DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

An independent study prepared for the Emergency Response Division, UNDP

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Note: While this study was commissioned by UNDP, the views contained in it do not necessarily reflect the position of UNDP, but rather are intended to stimulate debate on the development dimensions of peace-building and conflict prevention.
This study was first launched in June 2001 with the aim of contributing to our collective understanding of how development can play a role in conflict prevention and peace-building. The original study, prepared by Mr. Bernard Wood, has since informed discussions with other UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes as well as other development partners such as governments, NGOs and the policy research community. I would like to express my personal gratitude to the former Director of the then-Emergency Response Division, Mr. Omar Bakhet, for his vision in commissioning the original study.

The objective of this study is to bring together the diverse strands of current thought on the link between development on the one hand and conflict prevention and peace-building on the other. It seeks to provide answers to the basic question of how development cooperation can contribute most effectively to the maintenance, and return to, peace. The document aims to:

- Respond to analytical needs identified in the Brahimi report and related discussions to set out clearly the development dimensions of peace-building and potential contributions to it.
- Take account of a broad range of existing expert analyses, policy and operational experience, and examinations of best practice.
- Provide an appropriate base for potential wider consultations to engage development and other agencies in assessing these results and their possible implications.
- Offer a realistic conceptual framework to guide policy and operations in the general conflict prevention and peace-building arena, and specifically guide UNDP/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery future strategy and programme development in relevant areas.

This study is being disseminated online; elements of it will also be tested and refined with interested collaborators as a basis for improved policies, programming and operations. Your views on its contents are welcomed.

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Concrete, and invaluable, proof of ERD’s serious commitment to the enterprise was its agreement to enlist an extraordinary group of advisors and resource people, who were invited to provide input at the conceptual, outline and first draft stages. The focal point for discussion of the first draft was a two-day symposium held at ERD’s Geneva office on 14-15 May, 2001, which many of these advisors and resource people were able to attend, and where the written suggestions of others were taken into account. This rich discussion was informal, and comments were not for individual attribution, so many of the helpful illustrative points and penetrating remarks used throughout the report, are simply attributed to “the Geneva Symposium.” Taken together, they reflect some of the extremely valuable exchange, and written input.

At the same time, of course, none of the following can or should be held responsible for individual citations, or for the author’s overall efforts to do justice to their valued suggestions. Given the sweep of this report, these advisors, and ERD as sponsor, must be absolved, even more than usual, of responsibility for its inevitable shortcomings.

Deep appreciation is due — for their time, effort, and wise and candid contributions — to: Hon. J Brian Atwood; Mr. Bernt Bernander; Amb. Boniface Chidyausiku; Amb. Carlos dos Santos; Mr. V. Lani Elliott; Amb. Marika Fahlen; Dr. Mukesh Kapila; Mr. Randolph Kent; Amb. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah; Amb. David Malone; Amb. Jonathan Moore; Mr. Charles Petrie; Prof. Satendra Prasad; Dr. Astri Suhrke; Mr. Roberto Toscano; Prof. Peter Uvin; and Prof. Ruben Zamora. Early guidance was received in interviews with: Amb. Lakhdar Brahimi, Mme. Louise Frechette, Dame Margaret Anstee, and Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, Mr. Michael Moller, Mr. Jehangir Khan, Mr. Thant Myint-U, and Mr. Michael Keating.

Bernard Wood
New York
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I. Summary and Guide

1. Purpose and approach

This study points to some solid directions in the international community’s search for more effective ways to help build peace and prevent widespread and mutating violent conflicts.

In spite of wider public and political concern, some new attempts to take action, and some important lessons from acknowledged failures, the overall performance by the international system in conflict situations has remained weak and inconsistent. The challenges include increasingly common states of “no war/no peace,” chronic or protracted conflict and instability, with complex global influences at work, and without clear outcomes or even clear “break points” to which the international community can respond.

The study offers an independent, state-of-the-art appraisal of what should realistically be expected from development, and from development cooperation — and thus provides a substantive answer, from the development perspective, to both the Brahimi Panel Report and the debates that have followed it. It brings together concrete, tested ways in which development cooperation can respond, and some of the ways to make those responses most effective. It does not get into the institutional debates about “who should do what” — focusing instead on the prior questions about “what needs to be done,” and on what development cooperation and other international responses should actually be able to deliver.

Section III of this study provides a brief synthesis of current understanding on how conflict and development are linked as a basis for thinking about policy and operational needs. Section IV of this study then summarises much current knowledge about the ways in which development cooperation can contribute most effectively to these objectives, in a range of six different “types of situation”:

1. in “normal” development situations;
2. in conflict-prone or especially vulnerable situations;
3. in situations of rising tensions;
4. in situations of open violent conflict;
5. in transitions from open violent conflict to peace;
6. in consolidating peace and restoring sustainable development.

Although it has proved useful to examine what can and should be done in these six broad “ideal types” of situation, each country’s case is in practice unique, and many of the suggestions overlap or apply to several of these scenarios. Some are also more fertile for suggestions than others, as reflected in the coverage. However, one discipline pursued throughout the report is to encourage the more thoughtful and consistent assessment of some important requirements for each type of situation, some of which have not been given enough explicit attention in the past. These are:

1. the needs for analysis, listening and learning;
2. appropriate types and priorities of development assistance;
3. relationships within the country;
4. relationships among external actors; and
5. dilemmas and hard choices to be confronted.

2. Evolving concepts

This study will mainly use the terms “conflict prevention” and “peace-building” together — they basically refer to very similar, if not identical, actions and processes, although they have often been used in the past to refer to different contexts. The study is thus following the lead of the UN Security Council, which began in a February 2001 Statement to see “peace-building” as the umbrella term for a comprehensive goal, “aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.” It is essential that this wider vision of peace-building not confuse or delay the momentum generated by the Brahimi Report toward stronger operational capacities and clearer mandates for the UN within peace operations. In the longer term, it does reflect the reality that the overwhelming majority of the development contributions to peace-building take place in situations far removed from peace operations.

3. The developmental perspective on conflict and its prevention

The developmental perspective starts from the premise that conflict itself is not just an aberration, but a normal and inescapable fact of life and development. Thus the goal of peace-building and conflict prevention in a developmental perspective is to help prevent the slide into violent conflict (or oppressive forms of “order”) and not any illusory ambition of trying to prevent conflict altogether.

Above all, reflecting the lessons of development cooperation experience, this perspective shows how to give the needed primacy to the internal dynamics and potentials of societies, and how all international actors could strengthen their contributions through greater modesty, together with more responsible coherence and coordination. In order to fulfill the potential, it argues:

1. development cooperation itself needs to apply the lessons of experience, and improve its own flexibility and practices to maximise its contributions — while recognising its limits — in helping build peace and prevent violent conflict;

2. other international actors need to be more supportive of the long-term developmental contributions to conflict prevention, and to apply the lessons of experience and necessary changes in their own practices to maximise their contributions and recognise their limits in building peace and preventing violent conflict.

4. Guiding principles

The Report concludes with the list below of eleven “Guiding Principles for Development Cooperation” reflecting the analysis here and elsewhere. These are worth recalling for development practitioners themselves. At the same time, understanding some of the basic

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1 UN, Security Council, Presidential Statement, 20 February 2001, para. 5
principles by which development cooperation aspires to guide its action should also help others to work with it, and to call upon its strengths, more effectively.

1. Maximise indigenous “ownership” and participation — the people and countries concerned need even more right and ability to decide, when they will bear such huge costs if things go wrong. Remember that communications can now reach almost everybody;

2. Minimise dependency, striving to find and support local capacities, and focus aid on sustainable activities;

3. Maintain long-term engagement and trust and strive to make “partnership” real;

4. Seek to reduce the dangers of violent conflict and mitigate its results, recognizing that many of the best preventive results will be gradual, and hard to prove;

5. Work for the respect of human rights;

6. Preserve an even-handed commitment to development values and goals;

7. Strengthen coordination and coherence with other external actors (including non-governmental ones) working against violent conflict, on the basis of comparative and collaborative advantage;

8. Improve responsiveness and flexibility, while maintaining a long view;

9. Listen and learn about specific country situations, while adapting relevant lessons and good practices from elsewhere;

10. Promote more development-friendly policies and coherent practices in fields beyond traditional development assistance (e.g. trade, finance, environmental regimes, international crime-fighting) that have major impacts on the prospects for development and peace-building;

11. Avoid making promises of aid that cannot be delivered, or sustained.
II. Introduction

1. Realism about conflict prevention and peace-building

Since the ending of the Cold War, the scale and devastation of violent intrastate and regional conflicts have become far more visible, and the demands have become more insistent for the international community to do a better job of helping the people and societies affected. Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking measures have been called upon much more frequently (as have sanctions of many kinds) and peacekeeping demands and responses have multiplied, together with their costs and dangers.

Global public awareness and concern are far higher than in the past, and the economic and other interests at stake are much greater in such an interdependent world, even if these stakes are sometimes unclear or contradictory. Paradoxically, while the need to be seen to respond to previously-ignored conflicts around the world, and respond better, has become a matter of high politics, most publics are less willing to accept major risks in peace operations.

In spite of wider public and political concern, some new attempts to act — and some major lessons of acknowledged failures — the overall performance by the international system in responding to these conflict situations has remained weak and inconsistent. Part of the reason, it must be said, is not only uncertainty about how to act or even a lack of political priority, but also political and economic interests that in practice often still outweigh the laudable objectives of building peace and preventing conflicts. Regrettably, it is often simply not true to say that the international community, or its most influential actors, are bent on ending or averting violent conflicts.

“The system seems always to be less than the sum of its parts — it is a systematically sub-optimal performance”…. “The donors preach about efficiency, but they can be the worst in actually delivering.” (Geneva symposium)

Meanwhile, it is true that many more analysts and policy-makers are giving serious attention to the search for effective ways of helping prevent violent conflicts — as a possible alternative to the enormous costs, human and material, of wars themselves, of stopping them once started, and of trying to rebuild — physically, economically, socially and politically — after their crippling impacts. The international community has gained experience in such efforts, particularly in aid with re-building after violent conflicts in various parts of the world. One chief realization is that the complexity of much contemporary conflict defies any simple patterns or diplomatic prescriptions — situations of “no war/ no peace” are increasingly common, conflict and instability are often chronic or protracted, often without clear outcomes or even clear “break points” to which the international community can respond.

“What about situations in which the ‘government’ does not really govern, i.e. there really is no state, just a set of cartographic lines and some guys downtown who have a lot of

2 As witnessed in the changed agenda and actions of the UN Security Council, and many other high level political forums, at the global, regional, and sub-regional levels.
guns? ...[those who] practice statecraft ... automatically assume there to be a state. But we are increasingly called upon to provide assistance where the state is a fiction at best."

"Somalia, Rwanda and the Congo all provide examples of where violence becomes so pervasive that it can take on a terrible logic of its own." ... "They blew up a power plant that was critically needed, but more important was that it symbolised the hated former regime." (Geneva Symposium.)

The developmental perspective on conflict recognises that conflict itself is not just an aberration, but a normal and inescapable fact of life and development, and that it is often healthy as well as unavoidable, as long as it can be managed without violence, or the abuse of human rights. In some cases, moreover — as in legitimate law enforcement, self-defence against aggression, or the overthrow of extreme and systematic oppression where all other means have failed — natural and international law recognise the legitimacy of the commensurate uses of force in conflict. In most situations, though, managing and resolving conflicts without violence remain deeply shared values and goals of good governance in all societies. The reality of course falls far short of that ideal everywhere, and often degenerates into patterns of linked violence, extending from the political to the criminal to the personal. (E.g. at various recent times in South Africa, some West and Central African countries, much of the Balkans, parts of Central America, and many other places). To sum up, the goal of peace-building and conflict prevention in a developmental perspective is to help prevent the slide into violent conflict (or oppressive forms of “order”) and not any illusory ambition of trying to prevent conflict altogether.

The search for root causes. The ideal of helping to prevent violent conflicts, and the experience in helping re-build peace after they occur, have led to an intensive focus on finding and combatting their “root causes.” A good deal has been learned has about conflict analysis and how to look beneath the immediate issues of contention to some sets of conditions that may make intense conflict in particular situations more likely, and its peaceable management less so.3 At the same time, facile and rote calls to attack root causes are unhelpful. Since it remains true that “the first casualty when war comes is truth,” it is often impossible to untangle and assess competing claims of aggression, discrimination, mistreatment and grievance, and to arrive at any reasonably objective conclusions about root, or “structural” causes and triggering factors. Only rarely can the search be expected to yield any kind of forensic certainty about specific single causes that may allow for direct solutions. So the attempt to identify and combat root causes should also, more modestly, study risk factors, and should as well be approached in a developmental perspective — it should be part of a broad, positive concern to help generate and maintain a supportive overall environment for peaceable development.

Modesty by outsiders. Consistent as well with the developmental perspective, and its many lessons and identified best practices, outside involvement in peace-building cannot and should not aspire to finding and imparting solutions for people in affected countries and regions. Instead it should aim to help them find and strengthen the capacities for their own solutions. Only in this way can such solutions ever take root and endure.

3 As Section IV of this report traces.
Doing a better job. Building on a strengthening base of knowledge, there is now more opportunity for the international community, if the consistent will can be mustered, to help societies overcome conditions which increase the likelihood of violent conflicts, and to strengthen their capacities to cope with this danger. As will be outlined below, many of these possibilities lie in the realm of development and development cooperation. However, in order to fulfill this potential:

1. development cooperation itself needs to apply the lessons of experience, and improve its own flexibility and practices to maximise its contributions — while recognising its limits — in helping build peace and prevent violent conflict;

2. other international actors need to be more supportive of the long-term developmental contributions to conflict prevention, and to apply the lessons of experience and necessary changes in their own practices to maximise their contributions and recognise their limits in building peace and preventing violent conflict.

2. Objectives and structure of the study

The study should clarify and synthesize the best current understanding about the linkages between conflict prevention/peace-building and development, and about how development cooperation can contribute most effectively.

The results of this work should:

a) set out clearly the development dimensions of conflict prevention/peace-building and potential contributions to it by development cooperation and other outside engagement, to help inform more effective thinking and action at the international and country levels;

b) provide an appropriate base for potential wider consultations to engage development and other agencies in assessing these findings and their implications;

c) offer a realistic conceptual framework for policy and operational guidance in these areas in general, and specifically to help UNDP/ERD guide its future strategy and programme development in relevant fields.

(Summary of Terms of Reference)

The aim here is to set out substantive, development-related needs for conflict prevention and peace-building; concrete, tested ways in which development cooperation can respond; and some of the things it needs to do to respond most effectively. In doing so, the study will take account of a broad range of existing expert analyses, policy and operational experience, and examinations of best practice, and should respond to the needs for such clarification highlighted in the Brahimi Panel Report and related international discussions.4

What the study does not attempt to do is to discuss “who should do what” — the debating over roles and mandates that should follow from consideration of “what should and can be done,” but sometimes seems to precede and overshadow that discussion of substantive offerings to an almost indecent degree. The conviction here is that there is more than enough for all parts of the international community to do, and an overwhelming responsibility on their part to overcome their differences and organise themselves to give the most effective help to countries in need. As one example, references are often made here are to “development cooperation” as though it were a single operation, pursuing a unified set of goals. This reflects more of an aspiration than a reality, and the repeated pledges of the donor community to coordinate better among themselves.

“This study should help non-developmentalists to know better what to expect of development in conflict situations — and help developmentalists to see more clearly the risks and potentials of being engaged.” (Geneva symposium)

There is no single, accepted theory on how conflict and development are linked, and there may never be. While those debates go on, however, people do make very different assumptions about these links and often act upon them. This study is not primarily focused on that continuing, rich academic debate. Instead, Section III tries simply to provide a brief synthesis of current understanding on these linkages as a basis for thinking about policy and operational needs.

Section IV then summarises much current knowledge about the ways in which development cooperation can contribute most effectively to these objectives, in a range of six different types of situation. Under each “scenario” it looks at the requirements of: analysis, listening, learning and planning; types and priorities of development assistance; relationships within the country concerned, and among external actors; and dilemmas and hard choices to be confronted. There is overlap between these but the points are repeated if necessary, since experience has driven home the need for the international community to pay careful attention to each of these areas in each situation.

**APPLYING “POST-CONFLICT” EXPERIENCE IN PREVENTION**

The record shows that organised thinking and documented experience of development cooperation and conflict is far stronger in relation to “cure” than “prevention”. Most analysis and most action has focused on situations of actual violent conflict, or on efforts to support post-conflict recovery and peace-building. Conscious attention to longer-term conflict prevention has been much more limited, in part because it has not been as urgent, but also because cause and effect in prevention are so difficult to trace or prove, since conflict prevention benefits are part of processes, not simply “products.”.

This imbalance is perhaps eloquent testimony of the human tendency to learn mainly through mistakes and trying to set them right. This study aims to help redress the imbalance. It suggests that many, if not most, of the wide range of

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5 The range of situations used here, extending from “normal” development situations to those of consolidating peace and helping generate sustainable development after violent conflicts, is deliberately framed as a set of situations or circumstances, rejecting any assumption that there are linear or predictable “stages” or “phases” of real-world conflicts, each of which has its own unique characteristics. The range of situations surveyed is also more specific than in most analyses, with a view to identifying some practical implications of certain differences, even though the idealised situations will rarely exist in “pure” form, and real-life settings will often overlap and combine elements from more than one type.
creative activities that have been worked out and applied in “post conflict” settings could well be used to inspire and guide more purely anticipatory awareness and action in “normal” settings, in conflict-prone ones, and sometimes even in situations of imminent or active violent conflict.

The report concludes by outlining a number of guiding principles for development cooperation that reflect the findings here and some of the essential lessons of several decades of learning in development cooperation. They may help non-developmentalists to understand where their development colleagues “are coming from” as they engage in these “new” multi-disciplinary challenges of conflict prevention and peace-building. They may also help remind development cooperation professionals of the basic principles of good practice and partnership that are vital to the legitimacy and effectiveness of their work.

3. The meanings of “peace-building” and “conflict prevention”

In spite of the intensified interest in the concepts, as well as the policies and practices of peace-building and conflict prevention, it is striking that there are no clearly established and accepted definitions of the meanings of these terms. Thus analysts and, with more serious consequences, policy-makers have sometimes been talking at cross-purposes, or pursuing different political or bureaucratic agendas, when they have used these terms.

This study will adopt a pragmatic approach in following some of the prevailing imperfect usage. It will mainly use the terms of “conflict prevention” and “peace-building” together for the reasons outlined in the Box below. It is beyond the scope of this study to pretend to resolve the problems of definition, but it should contribute by giving concrete illustrations of some of their most significant components, particularly in the development field.

“CONFlict PRESENTION” AND “PEACE-BUILDING:” toward CLEARER MEANINGS

The terms “conflict prevention” and “peace-building” basically refer to very similar, if not identical, actions and processes, but they have often been used to refer to different contexts. Conventional UN usage, around which a great deal of analysis and legislation is already built, saw “peace-building” strictly in terms of “post-conflict” actions, usually following on from a UN peacekeeping operation, that might help reduce the risks of renewed major violent conflict in a society that has undergone such conflict in the relatively recent past. “Conflict prevention,” on the other hand, has in past UN parlance been intended to refer to “purely” preventive, anticipatory actions and processes that can help reduce the risks of major violent conflict in a society that has not undergone such conflict in the relatively recent past.

While these usages now have some advantage in being fairly familiar to people working in these fields, they also have substantial disadvantages. The UN Security Council may now be trying to overcome these, for example by beginning to use “peace-building” for certain purposes as the umbrella term, for example in a February 2001 Statement, which sees peace-building as “aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.”

The peace-building term, if used in this broad way, has the attraction and advantage of conveying a more positive, realistically gradualistic, and multi-dimensional tone than “conflict prevention.” In its emphasis on “programmes and mechanisms,” however, it still tends to downplay the dominant importance of a society’s own processes and dynamics, as emphasised in the developmental perspective, and risks exaggerating the influence of most outside

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6 UN, Security Council, Presidential Statement, 20 February 2001, para. 5
intervention, and is perhaps a holdover from the narrower thinking of the past about peace-building as an adjunct to externally-driven peacekeeping operations.

Ironically, while “conflict prevention” in the past had been intended to connote the long-term, multi-dimensional integration of the goal of conflict prevention into normal development processes and cooperation, the term has been heard quite differently by many (especially in developing countries). Many have understood the advocates to be proposing intrusive new forms of conflict management or peace enforcement, a threat compounded by the prospect that scarce development cooperation resources will be diverted into these new types of interventionist political action.

The broad analysis in this study, then, follows the lead of the Security Council this year, and applies common-sense definition to these terms, with “peace-building” as the inclusive concept and the prevention of violent conflict as a consistent underlying objective. At the same time, it must be said, the Security Council has not quite completed its clarification — by using the peace-building term to cover a much broader field of action, but leaving unchanged most of the legislation, mandates etc. that were built around the previous, narrow definition.

The Brahimi Panel, with its aim of strengthening the overall strategic and operational capacity of the UN system in peace operations, defined “peace-building” for its purposes as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.” The momentum generated by the Brahimi Report toward stronger operational capacities and clearer mandates for the UN within peace operations needs to be maintained and to produce solid results. Taking a wider view of peace-building should not blur the much-needed precision and improved responses proposed for its post-conflict phases — the urgent need to simplify the system and for “someone to feel responsible,” and to have a permanent capacity for making those operations work better. Sections IV- 3, 4, 5- of this report in particular suggest concrete contributions that development cooperation can make, and ways that international actors can work together effectively.

At the same time it is vital to remember, that in the Security Council’s wider vision of peace-building, the overwhelming majority of the development contributions to peace-building take place in situations totally removed from peace operations. Especially in settings where there has not been recent major violent conflict, most of the things that can help prevent it happening are part of the “normal” processes of long-term development. The hoped-for conflict-prevention benefits from development in a society are often indirect, gradual steps in building peace, although in many cases they can and should integrate and pursue this objective more purposefully.

Thus, integrating the goal of conflict prevention in development cooperation with such societies does not necessarily imply any radical reorientation of development cooperation away from its basic — and powerfully re-confirmed — mission of helping reduce poverty and promote sustainable development. The poor are especially vulnerable to the impacts of violent conflict, and the “voices of the poor” themselves rank access to greater security very high among their needs. This alone, quite apart from all the other benefits, would readily justify applying the “conflict prevention lens” more systematically to development cooperation.

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7 UN, Brahimi Panel report, p.3
III. The Linkages Between Development, Peace-building and Conflict Prevention

“We should ask: ‘How does development impact on the risk factors for conflict, and how does conflict impact on development?’

“This analysis should strongly acknowledge the gaps between what would be desirable and what is feasible, the rational lens vs. the irrational truth, the best being the enemy of the good. I find in a lot of writing by and for the U.N. an asymmetry, an imbalance between the two — or an ignorance of the difference. At best this is a triumph of aspiration over viability, at worst it is reality denial and a cover-up.” (Geneva symposium)

1. What to expect of development itself

For some decades at least, many people have assumed that greater development — economic, social, and political — helps to build peace and reduce the dangers of violent conflict, within and between societies. This belief, however, is still a relatively recent one in history, and the long annals of war and violence offer many examples of societies that have achieved remarkable development in some fields, only to fall prey to major internal or external violence.

On the other hand, over the past half-century, the experience of integration and peace-building in the European Union — historically one of the zones of most frequent and terrible warfare on the planet, has been a powerful example of the potential of certain patterns of integration and development to make a repetition of such conflict among EU countries unthinkable, just as its founders intended. And there are many other examples to be found, in being or taking shape, in other parts of the world.

“… every step taken toward reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth — is a step towards conflict prevention. All who are engaged in conflict prevention and development, therefore — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, governments and civil society organisations — must address these challenges in a more integrated fashion.”

While research and analysis shows that the linkages between development and peace are not as clear or automatic as is often intuitively assumed — and particular definitions sometimes applied to both terms can promote controversy — the basic intuition that development ultimately tends to supports peace is borne out by historical experience and research. Certain levels of achievement and improvement in conditions of life, such as economic well-being, freedom and choice, social stability and social justice, seem to be a necessary part of such development, and so do trusted mechanisms of open, responsive governance, and the respect of individual and minority rights. At some point, these supporting beams, working together, do seem to provide a solid foundation for internal peace, and ultimately to be more conducive to peaceful relations with others — as well as being manifestly desirable in themselves.

UN, Millennium Report of the Secretary General, New York, 2000, p. 45
On the development front, an important breakthrough in recent years has been a new clarity about the basic objectives sought in development. Distilling from a wide range of objectives agreed upon in a series of global conferences, governments around the world and international organizations have rallied to support a programme that would help open up a new world for the poor in the new millennium, through reductions in poverty and concrete improvements in basic education, gender equality, and basic health, all underpinned by improved governance and environmental sustainability.9

There are no simple, universal formulas for enduring success, even in economic policy in its narrower senses. At the same time, there are some basic, but demanding, policy foundations for success that have been proven to have wide applicability. The best current understanding about the main requirements has been summarised succinctly:

1. A sound policy framework encouraging stable, growing economies with full scope for a vigorous private sector and an adequate fiscal base.10

2. Investment in social development, especially education, primary health care, and population activities.

3. Enhanced participation of all people, and notably women, in economic and political life, and the reduction of social inequalities.

4. Good governance and public management, democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law.

5. Sustainable environmental practices.

6. Addressing root causes of potential conflict, limiting military expenditure, and targeting reconstruction and peace building efforts toward longer term reconciliation and development.11

In very broad terms, these are the same policy conditions faced by all countries, developing and industrialised, as a basis for sustainable development. They are enormously demanding for developing countries, whose capacity is by definition limited and whose margin for policy error is even less forgiving. But the understanding has deepened that ultimately there is no escaping any of them if progress is to be achieved and sustained, and recent empirical studies have reinforced this conviction.12

9 These objectives have most recently, and widely, been endorsed by world leaders gathered at the Millennium Summit

10 The World Bank’s World Development Report 2000-2001 and other analyses are deepening the understanding of the relationships between poverty reduction and different market and enterprise environments.

11 Taken from OECD (DAC), Development Partnerships in the New Global Context. (Annexed to Shaping the 21st Century, Paris 1995, pp. 19-20)

2. Achieving “structural stability” — the keystone of governance and human rights

“Don’t let bad leaders off the hook with some of the other excuses for violent conflict.”
(Geneva symposium)

History also suggests, however, that there is no single standard of how these (and other supportive) attributes can be achieved by different societies, that frequent setbacks are to be expected, and that, while the dangers of large scale violent conflict can be much reduced, there is probably no such thing as a stable equilibrium that can be taken for granted indefinitely. Much thinking in recent years has seen the achievement of a multi-faceted “structural stability”13 in societies as a kind of working objective, while insisting at the same time that this is not to be equated to the “status quo” — this social stability must have the dynamism to cope with change.

Development itself is change, and de-stabilises. Even when broadly thriving, development raises expectations and highlights disparities, sometimes adding to the factors that may trigger violent conflicts. When development stagnates or regresses, the pressures are usually even more intense. Thus building up its capacity to manage continuing (and today’s accelerating) change, while protecting human rights and avoiding violent conflict, is now seen for any society as both a vital means and a continuing goal of development.

It is because these policy challenges for developing countries are so central, and so difficult, that the issues of governance have become increasingly prominent in development thinking in recent years. In fact, the primary rationale and purpose for foreign assistance can be seen as helping developing countries to strengthen the governance capacities they require to master these strategic pre-conditions for sustainable development.

The most serious breakdown of these governance capacities is when the conflicts that inevitably arise — and are often intensified during processes of development — can no longer be managed without violence. Thus some of the presumed “root causes” of violent conflicts — for example, ethnic, religious or regional differences, economic or environmental pressures, even poverty and disparities — are often only transformed into proximate causes of violence when they are mobilized politically, and then when the governance structures are not flexible and resilient enough to manage the pressures, so that extremism and/or political opportunism can prevail.

“The rule of law and good governance can keep ‘risk factors’ both of greed and grievance from being converted into violent conflict, by curbing criminality and corruption, and giving confidence that grievances — and exclusion, the most volatile source of grievance — can be overcome.” (Geneva symposium)

The international community has increasingly come to understand these linkages, and the need to help support societies’ capacities to manage conflict without violence — based on the rule of

13 Structural stability embraces the mutually reinforcing goals of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. It is supported by dynamic and representative political structures, including accountable security systems capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means. OECD (DAC).Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century. Paris 1998.
law, observance of human rights, and the inclusion and effective participation by the population in democratic processes. As with all development, however, it is clear that these capacities must be built primarily through a country’s own efforts and must take root and grow in the unique soil of each society.

“We can do more. In many poor countries at war, the condition of poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious cleavage. Almost invariably, the rights of subordinate groups are insufficiently respected, the institutions of government are insufficiently inclusive, and the allocation of society’s resources favours the dominant faction over others. … The solution is clear, even if difficult to achieve in practice: to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented.”

“Peace-building” is an appropriate term for the long and arduous toil — within a society, and by external supporters — of preparing the ground, and nurturing and protecting the seedlings of peaceable governance and participation. This developmental perspective integrates the recent insights in economics and other disciplines about the critical importance of human capital and “social capital” in development, while taking note that “bridging” social capital — the basis of relations, habits and institutions of trust between groups — is key for conflict prevention, rather than merely “bonding” social capital within groups, which can sometimes exacerbate divisions and potential conflicts.

Alongside, and supporting, improvements in governance, other development goals — and areas for development assistance — have major direct and indirect impacts on peace-building and conflict prevention as a society navigates its development course:

1. economic vitality and the reduction of poverty and disparities;
2. the breadth of participation and inclusion (economic as well as political);
3. the rule of law, justice systems and the respect of individual and group rights;
4. environmental sustainability;
5. equity and opportunity;
6. healthy respect for culture and identity; and
7. maintaining peaceable regional and international relations.

The necessary balance among all these elements makes for sustainable development, and the human and societal dynamics are critical. Moreover, as one further source of pressure, a globalisation of aspirations has today led to expectations that these balances should be achieved relatively rapidly, rather than following the trial-and-error processes that have taken centuries in many countries.

3. Beyond “aid”: other responsibilities of the international community.

“Greater coherence is absolutely essential, and absolutely lacking.” (Geneva symposium)

With all these powerful links between development and peace-building, and clear opportunities for development cooperation to help, it remains true that direct assistance for peace-building

14 UN, Millennium Report of the Secretary General, New York, 2000, p. 45
development is only one of the responsibilities of the international community, and in many circumstances not the most important. Breaking with traditional political taboos, the connections have increasingly been drawn in the international community between conflicts around the world and the proliferation of weapons — beginning with land-mines — and some serious efforts have got underway, in some cases led by groups of developing countries themselves, to stem these flows.\textsuperscript{15}

The international community — along with increasing grassroots and media attention — is also increasingly tracking down the predatory and criminal international interests that are often drawn to the spoils, together with the homegrown “spoilers”, who fuel and sustain such conflicts. The growing number of recent investigations of resources feeding conflict — highlighted by that of the UN Security Council on the embargo-breaking diamond traffic and arms supply in Angola and the follow-up measures — shows promise of exposing and ultimately curtailing some of these international involvements feeding conflict. Similarly, widening international efforts to combat corruption — including legal measures to pursue those offering bribes as well as accepting them, and measures to recoup illicit gains placed in foreign financial institutions — are all part of the responsibility of the international community to help prevent practices which can corrode governance and ultimately peace.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{“Some armed conflicts today are driven by greed, not grievance. Whereas war is costly for society as a whole, it nevertheless may be profitable for some. In such cases, often the control over natural resources is at stake, drugs are often involved, the conflicts are abetted by opportunistic neighbours, and private sector actors are complicit — buying ill-gotten gains, helping to launder funds, and feeding a steady flow of weapons into the conflict zone.”}\textsuperscript{17}

The relevant international and regional organisations and their members have responsibilities for ensuring constructive and consistent responses in creating the supportive international environment for peace-building. On the positive side of the ledger, appropriate measures for encouraging macro-economic stability and open regional and international flows of legitimate trade, investment, and know-how are now almost universally recognized as having enormous potential for spurring the economic efficiency, transparency and opportunity that can underpin peace-building.

All of the cross-border issues mentioned above — and a number of others such as regional cooperation for law-enforcement, respect for human rights, the treatment of refugees and internally displaced persons, regional economic cooperation schemes, etc. — can be sensitive political matters internationally, going well beyond the capacity of development cooperation to influence decisively, but critical to peace-building and conflict prevention.

\textsuperscript{15} E.g. in the Landmines Convention and ECOWAS Moratorium on the Import, Export, and Manufacture of Light Weapons, 1998.
\textsuperscript{16} See for example the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions.
\textsuperscript{17} UN, Millennium Report of the Secretary General, New York, 2000, p. 45
IV. How Can Development Cooperation Contribute Most Effectively?

“The ODA community is often the only one present, with the largest resources and contacts. The conflict resolution people tend to become interested only when violent conflict is truly imminent and, more often, when major violence has broken out. The same holds, for that matter, for the humanitarian community and, very often, the human rights one. Hence, for the many non-strategically important countries — the Rwandas, Solomon Islands, Nicaraguas of this world — the development community is the only one to be significantly present, possessing significant human and financial resources, almost throughout. For that reason alone, it has a crucial role to play in peace-building.”

(Geneva symposium)

Paradoxically, the close and pervasive links in theory between development, peace-building and conflict prevention have contributed to considerable debate and confusion in practice. Because of all these links, some have been tempted to conclude either that:

1. development somehow automatically and inexorably builds peace, and thus that simple “business as usual” for development cooperation is its most useful contribution; or

2. conflict, turning to violence, is somehow an anomaly in a long-term development process and separable from that process — in other words that development goes “on hold” during such conflict, and other measures to stop the violence and “get back on track” must precede the resumption of development progress.

Both of these positions, which can be caricatured in their extreme forms as “development is all about conflict prevention” and “development is separable from processes of violent conflict and peacemaking” have attracted sources of intellectual support, and have sometimes fit conveniently into traditional tasks and jurisdictions of international actors. But, even if the ways the linkage works often remain unclear and indirect, growing experience and learning has driven home the realisation that the processes of development and the building of capacities for peace and conflict prevention are inseparable and that all the contributions of the international community need to be attuned to that reality.

In order to clarify our understanding of what has been learnt, and organise future responses effectively, it is helpful to try to distinguish broad types of situations and their particular implications in terms of:

1. analysing the situation and the needs for international support;

2. within the field of development assistance, seeing what types of development and other forms of assistance are appropriate and should have priority in this type of situation;

3. seeing what types of relationship prevail within a country in this situation, and among the variety of international actors who are likely to be involved; and finally
4. openly facing the fact that there are no simple formulas in these complex situations, and that there are often painful dilemmas and hard choices to be identified explicitly and confronted.

In order to help move beyond theoretical debates about the development-conflict linkages, and arguments about the respective responsibilities of external actors, the following sections attempt to isolate a number of broad types of conflict-related development situations, to clarify what is now known about the actual and potential contributions of development cooperation, and then analyse some of the related implications in each type of situation.

“There is no linear link between development and peace — and no linear link between development assistance and peace, as the case of Rwanda tells us so starkly. It's not just the economy, it's the political economy.” (Geneva symposium)

First, it is worth noting the new willingness of development cooperation in recent years to work through some of these difficult areas with partners.

In a January 2001 paper to the UNDP Executive Board on the “Role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations” the Programme set out its basic approach to the development-peace-building linkages in the following terms: “UNDP peace-building aims to build and enable durable peace and sustainable development in post-conflict situations. Inside and outside of crises, sustainable development aims to promote effective and accountable public institutions and policy frameworks, socially inclusive policies and programmes for national development, and economic and social strategies that create the lasting conditions for the poorest and most vulnerable groups, especially women, to make choices that secure their lives and livelihoods. From a development perspective, it is these economic and social building blocks that lay the foundations for peace and prosperity by addressing the build-up of insecurities that can cause, trigger or escalate conflict behaviour.”

After many donors had shied away from explicitly “political” issues for many years, by 1997 the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC), with its bilateral donor members and multilateral observers, was able to make a firm commitment to this sensitive and difficult work. This was based on the understanding that governance is the critical underpinning of development, and that the ultimate challenge of governance, and one that is all too immediate for many developing countries, is that of managing conflict without violence. The donors accepted that:

“Work in war-torn or conflict-prone countries must be seen as an integral part of the development cooperation challenge. Wars have set back development severely in many countries, including in some of the poorest; excessive military expenditures have too often taken priority over more productive public investments and responses to complex emergencies have come to represent a major claim on development cooperation.”

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The members and observers of the DAC have continued working — through their representatives in other international forums (e.g. the G8 and EU, all the way to the Heads of Government level) and through a specialised group in the DAC — to propagate and promote the implementation of the impressive Guidelines and related best practices, to test them with people in developing regions, and to supplement them with a new publication in 2001.20

The World Bank, in spite of its original vocation and early concentration in “Reconstruction and Development” had for many of the intervening years interpreted its development mandate in narrowly circumscribed economic terms. It remained cautious about engaging in governance and conflict-related work until late in the 1990s. It then selected some particular entry-points, and invested over several years what for most donors would be seen as very substantial human and financial resources, undertaking a widening range of engagements, particularly in “post-conflict recovery and reconstruction” settings.

As of February 2001, recognising the chronic character of many violent conflicts in countries in which it works, and its links to the Bank’s declared central mission of poverty reduction, the Board adopted a new Operational Policy statement on “Development Cooperation and Conflict.” The new policy builds on the Bank’s 1997-98 “Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Situations,” which had been largely derived from the DAC Guidelines. Following a evaluation study completed in 2000, the new policy is more comprehensive, in that it covers more country situations, but it appears more targeted to a partnership approach, with the Bank focusing on contributions where it has a clear mandate, expertise, and comparative advantage.

To guide the new policy, the Bank explicitly recognizes that:

1. economic and social stability and human security are preconditions for sustainable development;

2. conflict not only affects the country or countries of the combatants, but also may spill over to other countries and have regional implications, so the Bank defines its objectives in relation to conflict-affected countries, including those involved in or emerging from conflict, as well as to countries whose development is affected through their proximity and/or relations with these countries;

3. the causes of conflict differ from country to country and that there is still much to be learned regarding the links between development assistance and conflict. The Bank's analytical work in this area, undertaken in partnership with other institutions and external experts, works, within its mandate, in close partnership with bilateral and multilateral agencies, particularly international and regional institutions that have the major

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responsibility for peacekeeping and security, development and humanitarian assistance, with government authorities, and with civil society and private sector entities that have complementary mandates and common concerns.

Depending on the conflict-related situation in particular countries, bank activity will be driven by one of three instruments: a normal Country Assistance Strategy (CAS); a watching brief; or a short- to medium-term Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for a country in transition from conflict which does not have a CAS, or whose CAS, because of the effects of conflict, no longer represents a responsive strategy. Emergency recovery assistance continues to be available in countries in transition from conflict, and to assist a country emerging from conflict meet its transitional financial needs in a timely manner, the Bank may provide exceptional financial assistance. The World Bank’s Post Conflict Unit is in the process of building a data base of good practices in these areas to complement its new Operational Policy.

1. In “normal” development situations.

Development cooperation professionals today realise that “normal” development situations do not exist, if this term is taken to imply that the countries in question are not vulnerable to risks of complex emergencies, often including violent conflict. Individual and collective work by development cooperation agencies over the past decade has attempted to “build in” understanding of the ways in which conflict can turn to violence, and ways in which development should try to avoid contributing to these risks, and instead to pro-actively helping to reduce them.

This growing “conflict prevention” consciousness in today’s development cooperation converges with the powerful consensus in the field over the past few years about the most effective approaches to development cooperation in general. This approach recognises and respects the centrality of a country’s internal dynamics in generating development, and the subsidiary role that can and must be played by external actors. Helping countries to develop and strengthen their own capacities to handle their problems, rather than trying to do things for them, offers the only hope for durable results.

While recognising the complex interplay of the many different processes and factors required to build sustainable development, it also focuses on a number of clear, broad goals (generated by the whole international community through a series of UN global conferences) to help mobilize and focus efforts, and measure progress. Donor and developing countries have made repeated public commitments to apply lessons of experience and build true “partnerships” in development cooperation, reflecting greater country ownership, and shared goals and mutual accountabilities. The painstaking work and adjustment of turning these commitments into realities is underway in many efforts to strengthen country leadership of strategic development efforts, and to support countries with far better coordinated and more responsive external action.

Finally, this new approach to development cooperation acknowledges that it must encompass far more than aid activities, which are at best only a modest catalyst and lever to the internal efforts required. The international community can provide much greater support to development through a supportive international economic environment, stable international security conditions, and effective responses to global problems in areas such as environment, health, crime, responses to international disasters etc. For a “culture of conflict prevention” to take root in international
action, the full range of institutions concerned will need to give more respect and practical weight to a “culture of development.”

“A ‘Culture of Prevention’ has been proclaimed, but a culture of reaction prevails.” (Geneva symposium)

Analysis, listening, learning and planning

Conditions which may lead to different forms of violent conflict, and insufficient capacities to prevent this happening, are a “normal” problem in many developing and transition countries. This potential vulnerability should now be part of the basic development cooperation analysis. It should be taken into account in analysing the development history of the country and the incidence of the benefits and costs of different development trends and activities on different regions, ethnic and religious groups, clans, social classes, genders and generations. The vigilance needed — to inequality, social exclusion and the dynamics of difference — in setting the objectives and content of development programmes, requires that external actors not only have a substantial understanding of the country, but also the capacity and willingness to listen to and learn from a wide range of groups and individuals in society.

Countries’ own development plans and strategies, and the programme strategies of donors to support them — with the central focus on poverty reduction and sustainable human development — should now explicitly consider the existing state of social cohesion and inclusion, together with development trends which appear to have an impact on them and the stability of the overall economy. More specifically, tools of vulnerability assessments for different groups should be used in working through with partners their sectoral programs and priorities, and individual aid-supported activities should be subjected to “conflict impact assessments”. While both of these sets of tools are still somewhat experimental, what is most needed, for development cooperation to “mainstream” conflict prevention or conflict sensitivity, is to:

1. build a capacity to analyse and understand different conflict situations, their causes, course and impacts as well as to assess the impact (both positive and negative) of aid on equality, inclusion and poverty eradication aims; and

2. propagate and maintain a culture of conflict consciousness, together with regular and structured analysis and dialogue around these risks and opportunities.

It must be said that the record to date in “building in” a conflict consciousness — and its tangible reflection in risk and situation assessments, programme selection and project design — is still weak in most multilateral and bilateral assistance programmes. In the case of UN activities, for example, the basic programme and coordination frameworks for most countries do not broach the subject of latent or potential conflicts, except as a side-issue in the special cases of emergency and recovery situations. The probable reasons for this, and suitable responses, are discussed below.

Types and priorities of development assistance

When and if a sufficiently clear “conflict consciousness” has been built in, development cooperation activities in these “normal” country situations have wide scope to address a wide
range of development needs, and at the same time promote peace-building and conflict prevention. Programmes can span functional areas that include economic growth and adjustment, food security, agricultural and urban livelihoods, governance and institution building, education, health, environment and resources, integrating a gender perspective in national and local planning, and many others.

At the same time, it is vital, for peace-building purposes as well as others, that development cooperation programmes reflect in practice the strategic lessons and orientations captured in the “Millennium Goals” and partnership approach, as suggested in the preceding section. By directing its own resources — and supporting a partner-society’s own efforts — to reduce extreme poverty and respond to some of the other most universal and basic goals of sustainable human development (as captured in the Goals) development cooperation is on surer peace-building ground than if its benefits are spread in other areas that may be far more amenable to appropriation by one group or another, risking widening disparities and potential grievances.

In practical terms, the major new emphasis on strengthening capacities for governance is consistent with the international development strategy, and at the same time responds directly to conflict prevention concerns. Since corrupt and nepotistic practices contribute to potential conflict and undermine confidence in governance, measures to combat corruption have a substantial role — beginning with protecting development cooperation operations themselves, and targeting both national and international participants in corruption.21

**Relationships within country**

Good practice in development, and in development cooperation is now universally recognised to require strong participation by all affected groups in society. This is the implication of country ownership in practice. In “normal” development situations the key relationship with government is less complex and problematic than in most other types of situation, although there will always be sensitivities and tensions, often explaining why “conflict consciousness” is weak in most development cooperation dialogues and strategies.

In “normal” situations today, where potential sources of serious conflict are not at a threatening level, including a concern for peace-building and conflict prevention as a normal part of the development cooperation dialogue with all countries need not be controversial, recognizing that it may raise issues for both sides to address. Moreover, helping to achieve wide and equitable participation by regional and local authorities and civil society in development decisions can be a productive part of the dialogue and cooperation between a country and its external cooperation partners, while tangibly helping strengthen the capacity to manage conflict.

**Relationships among external actors**

In these “normal” development situations, development cooperation is likely to be the primary channel for the continuing organised involvement of the international community with a developing country. Diplomatic, international security and economic and other relationships are likely to be carried on a fairly low-key basis, with problem-solving “peaks” and humanitarian

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21 As in the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
responses as needed. At the same time, today’s more holistic view of the mission of development cooperation (e.g. including cooperation to help strengthen governance, strengthening capacities for trade and international economic engagement, participation in responding to global problems) means that development cooperation programs need to influence the policies, and draw on the capacities, of ministries within donor governments, and other international organisations, which were traditionally less engaged in development cooperation.

It would not be realistic to expect the different donor countries and international organisations to standardize all their own distinctive arrangements for managing their representation, policies and activities in developing partner countries. But they do all share an over-riding responsibility to strengthen coherence within their own systems and improve harmonization and coordination among themselves in order to ease the burden of coordination that falls on the developing country itself. Too often to date the lack of discipline and coordination by the international actors have unconscionably added to these burdens.

In practical terms, in order to bring a “conflict prevention lens” to ongoing development cooperation work, peace-building and conflict prevention concerns, and evolving best practices for assessing them, need to be explicitly integrated into the systems for planning, implementing and evaluating programmes. They should be credibly treated in country-led general and sectoral strategies and plans, comprehensive development frameworks, Poverty Reduction Strategies, and Common Country Assessments, and UN Development Assistance Frameworks, as well as regional and sub-regional frameworks. Development agencies need to recruit and train staff to follow-through on conflict-related objectives with consultation and programme design, implementation and evaluation. The idea of calling upon diverse networks or “brains-trusts” of country and regional experts to advise on strategies and programmes, as referred to in the discussion below of “conflict-prone” situations, may also be valuable even in relation to regions or countries without current serious conflicts.

**Dilemmas and hard choices**

In “normal” times — in addition to the sensitivity of raising questions around potential sources of conflict with partner governments — a further difficulty may be in getting sufficient attention and resources paid to looking at potential vulnerabilities (and possible de-stabilising impacts of development or development cooperation) when all seems to be going reasonably well. Without neglecting the many other analyses and factors that must also be considered, painful experience simply drives home that the conflict prevention dimension of development cooperation work must be kept in the picture. This does speak for stronger analytical capacities (in social science and related areas) by donors on the ground, as well as reasonably light but regular systems for ensuring that the relevant monitoring is maintained.

Beyond this, most of the dilemmas and hard choices in these “normal” situations hinge on actually achieving the overall improvements in development cooperation to which countries have committed themselves in the new international development strategy. These improvements aim at major qualitative upgrading in both the processes of cooperation and in the results or “products” of development itself. If they are in fact delivered, the continuing dividend in improved peace-building impacts should be very substantial.
In this regard, one continuing tension will continue to be between the need to seek sustainable results — since better development cooperation with ownership is likely to take more time — and the frequent tendency of external partners to seek quick and highly visible results. There will be a need to guard against this tendency increasing because of a heightened interest in peace-building impacts by organizations and ministries less experienced in the lessons of patience and promoting local ownership.

Similarly, one of the most difficult challenges in the new style of development cooperation is for donors (and their publics and taxpayers) to accept the need to coordinate their own activities, if necessary at the expense of some independence of action and donor identity, in order to support truly effective, country-owned results.

2. In conflict-prone or especially vulnerable situations

Growing experience, greater conflict awareness in analyses of developing country situations, and some analytical techniques and tools are helping to identify circumstances where, for various reasons, the potential for dangerous conflict is higher than in most developing countries, even if it may still be submerged.

“Watch” factors. The first and clearest reason to be especially alert to this potential is a history of past violent conflict, which almost inevitably signals some powerful legacies, unresolved root causes, and potential flash points for future violent conflict. Contrary to some popular assumptions, careful analysis suggests that ethnic or religious diversity in a society is not necessarily a risk factor for violent conflict. The mobilisation of these identities for political purposes is often a serious warning sign, and becomes especially potent when there are substantial inequalities — political, economic and/or social — among different groups.22 These dangers are magnified in a situation of increasing competition for some finite resource or opportunity (e.g. land, or educational opportunities in a stagnating system, corruption or the spoils of government employment or patronage).

Violent conflict in a country’s immediate neighbourhood or region is another “watch” factor, as shown in the recent history of some West African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, as well as other regions. Research and accumulated experience also suggest that a country’s heavy reliance on a very narrow base of natural resource exploitation constitutes a potential vulnerability to conflict, as do marked and widening disparities between development opportunities among different groups and regions. Rapid downturns in the economic circumstances of whole countries, regions, sectors and social groups are also a serious warning sign. Countries with very weak governance capacity extending to their whole territory and population and unable to sustain the most basic services to citizens, beginning with security of persons and property, are similarly vulnerable.

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“The case of Guinea shows again that early warning and political will in themselves may not prevent a slide into violent conflict.” (Geneva symposium)

In these kinds of situations, development cooperation needs to redouble its sensitivity and take extra precautions to ensure that its work, while always making economic sense, does not exacerbate potentially divisive development trends. On the positive side, development assistance can be designed quite specifically to help reduce “horizontal inequalities” and strengthen “bridging” institutions and social capital between groups, as a counter-weight to the “bonding” types within groups which can in these circumstances spell danger.

Analysis, listening, learning and planning

As mentioned, in these situations the conflict consciousness and the measures used to apply it concretely need to be intensified from “normal” development situations, but can still basically follow the approaches recommended there. At present, it is probably fair to say that only in this kind of “first alert” situation do these measures now get applied at all.

In these conflict-prone situations, methods and organised systems for risk and vulnerability analysis, conflict impact assessment, and evaluation are no longer merely desirable, but essential for responsible development cooperation. So are early warning information, capability and sharing/dissemination, and decision-making “trip-wires” to ensure responses to these warnings. As underlined below, in the discussion of “relationships among external actors,” there is now an even higher premium on wide information-sharing, and coordinated analysis and action. More importance needs to be given to training and awareness-raising of all staff about conflict dynamics and awareness of the possible impacts on development institutions and programmes themselves.

Types and priorities of development assistance

In these settings, working to strengthen broad and balanced participation in development strategies and programs becomes more necessary and probably more difficult. Working with and through indigenous authorities as far as possible, donors can use their skills, contacts and programmes to help find and support peace-building initiatives and promote the actual practice of voluntary cooperation across the widest possible range of the society — bringing people and ultimately groups together at community and national levels.

The DAC’s new publication draws on case studies to show the marked difference between two dam projects in conflict-torn Sri Lanka. “Some of the factors that contributed to [Gal Oya’s] success as a development project also contributed to its success in peace-building. Its success in both areas is explained by its thoroughly participatory development approach.”

The development dialogue and programme support should encourage vigilance about both positive and negative impacts of the presence, activities and resources of development cooperation programmes on conflict tensions. It should also help promote vulnerability assessment in identifying at-risk groups, communities and areas that may need particular

development support for social and economic protection — access to agricultural produce, inputs or markets, response to migration movements to cities etc.

In practice, the horizons of development cooperation planning in these situations may tend to shorten somewhat. As mentioned above, conscious attempts to avoid deepening divisions or cleavages, and seeking to bridge them instead, should be given more prominence. Under these circumstances development assistance is likely to meet these goals best if support is focused in areas such as the following:

1. Poverty reduction with a specific view to helping narrow and close inter-group disparities;

2. Improving the allocation and management of natural resources;

3. Programmes in participatory development, the rule of law, and good governance. These can include promoting specific peace-building development objectives in situations of chronic or low-intensity conflict that are deemed ‘non-crisis’ e.g. institutional reform aimed at improving representation of national groups or creating legal avenues of redress for grievances; rule of law — human rights monitoring and oversight capacities at national and local level — institutional development and reform.

4. Measures to limit the flow and diffusion of arms;

5. Civic education and programmes to strengthen respect for human rights;

6. Targeted measures to support the self-help potential of crisis-threatened groups; and

7. The encouragement or reinforcement of structures for dialogue and mediation. 24

Relationships within country

Work in helping to strengthen governance and the rule of law becomes more sensitive, more important and more immediate. Similarly, dialogues with governments (national, regional and local) and organised civil society need to be deepened and existing relationships of trust need to be called upon by well-informed external partners to address explicitly the potential dangers looming on the horizon. Backed by advice from diplomatic and other specialized experts, development representatives may be able to use their established channels and relationships to work with leaders and groups to help establish the sources of, and possible solutions to, tensions.

Because the dangers are still potential ones, there may be even more resistance on the part of some in the country to discussion or involvement by foreigners than in a situation where violence has erupted and the existence of serious problems becomes impossible to dispute. Conversely, however, the right kind of dialogue, properly informed and approached respectfully and constructively by proven and trusted partners, may in some ways be easier before problems become excessively politicized and polarized, and erupt openly.

24 This listing is derived mainly from the DAC Guidelines 1998, p.22
As always, donors and other international actors need to avoid over-estimating the incentive effects that the granting or withholding of aid can generate, and recognise that trying to impose any crude application of aid conditionality is likely to be ineffective or counter-productive. At the same time, there are situations in which external partners may need to indicate frankly the limits of what they can and cannot continue to support, and if the basic relationships of trust and partnership are in place this may have a salutary effect on local protagonists, and can give valuable support to those who are working internally for peaceful improvements.

“In the DAC case studies we found that there may still be some chance for effective conditionality — if your goals are achievable, and your methods coordinated and principled, and if you ask the people if it’s helping.”

“There is room for selectivity in programming, for example, we did it in Pakistan to pursue people-oriented benefits under the International Development Goals, while stopping more ‘fungible’ flows like civil service support and higher fellowships.”

“In Zambia, the coordinated threat of aid withdrawal by several major donors helped turn the tide on the threat to the constitution.” (Geneva symposium)

In these circumstances, development cooperation also has a special responsibility to be listening to credible voices in the society, including human rights bodies and experts, to be sure that all possible measures are being taken to avoid stresses turning into abuses.

Relationships among external actors

Development cooperation has generally continued to be the most prominent continuing presence of the international community in conflict-prone situations prior to any imminent or overt outbreaks of major conflict or violence. Except in a relatively few countries which were of great strategic importance internationally, such potential problems had difficulty getting onto the “radar screen” of mainstream diplomacy, human rights, or international economic actors. Given the changing nature of development cooperation, particularly to address governance issues, trade capacities, cross-border issues etc., together with the clear commitment of the international community to move to a culture of prevention, these situations probably now require development cooperation to call on the expertise and low-key engagement of other international actors further “upstream” to influence affairs before crisis becomes inescapable.

The low-key character of this greater multi-disciplinary involvement, and its continued coordination from a developmental perspective, will be important to avoiding a possible perverse, “self-fulfilling prophecy” effect. High-profile international political involvement might in some circumstances intensify the politicization, and harden the polarization, of problems which might better continue to be treated on a “functional” basis, with a search for functional solutions, wherever possible.

The sharing of information and coordination of analysis and action among external actors (multilateral, bilateral, voluntary and private sector) are critical to an effective response where dangers of conflict are anticipated. In the past, as is well known, the sources of danger and appropriate international responses have sometimes been issues of heated debate between different external partners. This may sometimes have been because of defensiveness about their
inaction leading up to a crisis, as well as some genuine differences of interest, perception, and
diagnosis. Possibly, by working together more closely “upstream” of any imminent crisis, the
external actors as a group may do better inconcerting their response. One promising mechanism
to help facilitate this may be for them to call jointly from time to time on a diverse “brains trust”
of country experts to assure full, shared discussion of relevant information and analyses.25

“… all too often the understanding that external actors have about the in-country situation
is one-sided, superficial and devoid of means to analyse and up-date its
analysis.”(Geneva symposium)

Dilemmas and hard choices

In some conflict-prone and especially vulnerable situations, there are likely to be different views
as well between the government and external partners as to the severity and sources of risk in
play. This requires the external partners to make decisions about the degree of engagement and
long-term partnership they are prepared to maintain, and the concomitant risks that they are
prepared to accept. As long as the international community maintains a predominantly
developmental approach and profile in its engagement, the long-term relationships of trust should
be protected, but there will already be some within the country who will start to attack aid as
“politicised.” This is a perception and a real risk that must be managed through dealing with
issues and groups in the most transparent ways possible.

3. In situations of rising tensions

If an international culture of conflict prevention is to be carried further and made operational, the
next logical task for the international community is to work out ways of anticipating and acting
helpfully before full-blown crises actually erupt. When crises are imminent or underway,
international concern for immediate preventive and protective efforts naturally tend to come to
the fore, although in practice, the instruments of preventive diplomacy are still used in only a few
of these situations. Meanwhile, the common reflex of a government in a country concerned will
be focused on “keeping the lid on” the crisis internationally — while either trying to resolve it,
repress it or deny its existence.

Thus, at present, development cooperation often continues to be the main channel for
involvement by the international community, and by default is implicitly expected to carry some
very immediate conflict prevention tasks. This, in some circumstances, can strain the capacity of
development cooperation systems and also begin to undermine the broadly-based trust and long-
term orientation which development cooperation needs to maintain. On the other hand, there is
no question that development cooperation activities may need to be adjusted in these
circumstances.

25 As proposed in the synthesis study on “The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict” prepared by
Professor Peter Uvin for the OECD/DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, and
included in the DAC’s May 2001 Supplement to its 1998 Guidelines in this area. UNDP Resident Representatives
from conflict and post-conflict countries proposed and accepted a similar sort of mechanism when they gathered in
March 2001. Some related efforts have been tried in the past, e.g. in the Great Lakes region of Africa in 1998-99, but
not sufficiently sustained
Analysis, listening, learning and planning.

It has now been well documented, and recognised internationally, that there are serious deficiencies in the capacities of the international community, beginning in the UN Secretariat, with its central responsibilities in these areas, for “accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating long-term strategies.” There is no adequate substitute in the knowledge systems of other actors for a politically-informed, multi-disciplinary base of knowledge required for these purposes, and there are good reasons for ensuring that development cooperation knowledge retains and protects its developmental rationale, character and reputation, with very high transparency.

At the same time, from the developmental perspective, experience and analysis have now generated some significant indicators of rising tensions and potential crises.

Some Key Risk Factors

Early warning tools can help promote explicit and timely attention to risk factors. This helps encourage a “culture of prevention” and provides information required for situation-specific judgements.

1. The loss of political space for opposition, civil society and media to engage in public discourse.

2. Social, economic and political exclusion of certain groups from mainstream development.

3. Large proportion of unemployed youth.

4. Impoverishment, rapid decline of access to basic services and livelihood opportunities.

5. Distorted distributional effects of development, and increasing horizontal inequalities.

6. A rising sense of indignity, human rights violations.

7. Increased insecurity and perceived threats.

8. Migratory flows, both internal and external, for economic and political reasons.

By listening to their diverse collaborators and contacts within a country, development cooperation personnel should be able to contribute to informed judgements about the potential seriousness and extent of rising tensions, and to contribute openly to thinking about options for constructive external help.

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26 UN, Brahimi Panel Report, p.12
At the same time, prudent planning must now include contingency measures to help protect development investments.

**Types and priorities of development assistance**

Most of the types of assistance suggested for conflict-prone or especially vulnerable situations are likely to remain priorities for continued development cooperation here, as long as it remains safe and practicable to continue them. At the same time, some targeted new activities may need to be emphasized. For example:

1. make the presence of “witnesses” to emerging problems felt, while working to keep attention on practical development actions;

2. focus on assistance to help preserve macroeconomic, and especially price, stability without exacerbating divisive pressures;

3. support local efforts for peacemaking dialogues and, where possible and appropriate, reinforce national and local institutions for peacemaking, as well as responsible, independent media to help counter the dangers of incendiary propaganda;

4. ensure that staff has the capacities and mandate to respond to and deal with the effects of tensions on development programmes and to seek opportunities for their constructive engagement with these conflict tensions (e.g. in work with different levels of government and civil society, or in whatever space remains for supporting sound civil-military relations, the justice system, and the protection of human rights);

5. at a higher level, reinforce assistance for cooperation on development issues at the regional and sub-regional levels, to help counter the possible souring of relations with neighbours, and the widening of crises across borders.

“The regional organizations have a growing role to play. One example is in the Americas where the OAS has more credibility and gradations of pressure, under the Santiago Declaration, to discourage backsliding from democracy. Other regional organizations, and those like the Commonwealth and Francophonie can do similar things.” (Geneva symposium)

Plainly, development cooperation work assumes new risks in these situations of rising tensions. Meanwhile, to prepare for the worst, specific contingency planning is also needed to help protect existing development gains and assets in human, social and physical capital. For example:

1. strategies and practical arrangements may be designed to try to assure low-key, sustaining support to some vital organizations and economic, social and governance activities;

2. alternate plans need to be prepared to reorient, suspend or wind down aid programmes in event of open conflict or stepped up external political and military intervention;
3. coordination with other development actors, international political actors and potential humanitarian actors may need to be stepped up;

4. development cooperation programmes should prepare themselves for support roles to humanitarian efforts in the event of escalation;

5. the position of local and expatriate staff needs to be carefully assessed and clear strategies set out for the protection and welfare of staff.

Relationships within country

The contacts and working relationships of development cooperation with government at all levels, and with different parts of civil society, are particularly important and sensitive at this time. The state may already face a crisis of legitimacy or impotence. Clear strategies of engagement are needed to establish “entry” and “exit” points in seeking to influence national and community situations in these situations of rising tension, with input from other foreign policy actors. Aid personnel need to be better equipped for managing the tasks and the risks involved, and better supported when their work comes into conflict with a state’s officialdom or others. At the same time, development cooperation actors may often need to remind others of the availability and strengths of internal capacities and processes in the country, to help promote the search for indigenously-rooted solutions.

Contingency planning to protect development investments, like other development cooperation planning, should be carried out in dialogue with local partners, governmental and non-governmental, as it will fall primarily on them to actually assure the protection of these investments. It is even possible that initiating this kind of dialogue may make a modest contribution to conflict prevention, by at least reminding all concerned of some of the potential costs of unchecked conflict, including the constraints that will inevitably limit further external help.

Relationships among external actors

In this kind of situation, the international community is recognising, at least in principle, that it is vital for development cooperation to be supplemented by other channels of international involvement, such as fact—finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisis prevention. 28 At the same time, development cooperation still needs to work intensively to preserve the momentum of development programs and the integrity and trust of long-standing and diverse relationships. All donors have a special responsibility in these circumstances to share information, analyses and representations on conditions affecting their work in the country, with a view to presenting consistent positions on their concerns and recommendations to government and others.

“UNDP is still lacking in predictable instruments and predictable capacities.” (Geneva symposium)

28 ibid
As indicated above, specific new initiatives or emphases in development cooperation programs may be called for, without sacrificing the basic guiding principles of local ownership and partnership. As preventive diplomacy efforts unfold and, hopefully, succeed — carried and coordinated primarily by diplomatic actors — there are likely to be weighty implications for short-term and longer-term development cooperation strategies, as there often are in peace settlements after wars. The knowledge infrastructure of development cooperation is a vital asset for these diplomatic actors in seeking out and thinking through potential constructive responses to some of the root causes of the crisis, as well as practicable institutional and other assistance measures.

Tensions may begin to arise between diplomatic actors, who typically wish to see cooperation activities re-oriented rapidly to support political objectives, and development professionals, who tend to take a longer view. This dialogue, which will also be found in other situations of violent conflict or near-conflict, should not be considered abnormal or unhealthy — both these perspectives have their merits in each case, and the process of an informed and responsible debate of the options is indeed a responsibility of the international community. Given the pressure of negotiations to resolve crises and avert the outbreak of violence, dialogue is also vital between diplomatic and development experts to guard against diplomatic negotiators promising unrealisable development contributions, while on the other hand encouraging development actors to help generate more flexible and rapidly-responsive actions than in their longer-term programming.

Dilemmas and Hard Choices

The country knowledge and diverse relationships of development cooperation actors can be an invaluable asset for all international preventive and protective action, but great care must be taken to respect the development partnership character of these relationships and avoid over-politicising them in these tense situations.

As soon as international involvement begins to intensify, so does the perennial danger of beginning to overwhelm or push aside local actors and their capacities, especially when they are divided and often mutually-antagonistic, and it is urgent to try to take action. Nobody has any magic solution to this problem, but development cooperation personnel should be able (and asked) on the basis of their professional culture, longstanding and wide-ranging relationships and trust, to advise at all stages on how all international action can keep trying to reinforce local capacity for peace-building, and avoid substituting for it.

4. In situations of open violent conflict

When fighting has broken out on a substantial scale, international concern necessarily focuses on efforts to stop it, to mitigate its impacts on populations, and prevent its possible spread. Development cooperation has only modest direct influence in these tasks. “Peacemaking” and humanitarian activity is the first order of the day — Security Council resolutions, negotiations, Special Representatives, and ultimately peacekeeping mandates can come into play. Food aid, assistance to refugees and internally displaced people, and other areas may grow to very large scales.
At the same time, the basic rule for development cooperation should be to maintain as much of its activity as possible, as long as possible, unless compelling reasons of safety or of embroilment in the conflict force their suspension. Some long-term development cooperation activities become difficult or impossible to keep active but must be protected as much as possible, others can and must be sustained, and some development cooperation knowledge, experience and capacity may be called upon to help diplomatic/political and humanitarian actors in their tasks.

“What can you do to help to enlarge opportunities, even in the midst of conflict? Otherwise, war and criminalisation will certainly fill the ‘opportunity gap.” (Geneva symposium)

One important reality to be taken into account is the number of violent conflicts that can be protracted or chronically recurring over many years. Some may encompass wide regions or parts of the life of the country, for example in Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, or Northern Ireland for long periods. Other protracted conflicts may be more partial, or regionally confined within countries (e.g. Chiapas) but even these may have volatile external linkages (e.g. Kashmir). Evidently, each of these types of enduring violent conflict — and changes in them — shapes very differently the potential and limitations of development cooperation in supporting peace-building and conflict prevention, and the types of action that are likely to be most effective. Because these longstanding situations eventually tend to force the international community to think and act more strategically, they may sometimes also hold lessons about the approaches which should be taken in other conflicts before they drag into the years. The instrument of agreed strategic frameworks (piloted in Afghanistan, with mixed success) through which international actors can coordinate their responses to a complex internal situation, appears to be an approach which could be refined and applied more widely.

Analysis, listening, learning and planning

When violent conflict is underway, the strengthening of a credible international system for information-gathering, analysis, and policy is even more imperative than in situations of imminent crises and rising tensions, in order for the international community to be able to generate more effective responses in peacemaking and help lay the groundwork for peace-building. Given the predominance of concern for protecting populations, moderating conflict, ending hostilities, and starting peace negotiations, these goals should be expected to predominate as well in analysis and dialogue by the international community. Operationally, the humanitarian actors have moved in and emergency relief is the dominant mode of operations.

At the same time, the humanitarian and political/diplomatic responses will need all the help they can get, and many of the actions that will be called for — if negotiations become serious, and peace-building opportunities open up — will lie in the domain of development cooperation, which needs to be as well-prepared as possible. Development cooperation will need to work to keep its contacts alive (sometimes quite literally) and its channels open to support whatever ongoing development cooperation activity can be maintained. At the same time, the analytical capacity of development cooperation and its networks (even partial ones) of partners throughout the society are crucial assets to have in readiness to help design and then implement realistic aid actions as soon as circumstances permit, or demand.
Types and priorities of development assistance

Donors should be prepared to:

1. implement strategies to protect development gains, reorient development programmes and plans to respond to new challenges and realities of conflict;

2. set clear criteria and justification for suspension of existing development programmes or exit strategy from areas involved;

3. work with civil society institutions and networks to help preserve social and human capital, and reinforce capacities to protect a working economy and physical capital;

4. support specific peace-building initiatives that can help “cross the lines” drawn by combatant interests;

5. gather and share information with all actors to optimise strategies for humanitarian and development responses;

6. coordinate with humanitarian actors to facilitate a continuity in work begun and to build on the assets from the relief phase to support the transition to early recovery once the situations stabilizes;

7. coordinate with incoming relief agencies to tap into development resources (infrastructure, personnel, vehicles, communications, local knowledge, road access etc.)

8. bring the development perspective to humanitarian programmes — prepare for the recovery phase, ensuring elements are in place — e.g. avoiding artificial ‘islands of development’ that can result from an intensive influx of relief aid that is likely to be abruptly halted as crisis scales down;

9. adopt flexible response to supporting quick impact projects to support livelihoods and basic needs of communities in areas deemed ‘safe pockets;’

10. concerns remain in force for the safety and welfare of local and expatriate staff, and their need to have flexible capacities and mandates.

“Small projects can sometimes make a big difference in the midst of crisis, but a lack of political will and rigid donor approaches have led to missed opportunities to help communities preserve development and move toward peace. In 1999, in South Kivu in the Eastern Congo, $5000. to help rehabilitate a market, health centre and school could have greatly boosted local reconciliation efforts. It could not be found.”

“Donors should not leave the field to the ‘spoilers.’”

(Geneva symposium)
Relationships within country

In the midst of conflict, all the normal sensitivity about the presence and involvement of foreigners, and the suspicions and charges of one-sidedness are likely to be re-doubled. The representatives of the international community can work to reduce this problem by applying the maximum care and transparency to act with a principled impartiality\(^{29}\), and by working hard to arrive at common analyses and positions, rather than reflecting and thus feeding internal factionalism through their own divisions.

While governments and other main political actors are likely to be embroiled in the worst of the battles, there are almost always still other important institutions and networks of people working at local, regional and national levels to try to maintain as much stability and normalcy as possible, and sometimes to work actively for peace, crossing the lines drawn by the combatants. These groups — often including business and professional associations; religious groups; NGOs; women’s organisations; and specific conflict-bridging initiatives — tend to take on wider roles in maintaining general development, as well as providing support for peacemaking, and for the rebuilding to follow. By definition, the activities of these civil society groups are also likely to need more help under conditions of violent conflict and its attendant economic dislocation and destruction. Thus these types of development cooperation are likely to be a high priority, growing logically out of prior activities and contacts, and feeding logically into preparation for post-crisis peace-building.

“Know where the open space is, and work within it. South Africa, Nicaragua, and Pinochet’s Chile all offer examples. Development people need to be politically informed and to have staying power.” (Geneva symposium)

The strategy of working more closely with civil society groups and networks, it must be recognised, is not without its dangers, both for external partners and, most seriously, for the nationals involved in these groups. Some donors will be open to charges of favouring one side or other in the conflict, and even the most even-handed will often be perceived and treated this way, following the polarised logic of conflict that those who are not allies must necessarily be adversaries. Their local partners can be in real danger, and even be specifically targeted, with their foreign support an additional factor sometimes used against them. This danger demands special levels of sensitivity and responsibility from external partners and donors, to avoid exacerbating problems for those they work with, and offering whatever measures of support and protection they can be confident of actually delivering.

Relationships among external actors

During active violent conflicts, development cooperation rarely, if ever, plays lead roles, but it needs to be explicitly recognised and called upon for a number of key supporting roles to the peacemaking and humanitarian tasks which now take centre stage, with the diplomatic/political, security and humanitarian actors in the lead. The development cooperation roles build on past

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\(^{29}\) Building on the self-criticism of the UN and others of their roles in cases like those of Srebrenica and the Rwandan genocide, the Brahimi Panel has helped point to a more acceptable approach for the future.
activities and relationships, and focus on a kind of “low level maintenance” of development investments during conflict, and helping prepare the developmental peace-building foundations for transition to peace, recovery and renewed development momentum.

As most analysis of experience suggests, it is necessary to begin preparing peace-building strategies even during conflicts, in order to be ready to put them into action when the opportunity opens up. As the Brahimi Panel Report aptly summarizes the situation, “peace-building is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict.” It recommends that the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs — as the Convenor of the multi-agency Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) — be designated to serve as the appropriate focal point to coordinate the diverse activities involved, and that the ECPS “provides the ideal forum for the formulation of peace-building strategies.” The Panel report then adds that “a distinction should be made between strategy formulation and implementation, based upon a rational division of labour among ECPS members. In the Panel’s view, UNDP has untapped potential in this area, and UNDP, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the World Bank, are best placed to take the lead in implementing peace-building activities.”

This logical division of labour obviously demands high standards of cooperation, consultation and partnership among the actors involved from the international community, multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental. This is especially the case because:

1. peace-building planning should begin while the conflict is still going on, and while the political and humanitarian actors are most prominent on the scene; and

2. the types of activities likely to require emphasis include such areas as strengthening policing and the rule of law, upholding human rights and working toward reconciliation; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, as well as “quick impact” projects, intended to show rapid benefits to populations. All of these may be closely linked to peace negotiations, but they require the best of developmental expertise, and extend as well into the future, requiring the fullest two-way consultation.

Even in an experience as recent as that in the East Timor transition, for several reasons, both advance preparation and the necessary participatory, developmental approach to the transition were found to be sorely deficient. A convincing case has been made that “the mission suffered throughout from an underlying contradiction between its structure — which was classic peacekeeping — and its mandate, which was to prepare the Timorese for independence.”

Dilemmas and hard choices.

Impartiality in action. In the charged setting of conflict situations, all international action faces agonising dilemmas over the challenges of maintaining a principled impartiality among warring factions, while doing their best to protect the populations who are often helpless and blameless.

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30ibid, p.8
31 Astri Suhrke, “Structure versus Mandate: the contradictory logic of UNTAET” (June 2001, forthcoming), p. 15 (Contact astri.suhrke@cmi.no).
but under the control of leaders who are quite prepared to use them as hostages. Impartiality remains one of the “bedrock principles” of UN peace operations, although the Brahimi Report urges (in the light of the Rwandan genocide and other cases) that impartial treatment must in future take clear account of the principles of the UN Charter — “where one party to a peace agreement is clearly and incontrovertibly violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst case amount to complicity with evil.”

Even the humanitarian relief community, parts of which have a long tradition of strict political neutrality, is now compelled to debate and resolve its approaches to neutrality and impartiality in light of the ways that the resources and international attention brought into some conflicts by humanitarian relief has been exploited and abused as a source of war financing, or another weapon in the hands of some warring factions.

Like humanitarian relief, development cooperation injects substantial resources and attention into conflict situations, and can be subject to similar exploitation and abuse. Although the development mission cannot be as insulated from political dispute as much as humanitarian action should, donors rightly hesitate to take decisions to move away from impartiality in their aid — which in conflict situations should already be mainly targeted directly to populations — since the longer-term investment in the relationship with the whole population is vital to preserve. Experience has now quite clearly established that trying to use the granting or withdrawal of most types of aid as a lever to influence the behaviour of protagonists in a conflict most often fails to achieve that objective, while also causing considerable unintended pain for others. To some extent, “smarter,” more targeted measures — such as stopping the most fungible aid flows, those clearly benefitting miscreant leaders, or those through belligerent channels — can help meet these concerns, unless the abuse becomes so extreme that total withdrawal is the only choice left.

In light of all these factors, it might be suggested that — with stronger arrangements for transparency and communication, and some broad shared parameters — the international diplomatic/political, security, developmental, and humanitarian responses in conflict situations need to reflect their particular missions, principles, and “target groups” in their approaches to impartiality. The humanitarian response clearly needs to continue to give priority to the immediate survival needs of populations, while realistically managing the risks that its help may be diverted or politically manipulated. Development cooperation can and should be even more guarded against diversion and manipulation, and move to use alternative channels to those which may be threatened by the interests of combatants. The diplomatic/political and (perhaps even more) security responses — as importantly suggested by the Brahimi Panel — may at the same time need to adopt more forceful positions vis-à-vis the political and security leaderships with whose actions they are called upon to deal most directly. It would clearly be damaging to the constructive impact and credibility of the international community’s role if external actions in any of these domains were undermining each other, but with reasonable safeguards there is no evidence that this is an overwhelming threat. Meanwhile, there are powerful arguments for maintaining some measure of mutual insulation between these different international responses.

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32 ibid, pp9 and ix
Further difficult choices will be confronted in the attempt to devise and implement suitable “quick impact” assistance projects, where conditions permit, as a way of delivering and demonstrating the tangible benefits of stability and peace to affected populations. Since nobody would ever deliberately choose “slow impact” projects, the legitimate reason that most good aid projects take time — recognizing that often there are also less legitimate reasons — is that good preparation, consultation, and participation in implementation are the proven hallmarks of sustainable success in development, and of the effective use of aid. Even with some fairly obviously benign quick projects like the provision of seeds, inputs and equipment for putting in a new crop, the links to the longer-term supply and financing systems need to be considered. It goes against the grain for development cooperation professionals to abandon these standards in order to show quick impacts, when they know that many of the impacts will be unsustainable, especially when the interest and largesse of the international community dries up as the “CNN factor” wanes. At the same time there may be a compelling need to show such “results” for peacemaking purposes, and development cooperation professionals are the only international representatives with the skills to select, design and manage them. This is an area where organized and frank joint examination of best practice will help to bridge these dilemmas, and allow for better advance preparation for these difficult situations.

“A ‘de-mining’ project in Somalia in 1998 was driven by the external assumption that 1) ‘of course everyone wants de-mining;’ and 2) ‘the budget allocation for de-mining will only be available for the budget year.’ Yet the consultative process for Somalis is a long, democratic and all-inclusive affair that often takes months to complete. The final result was a relatively quick agreement on a project that — due to lack of full clan and community consultations — resulted in conflict.” (Comments from the Geneva symposium.)

5. In transitions from violent conflict to peace

“The Mozambique case was extraordinary, with a trust fund and adequate resources to help secure a peace agreement”. … “In Guatemala, the agreement was designed to give major weight to development issues and action, reflecting the understanding that systemic imbalances in development were a chronic and critical problem”. … “In Angola there were not enough resources to follow through”. … “In Bosnia, by focusing early on governmental structures and elections at all levels, we got all the old warriors legitimized”. … “[and] in Sierra Leone, we were stuck with all the dilemmas of trying to make a badly-flawed agreement work.” (Comments from the Geneva symposium.)

‘Peace-building’ transitions are usually fragile, and have repeatedly been shown to call for the intensive and coordinated involvement of political, economic, humanitarian and developmental action by the international community. A coherent diplomatic approach by is vital in sorting out which factions will be engaged with and how, and in helping the internal parties work out the framework of peace agreements. The framework will almost always need to contain longer-term development support on several fronts. In addition to a stronger political commitment to follow-through on such promises, more timely, practical advice from development cooperation experts will need to be sought, and heeded, to help ensure that such promises will be realizable and sustainable.
The focus of attention for the international community begins to shift from saving lives, to securing peace and saving livelihoods. All the assistance being undertaken or considered will require considerable operational management and capacity-building assistance. Relatedly, the overlapping relief-to-development transition in the focus and management of international assistance activities needs to be properly organised and financed, to help ease the enormous burdens on the country and its administration as it emerges from violent conflict.

Analysis, listening, learning and planning

To provide the most effective help with early recovery efforts, development cooperation planning should focus on:

1. filling the foreseeable gaps in external support between humanitarian relief and longer-term development (building on the assets provided through humanitarian action); and

2. helping the society to re-build its capacities, identify and prioritise recovery and development needs, and restore the vital sense of “ownership” to replace dependency in relations with external supporters.

Here again, the best possible developmental analysis of the sources and triggers of the past violent conflict — if not a definitive analysis of “root” or structural causes — provides valuable background to future planning. Transparent and jointly-sponsored analysis, with continuing joint consultation of domestic and outside experts, is likely to be the best guarantor that significant past lessons will be taken into account.

Types and priorities of development assistance:

Aid should include support for the peace process itself — through modest, quick impact and negotiation support activities, but more importantly by advocating and enabling the national development priorities to be part of such processes, including the macroeconomic and national infrastructure elements of recovery. Rapid response is needed to put in place the foundations for sustainable recovery while providing clear evidence early on to communities, government and opposition groups that a peace dividend is possible. Working with all these parties to identify development needs and priorities, human resources, local capacity and skills etc. and helping create forums and opportunities for cooperation is a basic part of this immediate development process.

Other early assistance needs, often directly linked to the terms of peace agreements, form the essential foundations for re-launching development on many fronts, and many programmes and projects need to be worked out and initiated with all due speed during a transition process.

33 The 1998 DAC Guidelines provide a very strong, and mostly still valid, framework for this discussion — including a listing of “operational priorities for supporting post-conflict recovery.” These have since been widely used and endorsed, and supported by participants in consultations in Africa, Latin America, and the Asia-Pacific. This work, together with other inputs, is reflected in this section, but it also merits direct reference. OECD/DAC, Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, Paris, 1998. pp. 75-100
“Trying to have a comprehensive view cannot always mean trying to have a comprehensive programme.” (Geneva symposium)

As they emerge from crises, countries are likely to face many urgent needs among the enormous range of types of transitional and development cooperation listed below. Their capacities, however, are likely to be shaky and over-stretched, and manageable priorities must be worked out, depending on the situation of the particular country. The donor community has a responsibility to find the most helpful appropriate “entry points” for external contributions, and to work in much more coordinated, disciplined ways than in the past with the beleaguered nationals responsible for selecting, sequencing, and acting on these priorities. Even with all these urgent needs, the time needs to be taken to fully consult and engage local populations. Failure to do so is likely to produce results that are unsustainable or worse.

“This is a very proper list indeed, but a HUGE agenda even to contemplate in most of the countries we’re talking about. The list shouldn’t be arbitrarily shortened, but it needs at least to be accompanied by a strong warning that it cannot all be accomplished and requires selectivity, prioritization, flexibility, a strong sense of what the various circumstances on the ground will allow, and a strong dose of pursuing the art of the possible, in order to have a chance to effect continuing progress.” (Geneva symposium)

1. Support for Governance, Civil Society and the Rule of Law: To help assure a sustainable peace by helping restore or institute accountable governance and a healthy civil society, and legitimate protection for the security of persons and property:

   a. Help to train and organize for the basic functions and services of accountable government, taking account of traditional models and capacities:
      i. support for electoral systems and well-prepared new elections;
      ii. institutional support and strengthening of key government ministries;
      iii. support to institution building and reform at regional and local levels through decentralization and public administration programmes;
      iv. enabling and supporting forums for inclusive discussions and planning of development programmes and priorities (e.g. state and civil society, inter-regional etc.)

   b. Help to train and organize for the basic functions and services of a legitimate justice system:
      i. judicial training
      ii. reform of security services, policing etc.,
      iii. penal reform,
      iv. assuring access to justice, and to grievance mechanisms including human commissions, ombudsmen etc.

   c. Offer related support for wider security needs:
      i. mine action — safe agricultural land and roadways, help build local capacity to de-mine;
ii. demobilisation and disarmament of former combatants — small arms reduction;  
iii. reintegration of former combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons, with access to land, housing, training etc., addressing local fears and tensions, assisting whole communities and not just “favoured” target groups. (e.g. through area development programmes such as PRODERE in Central America and its successor programme in Cambodia);  
iv. truth and reconciliation commissions, and/or war crimes tribunals, where instituted;  
v. pro-active peace-building dialogues, inter-group cooperation, mediation and negotiating capacities, civic education, professionalised media, and other underpinnings of civility and eventual reconciliation.

2. Support for Restored Livelihoods and Economic Development: To help assure a sustainable peace by supporting the frameworks and underpinnings for viable economic recovery — in the face of multiple competing demands — and restored livelihoods for all parts of the population:

a. as early as the stage of peace negotiations, if applicable, helping work out a sound, even if rudimentary, macroeconomic framework for recovery to encourage realistic commitments and expectations and help identify agreed priorities;  
b. restoring or building a working capacity for economic management: public finance management, including revenue generation and priority-setting and expenditure management; currency, monetary and exchange rate policies; economic information systems; banking system and governance; investment policies, etc.  
c. supporting measures to help shift from reliance on the economy of war and profiteering to more stable avenues for income at household and national levels;  
d. seeking entry-points for viable, and potentially replicable, micro-economic aid to support fragile peace and create opportunities to revitalise incomes and livelihoods: e.g. seeds and tools programmes; shelter; access to credit for families, women and youth; support for local income generating ideas that provide community goods and services;  
e. strategically supporting essential social services, and reconstruction (e.g. roads, schools, clinics, public buildings, housing.)

“The ‘Greater Horn of Africa Initiative’ took the early warning of famine as an entry point to try to link from relief to transition to sustainable development. Starting with food security, it extended to local production, trade, infrastructure, and regional organization and communications. In the end it failed because we did not have the staying power, but the concept of these linkages was not bad.”(Geneva symposium)

Relationships within country

The conditions under which the violent conflict ends — as a result of the victory of one side, a negotiated settlement, or some hybrid of the two — will have a critical effect on what kinds of assistance are likely to be appropriate and effective in, and beyond, these transitions. This also
has a major bearing on how the international community, and development cooperation actors in particular, should conduct their activities in relation to the host society. The relevant provisions of a peace settlement obviously have special standing and priority, but even in their implementation, as well as the re-launching of general recovery, rehabilitation and development programmes, wide and balanced consultation and participation of the population should be the standard from the outset. Otherwise, a one-sided or unbalanced recovery process is likely to set the stage for further rounds of recrimination and grievance.

“People will quickly become disillusioned with fledgling institutions, and even with the peace process itself, if they see no prospect for any material improvement in their condition. Post-conflict peace-building has helped to prevent the breakdown of numerous peace agreements, and to build the foundations for sustainable peace.” 34

A special challenge for donors in these transitional situations is to find and maintain the appropriate balance in their relationships between government, opposition forces who have entered into non-violent political processes, and the many elements of civil society, which may have become the most important partners for continuing development efforts while violent conflict was underway. Newly-mandated state authorities will need support, moral and material, to carry out their basic functions, and the traditional reluctance of donors to find ways to help fund civil service salaries, for example, can be a prescription for failure and corruption.

“In Colombia, with its huge population of internally displaced people, a national relief body substitutes for the weak presence of the state in rural areas, and donors support it in doing so. This is anti-developmental.” (Geneva symposium)

Legitimate political opposition needs recognition and support as an intrinsic part of the system for non-violent management of societal conflict, and a healthy, vibrant civil society remains an essential pillar alongside the political process. Civil society representatives have complained that donors have sometimes abandoned them in the rush to engage the government after violent conflict, underlining the need to maintain balance. 35

“In Albania, Italian policy focused first on strengthening state structures — in post-war Serbia, it gave support only through NGOs and local government. It’s horses for courses.” “In Somalia, businesses turned into NGOs, then when the aid stopped they collapsed.” (Geneva symposium)

Relationships among external actors

The international diplomatic actors still have key responsibilities for backing a strategic framework with clear political and negotiating support and credible funding commitments. Peacekeepers, and increasingly their international civilian police elements, still have a critical function in assuring a security base for fragile, transitional initiatives and, where it is compatible

34 UN, Millennium Report of the Secretary General, New York, 2000, p. 49
35 These issues were featured in regional consultations held by the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, to review their 1998 Guidelines and help prepare the 2001 Supplement.
with this basic function, they can also take part in planning and implementing longer-term assistance in areas of their expertise.

Wherever applicable, the multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental agencies specialised in particular types of assistance — including the international financial institutions, with their key responsibilities for macroeconomic support — need to be integrated into a coordinated, team response from the international community.

“Given the typical characteristics of ‘nation-building’ or ‘governance’ missions — long-term, messy, bottom-up and democratic — the most logical solution would be to clearly split the mission with one structure for relief and peacekeeping, and another for the governance part. How the two would relate to each other is an open question. Current efforts at the UN focus on the opposite concept of integrated missions that can undertake both peacekeeping and peace-building. Arguably, however, the main lesson from East Timor calls for thinking on how to de-aggregate missions so as to create a proper fit between structure and mandate.”

The multi-faceted handover from relief to development activities is likely to need to begin in these circumstances. If development cooperation expertise has been adequately called upon during relief operations, and development personnel in turn work closely with the international and national relief staff who have been such an important factor during the worst of the crisis, the required “bridging” (which will be phased in most places) can be greatly eased. The international community has an overriding responsibility to maintain especially close coordination in these transitions to assure continuity of the capacity — human, organisational and financial — to respond to the most pressing needs while also helping the country move into the longer term work of peace-building.

Dilemmas and hard choices

There are likely to be several serious tensions and dilemmas to be resolved by the international community in these “transition” situations.

First, the likely diplomatic attractiveness of making large aid promises and proposing “quick impact” projects to help “sweeten” a possible political settlement needs to be tempered by a sense of continuing responsibility. The international community has in the past notoriously over-promised resources in times of crisis and under-delivered when the crisis was no longer on the front pages. The sustainability problems of some quick impact projects have been discussed above. In addition to the ethical concerns raised by making such unrealizable commitments, there are issues of “prudential morality” involved, in that the breach of international funding promises, and/or the collapse of ill-conceived aid projects during the long and difficult climb out of violent conflict can contribute substantially to backsliding into crisis. While aid offers are realistically likely to be needed as supplements to complete some settlement packages and make them saleable to combatants and publics, it should be clear that aid cannot form the main basis of any viable settlement. The advice and consultative involvement of development cooperation experts

36 Astri Suhrke, “Structure versus Mandate: the contradictory logic of UNTAET” (June 2001, forthcoming), p. 15 (Contact astri.suhrke@cmi.no).
should be enlisted, with the local protagonists, to maximize the feasibility and sustainability of aid commitments to be made, and to clarify some of the “opportunity costs.”

“In Rwanda in 1995, major donors made promises that were central to promoting justice in that post-genocidal country. Their failure to deliver led not only to a lost opportunity for early reconciliation, but also to a reinforced distrust about the intentions of the international community. Similarly, in Kosovo, four years later, urgent pre-winter housing promises — exceeding $400 million — did not come to fruition until the following summer. As the military mission (KFOR) wielded ‘sticks’ to stabilize security, the essential ‘carrot’ to make stability more tolerable was missing.” (Comment for Geneva symposium)

Second, a related dilemma arises in relation to the position that the international community will take on the hurdles that countries face in post-conflict economic stabilization and recovery. There is no question that these burdens are formidable, added to all the other intense demands and pressures confronting countries and governments in these situations. This leads some to suggest that, in the interest of preserving a political settlement, the conditions of economic stabilization and recovery should be somehow waived or relaxed. Once again, there might be some merit to the idea of deferring or softening the economic landing if there were serious prospects of massive international subsidization to make this possible, and if there were any assured ways of ensuring that heavy economic interventionism did not, as is almost always the case, result in new rounds of divisive politicization and favouritism in economic policy. In fact, thinking on economic stabilization and recovery policies has evolved with experience, recognizing that there are often different routes to the same inescapable goals. At the same time, the basic goals remain inescapable, urgent, and are better served if they are not deferred, even in the most difficult post-conflict settings.

The case of Mozambique — which went through wrenching debates about the economic policies to adopt in the post-war situation — suggests that countries coming out of violent conflict may be able to make virtue of necessity, and take a rare opportunity to shift decisively in the direction of more sustainable economic policies, while also guarding against the worst in the divisiveness and potential corruption of pervasive political intervention in the economy. (Comment for Geneva symposium)

Beyond the economic arena, another sharp dilemma in transitional situations merits highlighting here. It centers on the positions to be taken by representatives of the international community in relation to tensions between post-war justice and reconciliation, and the dangers of impunity. This is an evolving picture internationally, and responses are being considered and developed in relation to many different cases and institutional developments. It will not be discussed in any depth here, but it is suggested that development cooperation — which will not itself determine the position to be taken to particular cases by the international community — can be a significant practical supporter of the course adopted by particular societies, consistent with the basic principles of international law and human rights.37

37 The 2001 Supplement to the DAC Guidelines discusses the donors’ positions in relation to these questions in some more depth.
6. Consolidating peace and restoring sustainable development

In these situations, the involvement of the international community tends to centre once again on long-term development and development cooperation (similar to “Normal” situations, and those in Conflict-Prone or especially vulnerable cases — see above). Here, an especially acute sensitivity is needed to what is probably the highest single risk factor for serious conflict, which is the history and legacy of a prior war. Thus, many of the types of activities, which have come to the forefront in the analysis of Transitional situations, are likely to be highly relevant for continuing attention and support.

Together with responding to the destruction of physical and social capital, the consolidation tasks require a style of development cooperation which is especially attuned to helping find and support indigenous capacities, in economic, social, governmental, environmental and other fields, and breaking out of degrees of dependency which may have grown up during wars.

Analysis, listening, learning and planning

As more normal development strategies, plans and programmes take hold, both host country and coordinated donor approaches should be expected in these settings to embody best practices in conflict consciousness, and techniques such as vulnerability assessments, conflict impact assessments, and conflict-related evaluation.

Types and priorities of development assistance

1. enabling local ownership to take root;

2. building local capacities and skills for the longer term;

3. many of the priorities in the previous section may still apply but as the situation ‘normalises,’ they should be transformed into longer-term forms of enabling support to ensure that sustainable capacities are created locally;

4. much of the content in sections A and B applies here, in terms of a “normal” profile of development programming, as it does in learning the lessons of conflict, and mainstreaming conflict prevention approaches;

5. an important difference here is that the scars to individuals, communities and countries are very immediate and so the context of peace-building is one in which commitment to rebuilding relations may be long-term and will most certainly require support of local capacities and institutions to do that work.

Relationships within country

See discussions above.

Relationships among external actors

In these consolidation situations, any international peacekeeping presence is likely to have been phased out, together with most humanitarian operations, and international diplomatic and political concern is probably downscaled to a “watching brief” mode. Development cooperation
is then likely to have become once again the main channel of engagement for the international community and, hopefully with the support of other actors in areas of their competence, is on the front line of delivering support for a country’s own continuing peace-building in a wide variety of fields.

**Dilemmas and hard choices**

Many of the dilemmas identified in previous sections persist, but the spotlight of crisis and the focused attention of the international community have moved on. The most serious and chronic difficulty in the long, arduous work of peace-building through effective and conflict-sensitive development cooperation, is to secure sufficient resources to make good on international pledges of support.

Even in the best of circumstances, selectivity and the focusing of limited aid resources in coordinated ways to support indigenous efforts in priority areas will be a necessary discipline. But if the pledges of growing interest by the international community in peace-building and the “savings” possible through conflict prevention are to be taken seriously, all international actors will need to make much more serious efforts to support adequate flows of Official Development Assistance, as well as good practices in aid, and far more supportive policies and practices in other areas affecting development such as trade, financial systems, environmental frameworks, etc.
V. Recalling Some Guiding Principles for Development Cooperation

Developing and applying the conflict prevention “lens” to development cooperation work is both legitimate and important, for all the reasons elaborated in various sections of this report. This does not change the basic nature and objectives of the development cooperation enterprise, nor the other terms of the partnership of trust between developing countries and those who aspire to cooperate with them. Both of these have been prominently re-confirmed over recent years, after a full assessment of experience, and all members of the international community have re-committed themselves to a clear set of joint global goals for the year 2015, and working practices for achieving these goals in a true partnership.

The integrity and effectiveness of this relationship needs to be protected and enhanced as the goals of peace-building and conflict prevention are more explicitly integrated into it. With this in mind, the following principles — which are clearly related to the analysis in this paper, and also result from long experience and, often, from hard lessons in development cooperation — need to guide that integration. Understanding some of the basic principles by which development cooperation aspires to guide its action should also help others to work with development cooperation, and to call upon its strengths, more effectively.

1. Maximise indigenous “ownership” and participation — the people and countries concerned need even more right and ability to decide, when they will bear such huge costs if things go wrong. Remember that communications can now reach almost everybody;

2. Minimise dependency, striving to find and support local capacities, and focus aid on sustainable activities;

3. Maintain long-term engagement and trust and strive to make “partnership” real;

4. Seek to reduce the dangers of violent conflict and mitigate its results, recognizing that many of the best preventive results will be gradual, and hard to prove;

5. Work for the respect of human rights;

6. Preserve an even-handed commitment to development values and goals;

7. Strengthen coordination and coherence with other external actors (including non-governmental ones) working against violent conflict, on the basis of comparative and collaborative advantage;

8. Improve responsiveness and flexibility, while maintaining a long view;

9. Listen and learn about specific country situations, while adapting relevant lessons and good practices from elsewhere;

10. Promote more development-friendly policies and coherent practices in fields beyond traditional development assistance (e.g. trade, finance, environmental regimes, international
crime-fighting) that have major impacts on the prospects for development and peace-building;

11. Avoid making promises of aid that cannot be delivered, or sustained.
Biographical Sketch of the Author

Bernard Wood brings an unusual combination of experience in development, political and security affairs to his independent analysis of the Development Dimensions of Peace-building, sponsored by UNDP’s Emergency Response Division.

Since 1999 he has been President of Bernard Wood & Associates Limited in Ottawa, Canada, and an associate of International Development and Strategies, Paris, France. From 1993 to 1999 he served as Director of the Development Cooperation Directorate of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, heading the Secretariat of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In that capacity, he personally oversaw the preparation of the 1998 DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, and has since served as the principal consultant assembling the 2001 Supplement to those Guidelines.

In 1992-1993, Mr. Wood was a fellow of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. From 1989-92 he was Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, and from 1976 to 1989 was the founding CEO of the North South Institute, Ottawa, Canada.

Mr. Wood served as the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister of Canada to Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1985 and again in 1986 on issues in Southern Africa, including sanctions. Between 1990 and 1992 he was a member of the Canadian panel of Japan Forum 2000. He has been a Special Advisor to several Canadian Delegations to the UN General Assembly, and a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Expert Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, and the Commonwealth Observer Mission to Namibia.

Earlier in his career Mr. Wood served as advisor to Canadian parliamentary committees and delegations overseas and worked on international finance policy in the Canadian Government and in a private financial firm.

Mr. Wood was born in Britain in 1945. He received his B.A. at Loyola of Montreal, his M.A. from the School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa, and did doctoral work at the University of London. He earned his commission in the Canadian Army in 1965.

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