘Question of East Timor’.


Annex IV: UNPOL in Action


Annex I: The Case of the Kosovo Police Service
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of PRIME Findings</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Conditions</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Measurements</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIME Findings</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Effectiveness</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and Oversight</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPED</td>
<td>Department of Police Education and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPSS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Service School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMIK</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISG</td>
<td>Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIME</td>
<td>Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The following report and conclusions on the progress of police reforms in Kosovo are primarily based on in-country field research conducted by Ylber Bajraktari and Jane Rhee using the PRIME metrics between 30 October and 6 November 2005. This analysis is the product of more than 30 formal and informal interviews conducted in Prishtina / Pristina, Vushtrri / Vucitrn, and Peja / Pec in Kosovo, as well as Washington, DC and New York, with officials from organizations including, but not limited to, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS); Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), including its Department for Police Education and Development (DPED); United Nations Police (UNPOL) and United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); local and international media representatives; and members of civil society. Official reports and governmental documents collected within Kosovo and on the Internet also contributed to our findings.

6 Throughout this annex, the names of the cities and towns in Kosovo are written in both Albanian and Serbian.
Acknowledgments

The research we conducted in Kosovo could not have been accomplished without assistance from numerous people. In particular, we wish to extend our profound thanks to Margareta Schluter of United Nations Police (UNPOL) in New York, Arber Gorani of the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS), Colonel Behar Selimi of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and Richard Warren, Deputy Commissioner of KPS. We are also indebted to the leadership of UNPOL in Kosovo, particularly Paul Hutchings, Deputy Commissioner for Operations; Andy Kirkwood, Deputy Commissioner for Crimes; and Hans Zimmermann, Deputy Commissioner for Administration of UNPOL in Kosovo.

In the KPS, we are grateful for all the help we received from Colonel Atifete Jahjaga, Head of Training Department; Colonel Shaban Shala, Regional Commander - Peja / Peć; Vjollca Ferati, KPS administrative assistant; and a number of KPS officers who guided us and shared their pride and experience of being police officers in Kosovo.

In the KPSS, we are grateful for the tremendous access and assistance provide to us by Director Steve Bennett and Special Advisor Tamara Duffey. Not only did they talk us through six years of police reforms in Kosovo, but they also allowed us to observe the training of the new KPS officers as well as the implementation of community policing initiatives.

In UNMIK, we want to thank Ambassador Larry Rossin, Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, who took time out of his busy schedule to provide us with a frank assessment of the security situation in Kosovo; and Iain Smailes, the Head of the Advisory Unit on Security, who walked us through the recent proposals for security sector review in Kosovo.

In OSCE, we would like to thank Deputy Head of Mission Dr. Jens Modvig for providing us with insights on institution building in Kosovo, and Franklin DeVrieze (Team Leader), Peter Vanhoutte (Consultant), and Kim Vetting (Program Officer) with the Democratization Department for their invaluable insights on the issue of parliamentary oversight of the security sector.

In Kosovo, we would also like to thank Enver Orucaj, Head of the Office on Public Safety of the Kosovo Government; Ylber Hysa, Deputy Chairman of political party Ora; Lulzim Peci and Ilir Dugolli of the Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Fisnik Abrashi and Tina Kraja of Associated Press; Nebi Qena of Kosovo RTV; Naser Myftari of Kaba Ditore newspaper; Jerome Mellon and Virtyt Gacaferri of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); and Alex Anderson of International Crisis Group (ICG).

In Washington, DC, we would particularly like to thank Robert Perito and Mike Dziedzic of the US Institute of Peace, who guided us with their wealth of experience on policing matters in post-conflict societies, and Joshua Black at the State Department, whose expertise on Kosovo was invaluable to our project. We take full responsibility for any mistakes or omissions in this annex.
Executive Summary

The building from scratch of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is often held up as one of the greatest successes of the international community in Kosovo, since its involvement began in 1999. The commitment with which the KPS has been trained and equipped, its anchoring on principles of democratic policing, and its indigenousness are thought to make it one of the most democratic police services not only in Kosovo, but throughout the region and in other places where the international community has engaged in post-conflict reconstruction endeavors. Today, the KPS is a largely cohesive service, has a clear mission and standard operating procedures in place, works well with most communities in Kosovo, and is respectful of human rights standards.

Performance Effectiveness: The democratizing of policing in Kosovo, however, has not come hand-in-hand with effectiveness in policing. The infancy of the service is still very much evident in its inability to deal with the complete spectrum of crime. The specialized skills required for more sophisticated crimes are still being developed and in instances when the KPS does tackle such crimes, the weak judicial system is unable to prosecute the suspects. Moreover, the overall authority of the KPS continues to be undermined by the activities of illegal Kosovar Albanian intelligence structures and police officers from Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) in Serb-populated enclaves.

Management and Oversight: The inexperience and weakness among some of the KPS’ senior managers, combined with a lack of legal insulation regarding its independence, renders the police service vulnerable to the highly charged political environment in which it operates. Initial promotions were done hastily, and though now stricter, they continue to be disconnected from any measurement of performance. While internal oversight is relatively robust with the existence of a Professional Standards Unit (PSU) and the presence of UNPOL monitors, external oversight has barely been established. Political considerations delayed for six years the UN’s decision to create a Ministry of Interior, an Inspector General, and a police law. The new police service is only now beginning to get the institutional and legal umbrella under which it can fully operate and be held accountable.

Community Relations: Through a demonstrated commitment to human rights, a concerted but fragile effort to refrain from corruption, and a number of community policing initiatives, the KPS has built a solid relationship with most communities in Kosovo. The degree of confidence it enjoys among the Albanians and non-Serb minorities is very high, though it remains unclear if it is a product of patriotism, performance, or both. Its overall standing among Serbs is significantly lower and also suspected to be more strongly influenced by political considerations than by KPS performance. Community cooperation with the KPS also varies across different types of crimes. Lack of effective witness protection programs still hinders the cooperation of all ethnic communities for higher profile crimes.

Sustainability: The fact that the KPS has been funded entirely by the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) since 2001 is a reassuring sign of its financial sustainability. The KPS has also received sufficient general police equipment to carry out its duties for the foreseeable future, and the OSCE staff at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) has trained large numbers
of local instructors and staff to take over its responsibilities in the next few years. Officers of all ranks, however, complain of low salaries and the lack of benefits, and it remains to be seen whether increases in compensation can be granted while maintaining an affordable budget. An even bigger concern is the susceptibility of the KPS to politicization and corruptibility, both of which are suspected to be prevalent throughout the Kosovar government.

In sum, the progress on police reform made by the international community and the KPS has been significant, but it risks being stalled or possibly reversed due to formidable challenges in tackling sophisticated crimes, building up senior leadership and external oversight mechanisms, gaining the trust of all ethnicities, and institutionalizing political independence. The looming future status talks and the end of UNMIK’s mandate have only added pressure on the international community to rush its plans, but a hasty exit could end up saddling the KPS with responsibilities for which it is not adequately trained, equipped, and experienced to handle.
Initial Conditions

A territory of historic significance to both Serbs and Albanians, Kosovo was incorporated as a province of Serbia into the former Yugoslavia following WWII. It operated autonomously until 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic became president of Serbia and brought Kosovo under his direct control. Kosovar Albanians, comprising approximately 90% of the province’s two million residents, protested by forming parallel government structures and later the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which challenged and provoked Serbian security forces with sporadic attacks. By 1998, the KLA controlled pockets of territory in Kosovo and claimed it had killed dozens of Serb police officers and government officials, as well as Kosovar Albanians suspected of collaborating with the Serbian government. That same year, Milosevic’s military began retaliating against KLA violence by killing and displacing thousands of Kosovar Albanians. Suspecting an ethnic cleansing campaign and a second attempt by Milosevic to destabilize the region, the international community stepped in diplomatically, and after several failed resolutions and agreements, intervened militarily.

NATO went to war for the first time in its fifty-year history with Operation Allied Force, which consisted of an air-bombing campaign that lasted from 24 March to 9 June 1999 and that resulted in forcing Serbia out of Kosovo. On 10 June, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1244 to authorize one of its most ambitious peacekeeping missions, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The ambitious mandate called for the international civil presence to, among other responsibilities, “[promote] the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo,” “facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status,” and “[maintain] civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.” This last stipulation, in other words, charged UNMIK with the dual responsibilities of policing a territory and creating an entirely new police force. UNMIK is now in its sixth and final year of operation in Kosovo (its mandate expires with a decision on its future status, which is expected to be made sometime in 2006).

In the six years UNMIK has exercised executive authority in Kosovo, it has overcome what UN Special Envoy Kai Eide has described as “a total institutional vacuum” and helped establish the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). It consists of a unicameral legislature called the Kosovo Assembly, comprised of 120 representatives; an executive office with functions shared by the President and the Prime Minister; and a judicial branch composed of the Kosovo Supreme Court, district courts, municipal courts, and minor offense courts.

---

Inputs

Given the UNSC mandate to “[maintain] civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo,” UNPOL authorized 4700-plus officers (a revision upwards of the initial number of 3110 officers) in late 1999. The first officers arrived on 3 July 1999 and numbered 1817 by the end of that year. The UNPOL deployment peaked at 4582 in March 2001 and hovered around 4000 until June 2003, when it began declining slowly. At its most diverse, it comprised officers from 53 different nations. As of October 2005, the number of UNPOL officers in Kosovo stood at 2207 (including Special Police and canine units) and represented 49 countries.

The responsibility of building a new police service fell to two institutions: UNPOL and the OSCE. UNPOL assumed the responsibilities of recruiting, monitoring, and advising new Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers and building of the new service from scratch. Recruits had to: fall between ages 21 and 56; have completed secondary school education; pass a physical, written and oral exams, medical and psychological testing, and a background investigation; and pledge commitment to tolerance and human rights. The OSCE took charge of providing basic training and graduated its first class of recruited cadets in October 1999 after eight weeks of training. Since then, a total of 31 classes of varying size have received basic training (which has grown to twenty weeks) at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) at Vushtrri/Vucitrn.

Following basic training, cadets undergo 20 weeks of field training under the supervision of UNPOL officers before becoming full-fledged KPS officers. As of April 2005, the police force was 6238 officers strong and, due to UNPOL efforts to make the KPS more representative in terms of gender and minorities, comprised 14.2% women, 9.3% Serbs, and 6.0% other minorities. The total goal is to have 7335 officers work for KPS, a number that breaks down to approximately 1 officer for every 273 Kosovars.

The budget for KPS has been fully covered by the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) since 2001, and the KCB has been funded solely by domestic revenue since 2003. The KPS budget has grown from 5.26 million Euros (6.58 million USD) in 2000 to 57.79 million Euros (72.24 million USD) in 2005, and as a percentage of the total budget, it has increased from 4.1 to 9.0 percent. In 2005, 24.80 million Euros (31 million USD, or 43%) were marked for wages and salaries, 16.25 million Euros (20.31 million USD, or 28%) for goods and services, and 16.64 million (20.8 million USD, or 29%) for capital outlays.

---

11 Interview with Margareta Schleuter, UN desk officer for Kosovo (17 October 2005).
12 OSCE Fact Sheet: Police Education and Development (March 2005).
13 Budget figures are in 2005 dollars, and those from 2000 are approximate conversions from deutschmarks to Euros and dollars.
Current Measurements

In Kosovo, there are currently two sets of measurements that deal with the KPS. The first set of measurements addresses the progress or lack thereof in standing up the KPS, and it is fairly elaborate. The second set of measurements, comprised of a few indicators, looks at the performance of the KPS. At this point, both sets of measurements are, by and large, kept by UNPOL and the OSCE-run KPSS.

Since Kosovo had no indigenous police force upon the cessation of hostilities in June of 1999, the standing up of the KPS has been an enormous undertaking. The international community had to build from scratch a new police service for Kosovo that embodied principles of democratic policing. Naturally, initial measurements of progress in police reforms were concerned with the number and composition of officers trained, deployed, promoted, and retained; the number of facilities constructed or reconstructed; the quantity of equipment purchased; and the number of police stations and regional commands transferred to local authority. As a first set of measurements this deals largely with inputs and outputs in the development of the police service.

While the aforementioned measurements detail the progress in the physical standing up of the service, they reveal little about its performance. For such outcome indicators, UNMIK relies on monitoring reports during field training, crime data, reports of disciplinary incidents, and public opinion polls conducted by international organizations and NGOs in Kosovo. Monitoring reports are filed by UNPOL and KPS trainers who provide field training and mentoring of new KPS officers upon their induction into the service. Such reports are submitted daily during the initial 20 weeks of field training and than once a month for the rest of the first year in service, and they become part of the permanent record of each KPS officer.

Crime statistics have been collected meticulously since early 2000 and are used as proxy to measure performance of the KPS. However, it is difficult to discern which crime rate trends have been affected by the performance of the KPS and which by the performance of UNPOL, which retains executive authority in Kosovo. The decreasing crime rates in Kosovo have coincided with the standing up of the KPS and gradual reductions in the number of UNPOL, but it is difficult to make strong empirical links between the two trends.

Incidents of disciplinary actions are also used by UNMIK as outcome indicators of performance and sustainability of the KPS. The Professional Standards Unit (PSU) was established in 1999 to collect, investigate, and act on any reports of misconduct by KPS police officers. The rates of reporting and actions taken are thought to reveal the extent to which officers behave according to the code of conduct and the degree to which the KPS is able to impose internal discipline.

Finally, UNMIK also uses public opinion data, which measure the confidence of the public in the KPS, as a proxy indicator for its performance. The United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) produces quarterly reports called “Early Warning Report – Kosovo” in which it includes results from opinion polls on a range of issues, including the level of satisfaction among Kosovars with various institutions such as the KPS. Though these polls have consistently revealed high level of satisfaction among most of the communities with the KPS, they do not provide for a necessarily direct relationship between public satisfaction and actual performance of the KPS.
PRIME Findings

I. Performance Effectiveness

Capacity

Since the first class of 176 cadets graduated from the KPSS in October 1999, the KPS has steadily been built over a course of six years to number some 6,530 armed officers in 2005. By June 2006, the goal of 7,335 officers is expected to be reached, an upward revision of the initial goal of 6,500 officers. When the KPS reaches this goal it will provide for a ratio of one police officer for roughly 273 Kosovars, a lower figure than for many of the countries in the region. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the ratio of police officers to inhabitants is 1:166, in Bosnia 1:184, and in Croatia 1:224. The size of the KPS is comparable to Slovenia’s 1:279 and Bulgaria’s 1:288. The current ratio, however, is much higher compared to the ratio of roughly 1 officer for 570 inhabitants that existed in Kosovo in 1989, the last time the province had a largely Kosovar-based police force.

Whether the ratio of police manpower to population is relatively low or high says little – if anything – about the capacity of the KPS to deal with the tasks and threats that it faces. In fact, the evidence seems to suggest a near lack of strategic or economic rationale behind the current ratio and by default the current size and strength of the KPS. In other words, there is no evidence to suggest that the ratio has been a product of careful analysis of threats that the Kosovar society faces or of the ability of the government to afford supporting such a force. To the contrary, the size of the KPS seems to have been decided in an ad hoc fashion and only partially in response to outbursts of violence. Only in 2005, six years into the UN’s mission in Kosovo, is a broad-based review of internal security sector being undertaken to identify the threats and determine what type, composition, and strength of security institution Kosovo needs.

Leaving the adequacy of size aside, the training of the KPS officers is fairly vigorous. Following the recruitment process, all future KPS officers – regardless of background or previous experience – undergo two rounds of training before official induction, followed by regular re-certification programs. The initial wave of training is conducted at the OSCE-funded and -managed Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) in Vushtrri / Vucitrn. The KPSS provides basic training for a number of skills required for policing in a democratic society. The duration of basic training was initially 8 weeks, driven by the demand to put officers in the street as soon as possible, but it has since been extended to 20 weeks. Following successful completion of basic training, the KPS officers then undergo 20 weeks

---

15 UNPOL and UNMIK officials in Kosovo acknowledged that the decision for an upward revision in the size of KPS was largely made in response to the outburst of violence in March 2004, when some 50,000 Kosovar Albanian rioters throughout the province, targeting primarily local Serbs and other minorities.

16 Additional Briefing Paper on Activities of OMiK's Department of Police Education and Development from Secretary General of the OSCE to All Heads of Delegation, Annex 7 (3 August 2004),

17 Various estimates put the strength of the police force in Kosovo in 1989 at 3,500.

18 A senior UNPOL official pointed out that in 2002 there was an analysis conducted of regional commands and police stations and their requirements and the conclusion was to have a 6,533 strong police force. However, the requirements did not stem from any threat or strategic analysis.
of field training under the mentorship of UNPOL officers or more senior KPS officers, and they are thus phased into their duties with the hope that they grow comfortable with their profession.

While the training of the KPS officers has become stricter and more uniform over time, in the initial years there was an obvious and harmful disconnectedness between basic in-school training and field training. All KPS officers would undergo a uniformly standard basic training curriculum at the KPSS, only to be subjected to a variety of training standards in the field, conducted by UNPOL officers from any of the 54 contributing nations. This artificial division of labor between the OSCE – in charge of basic training – and UNPOL – in charge of field training – is gradually being phased out as more KPS officers are being promoted and becoming trainers capable of supervising the new cadets.

From the initial basics, the training curriculum has gradually evolved over time to include management and advanced training. However, some of the more specialized skills, such as trainings in riot control and in investigations of organized crime, corruption, ballistics, and forensics, have only recently started being offered and thus belatedly related to the threats that exist in Kosovo in these areas.

Authority and Reach

The present lack of skills among the KPS officers to tackle more sophisticated crimes, however, is not solely a product of lack of experience, specialized skills, or willingness among KPS officers to deal with such crimes. It is also due to the lack of legal and political authority for KPS to act. In fact, KPS continues to operate in a legal vacuum of sorts. There is no police law in place that regulates and empowers the police service. The only legal basis upon which the KPS has been established is the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that defines the responsibilities of the international civil presence in Kosovo as to include: “Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.”19 Though the resolution provides for the standing up of the KPS, it does not provide for its empowerment, which has been left to the discretion of UNMIK’s interpretation that, by and large, continues to consider security as a reserved power for the international community. 20

The ability of the KPS to fight all types of crime is further limited by the continued operation of shadowy intelligence and police structures. A number of Kosovar Albanian political parties run their own intelligence structures that occasionally compete with the KPS or even actively undermine its authority. On the other hand, Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) continues to deploy – in violation of UNSCR 1244 – a substantial number of its officers throughout Serb-inhabited enclaves, some of which are thought to have infiltrated the ranks of the KPS.21 This Serb police presence thus affects the reach of the KPS and the freedom of movement for the public at large, particularly in northern Kosovo.

19 UNSC Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999), p. 3.
20 In October 2005, UNMIK presented a preamble for the draft-police law to the Kosovar government. As of this writing, neither has this preamble been promulgated, nor has the law been brought up before Parliament.
21 Interview with senior UNMIK and international officials in Kosovo. Some officials put the estimate of MUP officers operating in Kosovo in hundreds, though it is difficult to independently corroborate such figures. For a
Crime

From war and lawlessness that occurred in early and mid 1999, Kosovo has gradually moved towards an increased sense of law and order, but security and ethnic relations remain very fragile. The trends in crime rates, depicted in the graph of UNPOL-collected data below, generally support this proposition. Murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, rape, and robbery – some of the most severe acts of crime – all experienced a steady decline from 2000 to 2003. This progress towards law and order has largely coincided with the standing up of the KPS, which is increasingly seen as a vital contributor to this progress and is assuming ever more responsibilities from the departing UN Police and KFOR.

Figure 1: Crime Rates in Kosovo 2000-2004

The decline, however, has not been universal across all types of crime, as the rising rates in aggravated assaults and arsons indicate. What is more disconcerting are the reports suggesting that the KPS is still not up to the task in dealing with the complete spectrum of crimes, especially organized and politically motivated crimes. When it comes to such crimes, the KPS has not been able to provide effective protection.

more detailed discussion on Serbia’s MUP presence in Kosovo see also a report by International Crisis Group “Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide,” p. 26 (15 September 2005).

22 On 17-18 March 2004, some 50,000 Kosovar Albanians rioted throughout Kosovo in response to alleged chasing of an Albanian boy into river by a Serb mob. The riots left some 19 people dead, displaced hundreds of Serbs and other minorities from their homes and destroyed or damaged some 30 churches

23 The trends slightly changed in 2004, when there was a slight increase in murders and attempted murder, mainly attributed to events surrounding the March riots in which 19 people were killed.

24 This sense was not only shared by almost all the international and Kosovar officials and civil society representatives interviewed, but was among the chief conclusions of the report by Ambassador Kai Eide, the
sophisticated crimes, the KPS is considered to be in its infant stages, with required
specialized skills, as previously indicated, still being developed. This presents a serious
problem, especially amid reports that corruption and organized crime are the biggest threats
to stability in Kosovo and to sustainability of its institutions.25

Coordination

Though the degree of KPS’ effectiveness along the crime spectrum varies, its progress to
date far surpasses the progress in reforming the court system in Kosovo and, to a lesser
extent, the corrections system. The condition of the judiciary is particularly thought to be
dismal. A March 2004 monitoring report by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo on the work of
municipal courts concluded that “the administration of justice in the municipal courts
suffered from a series of shortcomings which may adversely affect the rights of the accused
to a fair trial.”26 Another report by OSCE published in late 2004 concluded that court
practices in pre-trial detention and sentencing, as well as institutional inadequacies, may lead
to breaches of the right to liberty and security of person and the right to a fair trial.27 The
report of Ambassador Kai Eide, the UN Special Envoy for evaluation of Kosovo’s
compliance with democratic standards, went even a step further indicating that Kosovo’s
judicial system is generally regarded as the weakest of all institutions in Kosovo.28

Amid such unevenness in progress across different producers of rule of law in Kosovo, the
effectiveness of all comes into question. While the building of an effective judiciary takes
longer than the building of the police service, the disparity in progress can be dangerous not
only for rule of law in general but for the KPS in particular. One such danger is that suspects
detained or arrested by the KPS could be released by the courts without legal basis, or that
the courts could take years until the proceedings take place. To the extent that this happens,
it could seriously demoralize the KPS officers in their role as contributors to rule of law in
Kosovo. Even worse, it could instigate them into taking justice in their own hands, either by
resorting to non-democratic practices or by becoming susceptible to corruption.

II. Management and Oversight

Mission and Procedures

Though the issue of a legal framework in the form of a police law is still under discussion in
Kosovo, the KPS has, by and large, a clearly defined mission and a delineated mandate
pertaining to the provision and maintenance of law and order in Kosovo. Legally, it is the

25 Ibid. p. 13
28 Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
only indigenous force that has monopoly over the coercive means of violence. The service also functions cohesively, with the main headquarters based out of the capital Prishtina / Pristina working and coordinating well with seven regional commands and some 33 police stations throughout Kosovo.29 All of the police stations and five of the regional commands had been transferred by July 2005 from UNPOL control to KPS control, with the exception of the regional command in Mitrovica in northern Kosovo, where ethnic tensions and freedom of movement remain most problematic. The command and control system for the KPS is also in place, as outlined most recently by an interoffice memorandum of July 2005, and provides for a division of labor between regional and main headquarters that pertains to operational, administrative, training, logistics, and support affairs.30

That said, the cohesiveness of the KPS still depends to a certain extent on the presence of UNPOL officers at its helm. The KPS, in its organizational structure outlined in September 2005, is organized along four pillars: operations, border police, crime, and administration.31 As of late 2005, the heads of all four pillars at the level of deputy commissioners and the police commissioner were all international UNPOL officers or civilian staff.32 As far as the hierarchy is concerned, the KPS also has a clearly defined ranking system in place that includes police officers, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and deputy commissioners. Once the KPS becomes fully operational and the international civilian police presence is entirely phased out, there will also be a rank of police commissioner.

Standard operating procedures have been put in place along with elaborate policies and procedures as they pertain to the conduct of police officers. A code of ethics, standard of conduct, and rules of conduct and behavior are among the policies and procedures established since 2000, with occasional revisions.33

**Strategic Planning and Monitoring**

The degree of strategic planning in the KPS is varied and fairly uneven. There is relatively good planning done on personnel, management, and budgetary matters, albeit with significant assistance by UNPOL. However, there is little, if any, strategic planning as far as setting up organizational goals is concerned, nor is there evidence of measuring progress towards any such goals. The limited executive authority, constrained primarily by international supervision, has not permitted for the KPS to steer towards formulation of particular goals in crime reduction and promotion of law and order. For example, as of October 2005 there was no strategic planning being done on reducing murder, kidnapping, or aggravated assault rates by any particular percentage rate. Moreover, there is yet no adequate system in place that allows for gathering of data and turning them into actionable tasks. Crime incidents are collected and mapped, and in response the KPS moves to increase

---

29 Interviews with KPS, UNPOL and UNMIK senior managers.
30 Command and Control System within the KPS. Interoffice Memorandum (6 July 2005).
32 Interviews with Richard Warren, Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Paul Hutchings, Deputy Commissioner for Operations (1 November 2005).
33 Kosovo Police Service: Policies and Procedures. Code of Ethics (Adopted on 1 January 2000 and revised on 19 February 2003); Standard of Conduct (Adopted on 1 January 2000 and revised on 19 February 2003); and Rule of Conduct and Behavior (Adopted on 1 January 2000 and revised on 5 December 2002).
patrolling and visibility in particular districts of concern. However, this process is not yet at a systematic level; its operation is heavily depended on the leadership of a particular commander and can cause delays between incidents and response to the changing criminal environment. As such, lack of strategic planning can easily undermine any initiative to measure performance of the organization. As of late 2005, the KPS relied primarily on crime rates, disciplinary reports, and public opinion polling (conducted by the United Nations Development Program in Kosovo) as proxy indicators of its performance.

As far as monitoring of performance of individual officers, this is a fairly robust process when the officers first join the force. Following basic training at the police school, new officers undergo 20 weeklong field training under the supervision of more senior KPS officers or UNPOL mentors. During this period, they are evaluated on their performance on daily basis. Following a successful completion of the field training, their performance is then evaluated on monthly basis, at least during the first year in service. That said, performance evaluations are not directly tied to the promotion system. While violations of codes of conduct could make an officer ineligible for promotion or even force him or her out of the service, the overall performance is not factored in when promotions are considered. As such, the performance of the officers is not incentivized by prospects for promotion.

**Oversight and Accountability**

While the internal oversight of the KPS is fairly robust, the external oversight is if not entirely inexistent, than in the very early stages of being established. As KPS was stood up, UNPOL officers that were in charge of law enforcement in Kosovo also acted as field trainers, mentors, and monitors for Kosovar officers. The sheer size of the UNPOL mission, at over 4,000 officers, allowed for close monitoring of conduct of KPS officers. In addition, a Professional Standards Unit (PSU) was established in 1999 to handle internal affairs investigations as a self-policing mechanism. As of late 2005, PSU investigations had led to some 317 officers being dismissed from the service for disciplinary reasons, some of which included charges of criminal acts.34

In contrast to the robustness of the internal oversight of the KPS, external oversight is practically wholly absent. An international office of the Ombudsperson exists in Kosovo, but its mission is to look after human rights issues in general and not the conduct of police per se. Courts are another venue where citizens could potentially file complains against the police, but the dismal situation in which the judiciary in Kosovo finds itself may not make this the preferred venue. More disconcerting than the state of the judiciary, however, is the fact that political considerations delayed for six years the UN’s decision to create a Ministry of Interior, an Inspector General, and a police law. The police service that was built from the ground up is only now beginning to get the institutional and legal umbrella under which it can fully operate and be held accountable. The delay has also prevented the establishment of parliamentary oversight, and to the extent that security continues to remain a reserved power for the international community in Kosovo as has been the case for the past 6 years, this critical element of external oversight will continue to lack.

---

34 Interview with Richard Warren, Deputy Commissioner for Administration (1 November 2005).
**Personnel**

Since its inception in October 1999, the Kosovo Police Service has consistently attracted a high number of applicants for its ranks. The first classes consisted of 175 to 315 cadets and were selected among some 19,000 to 40,000 candidates, and all successive recruitments have on average resulted in nearly 80% of candidates having to be turned away.\(^{35}\)

In addition to having a large pool of candidates to choose from, the KPS has adopted recruiting criteria that have grown stricter over time. In the initial two years, from 1999-2001, recruitment was directly tied to the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the former rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Some 50% of the new recruits had to come from the former KLA ranks, provided they met the other selection criteria. Additional gender and ethnic minority quotas were established, at 20% and 15% respectively and they continue to be followed, although the gender quota has been revised downwards to 15%.\(^{36}\) At present, the selection criteria have become much more stringent. A successful candidate needs to be of minimum 21 years of age and younger than 55, have completed high school, be a resident of Kosovo, be physically and mentally fit, and have no criminal history. The screening process that follows entails oral interviews, written examinations, psychological testing, medical examination, physical agility test, and background investigation.

While recruiting has become more selective and sophisticated, promotions continue to remain problematic. Initially, as the police service was stood up, promotions were done hastily, driven by the necessity to fill higher ranks with KPS officers and not by the experience or demonstrated on-the-job achievements of these officers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there were cases in which KPS lieutenants were promoted to colonels, a jump of four ranks in a very short period of time. Consequently, the KPS now has a number of senior managers who either do not merit being in the positions they are in or who are overwhelmed by the demands of their positions and the modern concepts of democratic policing.\(^{37}\) As such they have become more of a liability for the service than an advantage. Although in February 2003 the director of KPS installed a new promotion policy that sets exact policy guidelines and promotion standards and therefore represents a step forward, it does not ameliorate the problem entirely. Even under the new set of regulations, promotion is not tied directly to performance, but rather to a set of other criteria such as time in service, registration, and written examinations.\(^{38}\) While daily and monthly evaluations of KPS officers from the 20-week period of training and the initial first year in the force go into their permanent records, they are merely used to see if the officer applying for promotion has ever been a subject of disciplinary investigations.

Finally, the attrition rate among the KPS is relatively low. In 2005 it was estimated at around 4.3 percent, fueled by disciplinary dismissals, resignations, death, administrative terminations,

\(^{35}\) Ibid. Also interview with Tamara Duffey, Special Projects Advisor. Director’s Office of Planning and Development, Kosovo Police Service School (31 October 2005).

\(^{36}\) Interviews with Steve Bennett, Director of the Kosovo Police Service School (31 October 2005) and Paul Hutchings, UNPOL / Kosovo Deputy Commissioner for Operations (1 November 2005).

\(^{37}\) Interviews with KPS and UNPOL managers.

or other miscellaneous reasons. If the draft police law currently being discussed is adopted and likely imposes an age limit of 50 years for service in the KPS, the attrition rate may increase in the short-run to about 6%, but it is expected to eventually stabilize at around 3.4-3.5 percent.

III. Community Relations

Human Rights

KPS officers are made to understand the importance of human rights throughout all stages of interaction with international actors. Potential recruits for the police force must first demonstrate and reaffirm their commitment to uphold human rights prior to being accepted as cadets. Once they begin basic training at the KPSS, they are exposed to a curriculum that, according to the OSCE, “upholds principles of democratic policing and human rights…. International standards of human rights are interwoven into all core subjects, both in the classroom and in practical field exercises.” Interviews with KPS officers confirmed that the basic training they received was effective in terms of driving home the significance of human rights in creating a democratic police force.

Human rights is also a prominent theme in field training and afterward, with UNPOL officers monitoring and advising the newly minted KPS officers on how to conduct themselves in real-life situations. There have been complaints, however, regarding the inconsistency of assistance provided by UNPOL due to the fact that some international police officers do not hail from democratic countries and therefore have little experience in this regard. In general, though, KPS officers support the idea that UNPOL officers should continue in their roles as advisers for the foreseeable future because the KPS is a young force and still getting accustomed to democratic policing methods. One regional commander confirmed that while neither the KPS nor the UNPOL “are perfect, they can work shoulder to shoulder and the KPS can learn from those from developed democracies.”

The fact that KPS officers are able to discern the level of legitimacy among their UNPOL counterparts and to express willingness to learn more indicates the increasing sophistication with which they are able to understand and uphold human rights. In the event that they step out of line, however, the KPS has two internal bodies that investigate crimes committed by its officers. As of October 2005, the previously mentioned Professional Standards Unit (PSU) and a task force of international police officers had 108 and 9 open cases, respectively, an unknown percentage of which involved human rights violations. Once the new police law is passed, a Police Inspectorate of 35-40 staffers will replace the task force and take on complaints raised by citizens. It will join formal and informal external monitors such as the Kosovo Ombudsperson and various NGOs in reporting on human rights incidents.

39 Interview with Richard Warren, Deputy Commissioner for Administration (1 November 2005).
40 Interviews with Steve Bennett, Director of the Kosovo Police Service School (31 October 2005) and Richard Warren, Deputy Commissioner. (1 November 2005)
41 OSCE Fact Sheet: Police Education and Development (August 2005).
42 Interview with Colonel Shaban Shala, Regional Commander – Peja / Pec (5 Nov 2005).
involving the police, institutions that have thus far treated such incidents as isolated events rather than as a chronic problem.

The OSCE and UNPOL leadership are now seeking to institutionalize their emphasis on human rights, starting with the Human Rights Expert (HRE) program which they began implementing in January 2005. HRE teams have been placed at the main police headquarters and the five regional police officers to advise both local and international police officers on the development of human rights policies and to build their capacity to perform their duties accordingly (it is envisioned that KPS human rights officers will eventually replace these teams when the international community leaves). The goal, according to the OSCE, is to strengthen “the commitment of all parties involved to embrace human rights protection as a foundation of and as a reason for their work.”

Corruption

As part of its objective to build the KPS as a democratic police service, the international community has made a concerted effort to keep corruption to a minimum by monitoring and advising local police officers. Senior UNPOL officers cite the PSU as a relatively effective anti-corruption measure in that it has managed to catch individual cases of misconduct and bring them to light before such practices can become widespread. Interviews with members of the public (journalists, think tanks, and business owners) support the claim that the KPS by and large refrains from corruption.

UNPOL leadership and the Kosovar public, however, share the concern that the low level of corruption will be untenable unless additional anti-corruption mechanisms are institutionalized to help KPS officers stay the course. One senior KPS official speculated that the KPS stood alone as a relatively uncorrupt institution in Kosovo due to “international control and continued commitment and pride as a community-based police force. But [the KPS] is at a stage of being ready to be corrupted,” and he believed the positive influences he cited would eventually fall away or succumb to external pressure. Most locals and some internationals believe corruption is already quite prevalent throughout the PISG; according to the June 2005 UNDP Early Warning Report, Kosovars – both Albanians and Serbs – thought corruption was on the rise based on personal experiences. Even if the KPS is perceived as being above the fray of the conduct of most government institutions (its overall public satisfaction is 90.3% while the PISG’s is 67.7%), there is little confidence that it will remain so, particularly after the departure of the international community.

UNPOL and KPS leadership assert that one way to bolster resistance against the temptation to engage in corruption is to increase officers’ salaries. PISG officials, however, expressed their concern that higher wages might decrease officers’ incentive to work harder. They furthermore disagreed on practical grounds, claiming there is no money in the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) for meaningful raises. Other UN officials suggest that ensuring

the effectiveness of new external oversight mechanisms such as the new Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police Inspectorate will help curb corruption, but these have yet to be fully developed and their impact remains questionable for the foreseeable future.

Cooperation

In its 2005 Community Relations Strategy, the KPS readily acknowledges “that working together in partnership [with the community] will make Kosovo a safer place to live, work, and visit.” To facilitate cooperation between the police and the public, the KPS has established an interagency steering group composed of KPS, KPSS, UNMIK, and UNPOL representatives tasked to make recommendations on community policing initiatives that can be implemented by representatives’ respective organizations. It has also formed the Unit for the Coordination of Community Policing, which is charged with providing an effective visible presence in the community, implementing community policing projects, and developing partnerships that work to promote safety. In addition to having offices at headquarters, regional commands, and police stations, the Unit's presence is felt through School Resource Officers (SROs) who are placed at selected secondary schools.

Reaching outside the KPS, Local Community Safety and Crime Prevention Councils (LCS&PCs) consisting of international and local police officers, KFOR, OSCE, and civil society members have been designed and envisioned to carry out local audits that identify safety priorities and can be used to set local strategic aims for combating crime and disorder. The U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the OSCE have also initiated the Community Safety Action Teams (CSAT) program. Each team is comprised of 25-30 volunteer participants who represent a wide cross-section of their community and receive several days of training at the KPSS meant to empower them to take the initiative in tackling local problems in ways that complement the work of the police. According to a senior KPSS official, initiatives such as the CSAT program are meant to “[change] the attitude of the people who have become, often for legitimate reasons, fearful and distrustful of the police.”

Under the guidance of the international community, the KPS has made significant progress in dispelling such fears, and KPS officers report increasing public willingness to cooperate on investigations of low-level crimes. Wary attitudes persist, however, toward investigations involving high-level crimes (such as organized and politically motivated crimes), and it remains difficult to persuade potential witnesses or collaborators to assist police officers on these cases. The lack of effective security guarantees such as a witness protection program certainly hampers the potential for cooperation between the public and the police, and it is doubtful that community initiatives such as the LCS&PCs and the CSATs, even when they are fully up and running, will make enough of a difference to persuade the public that they are not compromising their safety by cooperating on higher profile investigations.

45 Kosovo Police Service 2005 Community Relations Strategy, p. 5.
Acceptance

According to public opinion polls conducted by UNDP and local NGOs, the KPS is by far one of the most popular indigenous institutions in Kosovo. Over the past two years, it has maintained a public satisfaction rating of 80 percent or higher while the PISG and the Assembly’s have fallen from the mid-70s to below 50 and 60 percent, respectively. (UNMIK, which retains executive authority in Kosovo, has fallen from the mid-60s to the mid-30s.) These rosy numbers mask at least three problems, however, starting with the fact that the approval ratings differ sharply among ethnicities. In June 2005, 90.3 percent of Kosovar Albanians expressed satisfaction with the KPS, while a mere 1.6 percent of Kosovar Serbs did the same. The opinion of Kosovar Serbs regarding the KPS has never risen above 14.3 percent in the past two years, while that of Kosovar Albanians has never fallen below 88.2 percent.

The fact that KFOR has consistently received ratings higher than those of the KPS – from both Albanians and Serbs – implies another problem, which is that Kosovars may not be distinguishing between international soldiers and domestic police in terms of who provides their security. It is possible, though impossible to confirm, that undue credit is being given to the KPS when it should be attributed to KFOR. A small but heartening trend for the KPS, however, is the increase in the reporting of smaller crimes — burglary, looting, theft, trespassing — over the past two years, which is believed to be a sign that the public is foregoing the opportunity to deal with these problems themselves and trusting the KPS to do its job. As mentioned previously, however, some of the increases are undoubtedly a result of the March 2004 riots and therefore not a clear indication of police acceptance.

PISG officials and community members interviewed for the report expressed a third cause for concern, which is that they perceived the overwhelmingly positive opinion of the KPS to be based less on performance than the patriotism it inspires as an indigenous democratic institution. And while the KPS’ efforts to practice democratic policing, protect human rights, and refrain from corruption should be appreciated, Kosovars argue rightly that “the KPS should be held to a high [performance] standard and not settle for just being democratic.”

The KPS still suffers from several significant performance weaknesses, such as the aforementioned inability to effectively tackle high-profile crimes, but if these shortcomings are not reflected accurately by public opinion, the KPS will lose an important incentive to change its ways.

IV. Sustainability

Budget

The fact that the KPS has been funded entirely by the Kosovo Consolidated Budget since 2001 is a reassuring sign of its financial sustainability. The current 2005 budget for the KPS is 57.79 million Euros (72.24 million USD), which comprises 9 percent of the total budget of

48 Interview with Enver Orucaj, Head of the Office of Public Safety, PISG (2 November 2005).
641.90 million Euros (802.38 million USD). The budget is broken down in the following way: 24.80 million Euros (31 million USD, or 43%) for wages and salaries, 16.25 million Euros (20.31 million USD, or 28%) for goods and services, and 16.64 million (20.8 million USD, or 29%) for capital outlays.

While the police’s share of the national budget has steadily increased over the past six years from 4.1 to 9 percent, KPS administration officials have projected that the annual budget will need to level out at approximately 53 or 54 million Euros or $64 million (at 2005 cost) in future years in order to allow the KPS to function more or less as it does presently. The issue of salaries, however, is a sticking point that is likely to have to change its status quo (see Compensation for details). In addition, if the assumption is made that the future status talks will result in additional borders for Kosovo, senior UNPOL officials predict another 1600 or so officers may be needed for border patrol and the budget will have to be revised upward to accommodate the change. A bright spot in terms of capital outlays is the fact that KPS officers have received a windfall of vehicles, computers, and general resources from the UN.

**Training and Equipment**

Once commissioned, all KPS officers must undergo re-certification training at regular intervals, and selected officers can complete more advanced training in supervision and management. Specialized training is also available at the KPSS in subjects including criminal investigation, traffic accident investigation, and emergency response driving. The fact that the KPS remains weak on certain types of crimes implies, however, that the training is inadequate to fully equip officers with the skills they need to fight crime effectively. One KPS trainer suggested that more and better training (along with more and better equipment that allows them to pursue more specialized criminal investigations) is still needed to help local police officers tackle sophisticated crimes.

To ensure the sustainability of the KPSS, which serves as the hub for basic and specialized training for the KPS, the OSCE implemented a 12-week Trainer Certification Program that graduated its first class of domestic KPS instructors (16 total) in August 2001. As of 2005, 265 officers have become certified trainers and been assigned to various police training programs. Currently, there are 105 KPS instructors and 3 local legal instructors who conduct classes in Albanian and Serbian at the KPSS. International instructors are present, but they have downshifted from teaching lessons to playing an aiding and monitoring role in the classroom. 49 The OSCE has been steadily transferring technical support functions to the domestic staff as well; by the end of 2004 over 70 percent of the middle- to senior-level management posts had been assumed by Kosovars, and the transfer has continued throughout 2005.50

Both KPS and UNPOL officers seem satisfied with the ability of KPS officers to handle and maintain equipment without placing an additional burden on the budget. UNPOL has also helped the KPS put in place equipment contracts, which, in addition to adequate finances and better maintenance, will increase the sustainability of such equipment.

49 OSCE Fact Sheet: Police Education and Development (August 2005).
50 An Introduction to the Kosovo Police Service School. Department of Police Education and Development (OSCE Mission in Kosovo), 2005, p. 5.
Political Independence

As previously mentioned, the KPS was built upon the mandate provided by UNSC Resolution 1244, which called for the international civil presence to establish a local police service in Kosovo. For the first six years of its existence, however, nothing it did or owned was legally binding. One senior UNPOL officer pointed out that the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) could technically claim ownership to all existing KPS structures and equipment. The need for “a sound legal foundation upon which the KPS can continue to develop as a paradigm of democratic policing in the region” has therefore become abundantly clear and inspired advisors and lawyers from UNMIK, OSCE, PISG, and other organizations to draft a new police law.51

The final draft of the law has not yet been released, but it is said to include several accountability mechanisms such as an Inspectorate General to investigate complaints, annual policing plans that must be made public, and a Senior Police Appointments and Discipline Commission that includes community citizens. One of the most important objectives of these proposals is to make the police force more responsive to the public and less so to political influence from other parts of the PISG. The new law will have to be enforced extremely strictly, however, to provide true political independence for the KPS and the assurance that they can pursue politically motivated crimes without suffering backlash. Just as the threat of corruption will persist in haunting the KPS, political pressure is a problem that will continue to trouble the police force, and it is only likely to increase in proportion to the decrease in presence of the international community.

Compensation

While the KPS budget is generally deemed sufficient to keep the institution financially afloat, it is insufficient in terms of providing adequate compensation for police officers. The current salary structure lacks differentiation and incentive; no matter their skill level or specialty, KPS officers currently receive a salary of 240 Euros (300 USD) per month while senior managers receive 310 Euros (387.50 USD) per month, placing them among the lowest paid public servants. An outside consultant firm recently proposed a more graduated salary scale and an officer salary of more than double the current wage (580 Euros or 725 USD per month), but no action has been taken to implement the plan, mostly due to a lack of available funding. In addition, KPS officers and their families receive no health benefits and are not compensated if an officer is killed in the line of duty. There is limited emergency medical assistance available if an officer is wounded on the job, but it alone provides too little a cushion for those who often put themselves in danger.

There is strong inflationary pressure caused by the large international presence and the influx of international aid that makes current wages wholly inadequate in providing for an average-sized family. PISG officials claim, however, that no extra funds from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget is available to pay for salary raises (KPS administrators counter by arguing that money could be found if other ministries were not overstaffed and had not beat

51 Harris, Frank. “A Police Law for Kosovo.” Details, p. 4.
the KPS in asking for higher wages). The chance for KPS officers to increase their salaries is also diminished by the fact that the current unemployment rate in Kosovo hovers around or above 50 percent, which contributes to the intense competition for positions in the KPS. At least for the time being, police officers cannot quit with the hope that protesting the salaries will result in increases.

In interviews, KPS officers expressed patience with the present situation but also held out expectations that they will receive higher salaries in the future, an expectation that is unfortunately grounded in little evidence. The issue of compensation – not only salaries but benefits as well – is likely to be a continuing point of contention between the KPS and the Kosovar government that will have significant implications for the financial and personnel sustainability of the police force no matter how it is resolved.
Annex II: The Case of the Sierra Leone Police
Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 80

Introduction 81

Acknowledgments 82

Overview of PRIME Findings 83

Initial Conditions 85

Inputs 86

Current Measurements 88

PRIME Findings 91

Performance Effectiveness 91
Management and Oversight 92
Community Relations 95
Sustainability 96
List of Acronyms

ACC    Anti Corruption Commission
CCSSP  Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project
CDF    Civil Defense Forces
CDIID  Complaint Discipline & Internal Investigation Department
CID    Criminal Investigation Department
CIVPOL Civilian Police (now known as UN POLICE)
DFID   Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DISEC  District Security Committee
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FSU    Family Support Unit
GoSL   Government of Sierra Leone
IDA    International Development Assistance
IMATT  International Military Advisory and Training Team
JSDP   Justice Sector Development Programme
LPB    Local Partnership Board
LCG    Local and Coordinating Groups
LGC    Local Governing Council
LUC    Local Unit Commander
MIA    Ministry of Internal Affairs
MTSP   Medium Term Strategic Plan (Sierra Leone Police)
NSC    National Security Council
NSCCG  National Security Council Coordinating Group
NGO    Non-Governmental Organization
ONS    Office of National Security
OSD    Operational Support Department
PRIME  Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation
PROSEC Provincial Security Committee
PRSP   Poverty Reduction Strategy Policy Programme
RSLAF  Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF    Revolutionary United Front
SLP    Sierra Leone Police
SRSG   Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSD    Special Security Division
SSR    Security Sector Review
UK     United Kingdom
UN     United Nations
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT   United Nations Country Team
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
Introduction

The following conclusions are based on in-country field research conducted by Arthur Boutellis, James Kapsis, and Eva Kaye using the PRIME system between 29 October and 5 November 2005. The analysis is the product of more than 50 formal and informal interviews in Freetown, Bo, and Moyamba, including but not limited to members of the Sierra Leone Police, Sierra Leone government ministers, UN officials, international NGOs, and local civil society groups. Official reports and governmental documents collected within Sierra Leone also contributed to the findings.
Acknowledgments

The research we conducted in Sierra Leone could not have been accomplished without the assistance of numerous people. In particular, we wish to thank the UNAMSIL team in Sierra Leone, including Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago, Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Vivek Sahay, Chief of UN Police for UNAMSIL; Deborah Addision-Campbell who coordinated our visit; and Peter Tengbeh who brought us to all our interviews.

In the Sierra Leone Police, we thank Brima Acha Kamara, Inspector General of Police, and his Executive Management Board for devoting an entire morning to answering our questions. The Local Unit Commanders of Central Division and D Division in Freetown, S.B. Kargbo and Amadu Mannah, were similarly generous with their time and also allowed us to interact with their officers.

We are grateful to the police commanders in Bo for organizing a town hall-style meeting with their officers to help us understand some of the challenges that exist outside Freetown. We also thank the community leaders of Moyamba, including Acting Paramount Chief Lamin Las, for speaking freely with us about their views of police reform efforts since the end of the war.

Finally, for assistance in making contacts and for support while we were in Freetown, we thank Rachael Doherty of the U.S. Embassy in Freetown and Sheka Mansaray in the Office of the President.

We take full responsibility for any mistakes or omissions in this annex.
Overview of PRIME Findings

The Sierra Leone Police (SLP) is slowly moving away from its past as an oppressive, politicized, and corrupt service, but many areas of reform remain incomplete or unsustainable. The international effort to reform the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) was largely led by the UK and was overseen by Inspector General of Police (IGP) Keith Biddle, who was installed by the UK in 1998 and replaced in 2003 by the current IGP. The SLP has installed a new organizational structure and now employs a more community oriented policing model.

Early UK assistance supplied the police with uniforms, vehicles, communications, and regular wages, which helped establish a level of professionalism that boosted morale. The UK-led Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) focused on training and mentoring SLP officers. The UNAMSIL Civilian Police (UNPOL) joined the CCSSP’s training and mentoring efforts in 2002. At first UNPOL focused on policing basics, such as how to maintain a diary, walk a police beat, and take statements. Eventually, it also introduced human rights and gender awareness training. Today, the SLP has achieved primacy over internal security. It will reach the pre-war service strength of 9,500 officers by December 2005 when the UNAMSIL mission will end. The new, United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which will be composed of 50 international civilians, will replace UNAMSIL at the beginning of 2006. It will continue to assist the Sierra Leonean government with capacity-building, good governance, and security sector reform.

Performance Effectiveness: The better conditions of service, facilities, and equipment have improved the visibility and expanded the reach of the SLP beyond the capital and major provincial cities. However, these better conditions have not translated into improved performance in all areas. The SLP has faced increasing overall crime rates since 2002, particularly in the categories of assault, larceny and housebreaking. This rise in crime may partly reflect increased reporting from the public, but it also seems to reflect critical insufficiencies in criminal intelligence, investigation, and information management. For example, the SLP has no forensics training or equipment. The SLP is still reluctant to conduct investigations against the rich or the politically powerful. Additionally, a dysfunctional judicial system, out-of-date laws and procedures, and overcrowded prisons have limited police effectiveness.

Management and Oversight: The restructuring of the SLP that took place under interim IGP Keith Biddle has proven effective at creating a professional upper management. While the management structure and reporting hierarchy are formally clear, discipline among lower ranks remains spotty. The lack of systematic performance measurement by the SLP raises concerns about its promotion system. Furthermore, while the SLP has an internal oversight mechanism, the Complaint Discipline and Internal Investigation Department (CDIID), there are serious doubts about its effectiveness. Community members do not feel comfortable filing complaints with the CDIID because it is located within police stations and they do not trust SLP officers to hold their peers accountable. External oversight belongs to the Police Council. However, there is a serious concern that the Vice President, who chairs the Council, could use his position to politicize the SLP. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)
and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee also provide some external oversight over the SLP.

**Community Relations:** The strong emphasis on community relations in the police reform effort has led to a modest increase in the SLP's support from the public. The SLP's efforts to improve community relations have included the creation of Community Relations and Family Support Units (FSUs) staffed jointly by police officers and social workers, Local Partnership Boards chaired by community members and, more recently, Local Governing Councils. However, perception polls and interviews with community members still indicate widespread community distrust of the police resulting primarily from persistent corruption, including bribery and extortion, which are often attributed to the low wages and a culture of impunity.

**Sustainability:** The SLP is heavily dependent on international donor support (the government’s national budget is 60 percent donor dependent) and remains vulnerable to politicization by elected leaders and competition from the military. Although the Sierra Leone National Budget has fully funded the salaries of SLP officers since 2003, the financial sustainability of a 9,500-member police service is uncertain given limited government resources. For example, donors still fully fund all of the SLP’s vehicles and equipment. If Sierra Leone cannot begin assuming greater financial responsibility for the SLP, it may have to consider downsizing its force strength. The political independence of the SLP, particularly of its armed paramilitary wing (OSD), is also of great concern. There is still considerable risk that political actors, particularly the Vice President, will use the SLP against political opponents in the upcoming 2007 Presidential elections. Finally, the scaled-down Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), which feels that the police are receiving too much donor support, could pose a threat to the SLP’s monopoly over internal security.

In sum, the SLP has made significant progress in its reforms, but remains far from a sustainable, democratic, and effective service. International efforts have assisted the reform in critical ways, but a lack of coordination among donors has led to some wasteful redundancies. The long-term outlook for the reform process remains tenuous due to the Sierra Leone Government’s limited resources, political corruption, and institutional competition between the police and the military.
Initial Conditions

The Republic of Sierra Leone fell into a civil war in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Foday Sankoh attempted to overthrow the government. A military coup on May 25, 1997 replaced then President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah with Major Johnny Paul Koromah. Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998 after Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces overthrew the junta.

The Lomé Peace Accord signed on July 7, 1999 offered hope that the country would be able to end the conflict and rebuild its devastated economy and infrastructure. In late 1999, approximately 6,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were deploying to bolster the shaky peace accord. In May 2000, however, the situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated and British troops were deployed in Operation Palliser to evacuate foreign nationals and stabilize the country. The British troops were the catalyst for a final ceasefire and end to the civil war, which allowed the UN mission to begin in earnest.

In 2000 and 2001, there were multiple revisions to UNAMSIL’s mandate, including the expansion of the authorized military component to 17,500 soldiers, who secured the territory, and the disarmament of close to 46,000 RUF as well as Civil Defense Forces (CDF) combatants. Peaceful national elections were held in May 2002 after which the Government of Sierra Leone progressively reasserted its authority. The eleven-year civil war led to tens of thousands of deaths and the displacement of more than 2 million people (from a population estimated at 5 million). Many still remain refugees in neighboring countries.

The history of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) from the late 1960s to the 1990s was one of oppressive policing, nepotism, and corruption. The police were more feared than trusted by the Sierra Leonean people. They were, themselves, however, also the victims of violence. An estimated 900 SLP officers were killed during the civil war. By its end, the SLP had decreased in size by almost 30 percent, from a high of 9,317 to a low of 6,600. Much of the police infrastructure, as well as that of the courts and prisons, was destroyed. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1991, and up until the intervention of the UK reform efforts in 1998, the SLP was considered the poor relative of the military. Many officers were illiterate and had never received proper police training. The SLP did not even have basic uniforms or equipment.

The international effort to reform the SLP was largely led by the UK. In 2000, the UK launched the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which provided the bulk of the training, support, and advice to the SLP from 2000 to 2002. The CCSSP received substantial funding from the UK Department of International Development (DFID) to reform and equip the SLP, principally with communications network and vehicles. DFID allocated approximately $22 million for 2000-2002 and approximately $10 million in each following year. The CCSSP budget did not cover the maintenance, rehabilitation, or construction of buildings, including police stations, holding cells, and processing centers, which were largely financed by UNDP and DFID. Inspector General of Police (IGP), Keith Biddle, who was installed by the UK under an emergency support project in 1998, oversaw the initial stages of reform. Biddle stepped down in 2003, and was replaced by the current IGP, Brima Acha Kamara.

The role of UNPOL has been one of support. UNAMSIL UNPOL began in 1999 with a modest deployment of three officers and a limited monitoring mandate. This number rose to six observers in February 2000. Security Council Resolution 1400 of March 2002 led to the recruitment of 30 additional UNPOL officers to support the Government of Sierra Leone and the SLP in preparing for the 2002 elections. Resolution 1436 of September 2002 authorized the deployment of up to 170 UNPOL personnel, no longer focusing on monitoring, but now required to “advise and assist” the SLP. The UN authorized a larger force to expand its activities well beyond Freetown and to establish UNPOL team sites at key locations in the hinterland in conjunction with the deployment of the SLP to new areas. Despite the 2002 increase in authorized personnel, the UNAMSIL mission had one of the smallest ratios of police to inhabitants of any UN peacekeeping mission with 0.02 police per 1000 inhabitants. Sierra Leone also ranked second to last of all UN-led missions in terms of annual per capita assistance.

The efforts of the CCSSP and UNAMSIL’s UNPOL contingent initially overlapped because of a lack of formal coordination. However, coordination eventually improved with the CCSSP taking the lead in strategic planning and UNPOL helping with implementation. UNPOL was particularly useful in facilitating SLP deployment in former RUF strongholds in the east of the country and in assisting with recruitment, training, and mentoring of the SLP. UNPOL also provided additional expertise for training 100 SLP officers on security matters pertaining to border control, diamond mining, and airport policing. UNPOL has trained field-coaching officers in the SLP who will take over mentoring responsibilities after the withdrawal of UNAMSIL. Responsibility for ensuring the continued building and improvement of the SLP has shifted from the CCSSP to UNPOL, particularly with respect to training and management. Coordination between the SLP, UNPOL, and CCSSP has largely improved and is now done through a monthly steering committee chaired by the Inspector General of Police.

Some of the responsibilities of the CCSSP, which ended in June 2005, have migrated to the newly created Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP). 53 The five-year JSDP

---

resulted from the need for more coordination across the justice sector following the realization that justice sector reform was lagging behind police reform. The JSDP includes up to $3.5 million over five years for SLP equipment (e.g. vehicles and radios).

Following Security Council Resolution 1537 (2004), UNPOL’s residual strength was fixed at 80 UNPOL officers from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2005. The mission was further extended until 31 December 2005 by Resolution 1610 (2005) with the same UNPOL strength. The new UNIOSIL mission will begin on 1 January 2006 and will include 20 UNPOL personnel divided into four regional teams. The contingent will have two trainers and eighteen specialized mentors.
Current Measurements

Both international actors and the Sierra Leone Police employ various performance measures to monitor the progress of police reform efforts. However, all measurements of the SLP are conducted in an ad hoc, unsystematic manner.

UNAMSIL Measures

UNAMSIL UNPOL monitors the progress of the SLP and reports its general findings back to headquarters in New York. These findings make their way into the periodic reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council (originally sent every forty-five days at the beginning of the UNAMSIL mission and quarterly thereafter) on the progress of the mission. These reports include updates and assessments of the work of UNPOL within the UNAMSIL mission.

Measurements in place since the beginning of UNAMSIL’s mission include Daily Situation Reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which detail the activities and deployment of UNPOL trainers and mentors. These reports identify problems encountered working with the SLP, but they do not systematically evaluate the performance of the SLP. The Daily Situation Reports form the basis of Bi-Annual Reports from UNAMSIL UNPOL, which provide an update on UNPOL activities within the reporting period and a general qualitative assessment of different sectors of activities of the SLP receiving UNPOL assistance.

The effort to reform the SLP has also been captured in two other UN documents. In the first of these, published in March 2003, the UNAMSIL Civil Affairs Section issued a progress report entitled Proxy Indicators: Restoration of State Authority and Recovery. This report uses the number of SLP posts and stations and the number of SLP officers as indicators for the police sector, using them to calculate percentage increases in police infrastructure and police strength, disaggregated by region. It compares the current data to the first set of post-war data collected in October 2001, using pre-war data as a baseline whenever available.

A second document is the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2004-2007, produced by the UN Country Team, which includes a monitoring and evaluation framework with 2002 as a baseline. The following indicators for security institutions and personnel are used in the UNDAF: number of functioning SLP posts and stations per district; number of police officers recruited, trained, and equipped; number of regular training sessions held; and number of regular joint exercises conducted among security, police, and emergency civilian personnel.

UNAMSIL UNPOL has concentrated most of its measurements in the last year of its mission, 2004-2005. In December 2004, the UN released the UNAMSIL/UNCT (Country Team) Transition Strategy matrix, which set out integrated benchmarks for the draw down of the UNAMSIL mission. The document is essentially a “to-do” list of tasks still to be accomplished in rebuilding Sierra Leone, including the SLP. While it is useful at identifying

unaccomplished priorities, it does not measure the quality of the SLP performance. Vivek Sahay, the head of UNPOL in Sierra Leone, argues that UNPOL should have its own evaluation team in its next mission.

In March 2005, eighteen SLP officers advised by UNPOL officers produced a UNAMSIL evaluation of the training regime the SLP had adopted, including the emphasis on “back to basics” policing, “local needs policing”, and the Community Partnership Boards that were created to give local communities a role in advising and shaping the police.

UK Measures

The UK, which was the primary player in the reform of SLP, had very limited monitoring and evaluation tools. The CCSSP, which started in 2000, did not have any systematic measurement mechanisms. The CCSSP was replaced by the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) in 2005. The JSDP was designed to address court and prison reforms and to better monitor and evaluate progress over the next five years. The JSDP will bring together the Government of Sierra Leone, donors, and other stakeholders to formulate policies and manage resources across the justice sector.

SLP Measures

The SLP monitors its own performance both on the tactical and strategic level. It tracks the performance of individual officers and station houses by reviewing police and station diaries. UNPOL and increasingly SLP managers do spot checks to make sure that these diaries are properly kept.

SLP managers conduct a performance assessment when an officer is applying for promotion. At the police station and post level, records (station diary, records of interviews and custody records) are generally kept, but the supply of notebooks is erratic. The Local Unit Commanders (LUCs) are responsible for keeping a book of violations of the code by their officers, but issuing sanctions requires direct approval of the Inspector General of Police.

On the strategic level, SLP managers have worked with the UK to develop short and long-term goals, but they do not have adequate means of monitoring progress. Despite the good monitoring measures at the station level, there is no institutional mechanism for measuring the overall performance of the SLP in a systematic way.

The SLP has commissioned Internal and External (conducted by CARE International) Perception Surveys for the first half of 2004, which have been used as proxies to evaluate the performance of the SLP in its focus on community relations. The SLP also collects detailed crime statistics (weekly, monthly & annual reports), but it is unclear how it uses the

---

56 SLP, Sierra Leone Police Annual Staff Performance Appraisal/Promotion Assessment of Constable.
statistics to improve performance. On the local level, LUCs respond to increased crime rates in particular areas (i.e. hot spots) by temporarily increasing patrols or setting up twenty-four hour postings.

The new SLP Medium Term Strategic Plan, 2006-2008 (MTSP) addresses the need for conducting macro level performance measurement of the SLP in a systematic fashion. It includes performance indicators and targets, and assigns the Executive Management and Change Board to carry out formal monitoring and evaluation. Also, for the first time in 2005, the Government’s Security Sector Review59 (SSR) was included as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)60 presented to the IMF and World Bank. The PRSP61 of 2005 also includes a comprehensive institutional framework for its implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. It was prepared jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank62, and sets an ambitious policy agenda with an estimated overall cost of US$1.7 billion for 2005-07. The choice of pillars is derived from a number of considerations, including the recent emergence of the country from civil conflict, the status of governance, and the need to invest in key productive sectors. It is critical for the future of the SLP that the key findings of the Security Sector Review63 (SSR) have fed directly into the security and governance pillar of the PRSP.

62 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) describe a country’s macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by governments through a participatory process that involves civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 2005 Sierra Leone PRSP comprises three pillars: (1) Good Governance, Security and Peace Building, (2) Pro-poor Sustainable Growth for Food Security and Job Creation and (3) Human Development.
PRIME Findings

I. Performance Effectiveness

Capacity

The better conditions of service, facilities, and equipment have largely improved the capacity of the SLP but critical insufficiencies remain in areas such as criminal investigation. The SLP complains of a lack of vehicles and communications equipment, as well as investigative capacity. The country has no forensics lab and only one fingerprint analyst. Vehicles donated by the CCSSP in 2002 are worn down from being used twenty-four hours a day. The SLP does not have money in its budget for maintaining, replacing, or adding vehicles. Gasoline rations from the government are also insufficient, according to SLP sources. The SLP appears to be trained in basic investigating techniques, but it is unclear how well these are implemented in the field. Basic questions posed to some officers about how to conduct an investigation were not answered. Professional development after initial training was lacking.

The National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) and Office of National Security (ONS) play an important role in coordinating the Government’s national security and intelligence strategy, including at the provincial and district levels. However, the police are missing from this strategy. Communication and coordination among the prisons, courts, and police officials appear limited at best, partly resulting from the lack of capacity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which should be coordinating the different sectors. Also, competition between the police and prisons for resources has limited the potential for effective cooperation. For example, although the police are supposed to transport remand prisoners to jail, the prison authorities contend that the police often fail to perform this duty. A dysfunctional judicial system, out-of-date laws and procedures, and overcrowded prisons have also limited police effectiveness, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to justice sector reform.

Authority and Reach

The SLP has achieved primacy over internal security throughout the country. However, tribal institutions, such as the Native Police, complement and occasionally challenge police authority in some areas of the country. Traditional justice systems still challenge the official legal system in cases involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure. Generally, relations between the SLP and tribal authorities appear cordial. In the southwestern town of Moyamba, the SLP works closely with the Paramount Chief and the Native Police to help extend its reach. For instance, the Native Police outside Moyamba sometimes detain

---

65 “Paramount Chiefs” are local tribal leaders in Sierra Leone. The “Native Police,” also known as the “Chiefdom Police,” are traditional police who work directly for the Paramount Chiefs. They have no legal authority.
suspects, report their detention to the SLP, and then hand them over when the SLP can make the trip to the more rural areas.

One of the most significant achievements of the Sierra Leone Police is the visibility they have gained since the inception of the CCSSP in 2000. This increase in visibility\(^66\) was the result of being properly outfitted with uniforms, equipment, and supplies in addition to the training support that was provided. These improvements notwithstanding, infrastructure (especially roads) and transportation limitations prevent the police from accessing many rural areas in a timely manner.

**Crime**

The SLP’s main challenges range from petty crime to assault and armed robberies, which are often perpetrated by young men and ex-combatants. Politically motivated crime does not appear to be a major problem in Sierra Leone at this time. However, the powerful still appear to have impunity when they commit crimes. Public perception is that the police cannot touch the political or wealthy elite in the country.

Recorded crime shows an increase between 2002 and 2004 and the crime figures for January-May 2005 are higher compared to the corresponding period of the prior year.\(^67\) However, these statistics may reflect increased reporting from the public. The collection of statistics is in itself a sign of progress. Crime statistics prior to 2002 are not available. Reporting of domestic violence, child abuse, and rape has increased, which is likely due to improved awareness of sexual crimes and the establishment of a Family Services Unit (FSU). The FSU, which has many female officers, investigates domestic crimes. Despite these improvements, Sierra Leone’s laws do not explicitly address many domestic crimes, which has complicated the SLP’s efforts to arrest and charge suspects. One interview with a Sierra Leonean NGO indicated that the SLP in general and the FSU in particular may be overly ready to urge victims to reach financial settlements with their victimizer rather than file a police report.

The 2004 external public perception survey revealed that the public felt somewhat safer in 2004 than in 2003. The same trend continued in 2005.\(^68\) It is unclear to what extent people feel safer due to police performance rather than to disarmament of combatants after the war.

**II. Management and Oversight**

**Mission and Procedures**

The mission statement of the SLP asserts that a professional and effective service will protect life and property, achieve a peaceful society, and take primacy in the maintenance of law and order. From top to bottom the SLP seems to have clearly defined job functions and to be aware of them. The police also have a disciplinary code (i.e. a code of conduct). While

---


\(E\)xcept at the peak of the rainy season when the fear of crime shot up.
not all police possess a copy, they seem to know of its existence, its general content, and some of its details. The management structure of the SLP appears to be very clear and comprehensive. Organizational hierarchy is clearly defined in the SLP organizational chart published in the SLP Medium Term Strategic Plan and officers of all levels seem to be aware of their place within it. There are some basic procedures for conducting investigations, but it is unclear to what extent they are followed. The consolidation of the rank system following the war (from 19 different ranks to 11 now) has reduced the LUCs to local managers responsible for overseeing the operations of the stations under their command.

Officers on patrol check in with their supervisors every 2 hours. An important duty of patrol officers is to keep a notebook (i.e. patrol diary) of their activities, which their supervisors are supposed to review at the end of each shift. Records of all activities in station houses are also kept. In some police stations, mentors have been assigned to make sure shift supervisors are doing their jobs, particularly the newest ones who were rushed through their training prior to UNAMSIL’s withdrawal.

The UNAMSIL Back to Basics Policing survey of March 2005 points out problems with the notebook system. It reports that “at all stations and posts the record keeping (station diary and custody records) is generally satisfactory but the supply of police note books is erratic and many SLP members do not possess them. And even though those who are in possession of police notebooks are generally making good use of such books, very little is being done to inspect these books by the supervisors.” The police officers we spoke with in Freetown and Bo kept notebooks. However, when asked, none of the officers in Bo were able to produce a single example of an arrest in either their notebooks or logs. Though the sample was small, this may indicate that not all relevant activities are being recorded or that arrests are simply not being made.

**Strategic Planning and Monitoring**

In 2005, the SLP produced its first three-year strategic plan that sets priorities, strategies, programs, and projects, and is the basis of future budget requests. The SLP Medium Term Strategic Plan, 2006-2008 (MTSP) will be updated for 2007-2009, 2008-2010, and so forth. The plan includes performance indicators and targets, and charges the Executive Management and Change Board with the responsibility for monitoring and evaluation. Currently, LUCs meet once a month at headquarters to coordinate planning and to share information with the Deputy IGP.

The SLP has conducted its own survey of public perception and commissioned an external perception survey, both of which were used to monitor police performance. The SLP headquarters collects detailed crime statistics but it is unclear how they use the statistics to improve police performance. Additionally, UNPOL publishes a bi-annual report summarizing its own activities within the period and also assessing progress made by the SLP.

On the local level, according to the LUCs of Central and Kissy Divisions, when crime rates appear to increase in a particular area, they respond with a temporary 24 hour post in the “hot” area or with adapted beat patrols. The Kissy LUC also indicated that local performance targets, which are complementary to the MTSP, exist for his area.
Oversight and Accountability

While the SLP has internal and external oversight mechanisms, there are serious doubts about their effectiveness. The SLP has created an internal oversight mechanism called the Complaint Discipline and Internal Investigation Department (CDIID). It is both a mechanism for internal disciplinary action against police (e.g. for absenteeism, not following orders, etc.) and for community complaints against police (e.g. for corruption, extortion, violence, etc.). The CDIID is physically located at police headquarters in Freetown, but there are CDIID units at every police station. Several NGOs expressed concern that community members are uncomfortable going to the police station to file complaints against the police. Internal oversight is further constrained by the power structure within the SLP. Only the IGP currently has the authority to sanction police officers. Thus, an LUC cannot even sanction a constable without direct approval from the IGP. Currently, there is no external complaint body, though members of the NGO community and members of UNAMSIL UNPOL have suggested that a police complaints authority be created within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

LUCs are responsible for keeping a record of disciplinary violations by their officers. There is some evidence that personnel at the station level are more loyal to headquarters staff than to their superior officers. Since personnel files are only kept at SLP headquarters, many breaches of discipline never make it from the field to personnel files. The Local and Coordinating Groups (LCG), composed of station commanders responsible for conducting inspections of stations, are not always aware of their responsibilities.

The Police Council provides external oversight of the SLP. Its members include the Vice President, who chairs the Council, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the IGP, the Deputy IGP, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, a member of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, and two other members appointed by the President subject to parliamentary approval. Other external oversight structures include the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG), and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee. These oversee the entire security sector, including the police. Concerns over the political independence of these oversight bodies led the 2005 Security Sector Review (SSR) to recommend strengthening “civilian monitoring and oversight to ensure adequate transparency” by redefining the composition of the above oversight structures, strengthening the Parliamentary Oversight Committee, and further pursuing the decentralization process.

Personnel

The SLP claims to have raised standards for new recruits. In contrast to before the war, a high school degree is now required of recruits. As part of its community-policing mission, the SLP now claims to recruit officers to serve in their local own communities. However, the SLP may have cut corners by shortening the training period of new recruits by half in order to meet the December 2005 target of 9,500 police officers.

69 UNAMSIL, Survey of ‘Back to Basics Policing’, March 2005
There is a formal promotion system in place, but it is unclear to what extent it is followed. A performance appraisal is done when an officer applies for promotion. An assessment is made of the officer's communication skills and relationship with others, written communication, investigation skills, knowledge of law and procedures, practical effectiveness, problem solving ability, decision making and planning skills, and conduct. However, the SLP lacks a performance assessment system for use on a regular basis. Several SLP officers of a variety of ranks also expressed concern over the lack of career development. The consolidation of the rank system from 19 different ranks to 11 has limited the potential for promotion.

According to SLP statistics, the attrition rate among officers is very low and few officers leave for other jobs despite complaints about low pay and the existence of higher starting salaries in private security firms.

III. Community Relations

Human Rights

The SLP has a formal commitment to human rights. It has its own Human Rights Unit (HRU) and UNAMSIL’s Human Rights Officers (HROs) claim that virtually all SLP officers receive human rights training. Nevertheless, there are several key areas where human rights problems remain. There are concerns over the treatment of suspected criminals in police holding cells, including poor conditions, overcrowding, and the mixing of children with adults and women with men. NGOs also indicated that suspects are often detained weeks or even months longer than is permitted by law. The 2004 US State Department human rights report for Sierra Leone identifies arbitrary arrest and detention among its main complaints.70 Both NGOs and the State Department also accuse the SLP of charging those detained excessive bail. According to Sierra Leonean law, bail is supposed to be free. However, several Sierra Leoneans said in interviews that they had personally paid large sums of money to get family members out of jail. The SLP also has had a mixed record on crowd control. On two separate occasions in 2005 the SLP is reported to have fired live bullets against protesters, once at students in Freetown and once at a group of “bike riders” (motorcyclists who transport passengers) in Kenema.

Cooperation

The strong emphasis on community relations in the police reform effort has led to a modest increase in the SLP's support from the public. However, perception polls and interviews with community members still indicate widespread community distrust of the police resulting primarily from persistent corruption, including bribery and extortion. The SLP’s efforts to improve community relations have included the creation of Community Relations and Family Support Units (FSUs) staffed jointly by police officers and social workers. There is now a Community Relations Department located in Police Headquarters tasked to work in concert with all divisional commanders to promote local needs policing, develop and

implement various crime prevention strategies with the LUCs, and provide an efficient link between the police and the community. The police regularly communicate with the public via radio stations and hold sensitization programs in communities. However, some NGOs and members of the public complain that the police are much better at providing information to the communities than soliciting input. The SLP has created Local Partnership Boards (LPBs) chaired by a civilian member of the community and populated by both local police and community members. The LPBs have not yet been established country wide and the majority of the community members who were interviewed during the March 2005 Back to Basics Policing Survey were not aware of the existence of such boards.

Although not an effort of the SLP, the GoSL’s new decentralization policy has the potential to improve community cooperation by increasing local control over the police. The UK’s DFID has worked with the GoSL to decentralize government authority by devolving some control to newly created Local Governing Councils (LGCs). In Moyamba this council appears to be helping to improve trust and coordination among community stakeholders and the police.

**Corruptibility**

There is a widespread perception that the SLP remains corrupt, though corruption is seen as less severe than before the war. Low salaries and a lack of accountability appear to be the main drivers of corruption. The CARE International public perception survey found corruption to be one of the public’s major complaints of the police. In interviews, several Sierra Leoneans shared personal experiences with SLP officers who perpetrated bribery and extortion. On the other hand, the SLP’s pre-war practice of setting up illegal police check points to demand bribes from motorists appear to have ended. Some NGOs allege that the SLP target people for arrest who can afford to pay for release and accuse the SLP of smuggling across international borders.

**Acceptance**

The public generally accepts police authority. However, the unarmed and armed portions of the police are not always distinguishable. There is anecdotal evidence that officers dressed in the uniforms of the unarmed SLP have occasionally brandished the weapons of the armed Operational Support Department (OSD). In rural areas, the Native Police appear to cooperate more often than they compete with the SLP. However, tribal authorities in rural areas tend to ignore government laws in cases involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure. Groups of youth in the countryside and in some areas of Freetown provide informal security networks where the SLP has not been able to extend its reach.71

---

IV. Sustainability

Budget

Resource management and financial sustainability are major areas of concern for the SLP. These problems are a symptom of Sierra Leone’s extreme poverty. An annual GDP growth rate averaging about 7% over three years since 2002 shows how far the country has progressed. Nevertheless, just over 70% of the country’s more than five million inhabitants still live in poverty, subsisting on incomes of less than $1 a day. Sierra Leone only recently climbed to 176 out of 177 countries on the UN’s Human Development Index. Sierra Leone’s national budget is 60% donor dependent and the police sector is no exception. Even though internal revenues have covered salaries and operational costs of the SLP, capital expenditure (e.g. equipment such as cars, buildings, radio, etc.) remains entirely dependent on donor money. The UK has so far financed capital expenditure, first under the CCSSP up to 2005 and now under the 5-year JSDP, with approximately $3.4 million in addition to $1.7 million already allocated for vehicles and communication. The November 2005 Consultative Group Meeting in London shaded a positive light on the financing of Sierra Leone’s development with aid promises for 2005-2007 totaling $800 million for the government’s plans for poverty reduction.

Although the 2005 Security Sector Review estimates that a police service of up to 9,500 may be required to adequately carry out the police’s assigned responsibilities, weak economic growth and donor fatigue may make such a number unaffordable. The pre-war strength of the SLP was 9,317, reduced to a low of 6,600 at the end of the civil war. With 9,500 officers, Sierra Leone will have a ratio of 179 police per 100,000 citizens, better than Spain (129) or Zambia (107) but less than Australia (275) or the US (300).

The GoSL currently does not have the funds to pay for any new vehicles or equipment. The SLP Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2006-2008 anticipates annual vehicle replacement and running costs to be $6.3 million and communication equipment to be an additional $666,000. While the level of overall SLP funding has grown from $1.5 million in 1999 to approximately $12 million allocated in 2005, this allocated budget falls short of the SLP submitted budget request for $27 million. There is a large gap between the resources the SLP requests and what it receives from the GoSL and no evidence that the GoSL has a plan to address this gap other than by requesting additional donor support.

Training and Equipment

The training capacity of the SLP continues to expand. In addition to the refurbished Hastings Police Training School (outside of Freetown), regional training centers are being rebuilt in Bo, Kenema, and Makeni. The original prisons in those cities were destroyed during the war. In 2003, UNPOL added specialized training for the SLP related to commercial crimes, criminal intelligence services, drug prevention, forensics, and Interpol procedures. Human rights and child protection officers also conducted nationwide training for SLP personnel, particularly those of the Family Support Units.

---

72 64 billion Leones
The SLP remains dependent on UNPOL officers for its training. UNPOL only recently started train-the-trainers courses for the SLP. Six training sub-priorities have been identified in The SLP has identified six training sub-priorities in its Medium-term Strategic Plan, 2006-2008: 1) developing training infrastructure; 2) designing and implementing new training products; 3) developing SLP trainers; 4) installing effective administration; 5) installing monitoring and evaluation systems; and 5) engaging in partnerships to provide training accreditation.

Early UK assistance supplied the police with uniforms, vehicles, communications, and regular wages, which helped establish a level of professionalism that boosted morale. However, funding for new for new equipment and the maintenance of existing equipment is severely lacking. Officers complain that vehicles are falling apart due to overuse and harsh road and weather conditions. The GoSL budget does not provide the SLP with funds for purchasing new vehicles.

**Political Independence**

There is a serious concern that political actors will use the SLP against political opponents in the upcoming 2007 Presidential elections. The scaled-down Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), which feels that the police are receiving too much donor support, could also pose a threat to the SLP’s monopoly over internal security. The 2005 SSR indicates that “the implications of threats to the security of Sierra Leone and its people have been assessed as largely from within, hence the need for a smaller Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Force (RSLAF) reduced to 10,500 by 2007 (possibly further reduced by 2009-2010) and a large SLP of 9,500 responsible for the maintenance of public order and the rule of law.”

Several international observers are concerned that the military will threaten the internal security of Sierra Leone when the international community withdraws. As noted above, UNAMSIL will withdraw at the end of 2005, leaving behind 20 police as part of the new UNIOSIL mission. However, the continued presence of the UK’s International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) and the remaining UN presence may dissuade the RSLAF from threatening the SLP or the civilian government.

NGOs expressed concerns over the political independence both of the SLP and of the OSD. In theory, the OSD is under the control of the IGP. However, the SLP and the OSD are both subject to the wishes of the Police Council, on which the Vice President and various government ministers sit. There is a concern that the OSD could be used as a political tool of the Vice President when he runs for president in 2007.

**Compensation**

The GoSL has paid the SLP’s salaries since 2002. Compensation in the SLP is very low, though better than for teachers or prison employees. One LUC commented that being a police officer “is one of the few living jobs in Sierra Leone” and went on to say that, “a constable with a high school degree makes more than a teacher with a university degree.” Police are provided either with small barracks housing (provided to less than 25% of the service, mostly in Freetown), or with a housing and transport stipend. They also receive a
rice allowance and a medical care plan that provides care for officers plus one spouse and four children. The monthly salary for a starting constable is approximately $22, and for the IGP is between $400 and $500 dollars. Police at several levels complained that their compensation was too low, and indeed the salaries of those officers who are not high up in the service are still low for supporting a family, even though their pay is better than that of many other Sierra Leoneans. Interviewees in all sectors said low compensation was a significant factor contributing to police corruption.

---

73 The SLP Budget for the 2006-2008 MTEF Period.
Annex III: The Case of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste
# Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 102

Introduction 103

Acknowledgments 104

Overview of PRIME Findings 105

Initial Conditions 107

Inputs 108

Current Measurements 110

PRIME Findings 111

  - Performance Effectiveness 111
  - Management and Oversight 114
  - Community Relations 117
  - Sustainability 119
## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoTL</td>
<td>Government of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>Organic Law of PNTL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEU</td>
<td>Professional Ethics Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHRJ</td>
<td>Provedor for Human Rights in Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIME</td>
<td>Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>Police Reserve Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Skill Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLPDP</td>
<td>Timor Leste Police Development Program (Australia/United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The following annex summarizes the application of the Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation (PRIME) to the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). Our conclusions are mainly based on in-country field research conducted by Fatema Gunja and Daniel Y. Harris between 30 October and 4 November 2005. This analysis is the product of more than 30 formal and informal interviews in Aileu, Dili, Maliana, and Suai, including, but not limited to officials from the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, Ministry of the Interior, Becora Prison, United Nations, United States, Australia, international NGOs, local civil society groups, journalists, and translators. Official reports and governmental documents collected within Timor-Leste and on the Internet also contributed to our findings.
Acknowledgments

The research we conducted in Timor-Leste could not have been accomplished without assistance from numerous people. In particular, we wish to thank the UNOTIL team in Timor-Leste, including Anis Bajwa, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, and Saif Ullah Malik, Senior Police Advisor.

In UNPOL Dili, we would like to thank Nuno Anaia, DCPTA, Bazlur Rahman, ADCPTA, Francisco Barreto, Local Staff Interpreter, John Daulby, TLPDP Policy Advisor, Wasim Khalik, Special Assistant to the Senior Police Advisor, Robert Krizanic, Technical Advisor, Jonnie Ngeluk, Executive Assistant to the Senior Police Advisor, and Jose Real, Team Leader of the Migration Department with special thanks to Arif Mehmood, UNPOL Team Leader, Technical Advisor.

In UNPOL Suai, we would like to thank Antonio Domingues, Team Leader and Technical Advisors, Leonardo Sant’Anna, Xu Chen, Fernando Guijarro, Santiago Marradon, and Luis Reis.

At UNPOL New York, we would like to thank Mark Kroeker, Director of UNPOL, and Ramli Yoosuf, Desk Officer.

In the PNTL, we would like to thank Paulo de Fatima Martins, PNTL Commander General, Ismael Babo, Deputy Commander General for Operations, Hermenagildo da Cruz, Chief of Administration, and Jose Maria Netomok, Director of Intelligence.

In Timor-Leste, we would like to thank Rogerio Lobato, Minister of Interior, Amado Hei of the Hak Association, Tracey Morgan of United Nations Children’s Fund, Karlito Nunes and Caroline Carter of the National Democratic Institute, Robin Perry of Justice Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Julio Pinto of Reuters, Casimiro Reis of the United Nations Development Program, and Sally Torbert of Internews.

Finally, for assistance in making contacts and for support while we were in Timor-Leste, we thank Isabel Hight of UN Corrections, Ludovic Hood of UNDP, Edward Rees of DPKO, and Anastasia Vrachnos of Princeton in Asia at Princeton University.

We take full responsibility for any mistakes or omissions in this annex.
Overview of PRIME Findings

Since its inception in 2000, the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) has developed into one of the most professional and sustainable institutions in Timor-Leste. At present, the PNTL is a force of 3,000 plus officers, more than 20% of whom are women, with an extensive reach across the country and relatively high levels of community acceptance and support. This outcome is largely due to the commitment and efforts of the United Nations Police (UNPOL) who have built the force from scratch and to the commitment and dedication of the Timorese. UNPOL has worked in an advisory and monitoring capacity, which has increased since the hand over of executive authority to the PNTL in May 2004. UNPOL is scheduled to leave Timor-Leste in May 2006 and has worked to build the PNTL into a competent and self-reliant police service that will uphold its mission and mandate long after the UN departure.

Performance Effectiveness: While the PNTL is able to fight basic crime, its effectiveness is hampered by its limited capacity and lack of proper human resources. The force is slowly making progress in confronting domestic/sexual violence issues, which are compounded by difficulties in the judicial and penal systems in prosecuting such crimes. Smuggling of basic goods and trafficking of persons remain key challenges; though units like the Border Patrol Unit have been created to address these problems, success is hard to fully measure in the absence of widespread activity, limited reporting, and the PNTL’s anemic capacity. Other units such as the Counter-Terrorism Unit have been set up to address potential problems, which given scarce resources, raises the issue of donor versus local priorities. While the PNTL has unquestioned authority in fighting crimes throughout the country, its reach is limited by basic infrastructure problems such as lack of equipment and roads. While the PNTL increasingly cooperates with the penal and judicial systems, their lack of development hinders the PNTL’s ability to effectively administer the rule of law.

Management and Oversight: The PNTL has a clear hierarchy of management and reporting structure in place. Moreover, though job descriptions and standard operating procedures exist and are explained during basic training, language complications (i.e. production in only English, Portuguese, or Tetum despite 33 dialects spoken in country) and limited distribution of print materials prevent officers from internalizing PNTL’s mission and understanding how their individual role contributes to the greater goal of stability, justice, and rule of law in Timor-Leste. Internal oversight is developing through the Professional Ethics Unit (PEU), which has a limited mandate and effectiveness. External oversight exists through the Provedor for Human Rights. Recruitment efforts are largely successful and based on a merit system. Retention rates are high, reflecting relatively high levels of satisfaction among PNTL officers and high unemployment rates in country.

Community Relations: Community support for the PNTL is largely fueled by patriotism and nationalism seeing as the police is the most visible presence of the new state. While community relations are generally positive, there have been domestic and international concerns over human rights abuses. To address these concerns, human rights training is now incorporated into both PNTL training and practice and a PEU has been created. While corruption is not widespread, it could become a problem due to low salaries and the PNTL’s limited political independence from other government ministries.
**Sustainability:** PNTL budgets are developed as a part of a national budget plan, which currently covers the period 2005 – 2009. Currently, approximately a quarter of the PNTL budget is funded through international donors. The PNTL is in the process of creating a 15-year strategic plan. UNPOL subject matter experts have developed a training curriculum that addresses current needs and is forward looking, although training standards are still low and capacity and human resource constraints limit effectiveness. Although the PNTL lacks the resources and/or legal framework to effectively use some of the tools of the training (i.e. forensics and counterterrorism), they remain important training tools for the future of the PNTL. The PNTL lack the necessary equipment, financial resources, and training to maintain and upkeep current equipment. There is a severe shortage of physical capital, including major items such as vehicles, fuel, and weapons and smaller items, such as radios, batteries, and notebooks. The Ministry of Interior and its senior leadership, which maintain a high level of control over the PNTL’s activities, limit the PNTL’s political independence. Salaries are average compared to other professions, but still inadequate to provide for families.

In sum, considering the PNTL’s recent history, tremendous progress has been made in the development and management of this nascent police service. Despite the lack of adequate equipment and training, the PNTL is capable of carrying out its basic responsibilities as is evident by its normal daily operations and planning. Once the UN departs, the PNTL will have to find ways to sustain the institution and build capacity through increased government support and/or continued donor coordination. Its ability to navigate these awesome challenges will be the true test of the institution’s strength and resiliency and of the UN’s efforts thus far.
Initial Conditions

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is the world's newest nation, achieving its independence on May 20, 2002. A Portuguese colony until 1974, Timor-Leste was occupied by Indonesia in December 1975 and formally annexed in 1976. The period of Indonesian occupation was marred by widespread abuses against the Timorese population and conflict between pro-Indonesian and pro-independence forces. The intermittent warfare and famine claimed approximately 250,000 lives. During the Indonesian occupation period, the United Nations recognized Portugal as the legitimate administrative power over Timor-Leste denying Indonesia’s claims to the territory, and called for Timorese self-determination.

In 1999, UN mediated talks between Indonesia and Portugal resulted in a UN monitored referendum where 78.5% of the Timorese voted against remaining under Indonesian rule and for UN administration and an eventual transition to full independence. In the aftermath of the referendum, pro-autonomy and pro-Indonesian militias engaged in a campaign of violence and destruction that killed more than 1,000 civilians, displaced upwards of 250,000 civilians, and destroyed about 80% of Timor-Leste’s infrastructure. In September 1999, the UN Security Council responded by authorizing an Australian-led multinational force, the International Force of East Timor (INTERFET), to restore order and security. A month later, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1272 established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), a multidimensional peacekeeping mission responsible for the administration of Timor-Leste.

The arrival of UNTAET came with the withdrawal of Indonesia’s police and military presence in Timor-Leste, leaving a security and police vacuum that needed to be filled by the UN Police (UNPOL). In this regard, the UN played a similar role to that which it had played earlier in Kosovo. UNPOL, under the command of a UN Police Commissioner and responsible to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, began the establishment of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) in August 2000 to prepare for independence. Following independence in May 2002, UNSCR 1410 transitioned UNTAET to the United Nations Mission in Support of Timor-Leste (UNMISET) with responsibility to ensure the security and stability of the nascent state. UNMISET held executive authority over all police functions and operations until the official handover to the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) on May 20, 2004. The UN Peace Keeping Force remained as a rapid response force and for border patrol, and UNPOL operations were limited to a small advisory unit to assist in the development of the PNTL. UNMISET completed its mandate on May 20, 2005. A special political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), is currently operating in Timor-Leste to support and advise the PNTL on building up specific competencies such as strategic planning, capacity building, border control management, ethics and human rights, forensics, and close protection, among other specific subject matter training. UNOTIL’s mandate expires on May 20, 2006.
In October 1999, Security Council Resolution 1272 mandated the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor Leste (UNTAET) to “provide security and maintain law and order” and authorized an international police element with strength of up to 1,640 officers. By the end of January 2000, only 400 UNPOL officers had arrived in country. Of these, only around 200 had been deployed to districts outside Dili. In July 2000, nine months after the establishment of UNTAET, the UNPOL strength was 1,270, still well below the authorized strength of 1,640. As of October 2001, UNPOL had a presence of 1,481 civilian police in country. At its most diverse, UNPOL officers in UNTAET represented 39 nations. There was one civilian police fatality. The UNTAET budget from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002 was $476.8 million (gross).

In January 2000, responsibility for law and order was handed over from the Australian led International Force for Timor Leste (INTERFET) to UNPOL. Because UNPOL was not prepared to fully assume its executive functions, INTERFET remained to provide back-up law enforcement functions. In March 2000, UNPOL established the Police Assistance Group (PAG), comprised of 800 Timorese who had formerly served in the Indonesian police. The PAG were unarmed and provided assistance to UNPOL rather than directly carrying out policing functions. Eventually, close to half of the PAG were eventually recruited into the Police Nacional de Timor Leste (PNTL).

In May 2002, UNTAET transitioned to the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor Leste (UNMISET) by Security Council resolution 1410. UNMISET was mandated to: provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of Timor Leste; provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in Timor Leste, the Timor Leste Police Service (ETPS); and contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of Timor Leste. UNPOL was decreased initially to 1,250 civilian officers with additional decreases bringing the number of civilian police to 741 by November 2002.

In May 2003, Security Council Resolution 1480 extended UNMISET’s mandate for another year until May 2004. The mission was again extended by six months in May 2004 through Security Council resolution 1543. The UNMISET budget from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2004 was $483.9 million (gross). During this period, UNMISET reduced the size of the mission and revised its tasks, in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary-General as outlined in his report of April 29, 2004 to include: support for the public administration and justice system of Timor Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes; support to the development of law enforcement in Timor Leste; and support for the security and stability of Timor Leste. In addition, UNPOL’s presence was reduced to 157.

In November 2004, Security Council Resolution 1573 extended the mandate of UNMISET for a final six months until May 2005. The Council also decided to maintain UNMISET’s tasks, configuration, and size, in order to allow the Mission to complete its mandate and consolidate gains made in that country thus far. At the time of withdrawal, UNPOL had a presence of 135. The UNMISET budget from July 1, 2004 to May 20, 2005 was $77.1 million (gross). At its height, UNMISET officers represented 54 nations.
In May 2005, UNMISET concluded its mandate in Timor Leste and was succeeded by a small follow-on political mission – the United Nations Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL), which was established by the Security Council Resolution 1599 to ensure that the underpinnings of a viable State are firmly in place in Timor Leste. UNOTIL’s mandate provides support for the public administration and justice system of Timor Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes; support to the development of law enforcement in Timor Leste; and support for the security and stability of Timor Leste. Currently, UNPOL’s presence in Timor Leste is 60 civilian officers. UNOTIL’s mandate is scheduled to end on May 20, 2006. UNOTIL’s budget from May 21, 2005 to June 30, 2005 was $8.1 million (gross).
Current Measurements

During the early years of the PNTL, initial performance measures evaluated the number and composition of officers trained, deployed, promoted and retained; the number of facilities constructed or reconstructed; the quantity of equipment purchased or transferred from the international community; and the number of police stations and regional commands transferred to local authority. As the PNTL developed, the UN and PNTL began using two additional criteria to judge the actual performance of the force.

The first is an internal PNTL performance indicator that examines the effectiveness of individual officers’ performance and skill sets. Results are gathered through a multi-step process that includes: observation of an officer by a team leader who reports to the District/Unit Commander, an assessment based on job requirements and weekly written and practical tests with the results then passed on to the team leader and kept on record in the officer’s file, and monthly weapon and equipment safety drills in some of the units. In addition to being used as a performance monitor, these results are used to plan and conduct future trainings for the enhancement of training capabilities.

The second set of measures, conducted by UNPOL, examines the effectiveness of program management. These measures include: observation of UNPOL/PNTL Field Trainers resulting in reports to District/Unit Commander highlighting evaluation based on job requirements and spot evaluations of cadet training and officers in the field. Based on these results, UNPOL Subject Matter Experts plan and produce professional development trainings in coordination with PNTL colleagues, UNPOL Strategic Planners develop plan for PNTL institutional strengthening, and UNPOL Advisor and PNTL Commander plan for UNOTIL departure on May 20, 2006.

While these latter two measurement tools have increasingly focused on qualitative, rather than quantitative, assessments, they still do not adequately capture a complete picture of police reform efforts. The bulk of performance measures remain focused on tasks and outputs instead of analyzing the actual conditions on the ground. There is no systematic measurement tool in place that is consistent across time and different missions, which creates unequal and incomplete reporting. This results in isolated snapshots of policing efforts. In 2003, the Joint Government/UN/Partner Country Police Needs Assessment (JAM) recognized the need for “improved measurement models and recommended the development of standardized indicators for efficiency, and compliance to strengthen the PNTL as a professional and independent institution.” As of October 2005, this type of measurement still did not exist.

---

PRIME Findings

I. Performance Effectiveness

Capacity

Since the first class of 50 PNTL cadets graduated in March 2000, the PNTL has grown immensely. In March 2003, the PNTL surpassed its policing goal of 3,000 officers. It currently has a service strength of around 3,100 officers. UNPOL determined the appropriate service size using a ratio of police officers to inhabitants of 1:250. However, current rates are 1:308. While it would be unjust to compare this ratio to Timor-Leste’s developed neighbors Australia and Indonesia, an appropriate comparison would be Kosovo (1:273) where UNPOL faced similar challenges in developing a police service from scratch. However, these ratios in both Timor-Leste and Kosovo are largely arbitrary since they were not developed based on a careful analysis of threats and local conditions. Instead, as the King’s College review of Peace Operations in Timor-Leste states, “the basis for this figure was that historically Timor-Leste always had 3,000 police officers.” Thus, there does not seem to be a clear link between the size of the police service and the needs of the local population.

In regards to resources, the PNTL often lacks the necessary equipment and financial resources to maintain public safety. UNPOL estimates that between 50-75% of vehicles, most donated by the UN, are inoperable due to the PNTL’s inability to repair and maintain vehicles and/or a lack of fuel. Based on the country’s rugged and mountainous terrain, the lack of transportation makes remote areas relatively inaccessible. In addition, police lack adequate radios and/or the batteries for the radios for communication between field sites and base. Without a radio, some PNTL officers have to travel three hours by foot to communicate with their base. This is further complicated by an inability to maintain current UN repeaters and generators due to lack of fuel, making available radios’ functionality sporadic. The PNTL also lacks an appropriate capacity to protect and patrol its sea borders. The Maritime Unit currently has three boats, two of which are broken and one is not sea navigable. The Border Unit has only limited capacity to protect its land borders without vehicles, a helicopter or adequate manpower to monitor the border for smugglers. The PNTL is developing a counter-terrorism unit, but terrorism as of yet is not an issue, raising concerns of donors creating units that advance their interests and not those of local significance.

In regards to training, PNTL officers receive a three-month in class basic training at the Police Academy in Dili followed by three months of on-the-job training. This training is followed by a six-month probationary period. The selected candidates undergo basic

---

75 Interview with Saif Ullah Malik, UNOTIL Senior Police Advisor.
77 See Kosovo Annex.
79 Interview with Saif Ullah Malik, UNOTIL Senior Police Advisor.
training at the Police Academy, where they learn the theory of policing and become familiar with police work. The UN prepared the training program, which covers 54 subjects with monthly exams. Many national police recruits have only middle school education, so they sometimes have trouble understanding all of the concepts and material covered. All officials interviewed agreed that the basic training given to the PNTL is not enough to prepare a professional police service. Similarly, the 2003 JAM on the Timor-Leste Police Service found that "all TLPS [now PNTL] recruits receive twelve weeks of basic training in addition to field training. However, it's widely acknowledged that this is insufficient and further training is required to strengthen basic policing skills."\(^{80}\) UNPOL maintains that the time period for the training was limited because it had to train close to 3,000 PNTL in such a short period with limited resources.

Additional professional development is limited to those officers selected for special units or promoted in rank. These trainings are currently led by UNPOL “project experts.” However, without a standardized UNPOL training model, UNPOL officers offer various training models depending on their own national background and police training. This lack of uniformity creates confusion among the PNTL. Some training opportunities have been offered to PNTL officers in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore on topics such as riot and crowd control and human rights. However, many of these officers expressed frustration upon their return to Timor-Leste that they were unable to incorporate new training methods into PNTL policing due to resource constraints.

Ten PNTL officers have been selected to serve with the civilian police component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 2006. These officers, on a one-year assignment, will be posted in managerial and operational areas along with international counterparts and the Kosovo Police Service. This opportunity will provide Timorese police officers with valuable experience, skills, and knowledge which they can share with their national colleagues upon return to PNTL service.

**Authority and Reach**

PNTL’s authority was first defined by UNTAET Regulation 2001/22, which formally established the PNTL in August 2001. UNTAET was responsible for the administration of Timor-Leste during its transition to independence. These responsibilities included the maintenance of law and order throughout the territory and the creation of "non-discriminatory and impartial institutions, particularly those of judiciary and police, to ensure the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law and to promote and protect human rights."\(^{81}\)

With the passage of a new constitution, under Section 147, the PNTL is now responsible to “defend the democratic legality and guarantee the internal security of the citizens, and shall be strictly non-partisan; prevention of crime shall be undertaken with due respect for human

---


rights; and the law shall determine the rules and regulations for the police and other security forces.\textsuperscript{82} The PNTL is under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Internal Administration. Regarding the reach of the PNTL, they have full access and freedom of movement across the entire country. They are only limited by difficult road conditions and a poor transportation infrastructure. Timor-Leste does not suffer from a problem of traditional organized crime. Rather, a bigger concern is cross-border smuggling, which the PNTL still does not have adequate capacity to effectively combat.

\textbf{Crime}

Crime statistics are carefully collected by both UNPOL and PNTL and used as a proxy to measure PNTL performance. Following the initial period of mass violence in 1999, there was a notable increase in low-level personal and property crime in 2000, largely attributed to the rapid increase in the cost of living, unemployment, and rapid, unplanned urbanization. Since then, the reported crime rate has been low and generally stable, although there has been an increase in traffic accidents and reported domestic violence cases. This latter trend may reflect the success of public awareness campaigns against gender-based violence, rather than actual increased incidence. There have also been sporadic incidents of violence in urban areas involving martial arts groups and youth gangs and occasional reports of armed groups and criminal elements in rural areas and smuggling and extortion. Overall, the PNTL reports that there has been a constant decrease in crime from a high of 5,234 crimes in 2002 to 1,558 in 2005 (as of September 2005).\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{crime_rates.png}
\caption{Total Crime Rates in Timor-Leste from 2002-2005}
\end{figure}

It is anticipated that crime trends could increase as a result of the developing socio-economic situation, which is characterized by high unemployment and limited resources. In addition, as the vanity of independence wears off, people are likely to grow increasingly frustrated with the absence of economic and political opportunities.

\textsuperscript{83} According to PNTL statistics, there were 5,234 crimes reported in 2002; 3,788 crimes reported in 2003; 2,749 crimes reported in 2004; and 1,558 crimes reported as of September 2005.
Coordination

Within the criminal justice system, the PNTL have thus far developed the most capacity as compared to the judicial and penal sectors. The judicial system is particularly fragile since it had to be built from scratch when Indonesia withdrew in 1999. It continues to face serious challenges in recruiting and training a sufficient number of qualified judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. The judiciary's shortage of personnel largely accounts for the PNTL’s inability to process criminal cases against most detained suspects within a reasonable amount of time.

The shortcomings of the criminal justice system have adversely affected the rights of suspects to a fair trial. Some detainees do not have access to legal counsel for weeks or even months. In some cases, detainees have been held beyond the expiry of their detention orders. Due to the slow progress of the courts, the right to trial without undue delay is threatened. Because of these frustrations with the formal justice system, many serious crimes, including rape and domestic violence, are habitually referred to traditional customary law mechanisms rather than to the courts. Such mechanisms lack basic due process protections and regularly fail to provide justice for victims, especially victims of sexual violence. Moreover, traditional systems are sometimes at odds with the constitutional system.

The corrections unit and prisons have generally met international standards. However, prison facilities are deteriorating, and there are a few reports of undisciplined behavior by prison guards.

In respect to coordination among the PNTL and the criminal justice sector, there is a concern that the PNTL largely exists and is developing in isolation of other organizations, leading to a duplication of efforts. In particular, the PNTL is a minor actor in the GoTL’s National Development Plan, which includes Annual Action Plans for all relevant government agencies. However, at lower levels, there seems to be healthy coordination among agencies. Specifically, UNPOL and PNTL have included the judiciary and corrections sector in the development and implementation of PNTL training courses.

II. Management and Oversight

Mission and Procedures

The PNTL has, by and large, a clearly defined mission and mandate to provide law and order throughout Timor-Leste. It has a legal monopoly over the use of force. The PNTL consists of the General Command, Community Policing Unit, Criminal Investigations Unit, Intelligence Unit, Traffic and Road Safety Unit, Marine Unit, Police Information Service (still in initial stages), Migration Service, VIP Security Unit, Rapid Intervention Unit, Border Patrol Unit, Professional Ethics Office, and Police Reserve Unit. PNTL district commands are located in each of the 13 districts, and there are sub-district commands in each of the 65 sub-districts. In May 2004, UNPOL handed over executive policing responsibilities as well as all of the police stations to PNTL control. UNPOL officers remained in high-level positions within the PNTL to assist in the transition. Currently, the highest position in the
PNTL is held by Paulo de Fatima Martins, PNTL Commander General. However, UNPOL and the PNTL have created an additional two, higher level postings, which are currently vacant due to a current lack of suitably qualified PNTL officers.

The PNTL has a command and control system, which provides for a clear division of responsibilities between regional and main headquarters, pertaining to operational, administrative, training, and logistics. Additionally, the PNTL has a clearly defined hierarchy of management and reporting structure in place. Moreover, though job descriptions and standard operating procedures exist at headquarters and district commands and are taught at the police academy, a lack of resources does not allow for the widespread distribution of paper copies of these items to all officers. Multiple language problems also make distribution difficult since materials are often translated into English and Portuguese, which are only spoken by a small percentage of PNTL officers. Bahasa Indonesian and Tetum are spoken by a large percentage of PNTL officers, but the use of Bahasa is politically problematic and Tetum does not have the linguistic capacity to serve as an official working language. Thus, many officers seek day-to-day guidance on basic responsibilities from senior officers, many of whom may also lack access to PNTL standard operating procedures and job descriptions.

**Strategic Planning and Monitoring**

Currently, ten of the 60 UNPOL officers have a specialty area in strategic planning and are working to assist the PNTL in strategic, administrative, and operational planning. In addition to developing a joint strategic plan, UNPOL is training the PNTL in strategic planning to continue the design and implementation process after UNPOL’s exit. UNPOL has also developed a 15-year strategic plan in coordination with other government agencies and bilateral and multilateral partners to project the PNTL’s mission and mandate well into the future. This plan stresses a long-term focus on developing organizational and operational capacity. However, despite UNPOL’s efforts, the PNTL continues to have little planning and policy development capacity, which complicates procurement and training decisions and necessitates prioritization.

**Oversight and Accountability**

The PNTL has a Professional Ethics Unit (PEU), an internal body that is in charge of inquiries, investigations, and disciplinary processes. The PEU is composed of 23 PNTL and six UNPOL officers with a presence in all 13 districts. It is responsible for all cases referred to by the PNTL Commissioner, maintaining the professionalism and internal discipline among PNTL, conducting analysis and evaluations of cases through investigations, and maintaining records of the disciplinary cases committed by the PNTL. The PNTL OL defines the PEU’s responsibilities as: ensuring the sustained development of the rule of law, justice, human rights, and internal discipline; enhancing and developing well motivated and accountable PNTL officers; and maintaining highly skilled, reliable PNTL officers, imbued with morals and responsibility.  

---


- 116 -
with close coordination with the Minister of the Interior and Provedor for Human Rights in Justice. The PEU is in charge of Inquiries and Investigations and Disciplinary processes. While the majority of investigations do not deal with human rights abuses, human rights violations are increasing as demonstrated below. They are split into four categories: (1) assault, (2) excessive use of force during arrest, (3) illegal detentions and (4) illegal arrest and searches.

Number of Cases Investigated by the PEU

External oversight exists through the Provedor for Human Rights in Justice (PHRJ). This independent system for receiving both complaints and praise from citizens is aimed to be a safeguard against the abuse of power by the police. While the PHRJ is an important addition, the PNTL remains highly politicized by the Minister of Interior. Additionally, there is hesitation and restraint among the public to approach the police with complaints due to imbalanced power dynamics, intimidation of entering a police station and pointing out a PNTL officer, lack of awareness among many that such a mechanism exists, and intimidation by the police.

While the PNTL has made significant achievements in developing accountability standards and monitors, Timor-Leste continues to suffer from an overall weak accountability structure. The lack of training for PNTL and PEU officers is a major contributor. Officers lack substantial training in investigation and interview techniques.

---

**Personnel**

UNTAET was charged with building a national police service from scratch amidst a legacy of police brutality, hostility, and mistrust leftover from years of Indonesian occupation and rule. Selection criteria for the PNTL as established by UNTAET Regulation 2001/22 included: good character and a resident of Timor-Leste; not less than 18 years of age by the date of entry into the Police Academy and under 35 years of age; able to speak, write and understand one or more of the languages of Timor-Leste; pass the required physical and medical examinations; and pass a selection interview. PNTL recruitment also focused on high levels of female participation with the dramatic result that women comprise nearly 20% of the service today.86

In general, the recruitment process is done transparently with an emphasis on ensuring competence and community acceptance. While the vetting system is imperfect, this flaw does not seem due to the lack of effort. The recruitment process reflects on the ground realities of high unemployment, low education levels, high percentages of former combatants, and a history of police mistrust. Officers’ performance is judged internally through a chain of command control, where commanding officers are responsible for conduct of subordinates and through regular performance assessments wherein the officer’s performance is measured against a set of performance standards. These performance indicators are used in coordination with additional UNPOL guidelines, which require a minimum time period in one rank before being eligible for a promotion. UNPOL has worked with the PNTL to identify qualified officers for promotion and personal development in both District Commands and PNTL headquarters. However, no promotion system currently exists outside of the UN system, which has been identified as a major problem that must be addressed by Parliament. PNTL and UNPOL agree that human resource development and management remain a major area of concern. Despite these issues, retention rates are high. This is due in part to a combination of patriotism and high unemployment rates in country.

**III. Community Relations**

**Human Rights**

UNOTIL has included human rights training modules during in-class and on-the-job training. While the aim of the training is to instill core values of both human rights and ethics into daily policing, the absorption of these values from theory into practice has been limited and will take time. PNTL officers have been the subjects of domestic and international criticism concerning human rights abuses. Many complaints suggest that PNTL officers, due to lack of adequate training and memory of Indonesian police methods, are using “Indonesian style” force in handling policing problems. Problems include the excessive use of force and abuse of authority; prolonged pretrial detention; limited due process; lack of a fair trial, largely due to limited resources and trained personnel in the legal system; and abuse of authority by government officials.

---

87 Interview with Saif Ullah Malik, UNOTIL Senior Police Advisor
Domestic and sexual violence remains a problem, with most cases handled informally within community structures rather than through legal mechanisms. Such traditional justice mechanisms are imbalanced against women and fail to adequately address gender grievances. The Justice and Security Monitoring Program reports that the “many police officers do not consider cases of domestic violence seriously. We come to this conclusion because according to the interviews, the police send back many cases of domestic violence to be dealt with by the family or traditional justice mechanisms.”

**Cooperation**

The PNTL has a police strategy to engage with local communities and offers training on community policing. Local communities are increasingly cooperative with the PNTL in providing information on crimes, since many officers come from these communities where they have ties and strong networks. Community policing includes local participation in community safety issues, community partnership in problem-solving policing; and building confidence among the local population in the police’s ability to investigate, deter, and prevent crime.

Geography limits cooperation between communities and the police since many people live in rural, mountainous areas that are hard to access. There is limited communication between field officers and their superiors in the districts because of equipment limitations (i.e. radios, vehicles, etc). Because of a weak civil society, there are few, if any, community initiatives to work more closely with the police.

**Corruption**

The U.S. State Department 2004 Annual Human Rights Reports suggests that “corruption in the executive and legislative branch was not considered a significant problem; however, there were credible rumors of petty corruption at the nation's port. In addition, customs and border officials were suspected of facilitating the smuggling of gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol across the border from neighboring Indonesia.” In addition, there was speculation of political corruption in the government and Ministry of Interior that affects the independence of the police.

**Acceptance**

Timor-Leste is a close-knit society. Most PNTL officers work in their home villages, which has both positive and negative impacts on community relations. On the positive side, the PNTL can easily build and maintain a solid relationship with most of the communities it serves due to the familiarity of PNTL officers by and with community members. Most Timorese see the PNTL as the only visible entity of the newly independent Timorese state and view them in a positive light. In addition, the PNTL has established Community Policing Sections, which work with informal policing networks in the community as a force multiplier. This is particularly true in hard to reach communities that lack any police.

---

88 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Police Treatment of Women in Timor-Leste, January 2005
89 United States Department of State, Timor-Leste Human Rights Report 2004, February 28, 2005
presence. Community policing has been effective in developing trust and credibility in the PNTL and helping solve local problems. Thanks in part to community policing, the PNTL report an increase in the number of people reporting crimes, both low and high, to police stations. While some of the crimes are local or family disputes that do not involve the police, the increased confidence and reliance in the PNTL suggests positive relations. The increase in public exposure and usage is due in part to the PNTL public information office.

On the negative side, as the PNTL is so close to the community in which it works, there are occasional complaints of PNTL officers abusing their power to settle family or personal issues.

**IV. Sustainability**

**Budget**

The current budget allocation for the PNTL is 7.2% of the Gross Domestic Product.\textsuperscript{90} The budget process and financial procedures in Timor-Leste are largely centralized through the Ministry of Planning and Finance. PNTL budgets are developed for the current and future fiscal year through the PNTL finance/budget section of the Finance Department office in Dili with significant input from District Commanders. PNTL budgets are developed as a part of a national budget plan, which currently covers the period 2005 – 2009.

\textsuperscript{90} General Budget of the State 2005-2006, The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Budget Paper 1.
The four-year budget projection suggests an overall decrease in aggregate growth levels and overall budget projections. This decrease is due in part to a net decrease in recurrent expenses. While the PNTL is working towards political independence, a significant portion of its budget comes from bilateral and multilateral aid. If the current budget allocation is maintained the projected increases in revenue from oil and natural gas supplies will proportionally increase the funding available to the PNTL. Projected increases in revenue derived from taxation and seizures of illegal contraband will also supplement certain elements within the PNTL. The current PNTL budget is $14.5 million, with $3.25 coming from external donors. According to budget predictions, the amount of external assistance will decrease in future years (see below).

---

---
External Assistance to the PNTL

Training and Equipment

Following the handover of executive authority to the Timorese, in June 2004, UNPOL developed a Skill Development Plan (SDP) to improve knowledge and skill sets through a learner centered, interactive teaching approach. UNPOL subject matter experts have designed the SDP courses with an emphasis on measurable evaluations that use identifiable benchmarks to help ensure objectives are learned and passed along. UNPOL and PNTL have engaged those in relevant sectors (i.e. prosecutors, judiciary, prisons, etc.) in development of PNTL training courses. Currently, subject matter experts have developed a curriculum that addresses current needs and is forward looking, although training standards are still low and capacity and human resource constraints limit effectiveness. The SDP is responsible for the trainer of trainer process, which has so far trained 72 PNTL officers at the Police College. It is estimated that these 72 trainers have trained 1,442 PNTL officers.

Although the PNTL lacks the resources and/or legal framework to effectively use some of the tools of the training (i.e. forensics and counterterrorism), they remain important training tools for the future of the PNTL. However, some of these training modules question local versus donor priorities i.e. counterterrorism. With the continued presence of UNPOL, the PNTL will remain a forward thinking and training organization.

In light of the UN exit, in 2004, the governments of Australia and the United Kingdom mobilized a team of police advisers as part of a four year, $24 million Timor-Leste Police Development Program. The Team comprises of six Australian Federal Police Officers and six advisors. The program aims to strengthen the capacity of the police service in Timor-Leste to maintain law and order effectively and professionally, with full respect for human

---

92 Ibid.
rights. Specifically, the program will work to foster the capacity of Timor-Leste's police service to: develop and review appropriate policies; effectively manage its finances and human resources; implement suitable operating procedures; develop a community policing capability; and promote sustainable approaches to police training and development.  

The PNTL lack the necessary equipment, financial resources, and training to maintain and upkeep current equipment. UNPOL estimates that between 50-75% of vehicles, most donated by the UN, are inoperable due to the PNTL’s inability to repair and maintain vehicles and/or a lack of fuel. In addition, police lack adequate radios and/or the batteries for the radios for communication between field sites and base. This is further complicated by an inability to maintain current UN repeaters and generators due to lack of fuel, making available radios’ functionality sporadic. The PNTL also lacks an appropriate capacity to protect and patrol its sea borders. The Maritime Unit currently has three boats, two of which are broken and one is not sea navigable. The Border Unit has only limited capacity to protect its land borders without vehicles, a helicopter or adequate manpower to monitor the border for smugglers. The PNTL is developing a counter-terrorism unit, but terrorism as of yet is not an issue, raising concerns of donors creating units that advance their interests and not those of local significance.

**Political Independence**

The GoTL Ministry of Interior and its senior leadership, which maintain a high level of control over the PNTL’s activities, limit the PNTL’s political independence. Under Article One of the OL, the PNTL is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. This is in principle consistent with internationally accepted policing models within a democratic society. Where the Timor Leste model differs is in the amount of control currently exercised by the Minister for the Interior over the day-to-day operational and administrative functions of the PNTL. The current structure does not provide a clear separation of powers. The Ministerial Direction states that the PNTL must “uphold the law without fear or favour in a strictly non-partisan manner and devolving to the Commander General all operational, administrative and logistical responsibilities for the day to day running of the police force would greatly reduce this vulnerability.” Nonetheless, the U.S. State Department suggests that there is “increased concern within society and among international observers regarding the independence of the police. For example, on March 26, the Minister of the Interior reinstated a PNTL officer who had been dismissed on March 10 after an investigation by the PEU found him guilty of assaulting a civilian.” UNPOL also recognizes that one of the greatest vulnerabilities of the PNTL is that of “external influence at all levels of government.”

---

94 AusAID Australia-Timor-Leste Police Development Program.  
95 Interview with Saif Ullah Malik, UNOTIL Senior Police Advisor.  
98 Ibid.  
Compensation

The average wage across the PNTL is around $1,600 a year, which is almost four times greater than average GDP per capita in country ($400). The wage structure spans seven levels, beginning at $85 per month and ending at $361 per month. In general, salaries are paid in a timely fashion. Additional benefits are rare, but may include room and board for officers on extremely rural or border assignments. While the wage for PNTL officers is low, it is comparable, if not higher than salaries in other professions. For example, private security guards can earn up to $120 a month depending on their experience and employer. Although the PNTL earn “average” salaries, they are inadequate amounts to meet family needs. Timorese families are very large (average birth rate is 7.8) and with a dollarized economy where basic goods are expensive, it is difficult for officers to support their immediate and extended families. As a result, some officers take second jobs (e.g. taxi cab drivers) to earn additional income. However, these concerns must be placed in the context of a 50% unemployment rate in Timor-Leste. Thus, while the salaries may be low, the fact that PNTL have a steady, regular paying job is already a large leg up in a society where more than half of the population is without a job.

100 CIA World Factbook – East Timor, 1 November 2005.
Annex IV: UNPOL in Action:  
Experiences and Challenges from  
Missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste
Table of Contents

Foreword 126
List of Acronyms 127
The Involvement of the United Nations 128
The Involvement of the United States 129
Experiences and Challenges 130
UNPOL in Kosovo 133
UNPOL in Sierra Leone 138
UNPOL in Timor-Leste 142
Foreword

The following report was produced at the request of J. Clint Williamson, Director for Stability Operations, at the United States National Security Council. “UNPOL in Action” is an annex to “The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform,” a report proposing a new, systematic tool for measuring police reforms in post-conflict and peacebuilding environments produced by a team of graduate students at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. This annex focuses specifically on the role that the United Nations Police (UNPOL) plays in post-conflict societies as both a reformer of indigenous police services and, more recently, as an executive police service. Using case studies of post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, “UNPOL in Action” compares the mandate and force strength of the three UNPOL deployments, details the major contributors and best performers, and identifies challenges encountered in all three missions. The goal of this annex is to highlight experiences and challenges from recent UNPOL experiences, particularly in missions in which UNPOL has exercised executive authority, and to help identify the strengths and weakness of current international policing operations.

The authors are grateful to Mr. Williamson for the opportunity to conduct this study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRPF</td>
<td>Central Reserve Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGP</td>
<td>Inspector General of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSDP</td>
<td>Justice Sector Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO’s Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPSS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Service School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Police Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Rapid Action Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Selection Assistance Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPU</td>
<td>Special Police Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>UN Integrated Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
United Nations Police – Experiences and Challenges

1. The Involvement of the United Nations

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) is the primary international actor for policing in post-conflict and peacebuilding environments. Its responsibilities range from monitoring and advising, to mentoring and training and, more recently, to providing executive police authority while simultaneously building local police services from scratch. No single international entity has a longer, more demanding and more successful record in police training and policing than UNPOL. From Congo in the early 1960s, to Kosovo and Timor-Leste in 1999, and most recently to the Sudan, the size and the scope of United Nations Police (UNPOL) missions have evolved to meet changing needs. As of October 2005, over 6,300 UNPOL officers from some 80 different countries were involved in 13 of the 18 UN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations around the globe. Some of these missions have lasted a few years, while others, such as the mission in Cyprus, have lasted decades. In October of 2000, the increasing demand for policing operations led to the establishment of the United Nations Police Division within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Figure 1

2. The Involvement of the United States

US involvement in UNPOL operations has been significant. In Kosovo – the largest and most ambitious UNPOL operation to date – the US was the largest contributor of individual police officers. During six years of involvement, the US contributed an average of over 16 percent of the total UNPOL officers deployed. The US involvement has also been significant elsewhere in the world. As of October 2005, the United States was tied with Nepal and Pakistan as the second largest contributor of civilian police officers for UN missions with six percent of the total number of UNPOL officers deployed. Only Jordan contributed more officers to UNPOL. The contributions of these four countries along with the remaining top ten contributors, which include Germany, Turkey, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Romania and China, amounted to 50 percent of the total number of officers deployed around the globe. American financial commitment to UNPOL operations has also been significant. US contributions represent 25 percent of the total budget of $3.55 billion for UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operation for 2005-2006, at $887 million. This amount is separate from over $900 million that the US has pledged to a multiyear program for standing up the Afghan National Police and billions of dollars in security assistance to Iraq.

Figure 2

Top Ten Contributors of Police Officers to Current UNPOL Missions
(October 2005) - Total 6,305

- Jordan, 741, 12%
- Nepal, 401, 6%
- Pakistan, 400, 6%
- USA, 391, 6%
- Germany, 244, 4%
- Turkey, 234, 4%
- Nigeria, 217, 3%
- Bangladesh, 203, 3%
- Romania, 198, 3%
- China, 197, 3%

68 nations - 3,079, 50%
3. Experiences and Challenges

Civilian policing – with heavy UN and US involvement – has become an integral piece of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. UNPOL deployment promotes the rule of law and helps create the safe environments that are essential for lasting peace and development. In the following case studies – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste – UNPOL’s involvement in policing has begun to restore public confidence in the local police. Despite the formidable challenges described below, UNPOL has made significant progress in transforming ineffective and oftentimes repressive police forces into democratic police services, and in building other police services from scratch. In all three case studies, where previous experience with policing was marred with repression and brutality, the involvement of the international community was vital to building public confidence in the new or reformed police services. In Kosovo and Timor-Leste, UNPOL initially provided executive policing until it successfully stood up new, local police services. In Sierra Leone, where the national police force once found its authority undermined by the military and political actors, the efforts of UNPOL and the British government to reform the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) has gradually begun to restore the institution’s credibility.

Despite these and other achievements in recent years, UNPOL’s record has been far from spotless. Some of its failures are beyond its control – UNPOL is only as effective as the level of commitment to its missions by the member states and the mandate given by the UN Security Council. UNPOL’s results are also constrained by the unstable environment in which it works. Nonetheless, UNPOL is also responsible for some of the blunders. A close analysis of UNPOL’s involvement in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste reveals the following experiences and challenges:

Planning

- **UNPOL lacked a strategic approach in mission planning.** There was no overall threat assessment done in advance of any of the three deployments. Threat assessments were limited to force protection, ignoring the political, economic, and social challenges in the mission areas that could undermine UNPOL efforts. There was also little evidence that any strategic planning occurred during the operations.

- **In the absence of strategy, political considerations drove sizing and goals of the operations.** The UN arbitrarily set the ratio of UNPOL officers deployed to local population, as well as the ratio of officers of the new police service to local population. Many of the goals for UNPOL missions were set and prioritized at headquarters in New York, or were left to the rotating police commissioners on the ground. The short terms of service of police commissioners often undermined the continuity of mission goals.

- **No mission reached its authorized level and all took more than a year to reach their peak strength.** While sizing of the missions lacked strategic grounding, the missions also found it challenging to mobilize to the strengths authorized and faced serious delays in deploying. Precious time was lost in each peacebuilding environment as UNPOL was being set up. A great deal of responsibility rests with the contributing countries for the slow start-ups.
- Exit was divorced from mission goals. Without clear strategic benchmarks against which to measure progress, the criteria for ending a mission were arbitrary or political rather than results-based.

Recruitment

- Recruitment of UNPOL officers was highly problematic and not standardized. The officers were recruited from any nation that offered them, without much consideration for the value they would add. In some instances, officers were recruited from countries with questionable human rights records. In other instances, countries sent officers with the intention of fighting transnational threats, such as human trafficking, trafficking in drugs, or terrorism, which reflected their own national priorities rather than those of the mission. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was particularly the case with some of the West European contingents in Kosovo, which focused more on fighting the crimes that threaten their own societies rather than those that threaten Kosovo. Furthermore, selection and assessment criteria were occasionally waved for political considerations.

- Recruitment did not adjust to the requirements of the mission. As missions matured, the recruitment process did not adapt quickly enough to the new set of requirements for more specialized and skilled UNPOL officers. Forensics investigators, organized crime specialists and intelligence officers were recruited with great difficulty, and often nations were reluctant to send their best officers.

- Few UNPOL officers had institution-building expertise. The recruitment process was largely driven by the need to put officers on the ground without much consideration for their experience or expertise in training and building of new police services.

Performance

- Short rotations undermined the efficiency of UNPOL officers. Officers were usually deployed for only 6-12 month missions, though they had the option to extend. As a result of the short missions, officers did not acclimate to the local environment of their missions until their term of service was nearly over. Thus, just when they were beginning to perform at an optimal level, they left. Short deployments were often a reflection of the national policies of the officers’ home governments.

- High-level rotations undermined the continuity of missions. While some rotation among officers is expected in any mission, the high rate of rotation among UNPOL managers disrupted the continuity and consistency of the mission’s goals. Each UNPOL manager was inclined to bring her or his own priorities and national training standards to the mission. The conflicting individual priorities of managers prevented the pursuit of common, long-term goals.

- Comprehensive performance measurements were lacking. UNPOL missions relied heavily on simplistic input and output indicators to measure success. Few outcome...
indicators were used, and those that were used primarily included crime statistics and public opinion polls of limited scientific significance. Measurements were also conducted in an ad hoc, unsystematic way, which compromised the ability of UNPOL to measure progress over time.

- **Performance depended on personality.** With no formal performance measurements in place, any sense of accountability among UNPOL officers was a product of their sense of duty and professionalism.

**Training**

- **UNPOL officers did not receive standardized training prior to deployment.** While UNPOL missions often attempted to recruit among officers with at least a few years of experience in law enforcement, the UN did not conduct its own training program for officers before they deployed. As a result, most officers met for the first time upon arrival and had to start working immediately.

- **Induction trainings were often too short.** Upon arrival at the mission, UNPOL officers were provided with an induction training that lasted about a week. This was a relatively short period of time for UNPOL officers to absorb the political and cultural intricacies of the environment in which they were to operate. In the executive missions, officers were also expected to learn local laws and regulations.

- **Different UNPOL officers practiced different training standards.** Since UNPOL officers were deployed without standardized training and with short induction trainings, they often improvised when they trained the local police service. Each police officer brought particular national training standards to the mission and consequently the newly established police received inconsistent and sometimes contradictory training.
UNPOL in Kosovo

On June 10, 1999 following the NATO bombing campaign that forced Serbia out of Kosovo, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 authorizing an executive administration for the province. One of the main responsibilities of this new UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) included, “maintaining law and order, including establishing local forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.”\(^{103}\) It was the first time in decades that the Security Council authorized an executive mandate for policing.

The Security Council divided the executive mandate into three broad phases. In phase one, UNPOL officers would advise NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) on how to ensure public safety while UNPOL was deploying. In phase two, UNPOL officers would assume responsibility from KFOR for maintaining law and order and simultaneously establish a Kosovo Police Service (KPS). In phase three, UNPOL would transfer policing responsibilities to the KPS and maintain a monitoring role.\(^{104}\)

At the outset of the mission, UNPOL and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shared responsibility for executive policing in Kosovo and the standing up of the new police service.\(^{105}\) The OSCE assumed the broad responsibility of institution building in Kosovo and to that end took charge of establishing a Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) in Vushtrri/Vucitrn, where the newly recruited police cadets would undergo weeks of basic training. UNPOL on the other hand, assumed responsibility for field training the graduating police officers, organizing KPS, and providing basic law and order in accordance with its executive mission.

UNPOL was to conduct executive policing throughout the province and to mentor the new KPS officers through the deployment of some 3,118 officers as authorized by the UN Security Council. These officers were to be part of one of the three components: civilian policing, specialized police units, and border patrolling. UNPOL deployed in five regions of Kosovo mirroring the areas of responsibility established by NATO and the UN civilian administration. The first wave of 35 unarmed officers arrived in late July 1999 from the UN Mission in Bosnia. By December 1999, over 1,800 UNPOL officers from some 40 nations had assumed responsibility for provision of basic security in Kosovo from KFOR.\(^{106}\)

UNPOL officers arrived too late to stop the worst ravages of post-conflict violence. This forced the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Bernard Kouchner, to plead for a near doubling of the strength of the authorized UNPOL mission from 3,118 to 6,000 UNPOL officers.\(^{107}\) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan responded by recommending to the Security Council that the authorized strength of UNPOL’s mission increase from its

---

\(^{103}\) UNSCR 1244 p. 4  
\(^{104}\) http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/rep005/s02.html. Also recently there has been discussion that the EU may take over policing in Kosovo, similarly as it has done in Bosnia.  
\(^{105}\) Exchange of letters between OSCE-UN. Letter from Ambassador Kim Traavik, Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to Ambassador Bernard Miyet, Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations.  
\(^{106}\) Report to the UNSC, December 1999  
\(^{107}\) http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/rep005/s02.html
original level by 1,600 to 4,718.\textsuperscript{108} By May 2000, nearly one year into the mission, UNPOL’s strength reached 3,629 officers and by November 2000 it grew to 4,387 officers.\textsuperscript{109} UNPOL’s strength stabilized at around 4,390 officers (still lower than the authorized level) and was maintained through October 2003 when it began to downsize. In May 2005, UNPOL had a total of 3,083 officers deployed in Kosovo and was headed for a 40 percent reduction by June 2006, by which date the Kosovo Police Service is expected to be fully operational and the transfer of authority to local authorities completed (please consult Figure 1 for details).\textsuperscript{110}

**Figure 3: UNPOL Deployment in Kosovo\textsuperscript{111}**

UNPOL in Kosovo drew its officers and units from various member states of the UN. From the time of its inception in 1999 to late May 2005, 54 nations had seconded police officers to the UN Mission in Kosovo. The largest contributor of individual police officers was the United States, whose contribution to UNPOL in Kosovo averaged around 16 percent of deployed officers, followed by Germany and India (please see Figure 4 below for average percentage contributions). In addition to individual officers, a number of countries also contributed national contingents in the form of Special Police Units (SPU). The deployment of SPUs started in June 2000, when India and Jordan deployed two units each,

\textsuperscript{108} [http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/factsfigs.htm](http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/factsfigs.htm)

\textsuperscript{109} Report to the UNSC, November 2000. Please note that the total includes international police officers, SPU officers and border police.

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Margareta Schlueter, UNPOL Kosovo Desk Officer, October 16, 2005

\textsuperscript{111} The data for this graph were obtained from SG Reports to the UNSC from 1999 to 2005.
and Pakistan deployed one unit. The strength of the SPUs averaged around 120 officers per unit. In the case of India, the unit was formed from its elite Rapid Action Force (RAF), which is an integral part of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), an Armed Force of the Indian Union. By May 2005, six nations had contributed special police units to UNPOL in Kosovo at various times: Argentina, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, Spain and Ukraine. The number of SPUs deployed simultaneously started at four and grew to six by December 2000, a level that has been maintained through 2005, but that is expected to go down to two by June 2006. The responsibilities of the SPUs were primarily to train and equip anti-riot police.

Figure 4. Average Percentage Contributions to UNMIK (1995-2005*)

UNPOL desk officers at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters in New York recruited officers and SPUs for the mission in Kosovo. When the mission was approved and the strength authorized, DPKO sent a memorandum to all UN member states, asking them to contribute police officers to UNPOL in Kosovo. To qualify for the mission, police officers needed to have five years of experience in policing, speak English, be able to handle and fire a weapon, be able to drive a car, and possess a valid national driver’s license. Previous UN experience was preferred. Indeed, many UNPOL officers in Kosovo have served in other missions. Member states have generally offered to contribute entire Special Police Units. When such an offer is made, the DPKO sends a team of evaluators to assess the unit and determine its deployment.

112 http://www.UNPOL.org/unmik/spu/spu_ind/SPU_ind_front.htm
113 Reports to the UNSC
114 Interview with Margareta Schlueter, UNPOL Kosovo Desk Officer, October 16, 2005
115 Ibid.
Each donor country has its own procedures for publicizing and recruiting for available slots in UNPOL missions. Some countries rely on their active duty officers, some on their reserves, while others resort to contractors to handle recruiting. The candidates submit their resumes and are than screened by the UN Selection Assessment Teams. Candidates are not generally interviewed unless they are applying for the position of police commissioner.

Upon arrival in Kosovo, those selected join other police officers from around the world and undergo a week-long induction training at the Police Training Center. This training is supposed to familiarize the officers with the mandate, living conditions, applicable laws, and executive powers that they hold in Kosovo. As the mission has matured, recruitment has become more difficult as demand has increased for officers with specialized skills in organized crime, forensics, community policing and domestic violence.

The performance of UNPOL officers deployed to Kosovo has varied across and within contingents. Official information about individual performance is limited, however, because UNPOL managers are generally reluctant to identify underperforming officers and lack systematic performance measurement. Based on interviews and available information, police officers from countries with long traditions in democratic policing performed on balance better than those from countries with less democratic records. Even so, performance varied within these two broad groupings. For example, some of the police officers sent initially from more democratic countries either could not complete the fitness test or handle a weapon. The SPUs generally performed well, especially those units from more developed countries, but they were rarely called to action. During the March 2005 riots, some observers criticized them for being too risk-averse.

Challenges in Kosovo

- **Lack of planning prior to beginning of mission:** The United Nations Mission in Kosovo was authorized on 10 June 1999, but the first UNPOL officers did not start arriving until a month later and the overall operation did not reach its peak until almost two years later. Even with the delay in deployment, there is little evidence of strategic planning within the mission. The size of the operation, though bigger than any other previous peacekeeping operation, was set with little strategic grounding and was revised upwards nearly a year into the mission.

- **Unclear division of labor:** As UNPOL officers began deploying to Kosovo, the UN mission decided to divide the responsibilities of training the new Kosovo Police Service with the OSCE. UNPOL was put in charge of field training and the setting up of the KPS, while the OSCE assumed responsibility for basic training. This last minute division of labor created difficulties on the ground, as UNPOL and OSCE took time to compose a workable timeline for training and deploying new KPS officers.

- **Lack of a police reform manual:** Senior UNPOL officials arrived in Kosovo with no road map for how to create a local police service from scratch, and instead relied on their experience of policing in their respective countries. The lack of expertise or training in institution-building was glaring.
- UNPOL officers had little access to lessons learned from past missions: Apart from the UNPOL officers who had previous UN experience, the rest of the UNPOL officers had little or no access to previous experiences and lessons drawn from other peacebuilding missions. As such, they were often forced to re-invent the wheel, while simultaneously trying to police and build the new police service.

- Lack of experience with democratic policing: The effectiveness of UNPOL officers to act as mentors and advisers to the new KPS officers was hampered because hundreds came from undemocratic countries, such as Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Egypt and Cote D'Ivoire. A recurrent complaint of UNPOL was the inherent hypocrisy – particularly of the member states – of having these officers teach human rights and rule of law. Other UNPOL officers were cited for their poor English capabilities, driving skills, and shooting ability, which are minimal UNPOL requirements.

- Inadequate mentors and advisers: As new officers graduated from the KPSS, they were turned over to UNPOL officers who were supposed to mentor and advise them as they transitioned into their positions. Lacking backgrounds in training and mentorship, however, many UNPOL officers risked confusing the new cadets more than helping them. Additionally, the executive authority that UNPOL exercised proved addictive for some of its officers, who sometimes blocked KPS officers from moving smoothly into their jobs and gaining field experience. This slowed the process of integration and independence for the KPS.

- Inconsistent policing methods across countries: At any given point in time, UNPOL was composed of police officers from several dozen countries and therefore several dozen methods of policing. With UNPOL officers of varying nationalities responsible for each of the 33 police stations and six regional commands, KPS officers were exposed to and adopted many different standard procedures. This led to uneven training in regions depending on the origin of the trainers.

- Training more officers than can be deployed: The OSCE training initially produced more cadets more quickly than the UNPOL field trainers could absorb. This bottleneck effect between the OSCE and UNPOL risked putting inexperienced KPS officers on the street with little to do and no formal mentor.

- Frequency of rotation among UNPOL officers: The short 6-12 month tenure of UNPOL officers translated into lost productivity and decreased quality of instruction of new KPS officers. Every rotation experienced a loss of institutional knowledge that could not be replenished. The frequent rotation of the UNPOL leadership was especially detrimental since it led to inconsistent mission goals and undermined the building of local relationships.
UNPOL in Sierra Leone

The United Kingdom was the leader and chief donor in the international effort to reform the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) after Sierra Leone’s civil war. UNPOL supported the UK’s efforts. The UK started its reform efforts by installing British Police Commander Keith Biddle as Inspector General of Police (IGP). Biddle took office in 1998 and was replaced in 2003 by the current IGP, Brima Acha Kamara, a Sierra Leonean.

The UNAMSIL UNPOL support mission began in late 1999 with the deployment of four officers to the mission and rose to six observers in February 2000. These missions had a limited monitoring mandate and by sheer dint of their limited size they couldn’t monitor much. In May 2000, twenty-eight UNPOL officers were deployed following the authorization for sixty officers with a monitoring mandate\textsuperscript{116}. Their number rose to fifty-seven officers from seventeen different, mostly African, countries in December 2001. Security Council resolution 1400 of March 2002 led to the recruitment of thirty additional UNPOL officers for a period of six months to support the Government of Sierra Leone and the SLP to prepare for the 2002 elections.

Figure 5: UNPOL Deployment in Sierra Leone

![UNPOL Deployment in Sierra Leone graph]

Security Council resolution 1436 of September 2002 marked a major shift in mandate, and authorized the deployment of up to 170 UNPOL personnel starting in early 2003. In

\textsuperscript{116} UNSC Resolution 1299 (2000)
addition to the increase in personnel, the mandate no longer limited UNPOL to monitoring. Instead, UNPOL was charged to “advise and assist” the SLP with a focus on the basics of policing, such as how to take statements, patrol neighborhoods, and maintain diaries. The intent of the bigger force was to expand UNPOL activities beyond Freetown and to establish team sites at key locations in the hinterland in conjunction with the deployment of the SLP to new areas. By June 2003, 128 UNPOL personnel had been deployed. These 128 personnel included thirty-two trainers who participated in the training of new recruits and 83 officers who were deployed at seventeen team sites to provide mentoring at police stations across Sierra Leone. The remaining 13 UNPOL personnel remained at UNAMSIL headquarters to support the officers working in the field.

In September 2003, the 126 UNPOL officers deployed throughout the country (thirty-one trainers and eighty-three mentors from 22 countries) started specialized training related to commercial crimes, criminal intelligence services, drug prevention, forensics, Interpol procedures and other key matters. Human rights and child protection officers have conducted nationwide training for SLP personnel, particularly those of the Family Support Units.

In spite of a call from UNAMSIL for more officers, the actual UNPOL strength remained at 130 instead of the 170 authorized until December 2004 when Security Council resolution 1537 fixed UNPOL’s residual strength at eighty UNPOL officers (from twenty-two countries) for the period from January 1, 2005 through June 30, 2005. By the end of February 2005 the transition to a force of eighty UNPOL was completed, leaving fifteen trainers at the Hastings police training school and three regional training center, thirty-five mentors continuing field coaching, nine headquarters staff, including the Police Commissioner, and six advisers on airport security, cross-border issues and diamond-mining policing. In addition, fifteen specialized unit advisers were posted at the SLP headquarters. The UNAMSIL mission was further extended until December 31, 2005 by Security Council resolution 1610 (2005) and its current UNPOL strength is thirty-four personnel.

The new UNIOSIL mission will replace the UNAMSIL mission on January 1, 2006. It will include twenty UNPOL personnel who will be deployed across the four provinces of Sierra Leone. The UNPOL component will include two trainers and eighteen specialized mentors who will provide specialized training and advice to the Sierra Leone Police, monitor the performance of police personnel, conduct in-service and train-the-trainers courses, coach senior and mid-level managers, and otherwise assist the SLP. These twenty remaining UNPOL officers will work in close collaboration with the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), particularly the police component of its justice sector program.

Challenges in Sierra Leone

- **Lack of coordination between the UK and UN police reform efforts:** The bulk of the UNPOL mission came to Sierra Leone in 2002, long after the arrival of the UK in 1998. With no lead agent or coordinating body, there was a lack of compatibility between the UK’s and UNPOL’s reform efforts. They had different mandates and different policing standards and procedures. The lack of coordination
also led to a duplication of activities. Coordination improved over time and is now facilitated by a monthly steering committee meeting chaired by the Inspector General of Police. The presence of UK-origin UNPOL officers within the UNAMSIL mission has also facilitated greater coordination.

- **UNPOL recruitment did not always match the functional needs on the ground:** A number of unqualified officers were sent to join the UNAMSIL mission. For example, officers with as little as eighteen months of experience in their national police services were sent to advise higher-ranking SLP officers. Also, a number of officers who could not communicate in English were sent to the mission. The mismatch between officers sent to Sierra Leone and those who were needed can be partly attributed to the UNPOL personnel recruitment system, which was run out of NY and received no input from UNAMSIL. The current recruitment system is also unnecessarily expensive. For example, UN DPKO Selection Assistance Teams (SAT) currently make visits to countries that are only volunteering two or three officers for service.

- **National police service reforms were not pursued within the broader framework of rule of law reforms:** The early UK-led reform effort privileged police over other justice sector institutions. As a result, the UNPOL police reform effort faced limitations due to a dysfunctional judicial system, out of date laws and procedures, and overcrowded prisons. The deficiencies in other rule of law institutions undermined police performance. Even if police fulfilled their duties well, detained persons were held in deplorable conditions, often for long lengths of time without access to a judge, while others were released or escaped because of overcrowded prisons and the understaffing of guards. The problems with the courts and prisons result from an initial decision by the UK to prioritize police reform. At present, the UK has turned its attention to a new *Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)*, which will make reforms to the court and prison systems. In effect, the UK has acknowledged the need for a more holistic approach to justice sector reform. This holistic approach ought to have been adopted sooner.

- **UNPOL component did not receive adequate resources to implement its mandate:** The mandate for UNPOL in Sierra Leone was to advise the Government of Sierra Leone on the planning and coordination of the rehabilitation and reform of the police service. UNPOL was particularly charged with the training, re-equipping, and restructuring of the SLP, as well as on promoting the awareness of human rights and the rule of law. UNPOL was also to report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone and to assist the Government in its efforts to address the country’s human rights needs. With only five officers, the component’s ability to implement this mandate was limited. Former Commissioner of UNPOL, Mr. Joseph Dankwa (Ghana) has mooted the establishment of a trust fund within UNAMSIL for the provision of further assistance to the SLP by UNPOL due to the limited financial resources of the mission.

- **The UN Police lacked a monitoring and evaluation team:** The UNPOL mission in Sierra Leone lacked an evaluation team or any other systematic mechanism to
gather information about the performance of the police service that it was aiding. Instead, the mission relied on ad hoc reports of problems its monitors observed. While ad hoc reporting led to greater awareness within the mission of the most common types of shortfalls within the SLP, it is no substitute for systematic performance evaluations and measurements.
UNPOL in Timor-Leste

In October 1999, Security Council Resolution 1272 mandated the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) to “maintain law and order” and authorized “an international police element with strength of up to 1,640 officers.” The arrival of UNTAET came with the withdrawal of Indonesia’s police and military presence in Timor-Leste, leaving a security and police vacuum that needed to be filled by the UN Police (UNPOL). UNPOL, under the command of a UN Police Commissioner and responsible to the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General, began creating the Timor-Leste National Police Service (PNTL) in August 2000. During UNTAET, UNPOL had three units: a Civilian Police unit consisting of 1,250 officers with executive enforcement functions that would be deployed throughout Timor-Leste; an armed border/marine police unit of 150 officers; and two armed rapid reaction units consisting of 120 officers each.

While the recruitment of UNPOL officers moved faster than the recruitment of other international civilian personnel, it remained very slow. By the end of January 2000, only 400 UNPOL officers had arrived in country. Of these, only about 200 had been deployed to districts outside of Dili. The slow procurement of equipment, in particular vehicles and communications equipment, further delayed their deployment outside Dili to the districts and sub-districts. In July 2000, nine months after the establishment of UNTAET, the UNPOL strength was 1,270, still well below the authorized strength of 1,640. By August 2000, the majority of remote sub-districts did not have a permanent police presence, and as of February 2002, UNPOL had only 300 vehicles for over 1,400 officers.

Moreover, the UNPOL’s effectiveness was significantly reduced by a lack of local language skills and a shortage of interpreters. UNTAET did establish a language and training unit, which included professional linguists, trainers and teachers with expertise in Timor-Leste’s culture and history. The unit was, however, not involved in the training of UNPOL personnel. UNPOL also suffered from an inadequate understanding of Timorese history and culture and unfamiliarity with the civil law systems. Despite the one-week mission training in Dili prior to deployment, it is clear that this time period was not sufficient to properly orient UNPOL officers.

When responsibility for law and order was handed over from the Australian led International Force for Timor-Leste (INTERFET) to UNPOL in January 2000, UNPOL was not prepared to fully assume its executive functions and INTERFET was forced to remain in country and provide back-up law enforcement functions. In March 2000, to support UNPOL’s insufficient presence in country, UNPOL established the Police Assistance Group (PAG), comprised of 800 Timorese who had formerly served in the Indonesian police. The PAG were unarmed and provided assistance to UNPOL rather than directly carrying out policing functions. Eventually, close to half of the PAG were eventually recruited into the PNTL.

117 UNSCR 1272, operational paragraphs 2(b) and 3(a)
119 Secretary General Report on UNTAET, July 26, 2000
120 ‘A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* Timor-Leste’
In May 2002, UNTAET transitioned to The United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) by Security Council resolution 1410 to support the handover of independence to Timor-Leste. UNMISET was mandated to: 1) provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of Timor-Leste; 2) provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in Timor-Leste, the Timor-Leste Police Service (ETPS), subsequently named PNTL; and 3) contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of Timor-Leste. Through UNMISET, UNPOL was decreased initially to 1,250 civilian officers with additional decreases bringing the number of civilian police to 741 by November 2002.

In May 2003, Security Council Resolution 1480 extended UNMISET’s mandate for another year until May 2004. The mission was again extended by six months in May 2004, through Security Council resolution 1543. During this period, UNMISET reduced the size of the mission and revised its tasks, in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary-General as outlined in his report of April 29, 2004 to include: 1) support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes; 2) support to the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste; and 3) support for the security and stability of Timor-Leste. In addition, UNPOL’s presence was reduced to 157.

In November 2004, Security Council Resolution 1573 extended the mandate of UNMISET for a final six months until May 2005. The Council also decided to maintain UNMISET’s tasks, configuration and size, in order to allow the Mission to complete its mandate and consolidate gains made in that country thus far. At the time of withdrawal, UNPOL had a presence of 135. In May 2005, UNMISET concluded its mandate in Timor-Leste and was succeeded by a small follow-on political mission – the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which was established by the Security Council Resolution 1599 to ensure that the underpinnings of a viable State are firmly in place in Timor-Leste. UNOTIL’s mandate provides support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes, to the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste, and for the security and stability of Timor-Leste. Currently, UNPOL presence in Timor-Leste is 60 civilian officers.

---

121 UNSCR 1410
122 UNSCR 1480
123 Secretary General Report on UNMISET, May 12, 2005
124 UNSCR 1599
125 Secretary General Report on UNOTIL, August 18, 2005
Since the UN’s entrance in 1999, more than 53 countries have seconded officers for one of the various UN missions in Timor-Leste. The largest country contributors to UNPOL Timor-Leste were Australia, China, Ghana, Jordan, Portugal, Philippines, and the United States. The US contributed 80 officers to both UNTAET and UNMISET, comprising 5% of the total UNPOL force strength in country. In addition, two Special Police Units (SPUs) deployed to Timor-Leste, including a 120-person SPU in Dili from Jordan and a 59-person SPU in Baucau from the Philippines.

At the national level, each country maintains its own procedures for publicizing and recruiting for positions with UN missions. Many countries publicized openings to national and regional units, some allowed individual officers to apply. Others, mainly the U.S., relied on contractors such as DynCorp. Once country candidates are selected and pass the country qualifications, the officer must undergo screening by the UN Selection Assessment Teams. With the exception of the police commissioner, candidates generally do not undergo face-to-face interviewing with UN staff. Upon selection and arrival in Timor-Leste, those selected join other police officers from various nations and undergo a week-long induction training. The training is designed to familiarize the officers with the mandate, living conditions and executive powers in Timor-Leste. Despite screening and training, the quality of international police officers provided to UNPOL in Timor-Leste was not always adequate. Specifically, a number of officers were hired for UNPOL postings in Timor-Leste, despite not meeting the minimum language, driving or firearms requirements. These officers had to be repatriated.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{126} DPKO “Monthly Summary of Military and UNPOL Personnel Deployed in Current UN Operations.”
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
Challenges in Timor-Leste

- **UNPOL recruitment process was slow:** United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) suffered from extremely slow UNPOL recruitment for Timor-Leste deployment. The recruitment of international police proved much more difficult than that of international military personnel. While Member States were generally willing to participate in on-call arrangements for the military, they had not been prepared to make similar arrangements for UNPOL.

- **Screening methods were weak:** The quality of international police officers provided to UNTAET was not always adequate. UN’s DPKO has since improved its pre-mission testing, selection and training of international police personnel. DPKO now uses selection assistance teams (SATs) to identify police officers that meet the selection criteria for deployment to UN peace operations. DPKO is also in the process of preparing standardized packages for use in pre-deployment training of police personnel.

- **Slow development of an exit strategy:** UNPOL’s exit strategy depended on the development of the PNTL, but it was slow to elaborate a comprehensive PNTL development plan. This was partly the result of the fact that no UNPOL officers had been assigned to the police development function in the original mission design. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy, UNPOL focused on training rather than the institutional development of the PNTL.

- **Limited UNPOL knowledge of Timor-Leste upon arrival:** A common theme for many UNPOL officers deployed was that they had little knowledge of Timor-Leste – its history, culture, language, or laws – upon arrival. Despite this limited knowledge, UNPOL officers quickly had to assume full responsibility of their duties, which involved significant immersion within the local population and often times, decision-making authority. This issue was further complicated with the transitions from UNTAET to UNMISET to UNOTIL. Each mission had a large-scale turnover of staff and limited institutional memory, which resulted in the UN being forced to continually reinvent the wheel with each new mandate.

- **Lack of Systematic UN Training of Trainers:** Despite the diverse composition of UNPOL officers, the UN did not provide basic international standards for training to UNPOL. Instead, training workshops, manuals, and approaches were left to “subject experts” (i.e. UNPOL officers who brought with them different technical expertise from their home country). These “subject experts” largely taught the PNTL based on their own national background and experiences. These mixed messages lead to confusion within the PNTL over policing style and create internal service inconsistencies. Currently, PNTL policing approaches reflect this global “hodgepodge” of styles, instead of those that are most appropriate for local conditions. Moreover, many UNPOL officers come from countries that are undemocratic and/or lack transparency in their police force. As a result, the PNTL were learning topics such as “crowd control” from Chinese police officers and “human rights” from the Jordanians.
- Limited Timorese participation in decision-making: In the beginning, UNTAET was slow to increase the direct participation of the Timorese in decision-making activities. UNPOL has in the meantime made a conscious decision to increase Timorese ownership of the PNTL throughout UNMISET and UNOTIL. At present, most PNTL policies are still drafted by UNPOL officers who then engage in a consultative process with PNTL officers. However, the consultative process is largely after the fact and as is common in Timorese culture, many PNTL officers do not openly question or criticize their UNPOL counterparts. Thus, the PNTL tend to rubber stamp many of the UN policies without much local input.

- Unsustainable handover of UN resources: The UN passed along a large amount of equipment to the PNTL and Timorese government. Many of these items are currently unusable due to either a lack of fuel or the inability to properly maintain and fix large UN items (i.e. industrial generators, Land Cruisers, radio repeaters, etc). UNPOL has recognized that a more effective handover strategy would have included less resource and upkeep dependent items, such as solar panels for radio repeaters or smaller cars. While it is a positive sign that UNPOL recognized its weaknesses during the handover, it did so too late to correct the problems. Moreover, it is troubling that PNTL has not been properly trained to maintain and upkeep their materials. As they lack the funds to hire mechanics to fix vehicles, most cars remain idle in lots.