Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report:
USAID/CMM’s People-to-People Reconciliation Fund,
Annual Program Statement (APS)

March 2014

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Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM’s People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS)

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. iii  
Acronyms .................................................................................................................................................... iv  
Preface ........................................................................................................................................................ vi  

## Chapter 1: Introduction and Key Findings .................................................................................. 1  
### Key Findings from the Evaluative Learning Review Products ......................................................... 3  
#### Desk Review ......................................................................................................................................... 3  
#### Meta-Evaluation and Meta-Analysis .................................................................................................. 4  
#### Israel/West Bank/Gaza ...................................................................................................................... 5  
#### Bosnia-Herzegovina .......................................................................................................................... 8  
#### Burundi .................................................................................................................................................. 9  
#### Overarching Conclusions and Scenarios for Innovation ................................................................. 10  
#### Lessons Learned in Evaluating the APS ......................................................................................... 13  

## Chapter 2: Desk Review of Global APS Documents ................................................................ 15  
### Acronyms .......................................................................................................................................... 15  
### Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................... 17  
### Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 23  
### Findings and Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 32  
### Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 57  
### Recommendations ........................................................................................................................... 58  
### Annexes ............................................................................................................................................ 61  

## Chapter 3: Meta-Evaluation and Meta-Analysis of APS Documents ........................................ 78  
### Introduction to the Review ................................................................................................................ 81  
### Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................... 82  
### Background and Purpose ................................................................................................................... 87  
### Summary of Methodology ................................................................................................................ 88  
### Meta-Evaluation .................................................................................................................................. 93  
### Meta-Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 103  
### Annexes .............................................................................................................................................. 113  

## Chapter 4: Field Study USAID/West Bank Gaza People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants ................................................................. 127  
### Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 131  
### Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 140  
### Findings and Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 145  
### Recommendations ........................................................................................................................... 177
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5: Field Study USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants</th>
<th>205</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 6: Field Study USAID/Burundi People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants</th>
<th>266</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overarching Conclusions</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 7: Potential Innovations in the People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement</th>
<th>362</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Terms and Concepts from CDA’s RPP</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths of the Current APS Design</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaknesses of the Current APS Design</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenarios for Innovation with the APS</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 8: Values and Alternate Scenarios for Evaluating People-to-People Reconciliation Programming</th>
<th>373</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualizing the Evaluation</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the Evaluative Learning Review</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapting Developmental Approaches to Evaluating Large-Scale Global Programs</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving Evaluation of People-to-People Reconciliation Programming through Ongoing Learning</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ACRONYMS

ADS  Automated Directives System (USAID)
APS  Annual Program Statement
ATC  Anti-Terror Certification
BIH  Bosnia-Herzegovina
BLTP  Burundi Leadership Training Program
CBO  Community Based Organization
CDA  Collaborative for Development Action
CENAP  Centre of Alert and Conflict Prevention
CICB  Conseil Inter-Confessionnel du Burundi
CMM  Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID
CNB  Conseil National de Bashingantahe
CNTB  Commission Nationale des Terres et autres Biens
CRS  Catholic Relief Services
CSO  Civil Society Organization
DCHA  Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DCT  Drama for Transformation
DE  Developmental Evaluation
DG  Democracy and Governance
DNH  Do No Harm
DPA  Dayton Peace Accords
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EU  European Union
FGD  Focus Group Discussion
FOG  Fixed Obligation Grant
FY  Financial Year
GIS  Geographic Information System
GR  Global Rights
IDEA  Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IP  Implementing Partner
IPA  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (EU)
IPCC  International Peace and Cooperation Center
IPJ  Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
IRC  International Rescue Committee
IWC  International Research & Exchanges Board
IWBG  Israel/West Bank/Gaza
LG  Learning Group
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
M, E, R  Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting
MIPAREC  Ministère Paix et Réconciliation sous la Croix
MOE  Ministry of Education
NGO  Non-Government Organization
OAP  Organisation pour l'Auto-Promotion
OHR  Office of the High Representative
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTI  USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives
P2P  People-to-People
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACBI</td>
<td>Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel</td>
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<td>PILPG</td>
<td>Public International Law &amp; Policy Group</td>
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<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance Management Plan</td>
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<td>PoI</td>
<td>Population of Interest</td>
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<td>PWL</td>
<td>Peace writ Large</td>
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<td>PWS</td>
<td>Peace writ Small</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Results Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>RfP</td>
<td>World Conference of Religions for Peace</td>
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<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposal</td>
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<td>RPP</td>
<td>Reflecting on Peace Practice Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska (one of the entities comprising BiH, the other being the Federation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOPE</td>
<td>Supporting Communities for Peaceful Elections</td>
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<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Social Impact, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>Scope of Work</td>
</tr>
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<td>STC</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>THARS</td>
<td>Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services</td>
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<td>THINC</td>
<td>Theories and Indicators of Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UFE</td>
<td>Utilization Focused Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>WWICS</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

Michael Quinn Patton, Author

Developmental Evaluation: Applying Complexity Concepts to Enhance Innovation and Use
(Guilford Press, 2011)

The evaluation of USAID/CMM’s People-to-People Reconciliation Fund is the largest effort to date, at least of which I am aware, to implement Developmental Evaluation. The transdisciplinary field of evaluation now offers a vast panorama of models, approaches, methods, frameworks, and standards. M&E also manifests competing criteria for judging quality, conflicting demands from diverse stakeholders, and professional debates about who is qualified to competently undertake evaluations. Challenges include developing sufficient capacity to keep up with growing demand, intensifying expectations to generate useful results, adapting M&E to vastly different contexts, and political dilemmas arising from trying to balance accountability with learning, standardized indicators with qualitative nuances of context-sensitive meaning, and short-term outcomes with longer term impacts. All of these issues, and I’m just scratching the surface, are evident in this evaluation.

Given the vast diversity of M&E options, the fundamental challenge is one of matching: selecting an evaluation approach and methods that are appropriate for what we call in the trade, the evaluand – the thing being evaluated. The specific niche for developmental evaluation is for innovative initiatives and interventions being implemented in complex dynamic environments characterized by uncertainty, turbulence, rapid change, and competing interests, where flexibility and adaptability is expected, and will be needed, to deal with what emerges, both expected and, as often as not, the unexpected and unanticipated. Most M&E approaches work best, indeed, are designed to work only, with definitively planned and fully specified projects characterized by highly prescribed implementation parameters and predetermined outcomes measures – all logically laid out in an elegant logical framework. Evaluations in such cases assess fidelity of implementation and achievement of pre-specified outcomes. But such approaches to planning and evaluation stifle innovation, interfere with adaptability, are inherently inflexible, and assume that the way to change the world is to find out what works, turn it into a standardized model, and replicate it with high fidelity over and over again around the world. For certain kinds of interventions, like polio immunizations, that can work. For many others, that high fidelity, standardized model often does not work well.

Peace-building, conflict resolution, and people-to-people reconciliation initiatives, the kind described in this report, are inherently dynamic—APS programs can be complicated, complex, or even both—requiring innovation, adaptability, responsiveness, and agility. Such initiatives need an evaluation approach that can deal with those complexities and dynamics. That’s what developmental evaluation was developed to do. So far, so good. But as this report reveals, understanding that developmental evaluation is appropriate and choosing to use that approach is not the same as actually fully implementing it. One of the great strengths of this report is the honesty and transparency about what aspects of developmental evaluation were actually implemented and the barriers that emerged to more fully realizing the potential of developmental evaluation. The insightful learnings reported here, both about the People-to-People Reconciliation Fund and developmental evaluation, are exemplars of what authentic reflective practice can yield.

I had the opportunity to participate in an initial review of the evaluation’s process and findings at a stakeholder summit seminar. I was impressed at that meeting by the candid interactions, acknowledging both strengths and weaknesses, applauding on-the-ground successes, naming barriers to greater success,
and doing so for both the initiative and the evaluation, for the two were ultimately intertwined, as is the nature of developmental evaluation.

I therefore commend this report to readers as an exemplar of serious learning. Such deep reflective practice remains all-too-rare. It can be risky. It is risky. But the risks are worth taking for the stakes are high: sustainable development, peace, inclusion, and equity, to name but a few. Developmental evaluation aims to serve development. The potential to make that contribution has not yet been fully realized. Developmental evaluation, as this report shows, is not easy to do. One especially common and herein evident challenge is the sheer weight of old ways of doing evaluation, traditional approaches to M&E, and the primacy of short-term, bottom-line accountability in any government-sponsored initiatives. Limited time and constrained resources add further degrees of difficulty. But the effort chronicled in these pages, and the lessons extrapolated, also offer a propitious glimpse of what is possible. Developmental Evaluation is still being developed – and these findings and insights will contribute to that development. This was a pioneering effort. The lessons generated are visceral, palpable, and pointed. These pioneers have navigated through some treacherous territory. More territory, no less treacherous, lies ahead. But the journey is well-begun – and thanks to this report, well-documented.

Finally, let me note that the timing of this report is exquisite. The year 2015 has been designated the International Year of Evaluation. Evaluators, policy makers, program implementers, change agents, peace workers, aid funders, and intended beneficiaries —indeed, the full, vast range of those with stakes in both development and evaluation -- will be discussing, debating, and developing responses to the challenges I listed in opening this preface. This report can contribute much to those discussions. It promises to be an important resource for reflective practice, especially integrating theory and practice, throughout the International Year of Evaluation – and beyond.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND KEY FINDINGS

Since 2004, the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in Washington has held an annual Reconciliation Program Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The APS is funded through a Congressional appropriation mandate that grants utilize a people-to-people (P2P) reconciliation approach to guide their work. According to CMM’s “People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide,” the underlying Theory of Change (ToC) is that in “communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities…[building or rebuilding] strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.” Thus, by creating a safe space where representatives from conflicting groups can interact, prejudices and perceived differences of “others” can be confronted, challenged, and hopefully ultimately replaced by “mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.”

Over time, the APS fund has grown from $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million reserved for Middle East programming and $16 million for global programs, supporting over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries. While the definitions have shifted slightly over time, the APS has always been focused on community and P2P reconciliation work, particularly at the grassroots level. Grants typically range from $100,000 to $1.2 million and last from 12 to 36 months.

An important operational aspect to note is that although CMM/Washington manages the overall APS, responsibility for the award and immediate oversight of the funded projects rest with USAID Missions abroad. The decentralized nature of project management means there is no centralized repository of APS project documents that would allow CMM to monitor and evaluate the overall program or study how APS-funded projects conform to or depart from the guidelines outlined in its technical publications. CMM’s ability to assess the effectiveness of the APS grants is further complicated by the mercurial and complex nature of conflict-related programs, which are difficult to monitor and evaluate using standard, linear monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches. Furthermore, conflict-related interventions rarely produce short-term, measurable results and are very context-sensitive, thus making it difficult to establish meaningful baselines, identify properly sequestered counterfactual examples, successfully plan for target outputs, and attribute outcomes and results back to inputs.

As a result, CMM has explored various methodologies for evaluating complex development programs, including developmental evaluation (DE), which may add greater depth of analysis and understanding. The DE approach uses evaluative information, analysis, and processes to contribute to the organic evolution of a project, rather than simply judge its success or failure. Michael Quinn Patton calls this relationship to an evaluated program “co-evolutionary.” The evaluator is not an independent entity standing outside the project, but a facilitator of a reflective learning process (action reflection) whereby evaluators, project staff, and other stakeholders are part of an inclusive, ongoing project design.

In the fall of 2011, CMM awarded Social Impact (SI) a contract to conduct a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under the CMM People-to-People Reconciliation APS through a pilot application of this DE methodology. The objectives of this review were not only to learn about the reconciliation APS projects themselves, but also to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs.
The evaluation team’s work was divided into three phases, which were not necessarily implemented in succession, but rather with learning and action reflection steps integrated throughout. Specifically, these three general phases are:

**Phase I: Knowledge Management and Study of the Reconciliation APS.** SI collected and organized the APS’ raw data and reports into a centralized and manageable database; conducted an analysis of project design and M&E reports to provide an assessment of the overall project monitoring systems and provide input that shapes further P2P APS evaluation; and conducted a meta-evaluation and meta-analysis of individual APS project evaluation reports to date. It should be noted that the desk review and meta-evaluation and meta-analysis do not probe the degree to which the evaluations used a DE approach, nor do they assess the related question of how appropriate the evaluation methodologies were in terms of programs operating in and responding to complex, open systems. These initial activities were intended to provide a richer understanding for the evaluative learning review team and CMM about what evaluations had been conducted on APS activities to date, the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluations, and any findings related to outcomes of the APS programming, as well as to gain insights into better options for future APS activity evaluative efforts and opportunities for skill-building among CMM’s partners.

**Phase II: Field Evaluation of Selected APS Programs.** The evaluation team conducted three field-based performance evaluations of the APS program in Israel/West Bank/Gaza (IWBG); Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH); and Burundi. The evaluations are intended to advance CMM and Agency learning with regards to the design of CMM’s APS program and its adaptability to changing local environments; the content of its technical publications; and ways to further develop its conflict mitigation and management technical assistance to Missions.

**Phase III: Reflective Learning.** SI and CMM carried out structured learning on emerging lessons from the evaluation activity itself and reflected on work in progress to deepen office learning and create knowledge on the evaluation of peacebuilding programs. This occurred through (1) regular management team meetings among SI and CMM staff to not only discuss the evaluation activities, but reflect on assumptions made during the process, surprises, successes, challenges, and ideas for next steps or adjustments needed for the next evaluative activity based on current learnings; and (2) the convening of a Learning Group comprised of CMM and SI personnel interacting with a number of noted experts in the field of conflict studies and peacebuilding practice who reviewed key work plans, data collection tools, and reports; discussed key thematic issues; and examined findings to establish key conclusions about the APS and lessons learned for future evaluation work on the APS and conflict programming more broadly.

All of these activities, and specifically the five key deliverables, take us several steps forward in understanding the APS projects to date, and the variety of challenges, specifically related to M&E and programming, which they face in the complicated systems and environments in which most operate. However, this evaluative learning review was not intended to follow a traditional evaluation structure in espousing strict conclusions and recommendations for next steps. Rather, the process by which the evaluation took place and the learnings that the process generated for CMM and the APS is more important than a summary of concluding statements and recommendations. This is best seen in the final chapters, where, instead of looking at the challenges to any changes in the APS, we look first for any possibilities and imagine potential innovative scenarios for future work in this area, as well as identify relevant values and principles to guide further development of the APS and its evaluation.

This final report is a synthesis of not only the five key products, but also our findings from the process of undertaking an evaluation inspired by a DE framework and the lessons this can provide not only CMM for future APS work, but peacebuilding programming and evaluation more broadly. After this introduction, we present key findings from each of the five products as a summary, and then the report is divided into individual chapters with the full desk review, meta-evaluation and analysis, and three field
evaluation reports presented individually. The final two chapters then review and synthesize findings on (1) the APS’ efforts to support conflict mitigation and reconciliation activities around the world, consider these in light of the guidance on P2P reconciliation, and offer scenarios of potential future developments in the APS, and (2) evaluation of the APS to date, and offer values, principles, and scenarios for potential development of evaluation within CMM, USAID, or similar complex settings. In addition, the evaluation team’s reflections on the team’s process of adapting a developmental approach to evaluating this type of programming are offered in the final chapter.

## Key Findings from the Evaluative Learning Review Products

### Desk Review

- **CMM APS guidance correlates with program design.** CMM has a strong mechanism for shaping P2P programming to be more effective: the APS statement. The 2010 APS introduced the requirement that a clear ToC be identified in every project proposal, and project proposals in that year and subsequent years were more likely to have a clear ToC. A variety of approaches to P2P and types of touch points have been welcomed by the APS and have contributed to Peace writ Small (PWS), and, occasionally, to Peace writ Large (PWL). Requiring conflict analysis prompts some implementers to usefully consider political space, and operating appropriately within limited political space is a hallmark of successful P2P programs.

- **The quality of touch points is strongly correlated to contributions to PWS.** Desk review data showed that 16 of 17 projects (94%) coded with an “ideal” quality of touch point, and 19 of 28 (68%) coded with an “adequate” quality of touch point, produced “adequate” to “ideal” contributions to PWS.

- **Projects focused on “key people”** (those working with high-level representatives from government or civil society organizations) are better able to report on contributions to PWL. However, an important caveat to note is that the desk review did not produce sufficient evidence to conclude that these projects were better able to produce PWL, but rather simply that they had an easier time addressing attribution to PWL as they often target at the macro level and thus identify and track indicators that resonate with this level.

- **APS projects do not appear to adopt truly “innovative” designs.** The desk reviewers, admittedly limited by the documents available, did not find any instances of “radically” different project designs but rather found a tendency for APS implementers to describe lesser modifications to standard designs as “innovative”—i.e., using radio or theater programs in areas of low literacy or using new forms of social media to engage larger but similar groups as past activities.

- **Adaptive implementation increases program efficacy.** Projects that reported adaptations to their implementation plans explained that these changes were necessary due to changes in the conflict context or to early feedback on project efficacy based on M&E. Adaptation of project plans is possible when warranted, as evidenced by several examples of implementation plans that were altered due to changing circumstances or due to new information generated by sound M&E. However, it should be noted that these projects were in the minority and that the majority of APS projects do not effectively link reporting on changes in political/conflict contexts with reporting of changes in their implementation. The desk reviewers found that many APS projects report on changes in the political/conflict contexts (particularly in their quarterly reports), but few describe how these changes result in specific instances of adaptive implementation.
Poor monitoring, evaluation, and reporting (M, E, R) hinders learning and adaptive implementation. Despite the innovations noted above, the findings from this study reveal that most APS grantees share a fairly broad and consistent—with a few noteworthy exceptions—lack of conformity with CMM guidance for how P2P programs should be designed, implemented, monitored, evaluated, and reported upon. Many of these identified weaknesses also reflect imperfect integration with more general USAID best practices related to the need for strong systems of M&E. Poor M, E, R make learning difficult. Of course, there are also implications for accountability, but learning is the primary and overriding purpose of the learning review to which this desk review contributes. Very weak data make it difficult to provide strong information and analysis that would be most useful to CMM to understand and improve P2P project design and performance. This, of course, is of concern for this desk review, but, more importantly, it has larger implications for CMM’s ability to understand, learn from, and improve overall performance of the APS. Furthermore, poor M&E deprives program implementers of the input they need to adapt their programs effectively to changing conflict contexts or to otherwise improve program performance. By neglecting appropriate M, E, R, implementers prevent CMM from learning how best to develop the APS in future years. Even worse, implementers deprive their own project leadership from receiving the feedback and updated conflict analyses that would allow them to appropriately adapt their P2P plans to be more effective.

Meta-Evaluation and Meta-Analysis

Meta-Evaluation

In this assessment, evaluation methodologies are defined broadly to include the evaluation purpose, users, questions, approach, and data collection methods. The methodologies were both highly variable and very similar. The majority of the evaluations had two purposes: (1) informing future implementer programming and (2) donor reporting. The reports referenced generic users such as the implementing organization or USAID, but none clearly indicated who should use the evaluation. Similarly, the evaluation questions were not always explicitly given and the questions that the assessment team was able to identify were not sufficiently clear. The team found that none of the evaluations appeared to be informed by an evaluation approach; instead the evaluations were designed as mini-research efforts. While the majority of the evaluations used mixed methods, six of the evaluations used a “post-test project group only” design, which is a limited design that cannot ascertain the degree of change because data is gathered only once and only from people involved with the project.

The evaluations lacked adequate conflict considerations and gender sensitivity, and, regarding the thoroughness of the evaluations, none of the evaluations referenced side effects, although three did discuss unexpected things that had happened in the course of the evaluation. Only half of the evaluations offered alternative explanations for some of their findings, and none of those stated that the evaluators had conducted a formal factor analysis or had provided the basis for the alternative explanations.

The implications of the methodologies’ findings span several important areas of concern. Without evaluation approaches, the evaluations are not intentional processes set up to optimize the potential utility and/or rigor of the process. Insufficient conflict considerations and gender sensitivity mean that the evaluations risk doing harm and not taking into account all of the relevant variables and, therefore, not fully understanding the interaction of the program and context. Regarding the data sources, the weaknesses identified above mean that consumers are not able to determine whether the evaluations drew on multiple, valid sets of sources to inform the evaluation questions. Additionally, without clear methodological descriptions, evaluation consumers are not able to assess the source, accuracy, and thoroughness of the findings.
Meta-Analysis

- The meta-analysis found that P2P programming had not catalyzed specific common results (understood as changes external to the implementing actor) across the sample. In an effort to provide a synthesis of the evaluations’ findings, the team identified several common types of change that programs catalyzed. The majority of the evaluations found that individual-level behavioral changes had been catalyzed as a result of the programming. Likewise, six of the evaluations found that participants had changed their attitudes as a result of programming. Half of the evaluations found that participants had acquired new skills. Three found that knowledge changes had occurred in the participant population and one referenced a functioning change. Only two of these changes, behavioral and attitudinal changes, were credibly claimed by a majority of the evaluations [6/10].

- The vast majority of the types of changes identified were individual-level changes. Only three specific changes could be interpreted as sociopolitical level changes. This finding has important implications for P2P programming, as the widely recognized Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project found that changes effected on the sociopolitical level (community attitudes, relationships, social norms, and behaviors) can have more significant impacts for the broader peace than changes effected on the individual level.

Israel/West Bank/Gaza

- Prior to 2013, when peace negotiations resumed, the consensus of Israeli and Palestinian APS implementers was that the lack of a “political horizon” promising change in the overall conflict conditions rendered their work progressively more difficult.\(^1\) They cited obstacles that have long been features of the local landscape: stark social and power asymmetries between the two societies, and de-legitimization campaigns waged against peacebuilders and peacebuilding per se. P2P has always aroused ideological opposition here; yet the pessimism of mainstream Israeli and Palestinian publics towards the prospect of a peaceful solution emboldened critics to cast the entire field as a relic of the failed “Oslo” process.\(^2\) Advocates of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation found themselves with fewer champions in government, media, and civil society, and thus increasingly vulnerable. At the implementation level, these trends manifested in grantees’ struggles to achieve balanced levels of recruitment and engagement among both populations,

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\(^1\) As noted above, the field and research portions of this evaluation were conducted prior to the resumption of formal Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in July 2013. The text therefore reflects the state of affairs as they existed at the time of the field research.

and to obtain and maintain sufficient societal legitimacy and institutional recognition to operate effectively across the divide. At the same time, the “Arab Spring” revolutions and waves of socioeconomic protest among Israelis and Palestinians have generated increased energy in both societies for addressing internal divisions and social-structural disparities, a trend reflected in the focus and framing of a number of APS-funded initiatives.

- APS implementers cited a number of framing and programming strategies as effective responses to these contextual challenges, particularly:
  1. **Framing and designing projects around common interests, shared problems, and/or concrete benefits or changes:** In the current climate, projects oriented toward resolving specific issues of shared interest or common concern for both populations—e.g., environmental protection, civic equality, media literacy, educational and societal capacity, professional training, and issue advocacy—are perceived as more legitimate and relevant than dialogue or relationship-building *for its own sake*, although the latter remain essential methodological elements of meaningful P2P work.\(^3\) This was especially, but not exclusively, true on the Palestinian side.
  2. **Integration of uni-national/intragroup and bi-national/intergroup elements:** The deliberate, sequential integration of uni-national and bi-national encounters is now the industry standard for Israeli/Palestinian intergroup programs.\(^4\) APS grantees emphasized the essential contribution of uni-national preparation and processing phases staged before and often after bi-national encounters. These are seen as necessary and complementary responses to the asymmetry and dissonance between positive intergroup encounter experiences and the inevitable return to separate, unequal everyday realities. At the macro level, a synergy of uni-national and bi-national consensus-building processes is also seen as an essential element of a sustainable peace process. As one implementer explained, “Both Palestinian and Israeli societies are fragmenting. They each need to address internal divisions while concurrently tackling the Palestinian-Israeli divide.”
  3. **Persistent, strategic engagement of authorities and institutions:** APS grantees widely cited the inertia or resistance of governmental authorities on both sides as a contextual challenge. Yet a number of grantees, through persistent efforts, succeeded in enlisting official support, thereby reaching broader constituencies and “scaling up” programs to communal, municipal, and even regional levels.\(^5\) These initiatives typically engaged through multiple channels at multiple levels, and adopted both cooperative and critical approaches as necessary.

- APS-funded projects of diverse methodologies commonly report the achievement of positive outcomes with their direct participants and at local/communal levels in terms of sustained

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participation in the face of opposition, positive attitudinal changes and relationship building, institutional development, and the establishment of “touch points” or forums for meaningful cross-conflict engagement—achievements not to be taken for granted in the present context. A number of projects have expanded significantly and established programs across multiple new campuses, communities, and regions. At the societal level, however, these personal/local/communal successes have not necessarily “added up” or perceptibly influenced prevailing social and political trends. These programs were, of course, never intended to bring about peace by themselves; instead they were designed to positively influence dynamics that would contribute in discrete areas to the eventual resolution of the conflict. So while the evidence points to localized successes, more work needs to be done to increase aggregate impacts at the macro level.

Moreover, gaps remain in terms of recruiting participant populations reflective of Israeli and Palestinian societies. While APS projects often explicitly aim to include and empower youth and women, the same cannot be said regarding key constituencies not identified with the political “peace camp,” e.g., traditional and religious, politically conservative, and socioeconomically disadvantaged sectors of Palestinian and Israeli societies. The identification of P2P and “peace” with certain sociopolitical demographics limits the scope of potential impact to those groups.

Given the diversity of the APS pool in the IWBG region, “success” indicators take different forms for different types of projects. Dialogue, education, and leadership projects point to participants empowered to become peacebuilders and activists; advocacy and media initiatives point to shifts in public discourse or institutional policy generated by focused campaigns; environmental initiatives cite infrastructure built and awareness raised, and potential environmental hazards mitigated or prevented. The wide spectrum of project approaches led some grantees to question CMM’s selection of “changing perceptions” as a “universal indicator” of impact, as numerous initiatives do not primarily evaluate their own impact in such terms.

- APS grants are lauded as the most generous available in the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian context; there is wide acknowledgement among grantees of the program’s contributions to the resilience and development of their organizations, their strategies, and the field as a whole. It is clear that in present circumstances, the continuation of APS support is essential to the ability of grantees to build on the foundations they have created. Additionally, grantees widely praised the capacity-building effects of USAID’s rigorous standards of evaluation and compliance. Eighty % of survey respondents agreed that, “Working on a USAID-funded project has helped to build organizational capacity,” especially in terms of administration and financial management.

At the same time, the majority of grantees described certain policies as deeply problematic in the local context. The required “vetting” of vendors and the Anti-Terrorism Certification (ATC) signature are perceived as singling out and thereby alienating Palestinians. Even though measures against providing material support to terrorists are required by the United States Government according to Executive Order 13224, the perception is that Palestinians are specifically targeted.
by the requirement to sign the ATC. This serves to undermine the legitimacy of the program in the eyes of some and complicates recruitment. Similarly, the structure of prime/sub-grant relationships is described as reinforcing existing power asymmetries because Israeli organizations often serve as the prime grantees with Palestinian organizations as sub-grantees. Related to this is the complaint that USAID’s administrative requirements place excessive demands on grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and divert time and resources away from programming. Grantees ranked USAID grant oversight as the most difficult challenge they face in their work, even relative to the contextual issues described above.

It is crucial to emphasize that local USAID Mission staff invest care and effort in guiding grantees through the intricacies of the grant application and management process. Indeed, many grantees praised Mission staff as understanding the local context, being responsive to concerns, and showing flexibility regarding the necessity to change implementation schedules in response to events. Grantees’ critiques were clearly directed at policies/regulations rather than personnel or performance. The critiques were, nonetheless, emphatic and widespread to the point of near unanimity, appearing in more than 90% of grantee interviews.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

- The overall context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH has not significantly changed in the past four years; however, certain trends that were present earlier continue and these have exposed new challenges and opportunities to and for peacebuilders. The primary negative trends have prompted more people to see the need for a different way of doing things; enough time has passed (and too much time has passed) for war-related traumas to continue to define people. There is a craving for normalcy, and this has created a fertile opening for peacebuilding interventions. The willingness of government, local business, and a variety of civil society associations to work together, often across the ethnic divide, is a sign of strengthened social trust at these levels. This represents an important opening, which also can be potentially harnessed for more effective peacebuilding work. The context is ripe for Bosnian-led reconciliation interventions if both timely and strategic.

- All of the projects in their own way were able to be flexible and were appropriate, to one degree or another, in addressing the conflict drivers and dynamics, whether interacting with youth, civil society leaders, or religious and community leaders. However, only one of these projects—the psycho-trauma healing project delivered by Catholic Relief Services—had a specific and intentional reconciliation emphasis as an objective. The others had an ad-hoc approach to reconciliation and generally had relatively weak reconciliation outcomes as a result.

- The APS projects conducted in BiH to a greater or lesser degree were appropriate responses to the contextual factors. However, there appears not to have been a careful conflict analysis/mapping on any scale that had strategically identified these drivers before

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Standard Provisions for Non-U.S. Nongovernmental Organizations:
the interventions. These projects addressed these drivers, but not as intentionally as they could have, which diluted reconciliation results that were both possible in affecting individual drivers and in seeing how these together represented a strategy addressing the conflict drivers.

- There is evidence of some limited progress at the community level and quite extensive evidence of personal transformation at the individual level. However, the evidence suggests that the APS projects are making minimal, if any, contributions at the societal level. No observations support the conclusion that there has been any significant effect from APS projects at the top level. Given the extremely limited scope and reach of most projects, and the minimal resources made available through the small grants of the APS mechanism, there simply is not enough input into the system to find evidence of traction that could add up to a top-level result. However, it should be noted that the evaluation team does not intend to say that the APS had no impact on the overall context, but simply that it could not find sufficient evidence of any significant impact given its evaluation design and resources. The APS may well have contributed in some small way but that impact appears to have been minimal at best—“a drop in the ocean”—and cannot be said to have changed the overall context in any significant way.

**Burundi**

- P2P interventions are appropriate, relevant, and necessary in Burundi. There was a clear, logical, and plausible connection between the contributions of P2P programming and the goal of affecting reconciliation at different levels in society. Bringing groups together was seen as a critical and necessary element to move reconciliation forward. The physical proximity and intermixed nature of different ethnic, religious, and political groups—along with their shared interrelated cultural similarities—binds communities together in a way that guarantees that different groups must necessarily interact and participate in a shared future.

- P2P approaches offer significant and unique programming advantages. P2P approaches are well-placed to identify, strengthen, and bolster existing informal and formal local approaches for conflict mitigation. These approaches contributed to improve trust between communities and in governance structures and built a foundation for peaceful interaction and cooperation among previously conflicting groups. P2P and personal interaction accessed and laid the groundwork for deeper, more meaningful reconciliation in a way that some governmental programs were not able to reach or foster. However, P2P engagement and programming alone are not sufficient to maximally affect future reconciliation and peace—a combination of approaches has added value.

- The P2P approach is necessary but not sufficient to sustain reconciliation or achieve PWL and there can be some considerable programming disadvantages when over-relying on this approach. P2P projects in Burundi contributed strongly to reconciliation but several interviewees expressed reservations about how P2P directly affects national level change. The focus on P2P in some cases could have detracted from efforts to implement a combination of approaches structured to more comprehensively work together for augmented impact. In addition, in resource-constrained environments, reconciliation gains made by P2P projects could be undermined by perverse economic incentives and political manipulation.

- P2P approaches have contributed to building capacity of local informal and formal structures to support them in responding and adapting to salient and changing contextual factors. P2P programming contributed to building the skillsets of community structures to improve their tools to address and solve conflicts in their societies. Imparting these skills and strengthening existing skills within these bodies supports sustainable approaches that can adapt and respond to contextual changes as they evolve.
Explicit links to other programming, particularly if there are links between individual, community, and institutional change (even if a link to national level change does not exist) is critical to effective programs. These links can contribute to sustainability in attitudinal and behavioral change as well as to PWL.

Sustainable change is linked to programming that explicitly builds in ownership of reconciliation processes—which, for example, meant empowering local community members to establish peace committees or, in the case of the Ministry of Education, taking the next step in integrating a national civics curriculum or getting government buy-in for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Advocacy and policy work, particularly in Burundi during the projects being evaluated, was subject to a large and often powerful number of influences, requiring greater donor commitment over time. At the same time, evidence shows that this advocacy work is a necessary part of the other reconciliation efforts. Without it, implementers cannot guarantee sustained change even at the community level.

Overall, real strides have been made in reconciling individuals and groups at the community level, particularly in rural areas. This cannot be exclusively attributed to the Burundi APS projects, as it is a result of a confluence of factors. However, there was substantial evidence that APS projects have made a real, mostly localized, contribution to peace. In order to further the reconciliation process, more effort needs to be made towards working with, and restraining the disruptive potential of, national-level politicians.

APS Burundi projects have achieved some qualified but still significant successes in changing attitudes, behavior, and legislation at the provincial and national level, although these are fewer and less resilient than at the participant and community level.

While the vast majority of Burundi APS projects did not adequately describe or explain the linkages between their activities and linkages to PWL, all have mechanisms that would allow for higher-level impact. The most enduring of these mechanisms is the support of existing local peace structures or the establishment of new ones.

APS activities focused at the grassroots enjoyed greater success in transferring attitudinal and behavioral change to those not directly involved in the program than those working on national level issues; however, their contributions to PWL are less immediate than those working at the national level. Also, although some APS projects have resulted in transferred changes in attitudes and behavior, there is widespread concern that these changes are not resilient enough to resist negative political manipulation.

Greater strategic cohesion in the selection of Burundi APS projects could have increased overall effectiveness. Only two of 11 APS implementers were repeat grantees, there was little cross-program linkages or synergies between APS projects, and no project appears to have been selected based on building on previous successes.

**Overarching Conclusions and Scenarios for Innovation**

- A clear and consistent theme in all five learning products is that the APS has supported reconciliation among individuals in diverse conflict contexts.
- Our evidence shows that a key strength of the current APS design is that programs are able to make strong contributions to PWL in the form of reconciling individuals and local communities directly involved in APS programs.
• However, the APS has not been as successful in contributing to PWL, and all the systemic societal shifts that PWL entails. The programs as a whole, despite all the significant evidence of individual and local community change, can generally credibly claim only that they have paved the way for eventual broader social-structural impact over time. However, the APS projects are generally much shorter than the timeframe that would be required for full realization of such PWL shifts.

• Our review found several notable challenges preventing the APS from making more substantive contributions to PWL, including:
  o APS projects are relatively small, not reaching critical mass to bring systems-level change in their overall conflict system.
  o Separate APS projects are selected without consideration as to how they will complement each other and add up to more than the sum of the parts.
  o APS projects are generally limited to working within one country at a time, although conflict dynamics often spill across international borders.
  o APS projects are funded at most for three years and there was little evidence of strategic follow-on funding, but PWL shifts require longer-term engagement.
  o Tracing the indirect contributions of specific individual and community shifts to the overall social-structural impact is difficult in complex and rapidly changing contexts where many initiatives interact. This challenge is compounded by our finding that APS programs generally have weak/insufficient M&E systems for tracking these contributions and that USAID Missions generally do not track contributions to PWL at the portfolio level.
  o Gains achieved in part through P2P reconciliation approaches can be reversed by economic or political developments.
  o P2P programming—no matter how large its scale, how coordinated it is for maximum impact, how able it is to engage relevant conflict dynamics outside the one country of focus, how long-term it is, or how well its indirect contributions can be traced—is necessary but not sufficient to bring about PWL shifts.
  o P2P reconciliation should be directed at individual and local community-level change, as well as at paving the way for PWL, as part of a multifaceted peace process in which many other kinds of initiatives engage the social and political institutions and key people that are part of PWL shifts.

• Recognizing that reconciliation projects are only one part of the multifaceted peace processes, the APS should be seen as offering a unique and limited contribution in conflict areas. When we understand the limited role of APS programming, with its emphasis on individual change and local community shifts, we see that not all conflict areas are equally poised to respond to people-to-people reconciliation approaches.

• This analysis suggests that the APS should be revised to offer more strategic use of P2P reconciliation approaches, so that the efforts are not wasted on contexts or times when they will likely be futile. In order to improve the APS going forward, this learning review recommends that CMM consider the following scenarios for innovation:
  o Greater concentration of APS resources: Rather than spread APS projects each year across 15 different countries with about $1 million in programming in each country, the APS could invest in a small number of focus countries (i.e., four or five) with $4 million to $5 million in programming in each country. With so many projects receiving support, the APS would be
in a position to require coordination among grantees to encourage complementarity and overall impact. Instead of a wide global competition for projects in numerous countries, the APS program would first manage a process of identifying one or two areas where necessary contextual factors were in place to make the most of P2P programming.

- **More systematic engagement:** Rather than seeking out places that already offer ideal environments for P2P reconciliation to have maximum impact, instead the APS could help to create such contexts. The selection process for awarding APS grants could involve consultation with other donors, exploration of what they plan to support, and how an APS project would be part of a broader system intervention. In other words, more explicitly acknowledging other donor-supported efforts as part of the system could allow the strategic choices that would support more systemic engagement.

- **Regional approach:** The APS is currently structured largely to engage with conflicts that lie within one state’s borders, with only a small number of exceptions. But because many conflicts today spill across international borders, shifting an overall conflict system requires engaging with that full system. If the APS were restructured to allow greater flexibility for regional approaches, more effective P2P reconciliation would be possible.

- **Longer-Term Projects:** The APS could develop such that a particular project is funded for three years, renewed for another three years, and then renewed for another three years. After nine years of activity, the results would be much more significant than those that shorter programs can offer. Periodical renewal mechanisms would provide appropriate oversight. A common thread throughout our field evaluations was that APS implementers felt that they need more time to have more impact. Imagine a scenario in which the APS gives each project more time and gets more impact as a result.

- **Engage more key people:** APS projects have strongly emphasized engaging “more people.” However, as argued by both e Collaborative for Development Action’s (CDA) Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and CMM’s own P2P guide, effective peacebuilding projects need to also involve “key people” to support reconciliation. The P2P guide makes explicit reference to the need to “identify and involve those who can most directly and positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts” and that “approaches that concentrate on ‘more people’ but do nothing to link to or affect ‘key people’, or vice versa, do not lead to effective peace work.” APS managers should be encouraged to develop more programs focused on “key people” and link them with programs focused on “more people” by convening them around their shared interests.

- **More flexible programming:** The APS could develop mechanisms that encourage project implementers to seriously assess the local context periodically and then adjust their plans accordingly. While the learning review, particularly the BiH field evaluation and desk review, showed evidence of some project activities poorly matched to the needs of the local context, there were also examples of several projects that did make adjustments when the local context changed. As described in the desk review, this adaptive implementation increased program efficacy. Rather than simply allowing adjustments in isolated projects, the APS could explicitly encourage refined and updated analysis, leading to refined and updated project plans.

- **Local partner initiatives:** Like many USAID procurement mechanisms, the APS structures today generally favor large international organizations as the primary implementers of APS projects. However, the learning review pointed to a lack of sustainability of the programs, as large short-term initiatives were later not re-funded for longer-term implementation. While recent APS solicitations have had separate thresholds for local partnerships, and recognizing
that many of the APS grantees in IWBG are local grantees, CMM could do more to encourage local partners to lead local P2P programs within the APS. Such initiatives would be more sustainable and would be well aligned with USAID Forward and other procurement reforms emphasizing Paris Declaration principles, such as host-country ownership.

- **Provide funding dedicated to M&E, learning, and disseminating results:** CMM could set aside specific APS funding dedicated to M&E. This funding could, for example, be provided to USAID Missions to host “learning events” that explain the utility of sound M&E for implementing partners’ own programmatic benefit. This may even result in partners deciding to contribute some of their own resources to track and successfully report on their achievements, thereby effectively leveraging limited APS funds. CMM could also consider reserving a dedicated pool of funds to manage a central, APS-wide M&E system, which would allow CMM to aggregate individual project outputs and outcomes and try to discern large trends and influences on a national or even regional level.

### Lessons Learned in Evaluating the APS

Our contributions to the ongoing development of evaluation approaches can be summarized thus:

Ongoing learning, through process-oriented or complexity-oriented evaluation methods such as DE, will allow continued improvement and adaptation in both the evaluation of and the practice of P2P reconciliation. This calls for balancing the doing of a project with regular reflecting on it, and allowing the space for projects to develop over time. In addition, working towards a shared goal is itself a reconciliation process. Evaluation can serve as an intervention and can change the way people work together. Rather than seeking one right way and sticking to it, groups can find their way gradually, through trial and error, constant feedback, and continuous learning. Ultimately, this means that evaluation supports adaptive implementation, and, we have found, reconciliation programs are more effective when they are adaptively implemented.

In RPP terms, we propose the following “building blocks” or criteria for engaging effective and manageable learning and evaluation for adaptive implementation based on our findings related to current APS implementation and evaluation practice as well as reflections on our own team’s process of adapting a developmental approach.

These are useful for P2P reconciliation and other programs operating in similar, often complex, contexts:

- Work within an appropriate time scale;
- Engage multiple levels of the system;
- Consider project-level DE in the field;
- Consider local coordinators balancing adaptability and responsibility;
- Consider process-focused contracting for evaluation;
- Contextualize “what we know” within a culture of ongoing learning;
- Value adaptive implementation; and
- Focus on values.

These findings are consistent with the present conclusions related to ways to improve P2P reconciliation programs. While it is clear that the current P2P reconciliation APS contributes significantly at the community level to local changes, there are opportunities to increase the synergy of P2P programming with other approaches that will together add up to larger or higher-level changes. Scenarios for future development of the P2P Reconciliation APS include:
• Greater concentration of APS resources;
• More systematic engagement;
• Regional approach;
• Longer-term projects;
• Engage more key people;
• More flexible programming;
• Local partner initiatives; and
• Support M&E, learning, and disseminating results.

In sum, ongoing learning is important for both the development of P2P reconciliation programming and also the development of evaluation methodologies appropriate for these programs. In the spirit of ongoing learning, we offer this synthesis of our two-year learning process as a contribution to dialogue with evaluators and those engaged in reconciliation efforts, as we continue finding our way together.
CHAPTER 2: DESK REVIEW OF GLOBAL APS DOCUMENTS

EVALUATIVE LEARNING REVIEW OF THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT

USAID/CMM
DESK REVIEW REPORT

AUGUST 2013

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Susan Allen Nan and Lee R. Briggs with assistance from Kelly Heindel, Mathias Kjaer, Justin Reppert, Gabrielle Plotkin, and Catherine Broussard (Social Impact, Inc.)

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development nor the United States Government.
# Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>Automated Directive System</td>
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<td>APS</td>
<td>Annual Program Statement</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CMM</td>
<td>Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID</td>
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<td>DCT</td>
<td>Drama for Transformation</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>Developmental Evaluation</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace &amp; Justice</td>
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<td>International Peace and Cooperation Center</td>
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<td>International Research &amp; Exchanges Board</td>
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<td>Israel/West Bank/Gaza</td>
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<td>LG</td>
<td>Learning Group</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>M,E,R</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting</td>
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<td>P2P</td>
<td>People-to-People</td>
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<td>PILPG</td>
<td>Public International Law and Policy Group</td>
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<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance Management Plan</td>
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<td>Pol</td>
<td>Population of Interest</td>
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<td>PWL</td>
<td>Peace writ Large</td>
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<td>Peace writ Small</td>
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<td>QDDR</td>
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Executive Summary

Social Impact, Inc. (SI) is currently conducting a two-year evaluative learning review of awards and activities under the People-to-People (P2P) Reconciliation Programs Fund, known as the Annual Program Statement (APS). The APS is administered by the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM). The objectives of this Evaluative Learning Review are not only to learn about the reconciliation APS projects themselves, but also to enhance CMM's knowledge of evaluation generally and to further develop the Office's technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the “developmental evaluation” (DE) approach.

SI’s work on this project is divided into three general, non-sequential phases that integrate learning and action reflection, thereby combining experience (action) and thought (reflection) to create new learning throughout. These three general phases are:

- Phase I: Knowledge management, desk study of global reconciliation APS grants, and meta-evaluation of APS evaluation reports;
- Phase II: Field evaluations of selected APS programs in Israel/West Bank/Gaza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Burundi; and
- Phase III: Reflective learning with the assistance of an established Learning Group (LG) comprised of scholars and practitioners experienced in leading conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

Background and Purpose of the Desk Study

This report is a desk review of a wide assortment of APS project design and M&E documents. The review examines the strength and adaptability of the project design and reported implementation, the quality of the projects’ reporting, challenges faced by the projects, and the larger impact on or contribution to peace and reconciliation, as reported by the implementers themselves. The desk review is guided by a list of questions identified in close consultation with CMM and the project’s LG. The list of APS projects reviewed can be found in Annex A; final desk review protocol, including the questions and list of key definitions can be found in Annex B; and a comprehensive discussion of the sampling strategy can be found in Annex C.

Major Conclusions

Program Design:

- **CMM APS guidance correlates with program design.** CMM has a strong mechanism for shaping P2P programming to be more effective: the APS statement. The 2010 APS introduced the requirement that a clear Theory of Change (ToC) be identified in every project proposal, and project proposals in that year and subsequent years were more likely to have a clear ToC. A variety of approaches to P2P and types of touch points have been welcomed by the APS and have contributed to Peace writ Small (PWS), and, occasionally, to Peace writ Large (PWL). Requiring conflict analysis prompts some implementers to usefully consider political space, and operating appropriately within limited political space is a hallmark of successful P2P programs.

- **The quality of touch points is strongly correlated to contributions to PWS.** Desk review data showed that 16 of 17 projects (94%) coded with an “ideal” quality of touch point, and 19 of 28 (68%) coded with an “adequate” quality of touch point, produced “adequate” to “ideal” contributions to PWS (see page 14 for further discussion).
• **Projects focused on “key people”,** —those working with high-level representatives from government or civil society organizations—are better able to report on contributions to PWL. However, an important caveat to note is that the desk review did not produce sufficient evidence to conclude that these projects were better able to produce PWL but rather simply that they had an easier time addressing attribution to PWL as they were often targeted at the macro-level and thus more easily able identify and track indicators that resonate with this level.

• **APS projects do not appear to adopt truly “innovative” designs.** The desk reviewers, admittedly limited by the documents available, did not find any instances of “radically” different project designs but rather found a tendency for APS implementers to describe lesser modifications to standard designs as “innovative”—i.e. using radio or theatre programs in areas of low literacy or using new forms of social media to engage larger but similar groups as past activities.

Adaptive Implementation

• **Adaptive implementation increases program efficacy.** Projects that reported adaptations to their implementation plans explained that these changes were necessary due to changes in the conflict context, or due to early feedback on project efficacy based on M&E. Adaptation of project plans is possible when warranted, as evidenced by several examples of implementation plans that were altered due to changing circumstances or due to new information generated by sound M&E. However, it should be noted that these projects were in the minority and that the majority of APS projects do not effectively link reporting on changes in political/conflict contexts with reporting of changes in their implementation. The desk reviewers found that many APS projects would report on changes in the political/conflict contexts (particularly in their quarterly reports), but few describe how these changes resulted in specific instances of adaptive implementation.

Monitoring and Evaluation

• **Poor monitoring, evaluation, and reporting hinders learning and adaptive implementation.** Despite the innovations noted above, the findings from this study reveal that most APS grantees share a fairly broad and consistent—with a few noteworthy exceptions—lack of conformity with CMM guidance for how P2P programs should be designed, implemented, monitored, evaluated, and reported upon. Many of these identified weaknesses also reflect imperfect integration with more general USAID best practices related to the need for strong systems of M&E. Poor M, E, R make learning difficult. Of course, there are also implications for accountability, but learning is the primary and overriding purpose of the learning review to which this desk review contributes. Weak data makes it difficult to provide strong information and analysis that would be most useful to CMM to understand and improve P2P project design and performance. This of course is of concern for this desk review itself, but, more importantly, it has larger implications for CMM’s ability to understand, learn from, and improve overall

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performance of the APS. Furthermore, poor M&E deprive program implementers of the input they need to adapt their programs effectively to changing conflict contexts, or to otherwise improve program performance. By neglecting appropriate M, E, R, implementers prevent CMM from learning how best to develop the APS in future years, and, even worse, implementers deprive their own project leadership from receiving the feedback and updated conflict analyses that would allow them to appropriately adapt their P2P plans to be more effective.

The desk review relied on the review of an inconsistent and incomplete set of project documents, but from our perspective this study suffers another key weakness: there was no complementary review of USAID or CMM processes and systems for selecting, supporting, reviewing, or overseeing APS projects. This is significant in that a number of the recommendations discussed in this report, and the general recommendations laid out in the following section, necessarily are based on assumptions about how USAID and CMM engage with the APS grantees, and/or why grantees do or do not integrate best practices into the APS projects. However, we nevertheless offer the following recommendations, in hopes that they will be helpful to CMM staff who will consider them in the context of their deeper knowledge of current and possible approaches to APS selection, support, review, and oversight.

Moreover, it is important to understand and acknowledge that CMM has produced robust and extensive guidance, contained in several key background documents, on how to design, implement, and monitor and evaluate APS projects. Further, given the rich content contained in these two publications, which directly address many of the recommendations made in the body of this document and summarized below, the reviewers concluded that the apparent failures of implementers with regard to M, E, R, may reflect more shortcomings in implementer communication of their activities and results, rather than shortcomings in following APS design and implementation guidance.

**Recommendations**

**Improve APS project monitoring, evaluation, and reporting by:**

- **Setting aside a portion of all APS funds to support these essential portions of project implementation.** Rather than offer maximum of $1.2 million grants per project, offer, for example, a maximum of $1 million for project activities and $200,000 for associated M, E, R.9

- **Creating a pool of APS Evaluation Specialists to work with implementers in designing, and in some case implementing, the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting for APS projects.**

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8 See especially CMM’s *People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide* and *Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation.*

9 This example was used for ease of explanation and represents the largest amount of possible APS funding. The recommendation follows in the spirit of USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning (USAID/PPL) that programs reserve between 5-10% of funds for M&E. The desk review found the median APS project budget to be around $600,000, meaning that the median amount set aside for M&E should be between $30-60,000.
CMM should develop and distribute widely guidance on how to contextualize and refine M&E systems for APS programming to allow for rolling context analysis as well as track results at outcome levels, outside of immediate project activities, and linking PWS to PWL where possible. This could include providing a list of illustrative outcome indicators and field guides for appropriate methods that would be most useful to track outcomes and would help implementers—and USAID managers in Missions—conceive and execute such systems. Further, CMM should consider linking this with specific requirements (e.g., Evaluation Policy, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, etc.) and hold implementers accountable for the quality of the results frameworks, outcome level indicators, and M&E systems, as well as their adaptation as warranted.

- If CMM wishes to learn about touch points in particular, CMM needs to explicitly require that M, E, R include consideration of touch points. While CMM’s recent development of further guidance on ToCs is clear, Missions should consult with the implementers to clarify the ToCs guiding each project, and emphasize the need to integrate them into ongoing project implementation, adapted as necessary due to M&E feedback, and to reflect the ToCs in (certain) project documents. This would entail developing a standard definition of what constitutes a touch point, including establishing the variables that constitute the quality of touch points, along with guidance on what aspects of the design, implementation, and follow-up are critical success factors.

Improving data collection for ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluation of the P2P APS by routinely depositing all project documents into the new knowledge management database being developed by CMM. Specific guidance as to what documents need to be submitted and how to do so, as well as quality standards for what such documents should minimally contain, should be developed and inserted into all grant and cooperative agreements as mandatory project reporting deliverables. Disbursement of grant funds should be contingent upon project document placement in the knowledge management database.

CMM should consider mandating implementer reporting on changes in political/conflict contexts and ask implementers to explicitly state what affect this has or has not had on their implementation. Because P2P programs operate in volatile environments, implementers should be required to report on political changes and other changes in the context which will affect their implementation. These changes should feed into consideration of contingency plans. In other words, USAID should require that implementers not implement exactly the planned activity if the context has changed significantly. Activities must adapt to changing circumstances.

Improve APS project adaptive and innovative implementation by:

- Developing specific process guidance on how to perform rolling conflict analyses and examine broader contextual factors that affect not only project implementation and success, but could constitute windows of emerging opportunity. As this systematic analysis appears to be already occurring in the format of rolling situational security analysis, introducing a more reflective element to this analysis that would seek to identify windows of opportunity or emergent issues that the project could address likely requires simple awareness raising and conceptual grounding.

- Developing contingency planning as a regular part of APS proposals and management. CMM should consider requiring that APS proposals include contingency
plans considering likely shifts in conflict dynamics or potential risks, and appropriate project adaptation. These contingency plans do not necessarily need to cover the range of possible outcomes but could at least acknowledge one or two likely mitigating factors and how the implementer is equipped to respond. We suggest that USAID Missions pre-approve adaptations within the contingency plan, so that rapid shifts in activity plans can be implemented should the need arise. CMM could develop guidance for USAID Missions on how to integrate flexible management of APS projects and to develop greater tolerance for shifting and “adaptive” project activities and objectives. CMM could also require that implementers not implement exactly the planned activity if the context has changed significantly and that activities must adapt to changing circumstances.

- **Providing comprehensive guidance that explains the critical need to allow for adaptive implementation of even the best plans, and encourages innovation in project design and implementation phases.** Highlight that ToCs are useful to the extent that they allow thoughtful implementation guided by ongoing monitoring, updated conflict analyses, and consideration of contingencies and project adaptation strategies. Highlight that project management in P2P requires adaptation to project feedback and developments in the project context. Illustrate this with examples of successful adaptation. The APS program statement should encourage project designs to innovate as appropriate to their local context, ToC, and the implementers’ unique strengths, and encourage potential grantees to consider touch points other than or in addition to face-to-face where social media or other technologies can assist reconciliation.

**Encourage high quality P2P programming by:**

- Providing point values in proposal review for project designs that appropriately assess the project-specific political space for P2P, offer reasonable contingency plans for shifts in that political space, and demonstrate long-term local relationships and sensitivity to local political space by providing letters of recommendation from local partners as appendices to project proposals.

- Clarify what constitutes “innovative” programming. The desk reviewers found few examples of APS program designs deviating substantively from traditional approaches. If CMM wants to see more innovative designs, it must provide more explanation of what this means.

The desk review conclusions and recommendations are inherently limited by the data available. However, the desk review does highlight some areas that may be usefully explored in the final field evaluation portion of the learning review, and in future research by CMM. These include:

- Identify the range of funds spent, as well as range of percentage of project budgets spent, on M, E, R for APS projects. Is there a range of support that seems to be required for quality M, E, R?

- Field evaluations should explore the ability of projects to shift course midway in response to changes in the conflict context or unexpected obstacles or opportunities. How did these projects remain flexible? How can other APS grantees learn from these successes in flexible program implementation? What factors constrain or inhibit flexible and adaptive response?

- How familiar are implementers with P2P guidance and what internal processes exist to regularly reflect on and integrate this guidance in project management and implementation, if any?

- Is touch point a meaningful concept to project implementers? How is it understood by them? How would they develop it further, if meaningful?
- To what extent did projects actually follow the progression of activities mapped out through the P2P guide’s 14 guidelines? Why?
- What are the processes of USAID engagement with implementers, what are the strengths and weaknesses, and how could USAID engagement with implementers be improved?
Introduction

Since 2004, the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in Washington has held an annual Reconciliation Program Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The APS is funded through a Congressional appropriation mandate that grants utilize a people-to-people (P2P) reconciliation approach to guide their work. According to CMM’s People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, the underlying ToC is that in “communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities…[building or rebuilding] strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.”\(^{10}\) Thus, by creating a safe space\(^{11}\) where representatives from conflicting groups can interact, prejudices and perceived differences of “others” can be confronted, challenged, and hopefully ultimately replaced by “mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.”\(^{12}\)

Over time, the APS fund has grown from $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million reserved for Middle East programming and $16 million for global programs, supporting over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries. While the definitions have shifted slightly over time, the APS has always been focused on community and P2P reconciliation work, particularly at the grassroots level. Grants typically range between 12-36 months in duration and $100,000-$1.2 million in size.

An important operational aspect to note is that although CMM/Washington manages the overall APS, responsibility for the award and immediate oversight of the funded projects rests with USAID Missions abroad. The decentralized nature of project management means that there is no centralized repository of APS project documents that would allow CMM to monitor and evaluate the overall program or study how APS-funded projects conform to or depart from the guidelines outlined in its technical publications. CMM’s ability to assess the effectiveness of APS grants is further complicated by the mercurial and complex nature of conflict-related programs, which are difficult to monitor and evaluate using standard, linear M&E approaches. Furthermore, conflict-related interventions rarely produce short-term, measurable results and are very context-sensitive, thus making it difficult to establish meaningful baselines, identify properly counter-factual examples, successfully plan for target outputs, and attribute outcomes and results back to inputs.

As a result, CMM has explored various methodologies for evaluating complex development programs, including developmental evaluation (DE), which may add greater depth of analysis and understanding. The DE approach uses evaluative information, analysis, and processes to contribute to the organic evolution of a project, rather than simply judge its success or failure. Michael Quinn Patton calls this relationship to an evaluated program “co-evolutionary.” The evaluator is not an independent entity

\(^{11}\) See Glossary on pg v
\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 6.
standing outside the project but a facilitator of a reflective learning process (action reflection) whereby evaluators, project staff, and other stakeholders are part of an inclusive, ongoing project design.

In the fall of 2011, SI began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under CMM’s P2P APS through a pilot application of this DE methodology. The objectives of this review are not only to learn about the reconciliation APS projects themselves, but also to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs.

Our work is divided into three phases, which are not necessarily implemented in succession but rather with learning and action reflection steps integrated throughout. These three general phases were:

**Phase I:** Knowledge management and study of the reconciliation APS. SI has collected and organized the APS’s raw data and reports into a centralized and manageable database; conducted an analysis of project design and M&E reports to provide an assessment of the overall project monitoring systems and provide input shaping further P2P APS evaluation; and conducted a meta-evaluation of APS project evaluation reports.

**Phase II:** Field evaluation of selected APS programs. SI will conduct three field-based performance evaluations of the APS program in Israel/West Bank/Gaza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Burundi. The evaluations are intended to advance CMM and Agency learning with regards to the design of its APS program and its adaptability to changing local environments; the content of its technical publications; and the ways to further develop conflict mitigation and management technical assistance to Missions.

**Phase III:** Reflective learning. SI and CMM will carry out structured learning on emerging lessons from the evaluation activity itself and reflect on current work in progress to deepen office learning and create knowledge on the evaluation of peace programs. This occurs primarily through the convening of an LG comprised of CMM and SI personnel interacting with a number of noted experts in the field of conflict studies and peacebuilding practice who together review technical publications; discuss key thematic issues; and organize select meetings and conferences to examine findings, consider best practices, and establish lessons learned.

**Background and Purpose of Desk Review**

This document is a desk review of a wide assortment of APS project design and M&E documents. The review examines the strength and adaptability of the project design and reported implementation, the quality of the projects’ reporting, challenges faced by the projects, and the larger impact on or contribution to peace and reconciliation, as reported by the implementers themselves.

The desk review is guided by a list of questions identified in close consultation with CMM and the project’s LG. The purpose of these consultations was to determine the specific objectives of the three inter-related evaluative learning activities: the desk review, the meta-evaluation, and the field evaluations. Implicit in each of these activities was the larger question of how well APS projects conform to and integrate guidance into project design, implementation, and M&E processes. In order to produce useful and potentially significant findings, the analysis focused on assessing alignment in project implementation rather than project design. Particular emphasis was placed on determining the extent to which each project responded to contextual challenges. The original Scope of Work (SOW) for Phase I stated: “[SI] will carry out review and analysis of project documents...[and] the desk study should comment on aspects of the projects and APS program, such as [...]apparent alignment of projects and activities to the good practices described in USAID’s People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, with particular focus on the utilization of conflict and gender analysis in program design and management.” Although discussions with CMM resulted in a shift of focus away from gender analysis, it is important to note that desk review data reveals an absence of evidence that gender integration occurs in the implementation of APS programming. Although data on this topic was not systematically collected through the protocol,
several of the reviewers noted a dearth of information in this area. Some of these observations and suggestions for improvement are addressed below. Inclusion of these considerations is important to ensure compliance with APS guidelines, the Automated Directives System (ADS), and the litany of other guides produced by USAID in recent years, including the Evaluation Policy, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, CMM’s Women and Conflict Toolkit, and USAID’s Implementation of the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. Furthermore, incorporating more robust gender integration throughout the project cycle would encourage richer, more responsive CMM programs—and possibly greater impact.

**Research Design and Methodology**

**Research Design and Questions**

This desk study used a standard document review approach that employed qualitative methods to review and analyze content organized around three broad areas of research presented below.

1) **Project Design and Implementation**
   a) Discuss and record the number of interactions between opposing parties to the conflict or project stakeholders from opposite sides of the conflict (hereafter referred to as touch points).
      i) Number that occurred.
      ii) Form that occurred.
      iii) Quality of the touch point.
   b) To what extent is there evidence in project documents that the project contributed to or achieved PWS?
   c) To what extent is there evidence in project documents that the project contributed to PWL?
   d) To what extent has a ToC (or program hypothesis) been clearly presented?

2) **Adaptive Implementation**
   a) To what extent do project documents detail changing conflict and political dynamics?
   b) If so, to what extent did the project change its approach based on changing dynamics or conditions? That is, to what extent do project documents reflect or explicitly discuss changes in approach?
   c) Describe any innovative program design or implementation approaches identified. Record any information on the role of effective political support and/or that of safe political space in the project’s effectiveness.

3) **Project Monitoring and Evaluation**
   a) To what extent are indicators tied to the project’s ToC?
   b) Describe any outcome level indicators.
   c) To what extent did the project develop new indicators to reflect changes in political or conflict dynamics?
   d) Describe any innovative M&E approaches identified.
Data Collection Instrument

The SI Team, in collaboration with CMM, developed a desk review protocol that included questions on project design, implementation, and monitoring. Each question in the protocol was reviewed with CMM to determine the utility of possible findings for USAID. Questions were keyed to USAID best practices and guidelines for APS projects and were accompanied by definitions of each of the key terms. Reviewers provided answers to each question on a Likert scale from 0 to 3, with 0 meaning “not addressed or evident,” 1 meaning “poorly/partially addressed,” 2 meaning “adequately addressed,” and 3 meaning “ideally addressed.” A question for which there was insufficient information was coded as “n/a” for missing or insufficient information. This instrument is attached to this document as Annex B.

Reviewer Training and Inter-Coder Reliability

SI held several sessions with the reviewers to test and improve inter-coder reliability. After an initial session during which SI explained the questions on the protocol and the standards for ratings, each reviewer completed the protocol for the same sample project. The reviewers then came back together to discuss their results and to identify and clarify any rankings where reviewers were more than one full point apart on the four-point Likert scales used. Additionally, midway through the exercise, SI conducted another inter-coder reliability session using the same procedure on a different project in order to answer questions and correct any points where reviewers continued to differ. The midway review revealed that “PWL” remained a difficult concept to code due to differences in coders’ expectations of how significant impact on PWL should be and the lack of detailed discussions of this in many project documents. In addition, the number of “touch points” remained difficult to code, as project documents implied that meetings included stakeholders from across a conflict divide, but did not explicitly state this. Despite these two areas of low reliability, the other variables were all consistently coded to within at least one point of each other on the four-point scale by all six coders.

Sampling Strategy

The target population for the study was the entire population of all 184 APS projects throughout the history of the APS at the time, since 2004. Most of the project documents were provided by implementing partners in response to a request from CMM, while other documents were provided by Missions or were already in CMM’s files. Of the 184 APS awards made from 2004-2011, SI received at least one document from 111 projects. However, because the desk review protocol relies on a review of relevant documents, SI based the sampling strategy on projects that provided specific types of documents (indicated by the sample frame); for example, success stories generally cannot be used to answer questions about indicators while a Performance Management Plan (PMP) can. This also explains why there is variation in total numbers of documents reviewed, as presented in the tables below. Only projects which provided documents suitable to extract the information required were counted. The sample frame indicates the subset of cases that satisfied selection criteria (see Table 1 below).
Table 1: Summary of Sampling Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population of Interest (PoI)</th>
<th>Pol Size</th>
<th>Description of Sample Frame</th>
<th>Frame Size</th>
<th>Sampling Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>All APS Projects over time</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects for which we have: 1) At least 2 quarterly reports, 2) At least one semi-annual report, OR 3) At least one annual report</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Convenience Sample</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>“Strategic Design” All APS Projects (representativeness is not primary goal)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects with proposals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Convenience sample</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>“Innovative Approaches” All APS Projects (representativeness is not primary goal)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects with proposals OR Evaluation reports, AND all projects in Sample 1</td>
<td>~75</td>
<td>Convenience sample</td>
<td>~75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>“Monitoring/Indicators” All APS Projects (representativeness is not primary goal)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects with PMPs</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Convenience sample</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because useful data for answering different questions were likely to be discussed in different types of documentation, we selected projects for inclusion based on a range of criteria with the aim of casting as wide a net as possible. When assignments were randomized, SI believed it had sufficient documentation on 94 projects within the specific sample frames listed in the table above. Once coders received assignments and began reading through documents, the number of observations of projects had to be readjusted to 79. Of the original 94, three projects had been duplicated due to mislabeling or unclear sourcing and 12 projects were dropped due to missing or mislabeled information, resulting in a final sample size of 79 projects. Given the diminished sample size, in consultation with CMM, the desk review analyzed each of the 79 projects in accordance with the questions in the data collection tool.

A more comprehensive discussion of the sampling strategy can be found in Annex C.

The sample included projects throughout the history of the APS, although most projects started between FY 2008 and FY 2010, as illustrated in Figure 1:
The project budgets ranged from $121,538 to $1.5 million, though the median project budget was $600,000. 88% of projects reviewed had budgets that were smaller than $1 million, as shown in Figure 2.

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Figure 1: Number of Projects by Fiscal Year Start Date

The project budgets ranged from $121,538 to $1.5 million, though the median project budget was $600,000. 88% of projects reviewed had budgets that were smaller than $1 million, as shown in Figure 2.

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13 n=76. For some projects reviewed, the start date was not included in the available documentation.
The shortest project was five months in duration, while the longest was four years. Almost half of the projects had a period of performance of between 13 and 24 months, as shown in Figure 3 below.

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14 n=72. For some projects reviewed, the total budget was not included in the available documentation. Where possible budget figures were supplanted by CMM records. Figures reflect USAID funding only and do not reflect cost-sharing agreements or funds from non-USAID donors.
Variations in APS over Time

Key considerations guiding the analysis of the sampled grants included the timeframe of each project and the changes in the APS solicitation over time—for example, the desk reviewers were careful not to be overly critical of projects prior to 2009 lacking a clearly defined ToC as this requirement was not introduced until the 2009 APS. Similar fluctuations related to grant size, duration, APS-eligible countries, focus on cross-border versus uni-national programs, and adherence to the P2P approach occurred over the life of the APS.

Although a clearly defined ToC was not required until the 2009 APS, all APS projects since 2004 were expected to have been awarded based on the presence of an implicit and discernible underlying program logic. Given that the presence of an underlying/implicit was more important than its specific categorization, the desk reviewers were careful to note instances where a ToC or underlying program logic could be clearly identified regardless if that ToC or logic was explicitly stated or named as belonging to one of CMM’s ToC Families. In cases where a particular ToC family was identified by name, the reviewer was asked to note if the program narrative actually articulated that logic or if the implementer was merely making fleeting reference to satisfy the solicitation requirements.

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15 n=73. For some projects reviewed, the period of performance was not included in the available documentation. Numbers of reflect the planned period of performance; some APS projects received no-cost extensions.

16 Theories of Change Families were designed in June 2010.
Threats to Validity

Despite strong efforts to test and review coders' work, inter-coder reliability remains an issue since the rating scales rely on complex interpretations of a wide range of variable project documents to address multidimensional questions. To mitigate this concern, the reviewers were required to include a narrative justification for each score provided, allowing the authors to identify and correct any acute subjective imprecision in rankings during the data analysis phase.

Frequently, for the questions that required a rating (between 0-3 as discussed above), coders assigned a score of 2 and this pattern held in all three of the areas of research concern. Although the reason for this trend is uncertain, there are several potential explanations. It is possible that the coders did not have a substantial enough frame of reference or adequate on-the-ground experience with these kinds of programs and the settings in which they occur to make strong positive or negative judgments assertively, and therefore they used "adequate"—a numerical score of 2—as a default. The score of 3 was also defined as "ideally addressed or evident," which led to many projects being given an adequate or average score of 2 if they were not seen to exemplify the absolute ideal standard. This tendency is understandable, particularly given the absence of specific reporting discussions on issues such as touch points, PWS/PWL, and other variables examined through the application of the desk review protocol. Another likely explanation is that due to the understandably self-interested nature of the content contained in project documents, it was difficult for coders to discern the authentic qualities of the phenomena from the data as presented.

Table 2: Frequency of Coded Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Frequency of Rating</th>
<th>Percentage Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, as shown in Table 2 above, the frequency of the ratings across the five questions which required scores to be provided is fairly evenly distributed. In addition, for every score given, coders were asked to give a qualitative explanation and examples from the text as applicable, so, as much as possible, the conclusions sections of this report attempt to analyze the quantitative findings against the qualitative examples given to bring out nuances that the ratings may not show.

Methodological Limitations

Throughout the course of this desk study, the research was affected by the inconsistent quality and lack of completeness of the set of obtained documents. There are a variety of reasons why the set of documents was inconsistent and incomplete, not the least of which was the fact that many projects were several years old, implementers and USAID Missions did not possess complete sets of records due to the often decentralized approach to project implementation, and no commonly understood standard for documenting P2P projects exists. Because there were no standard sets of documents associated with each project, and the quality of documents varied widely, there is weak supporting evidence for many of the inferences drawn here. It must be understood that any generalized assertions related to the APS are
thus, at least from an empirical perspective, tentative. However, in spite of this weakness in the data, there are a number of informative conclusions that can be drawn.

**Findings and Conclusions**

Findings and conclusions in this section have been disaggregated and organized by the three broad research areas: Project design and implementation, adaptive implementation, and M&E.

**Project design and implementation**

**Discuss and assess quality of “touch points” during life of project**

**Findings/Observations**

According to its 2012 APS, CMM seeks to support “people-to-people conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and activities which bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war,” with the most consideration going to programs that establish “opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recent conflict.” While the requirements for P2P have changed over time, in the future, it will be important for program designers and implementers to establish metrics to track and report the quantity and quality of such contact—touch points among individuals and groups in conflict. To better inform this effort, the SI team analyzed the extent to which past projects reported bringing opposing sides together.

A “touch point” is an interaction between opposing parties to a conflict or project stakeholders from opposite sides of the conflict. These interactions are usually direct contact—face-to-face or otherwise. The actual number of touch points, the type of touch point, and the quality of touch point were all reviewed in this study to the extent that data was available. As discussed in the section on threats to validity, this is a particularly difficult question to confidently assess as many of the project documents were not clear on whether direct contact was made between parties, whether or not actual opposing parties were involved in the touch point, how many participants were involved, and/or how many interactions actually occurred. Furthermore, the quality of the interaction as well as the content, depth, and duration of the interaction are all significant in determining how to score it, and this information was inadequately chronicled in the reviewed documents. These results should therefore be considered with the understanding that they are reliant on the coders’ interpretation of the documents, subsequent categorization of the touch point, and assumed (as it was frequently unreported) rating on the level of quality as presented in project documents.

29 out of 79 projects (37%) were found to have inadequate information available to determine whether or not a touch point had occurred at all. For example, one project’s reports mention that the participants in the workshops represented a broad cross section of society and the political spectrum;

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however, they are not explicit as to whether those who were coming together represented opposing parties of the conflict. Many projects reported on “USG supported events” but did not explain whether or not these represented cross-community touch points as defined above. A standard practice among peacebuilding practitioners is to conduct uni-communal work prior to or in parallel to multi-communal interactions, and thus it should not be assumed that every workshop or event constituted a touch point.

Of the 50 projects that did identify some form of touch point, nine categories of touch points can be classified. These include:

1. Radio shows\textsuperscript{18} and other media events;
2. Peace forums, festivals, summits, and concerts;
3. Workshops/trainings, seminars, and sensitization activities;
4. Meetings and community development councils that focus on idea exchange;
5. Dialogues, interactive forums, and roundtables to exchange opinions and stories;
6. Field trips, exchanges, and visits;
7. Dispute resolution, mediation, conflict interventions, and reconciliation activities;
8. Community improvement projects and service groups, scenario planning, mapping, and legal glossary publishing; and
9. Sports, youth camps, retreats, music, dance, and theater performances.

Out of the projects in which touch points were described, the most frequently occurring touch points were workshops/trainings, seminars, and sensitization activities; dialogues, interactive forums, and roundtables to exchange opinions and stories; and sports, youth camps, retreats, music, dance, and theater performances. Percentages of the frequency of each type of touch point are presented below. (Projects which involved two kinds of touch points were coded as instances of both types.)

1. Workshop, trainings, seminars, and sensitization activities (19): 19%  
2. Dialogues, interactive radio, forums, and roundtables—all direct exchanges of opinion and stories (18): 18%  
3. Sports, youth camps, retreats, music, dance, theater performances—all fun-centered activities (12): 12%  
4. Radio shows and other media events (10): 10%  
5. Meetings and community development councils that focus on idea exchange (10): 10%

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\textsuperscript{18} Some radio shows were interpreted as touch points, and some were not. It should be noted that there are two types of radio shows: interactive and non-interactive. The interactive shows were more likely to be considered touch points than non-interactive shows.
6. Community improvement projects, service groups, projects, scenario planning, mappings, legal glossary publishing – all constructive activities that improve the community (9): 9%

7. Peace forums, festivals, summits, and concerts (8): 8%

8. Dispute resolutions, mediations, conflict interventions, and conflict reconciliation activities (7): 7%

9. Field trips, trips, exchanges, visits—all temporary, but intense activities that require leaving home (6): 6%

The quality of the touch point was rated on the 0-3 scale described earlier with the option of “not enough information available” (or N/A) as well.

**Figure 4: Quality of touch points**

![Quality of Touch points](image)

Of the most frequently occurring touch points, the category of “dialogues, interactive forums, and roundtables to exchange opinions and stories,” was considered of the highest quality with an average score of 2.6.

The main differentiating variables distinguishing high quality versus low quality touch points were:

**High quality:**

- Stakeholders who participated were influential community members, demonstrated buy-in, and the touch point is seen as legitimate among all parties;
- A large amount of stakeholders involved and/or attendance exceeded the target;
- A large amount or number of occurrences of the touch point;
- Diverse range of stakeholders involved; and
- Linked to evidence of some contribution to PWL, favorable participant statements and evaluations, or evidence of changed hearts and minds.
Low quality:

- Lower quality touch points were found to have issues related to physical access to opposing parties (because of location one community could not participate);
- Lop-sided opposing party diversity;
- No evidence of sustainable cooperation or peace beyond length of program; and
- Unclear evidence on the actual participation of opposing parties.

Analysis/Conclusions

Ultimately, touch points per se are not explicitly addressed in any project documents reviewed here. There is rarely a clear distinction made between activities bringing together opposing parties versus other activities, and many times, the number of people participating in activities is counted while the number of activities is not described. Furthermore, the duration of sustained contact is not addressed nor is a detailed description of the process of engagement with all steps and stages carefully recorded. Of the most frequently occurring touch points, there are likely advantages to each and these can be utilized in different situations depending on their relevance—and may, in the right circumstances, produce substantial results. Dialogues and other interactive forums are considered to be of high quality because they typically bring together high-level stakeholders who are key decision makers and have the capability of producing higher-level change, or they may focus on problem-solving around specific conflict issues, but if the process is superficial or poorly facilitated it is unlikely to result in meaningful change among participants or to produce substantive changes in the wider conflict context. Community service projects, camps, and other “fun-based” activities, while not necessarily incorporating the highest level stakeholders or focusing on specific conflict drivers may bring together opposing parties by having them work together towards a common goal of mutual interest and concern. This helps to build trust that can then be translated into willingness to engage on richer conflict mitigation activities, but this outcome may not occur if there is a lack of carefully integrated and intentional process for ensuring follow-up to sustain or intensify initial project results. Unfortunately, given the lack of information provided by the reviewed documents, it is not possible to assess the general quality of touch points that have occurred or make reliable assertions of likely results attributable to these projects.

Recommendations

CMM should develop guidance and clearer reporting requirements to ensure more uniform and consistent reporting on touch points across projects and implementers. This includes developing a standard definition of what constitutes a touch point, including establishing the variables that constitute the quality of touch points, along with guidance on what aspects of the design, implementation, and follow-up are critical success factors. Although CMM’s P2P guidance lays out a rich theoretical underpinning for how to design an integrated P2P approach, it says little about the micro-level process facilitation requirements that ensure success at the project level. The guidance should also identify indicators for touch points that would describe and record these success factors, as well as record results, and ensure that all projects track and report on these. Finally, the guidance should clearly articulate when and how implementers should report on touch points, including the level of detail and aggregation needed (e.g. age, gender, etc.).

To what extent is there evidence in project documents that the project contributed to PWS?

Findings/Observations

PWS is defined as changes at the project level among participants or in the immediate social environment within which the project is nested. As described in USAID's People-to-People Peacebuilding: A
Program Guide, PWS is the goal of the specific project or program and should ideally be linked to the vision of PWL as described in the ToC or development hypothesis.

As shown in Figure 5 below, 55 out of 79 projects (70%) cited some evidence of PWS. The most frequently occurring indications of PWS were found in a project's survey and focus group results and subsequent anecdotes (26% of the 70%), with others using project indicators and targets to show evidence of contribution to PWS. Increased capacity of beneficiaries and communities; improved attitudes or behaviors towards the opposite group, government, or higher-level uptake of activities; and a large amount of people or communities affected by the intervention were all cited as proof of a positive change in PWS (although government or higher-level uptake and large numbers of affected communities could arguably be considered to be further along the continuum between PWS and PWL).

**Figure 5: Evidence of PWS**

Some examples of PWS include:

- A final evaluation of the “Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project” found that, “The media programmes have had a significant impact on the conflict, because of the quality of design and the relevance of the content, which enabled Search [for Common Ground] (i.e. Studio Ijambo and Radio Isanganiro) to catch and hold the attention of the majority of the radio-listening population. An OTI survey carried out in two eastern provinces reported that focus group participants unanimously identified radio and meetings with local administrative authorities as the two primary sources of information on current events. In both target provinces, Radio Isanganiro won acclaim as the most popular radio station, both for its entertainment and for its dissemination of timely, accurate and detailed news [...] Yet another survey shows that 37% of youth (mostly males) have a radio, and 60% of them mentioned as reasons for listening to the radio that it contributes to reconciliation.”

- Project documents from the work of the Public International Law and Policy Group’s (PILPG) in Sri Lanka demonstrated that PILPG became the de facto legal and technical resource for Sri Lankan government officials and policy makers involved in crafting a negotiation proposal.
Beneficiaries confirmed that “PILPGs work products, deliverables, and workshops informed the peacebuilding process.”

- A community mediation board was set up to hear land disputes in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by a project focused on land rights issues. In North Kivu the Provincial Ministry of Land Affairs is aiming to approve a provincial law for the establishment of the Land Coordination Group as a provincial initiative. In addition, the services are being utilized by citizens, according to the project’s monitoring data; therefore utilization, alongside government involvement, is leading to increased integration in the land dispute process within the communities affected by the intervention. The program established structures for continued inter-ethnic and inter-communal dialogue. The documents demonstrated that the project has managed to bring together inter-ethnic groups and create an opportunity for different communities to know each other, dialogue, and work together towards a common goal.

One project had an indicator that appeared to track PWS, “# of conflicts peacefully managed as a result of training provided to Coexistence Facilitators at the family, organizational, community or educational level,” but there were no results reported as the project was still ongoing. It was also unclear how this would be monitored. Another project discussed why PWS had not occurred and cited issues with linking the grassroots-level components of their program (community-based forums) to the higher-level components (government institution involvement in the community issues/concerns).

Analysis/Conclusions

There is an evident link between the apparent quality of touch points and the perceived evidence of PWS. As demonstrated in Table 3 below, 45 of 79 projects received adequate or ideal scores of 2 or 3 for the quality of their touch points, while 44 of 79 received the same score for PWS. Of 79 projects reviewed, 8 (10%) received “ideal” scores for both their evidence of contribution to PWS and the quality of touch points. Interestingly, when the “quality of touch point” was categorized as “ideal,” 16 of 17 projects (94%) has project documents claiming the project contributed to PWS either “adequately” or “ideally.”

Sample APS Peace Writ Small Indicators

- Number of cases successfully resolved by local Peace Committees ~Pader Peace Program.
- Number of radio stations continuing to broadcast following end of funding. ~Brighter Futures Project.
- Percentage of children and youth demonstrate skills to resolve conflicts, acceptance and cooperation. ~I/WB/G Right to Play
- Number of conflicts peacefully managed as a result of training provide to Coexistence Facilitators at the family, organizational, community, or educational level” ~Reconciliar
- Percentage of youth program participants reporting increased empathy towards those of other ethnicities, religions and nationalities following the initial summer camps. ~Youth Theater
### Table 3: A Cross Tabulation of the Quality of Touch Points vs. Contribution to PWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Touch points</th>
<th>Not Seen or Evident</th>
<th>Poorly</th>
<th>Adequately</th>
<th>Ideally</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Evident</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Count</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the coders noted that there was an obvious lack of careful measurement and recording of indicators that track PWS, indicating a need for M&E capacity development of implementing partners and the requirement for indicators of outcomes to be tracked in the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP). A clearer understanding among implementing partners as to how the ToC leads to a results framework and associated indicators and how a PMP is used to manage for results would also be helpful. It is possible that many of the implementing partners do not understand attribution issues when developing indicators and they could probably benefit from assistance to conceptualize and track this.

**Recommendations**
CMM should consider developing indicators (or standard guidance) for tracking the “quality of touch” and contribution to “PWS.” This would help to standardize implementers’ monitoring and report, and offer CMM an opportunity to further test and validate the conclusions above. CMM should consider guidance already developed by other development partners19 and other USAID offices.20

**To what extent is there evidence in project documents that the project contributed to PWL?**

**Findings/Observations**

This question asks whether, in meeting specific program goals, a project makes a contribution to the bigger picture or in some way makes a contribution to broader, macro-level conflict dynamics that drive conflict at the national or higher level. This requires assessing changes in the overall conflict environment that may (or may not) be convincingly attributable to the project or program.21

Figure 6 below shows that 16 of the 79 projects reviewed (20.3%) did not evaluate or show any evidence of contributing to PWL, and for 27 (34.2%) projects not enough information was available to determine whether or not a meaningful contribution had occurred. Both of these findings are not definitive in terms of an absence of higher-level outcomes, as projects that did provide evidence may not have been looking at and/or tracking contributions to PWL, or it may not have had available documents to include in this analysis. Impact at the higher level may have occurred; it simply cannot be confirmed based upon available evidence.

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19 For examples, see: CRS’s “Gain Peacebuilding Indicators;” the OECD DAC’s “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities,” SI’s “Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning for Fragile States and Peacebuilding Programs Toolkit,” and/or the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’s draft indicators which have been developed to help countries monitor progress towards the Peacebuilding & Statebuilding Goals that were agreed in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.


18 of 79 projects (22.8%) did cite evidence of a contribution assessed as adequate to ideal. Evidence cited included a reduction in violence statistics, an “autonomous initiative” being undertaken by stakeholders, and a duplication or adaptation of the project following the end of the project. Although it is questionable how carefully attribution was assessed and alternative explanations were controlled for prior to making these claims of impact, there is nonetheless a likely associated contribution that grantees are well positioned to observe.

No projects reviewed had their own specifically identified indicators that would be used to measure PWL. Three projects explained why PWL was not achieved, which allowed for an understanding of which parts of the project were intended to produce higher-level results and what these might be, something otherwise difficult to ascertain where explicit ToCs were missing.

Some further examples of identified contributions to PWL include:

1. A final evaluation reported: “At the end of the project, with the elections date set for June 27 and the official electoral campaign period about to start, young participants in Mamou decided to step up their engagement on the topic of political manipulation. Working among themselves, they decided to shoot a short video on the forthcoming elections and highlight, in particular, the risk of manipulation by political parties. After developing the script and filming this short video, the young participants shared the final product with [Search for Common Ground] in hope of having it polished and possibly utilized in further sensitization events.” Some quotes from the script include:
   
   “No major violence has occurred since 2007.”
   
   “Young people are more peaceful now...[and] use mediation more.”
   
   “Youth in Mamou agreed to volunteer and donate to rehabilitate a building that many youth destroyed a few years before.”
   
   “Youth have been significantly empowered and equipped to create their own projects. It can also be argued that it is largely through effective and positive use of communication that possible
danger was averted in the three project locations at the time of the September 28 stadium massacre."

“Also, radio is being improved and repurposed for direct political conversations.”

2. The Youth Initiatives for Peace and Reconciliation project in Nepal conducted its own endline survey and found a large decrease in the amount of violence in villages. The survey did acknowledge that this is in part due to the signing of a peace agreement in the country, but it then controls for this variable and still finds that youth activities contributed greatly to PWL. This was then triangulated by an external evaluation that found positive aspects of the project contributing to PWL.

3. “Pact also worked together with government and other non-governmental organizations (specifically EPaRDA), ensuring their inclusiveness in the process. . . Success in relation to this objective is partly evidenced by demonstrated multiplier effects. Specifically, groups hosting other peace dialogues (e.g. Hamer), non-Pact prompted community peace dialogues (Kizo), government replication of the methodology (Mursi-Ari), and communities seeking government support (Hamer-Gnagatom).”22 “According to all reports, there has been an improvement in the peace over the past several years, specifically in 2007/08, whereas in 2005/06 there was less of a noticeable reduction in violence. People attribute this in large part to the efforts of Pact—an extremely notable success. Other relevant contributors to the peace include the increased [Government of Ethiopia] budget for the region, improved relations between communities and the police (also impacted by Pact).”23

**APS Contributions to PWL**

| The Asia Foundation (TAF) project in southern Thailand uses interconnected projects “to empower and facilitate efforts by Thai-Malay community to interact with local authorities and resolve their grievances and disputes through formal channels and mechanisms. Over the long term, this will contribute to reduced tensions and conflict in southern Thailand.” Following the launch of the program in the south, the Foundation supported a larger launch in Bangkok. The launch event helped to facilitate face-to-face dialogue between Thai-Malay leaders and key constituencies from across Thailand that are positioned to influence policy towards the South. IREX’s *Youth Theatre for Peace* in the Central Asian Republics found that “community members say that they have started to perceive people of other ethnicities and nationalities differently thanks to Forum Theater plays they have seen. The respondents emphasized that they have become more tolerant and patient now. Among other things mentioned, the target community members reported having significantly fewer conflicts between one another, and between parents and adults and school children…All in all, the evaluation findings show that YTP has a certain effect not only on direct program participants but on wider community members as well through events organized by program participants (i.e. Forum Theater plays).” |

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23 Ibid, p. 23.
There are a few recurring reasons for issues with understanding or collecting information on PWL. In many projects, the overall goals were very broad and not linked to a clear and achievable ToC. For example, an evaluator noted that a project in Sri Lanka “was too broad to achieve all of its goals; indeed, it appears (the implementer) stretched itself thin in trying to implement such vast projects.” Many projects showed an inability to measure contribution to PWL and/or suffered from a misunderstanding of what PWL is. For example, one project conflated popularity with impact. The evaluation report stated that, “while the media program was popular, there is no evidence that this made a greater impact towards achieving PWL.”

Analysis/Conclusions

Nationally-focused projects, or those working with high-level, or senior representatives from the government or national organizations, have an easier time addressing attribution to PWL, as these are often targeted at the macro-level and thus identify and track indicators that resonate with this level. For example, PILPG or other projects that have access to senior officials are explicitly aimed at higher-level or more comprehensive conflict drivers, and senior level political support and involvement is crucial as a key component of project operating modality as well as an indication of ultimate success. As the PILPG final report indicates, “PILPG has concluded that without those on board at the senior most levels—directing others within government to formulate a legitimate constitutional proposal to resolve the grievances of the Tamil population—any program will have a hard time achieving its goal—devising a sustainable political solution that met the demands of both parties and secured a lasting peace in Sri Lanka.” However, the ability to develop appropriate indicators and measure contributions to PWL is not evident in a majority of projects. This could link back to the fact that many projects do not have or show a clear and direct ToC (see section on ToC below for more detail on this issue). It seems that there are many implicit assumptions that the work will lead to PWL but with minimal conceptualization of how this would occur and few specific measurements to verify the result. A lack of dedicated human and financial resources for systematizing M&E in these various cases may contribute to the inability to track larger outcomes. In the example above, because of the way the project itself was structured, the project was able to collect data and conduct an evaluation to show contribution to PWL. But this is an unusual situation based upon the review of all available project documents.

Recommendations

CMM APS guidelines should acknowledge that some approaches cannot be expected to be meaningfully tracked for direct contributions to PWL. Rather, CMM APS guidelines should require that project designs indicate how, if at all, the project plans are expected to contribute to PWS and PWL, and how these two levels of impact can be linked in the particular project context.

CMM should also recognize that it will be difficult for projects designed to operate at the grass-roots level to demonstrate tangible evidence of national level impact.

To what extent has a ToC (or program hypothesis) been clearly presented?

Findings/Observations

A project’s ToC explains the causal logic, or the series of cause and effect linkages that lead from project activities to expected results. While a results framework and the resulting PMP and indicators to track progress are separate from a ToC, the logic behind a results framework can be clarified by a well-articulated ToC.

Among those projects reviewed, a normal distribution was found. 19% of reviewed documents showed no indication of a ToC, 20.25% revealed poor or partial indication, 34.2% were adequate, 20.25% ideal, and 6.3% contained insufficient information to inform observations on the program’s ToC. Of all of the projects reviewed, only eight provided documents that identified a specific ToC that conformed to
current CMM guidelines. Of those eight, six began in 2010 or later, follow the issuance of specific CMM ToC guidance, indicating a strong correlation between the changes in APS requirements and implementers beginning to delineate the ToCs for their programs. Thus it is important to note that the availability of specific and contextualized guidance appears to have directly contributed to a change in implementer behavior in the design of their programs.

Far more common was a rating of “adequate.” This score was assigned to projects for which coders could make confident inferences about the ToC or program hypothesis based on the activities or objectives described. In many of these cases, some level of logic is evident, but it is not explicitly clarified or represented in detail. Among the “adequate” responses, there were varying degrees of clarity. For the most part, coders were able to infer ToCs from program objectives rather than stated logic, and this was particularly true depending on the available documents. For example, there were several cases in which only work plans or PMPs were available, and in many cases documents such as these do not explicitly include a development hypothesis (although, PMPs should ideally contain a results framework, that should also contain a description of the ToC, so this absence of an explicit ToC is not in line with generally-accepted best practices). For cases in which the theories were implicitly stated, coders were able to extrapolate which ToCs were at work. It was observed that the majority of these implicit ToCs came from Families 2 and 3 of the ToCs, while fewer examples emerged from Families 6 and 7. Even if a theory was at play, either explicitly or implicitly, most documents did not explain connections between the fundamental hypotheses and the activities conducted, regardless of the documents available.

Analysis/Conclusions

CMM’s introduction in 2010 of a requirement that all APS project be based on a clear ToC has improved the quality of ToCs in project documents. This suggests CMM should continue to require all APS project proposals to explicitly identify the project ToC.

Recommendations

Missions should consult with the implementers to clarify the ToCs guiding each project, and emphasize the need to integrate them into ongoing project implementation, adapted as necessary due to M&E feedback, and to reflect the ToCs in (certain) project documents. ToCs should also be consistent with USAID policies, such as the 2012 Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy.

Adaptive Implementation

To what extent did the project change its approach based on the changing dynamics or conditions?

Findings/Observations

Most projects that reported on changing conditions made mention primarily of the consequences these contextual factors had on program implementation. By far, the most commonly noted response to these changes involved changing the timeline of activities. Planned activities were usually postponed or relocated in order for the implementers to maintain a low profile and prevent participants from being exposed to additional security

Illustrative Example of “Adaptive Implementation”

Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice’s (IPJ) project, “Building Constituencies for Peace and Democratic Development” in Nepal underwent several significant changes in response to setbacks. For example, following an election that resulted in the arrest of several lawmakers that were slated to participate in IPJ workshops, IPJ viewed this event as an opportunity to turn their focus to emerging leaders. IPJ restructured the workshop for the “next-generation leaders so that they [would] receive additional skills and training.” This reaction to an unforeseen political development was unique insofar as it was received as an opportunity to change or improve a program, rather than as an insurmountable obstacle.
risks. In one case, a project hired a consultant to advise the project staff on conflict sensitive journalism; their journalism trainings were then redesigned to occur in smaller groups that would attract less unwanted attention from the government.24

There were 15 of 79 projects (19 %) that made substantive changes to their programs in response to changing conditions. Naturally, the feasibility of major changes to programming is often constrained by time and budget limitations, as well as compliance issues related to contracts or cooperative agreements. Some projects were able to maneuver changes in cases where resources were ample or security risks were especially severe. Examples of positive responses that adapted to changing contextual factors include opening more local offices to give greater access to programs (“Seeds of Peace”/Palestine), making staff changes to ensure that the program staff was viewed as being neutral (“Youth Media Program”/Israel and Palestine), working closely with government officials and community leaders to intervene in arising conflicts (“Pader Peace Program”/Uganda).

One example of a change of a completely different character that meets the definition of “adaptive” is using current events as focal points for discussions and other activities. A particularly vivid example came in the PILPG project, “Building Sustainable Peace in Kenya”. In its grant proposal, PILPG focused on negotiation and implementation of the power-sharing agreement between key Kenyan political parties. However, by the time the grant was awarded, the agreement had been completed and the new priority was to implement the reforms mandated by the agreement. “PILPG, with USAID’s approval, revised its Work Plan and the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan to focus on supporting and strengthening the implementation of these ongoing institutional reforms and transitional justice mechanisms.”25 Based on this report, it appears that the collaboration with and support from USAID facilitated PILPG’s ability to respond to political changes in the country.

Analysis/Conclusions

Again, the limited availability of documentation prevents the team from making definitive statements. However, based on the documents available, it appears that programs are generally either unable or unwilling to make drastic changes to work plans to adapt their approach in changing contextual and conflict dynamics. This may be explained by the fact that very few projects appear to do rolling conflict assessments in the face of a changing conflict environment—only one example of this was noted. This inflexibility is undoubtedly, to some degree, a result of budget and time constraints and aforementioned compliance issues. It is possible that USAID Mission management is not able or willing to make changes to the work plan or allow flexible implementation of the project once implementation activity has begun, as rigid procurement and compliance systems may hinder the ability of a Mission to allow implementers to respond flexibly to changing situations.

Recommendations

Projects should develop contingency plans in their original proposals based upon a careful analysis of risk scenarios and likely trends in conflict context dynamics. In the event that situations change in a way that

24 Internews Zimbabwe Fourth Quarter Report p. 11
directly affects the implementation of their programs, implementers would have already developed and previously agreed to pre-approved contingencies. CMM should require implementers to do contingency planning during the proposal phase. In addition, Mission management should be encouraged to discuss these plans with implementers at the onset of the project and, throughout the life of the project, reflect on evolving conflict dynamics that might necessitate a contingency response, and pre-approving contingent arrangements as part of each projects’ cooperative agreement. Mission managers should be supportive of appropriate and adaptive changes to the project implementation and help brainstorm ways in which the project can mitigate the effects of a changing environment beyond simple postponement or relocation. Conflict responsive examples of this sort of adaptation should be provided to Missions.

To what extent do project documents provide detail about changing conflict and political dynamics?

Adaptive implementation is defined as the ability of a project to respond appropriately to shifting dynamics in the larger conflict context and, especially, to re-orient or alter project activities or adjust project implementation specifically to address unforeseen issues or exploit emerging windows of opportunity.

Findings/Observations

Overwhelmingly, projects reported at least somewhat on changing political dynamics. This information was generally found in quarterly reports, although annual reports and project evaluation reports also often contained information on major contextual changes that had implications for programming. In total, 29 of 79 projects (37%), particularly those that submitted progress and/or evaluation reports as part of their document spread, mentioned how these changes affected their activities, though there is wide variation in the thoroughness of this reporting. Some projects reported extensively (one page or more) on the political environment of a country or community, and others did not report on similar events at all. There was no direct relation between the quality of the reporting on the current political affairs and the reporting on the events’ implications for programming. For instance, the quarterly reports for the “Reconciliation of Conflict in Divided Communities of Côte d’Ivoire” program extensively discussed the lead up to the election, but did not mention any consequences that the tense environment had on the program’s implementation, while the “Addressing a Key Conflict Driver through Reconciliation and Structural Engagement” program in the Democratic Republic of Congo detailed how the political and security contexts affected the timing and diminished feasibility of program activities.

Several project documents reported on changing political dynamics that seem to have a tangential or indirect effect on the programs in question. It appears that these updates are included because they are a requirement, but these situational updates seem somewhat superfluous when the relevance of these externalities to the project is not explained. There were a number of projects that did not report on changing political dynamics at all. As expected, this finding occurred largely among those projects that only furnished one or a few documents and this was especially true if the documents were work plans or PMPs. However, there were several projects that provided many more documents in which no situational updates were apparent. Notably, among the 29 documents submitted by the “One Message” project in Israel/West Bank/Gaza, no mention of political updates was found. Reporting on current events cannot therefore be solely attributed to those projects with more complete document portfolios, nor can a lack of this context-analytical lens be associated solely with limited documentation.

Analysis/Conclusions

Tracking and analyzing changing conflict environments is a requirement if projects are to respond adaptively to the dynamics of conflict in which these projects are embedded. However, for many organizations, it seems that the importance of connecting context analysis to the project’s implementation is not fully understood, and there is scant evidence that this activity occurs systematically other than to provide project background or to inform basic logistical/implementation decisions. It is possible that changing political situations at the national level may not have much bearing
on community-level projects, and so little attention is paid to careful analysis. But none of these projects operate in a vacuum, especially given that all of these projects are designed to address an existing conflict and also given CMM’s assumption that conflict analysis is a key success factor when designing and implementing P2P programs and the absence of such thoughtful discussion throughout the received project documentation is conspicuous.

**Recommendations**

Because P2P programs operate in volatile environments, implementers should be required to report on political changes and other changes in the context which will affect their implementation planning. These changes should feed into consideration of contingency plans. In other words, USAID should require that implementers not implement exactly the planned activity if the context has changed significantly. Activities must adapt to changing circumstances.

**Describe any innovative program design or implementation approaches identified?**

**Findings/Observations**

Three trends were observed among the innovative designs identified: providing a new spin on a traditional peacebuilding program format; ability to adjust to changing circumstances; and innovative use of technology.

Radically new or different designs were not observed, as many of the program designs are essentially variations of a standard approach appropriately modified to fit the context. In place of truly radical new designs, modifications to standard program activities were identified as being innovative. For example, in areas of low literacy, radio programs and community theater are often used to engage the public. One project used this model but added a new and exciting spin. In the East Africa project, “Supporting Key Actors to Mitigate Conflicts,” a quiz competition on current events was conducted during a children’s show. This activity brought together students in border regions to answer increasingly tricky questions about evolving regional relations. This event not only brought together over 600 participants and allowed them to build cohesion across groups, but was also broadcast to ensure maximum exposure of non-participants.26 This activity was of particular interest because it combined elements from several traditional P2P models, including education about current issues, youth outreach, and competitions, which are normally associated with sports-based programs.

One notable example of a project successfully adapting its implementation to external (non-political) challenges occurred during the “Transforming Conflict, Consolidating Peace” project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The implementing organization aired a radio program, *Battisseurs de la Paix*. Audience feedback indicated the approach was not working:

*First, many of the peacebuilders stories, for example of heroes who’d saved lives of people during the conflict, harped back to an era of war and violence which was at odds with the new democracy and post-conflict reality of many of the listeners. Secondly, listenership surveys showed that the program was not highly listened to. Thirdly, it was felt that a new orientation of*

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highlighting positive actions by youth, by demobilized youth, and by repatriated youth, should be given to the program, and some of the ideas were thus integrated into Generation Grands Lacs, Wote Tukutane Tena and Sisi Watoto.27

The organization reacted to audience concerns by cancelling the broadcast of Battisseurs de la Paix. This was one of the few reported cases in which an organization eliminated a program due to the fact that it was not well received by the beneficiaries. This example also represents an honest approach to reporting that was not observed in most other reports. It is a good example of an implementer acknowledging that a specific program or component is not effective and then taking action to change it.

Finally, there were several instances of innovative technological integration that made for interesting program designs, particularly in dealing with logistical challenges. In the case of the “Sundar Shanta Bishal” program in Nepal, the implementers installed satellites in remote communities to give residents access to a radio program that was aired as part of a nation-wide peace education effort. Villages with limited electricity were also supplied with solar panels to power the satellites and radios.28 Similarly, the “Right to Play” sports-based program in Israel virtually brought together summer camp attendees from the West Bank and Gaza when physical interaction was not possible due to restrictions on cross-border movement.29 Although use of different technologies observed in the reports was not necessarily groundbreaking, the use of technology for troubleshooting and problem solving was noted by the coders.

Analysis/Conclusions

There may be hesitation to design programs that radically depart from traditionally-employed P2P strategies. However, small tweaks can be made to existing ideas that make projects stand out. Similarly, encouraging the clever use of existing technologies could be used to incentivize implementers to develop more innovative programs. The use of social media technologies was not observed as much as one might have expected, given their omnipresence in the social landscape, but this is perhaps understandable given the recent rise of these tools, and the limited internet access in some of the areas of conflict where P2P is engaged.

Recommendations

The APS program statement should encourage project designs to innovate as appropriate to their local context, ToC, and the implementers’ unique strengths. As social media and other technologies become more widely available, the APS should encourage potential grantees to consider touch points other than or in addition to face-to-face.

27 Transforming Conflict, Consolidating Peace Final Report, p. 11.
29 Right to Play, Second Year Implementation Plan, p. 5.
If seen, please record any info on the role effective political support or safe political space plays in the project’s effectiveness?

Findings/Observations

APS projects consistently attribute success to the availability of a safe political space, or failure to a lack thereof. Nearly all of the projects commented on the political environment and how it enabled or hindered their ability to successfully deliver programs. The most visible and significant manifestation of political support was the explicit cooperation of governing bodies. Many of the implementers found that partnering with government agencies had a direct, positive effect on the success of their programs.30 Government buy-in was regarded as an indispensable asset for many of the programs as this helps to legitimize the activities of foreign organizations among local groups. This political support may come in the form of a literal safe space, as was the case in the “Enhancing Capacity for Relationship Building” project in Sri Lanka, where the government allowed the organization to use its facilities. More often, the safe space was not a tangible resource per se, but rather endorsement, facilitation, or direct participation in activities.

Conversely, lack of political support had serious deleterious effects on the implementation of certain programs. This was true for one program in Bolivia, as detailed in the following:

“Anti-US rhetoric exists in many of the town councils and organizations need to be prepared for rejection. Even though we can propose a strong project to a Prefecture, which benefits the institution and its constituents, it may be rejected based on political motivations alone. An agreement signed by the Prefect does not necessarily mean the project will be approved by the town council. This was the case for Cochabamba, in which we had advanced significantly in our work based on a signed agreement. However, when we needed them to contribute their counterpart, the town council rejected the proposal, not based on content or budget, for political motivations considering the majority of the town council represent the opposing political party of the Prefect and planned to reject every project he presented. We were eventually able to resume activities but we lost six months of time.”31

Likewise, trained journalists in the DRC were not able to put their new skills into practice when one of the political parties pressured the trainees to only conduct broadcasts that portrayed them favorably.32

Analysis/Conclusions

Obtaining safe political space is a key success factor, at least when it comes to successful project implementation, which is an essential prerequisite for any further outcomes that may follow. This

30 It is important to note that this will vary by context. As CMM has explained, there will be instances when government involvement is undesirable and “It’s likely that any mitigating factors stemming from government involvement (e.g. corruption, political pressure) should be taken care of in a program’s description/analysis,” but this is not always the case and should be considered on a case by case basis.


“political strand” constitutes an essential project requirement in many conflict contexts that directly affects the likelihood of projects to contribute to both PWS and PWL.

**Recommendations**

Implementers should establish good relations with governing bodies to the extent possible and this key groundwork should not be overlooked. A key component, therefore, of the guidance provided to implementers—and criteria for determining whether a project is deserving of funding or not—is to ensure that project activities and approaches explicitly address how this safe space will be secured for both men and women. In order to minimize risk, CMM should recognize and reward implementers that have established trust with governments or communities, if deemed appropriate and advisable in the operating context. This, for example, could be done by allocating points in proposal scoring for those implementers able to furnish “letters of recommendation” from previous local partners describing their previous engagements. This would allow USAID to quickly identify those potential APS implementers with longer-term engagement in-country. When this buy-in and support is not available or advisable due to local politics or environment, it is particularly important to integrate contingency plans and incorporate alternative arrangements into program design to mitigate the negative consequences that are could very possibly occur when lacking this support.

**Project Monitoring and Evaluation**

**To what extent are indicators tied to the project's ToC?**

**Findings/Observations**

Sixty-one projects were identified for which both indicators and a ToC were identified in the available documents (if a ToC was not explicitly identified, reviewers looked for an implicit program strategy). In response to the question, “To what extent are indicators tied to the project’s ToC?”, the reviewers rated 15 of these projects (25%) as “ideally” tying indicators to the ToC, 24 (39%) as “adequately,” 15 (25%) as “poorly/partially,” and 7 (12%) as “not addressed or evident.” Over half of projects that received a rating of “ideal” for the articulation of ToC also received an “ideal” rating of indicators being tied to ToC. 53% of projects begun before 2010 adequately or ideally articulated a ToC, while 83% of projects begun in 2010 or later did so. Similarly, of 41 projects that began between 2003 and 2009, 59% were marked as ideally or adequately tying indicators to the project’s ToC compared to 78% of the 18 projects that began in 2010 and 2011. Overall, 30% of the 61 projects reviewed with ToCs and indicators began after 2009. Coders used the OECD’s definition of an indicator, a “quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention,” to assess whether or not an indicator was logically connected to the achievement desired according to the ToC.
Interestingly, and contrary to the reviewer’s hypothesis, there was no apparent association between the APS year and the degree to which the indicators were tied to the project’s ToC. Each category above included projects from across all years of the APS. Projects with larger budgets might be slightly more likely to have indicators that are tied to the project’s ToC, though we are unable to test this claim for statistical significance given the small population of projects under review.

For those projects that were rated as “adequately” or “ideally” tying indicators to the ToC, most structured their PMPs in the form of hierarchical results statements, each with an associated set of indicators. The projects that “poorly/partially” tied indicators to the ToC, or where this association was “not addressed or evident,” usually: (1) classified their indicators under activities instead of results; (2) provided a single, unstructured list of activity-oriented indicators; or (3) had only output indicators that were loosely associated with the results statements in the ToC.

Projects rated as “ideally” tying indicators to the ToC were more successful in identifying indicators that associated with higher-level outcomes, while projects rated as “adequately” doing so had some outcome-oriented indicators, but only at lower-level outcomes such as “changes in attitudes toward the other group” or “perceptions of the possibility of reconciliation or peaceful coexistence.” Projects that received an ideal rating for the articulation of a ToC had 50% also ranked as ideal for indicators tied to the ToC, whereas only 20% projects coded as having a poorly articulated ToC were coded as having

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33 The cross-tabulation reports only projects whose documentation allowed coders to code for evidence of Theory of Change and for indicators.
ideally linked indicators to ToC. Very few projects had indicators associated with changes in behavior ("PWS"). Also, very few projects made attempts to collect baseline data in order to assess progress over time on any outcome-level indicators. Programs consistently reported outputs data disaggregated by sex—an action that is compliant with the mandatory ADS requirements and USAID’s March 2012 Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, which states that “performance management systems and evaluations at the AO and project or activity levels must include gender-sensitive indicators and sex-disaggregated data.” This requirement was also included as part of the 2012 APS solicitation. Though many projects reported on sex-disaggregated data before 2012, it was somewhat evident that implementers do not comply with the larger intent of the requirement. The ADS goes on to say, “the use of a gender perspective means not simply presenting sex-disaggregated data but interpreting the data by considering the differences between men’s and women’s needs, priorities, responsibilities, status, perspectives, strengths, activities, opportunities, and constraints, among many other factors, over both the short and long term.” Coders encountered reports that noted activities with abysmally low women’s participation without offering explanations or insights about such disproportions. It is likely that this is due in part to incomplete data and a lack of explanation in the APS solicitation; however, it may also be indicative of a lack of familiarity, capacity, or resources among both Agreement Officers and/or the implementers.

**Outcome level indicators**

Most of the outcome-level indicators used by APS projects were associated with changes in knowledge or attitudes of direct beneficiaries. For example:

1. Increased perception of ex-combatants feeling they were accepted in new communities;
2. Percentage increase in confidence that Congolese can play a role in contributing to peace and the social reintegration of marginalized and vulnerable groups; and,
3. Percentage of participants willing to support peaceful coexistence.

A few projects also developed outcome level indicators to track changes in behavior, including measures of conflict dynamics, such as:

1. Percentage of participants who report examples of using their skills from conflict management training;
2. Number of violent incidents related to natural resource conflicts; and,
3. Number of hours of freedom of movement by the public.

Some projects that worked with institutions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or local councils conducted organizational capacity assessments and used changes in organizational capacity scores as outcome-level indicators.

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34 Guide to Gender Integration and Analysis, Additional Help for ADS Chapters 201 and 203, p. 4.
35 Ibid.
For some APS projects, outputs indicate other outcomes; for example, the fact that certain types of touch points are occurring at all can indicate an outcome in itself. As a more specific example, the number of joint, cross-border projects initiated by youth groups is both an output of the project and an outcome indicator of earlier project efforts to achieve buy-in and changed perceptions about opposing groups.

No projects that were reviewed reported outcomes at the highest, “goal” level of their ToCs (change at the regional, ethnic group, or national level) or PWL. Moreover, connected to the lack of contextual analysis described above, no projects developed indicators to measure contextual change.

**Analysis/Conclusions**

Very few projects attempted to identify indicators associated with outcomes or impacts described in their ToCs, perhaps because many of these project implementers believe these higher-level outcomes were beyond their manageable interest. Embedded in the ToC of the APS itself is the hypothesis that a collection of smaller efforts can produce some larger change in a complex environment, but outcomes at the highest societal and national levels are rarely attributable to individual APS projects. It would be unreasonable to expect projects to be accountable for these higher-level outcomes and impacts in a systematic way, especially when there is no focus at this level and no overarching activity designed to synergize multiple lower-level projects or significantly amplify individual lower-level projects up to higher levels.

However, the discipline of developing both a ToC and associated indicators that actually do reflect a project’s manageable interest can be useful for project management. For some types of projects, this takes the form of measuring transformations of “PWS” to “PWL,” outcome indicators that measure changes in behavior or record outcome effects that ripple outward from a project activity into the larger community—not just changes in knowledge or attitudes at the individual level.36

**Recommendations**

The APS should allow projects to differentiate between a project’s objective (an ambitious high-level result that nonetheless lies within the project’s manageable interest) and a goal statement (perhaps this is “Peace writ Large” or conflict transformation occurring at a macro-level, but it should be recognized that results at this level are effectively beyond the project’s manageable interest). This exercise does not necessarily require rigidly hierarchical program logic. Some ToCs may rely instead on complex concepts, and the APS should be flexible enough to accommodate alternative types of program logic while still requiring the use of outcome indicators designed to monitor and assess the project ToC.37

Depending on the scale and specific ToC of each project, macro-, societal-level indicators could be relevant measures of project outcomes. Though most projects could not plausibly claim a direct impact

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36 It should be noted that the 2013 APS requires impact level indicators, as well.

on macro-level indicators of PWL, the monitoring of such indicators offers a way to systematize rolling conflict and contextual analyses.

Review of ToC and of context and conflict analysis components of project plans should include a balanced consideration of both the realism and the potential larger contribution of the expected outcomes and their expected relations to PWL. In other words, projects should be both prudently realistic and also optimistically ambitious, noting the limits of the current operating environment while also gently nudging those limits in contextually appropriate ways. Project indicators should be diverse, so that monitoring will capture changes related to both the realistic aims and also PWL.

It is also important to remember that indicators never tell the whole story; they are by definition simplistic representations of far more complex processes and phenomena. They serve as management signals, but are only a component of the results-based management process, which also includes assessment, planning, ongoing monitoring, ad-hoc or strategic evaluation, and the use of all these tools to inform management decision-making. Implementers should be encouraged to discuss the utility of outcome indicators—not just report on them in their quarterly reporting—as part of the discipline of strategic management thinking. Are the indicators proving useful for management? What limitations do they have? How strong is the case for attributing outcomes to the project’s efforts? Could attribution be strengthened through the development and use of alternative indicators? What contextual factors might also be affecting these indicators? This can facilitate dialogue between the implementer and Mission program managers, encouraging implementers to adapt both their implementation and their monitoring to on-the-ground realities and contextual factors.

To what extent did the project develop new indicators to reflect changes in political or conflict dynamics?

Findings/Observations

None of the projects reviewed developed new indicators during the course of implementation, although a few removed certain indicators or adjusted targets to reflect changing dynamics. Even projects that changed their programming to reflect changing dynamics did not further develop new indicators. The Final Report for the “Building Sustainable Peace in Kenya” project identifies several indicators “that would have been useful for PILPG to utilize” due to changes in programming during the course of the project, but it did not actually introduce these indicators, even though they relied on readily available data and therefore such indicators would have been minimally intensive to collect. The report does not indicate why the project did not add these indicators to its PMP.

Analysis/Conclusions

It is not clear whether implementers understand that it is both allowable and desirable to develop new indicators in the face of changing programming and changing contextual conflict dynamics, especially if indicators are a tool for improved understanding and project learning, and not just mere instruments for ensuring compliance. Unfortunately, the PMP is most often treated as a static deliverable instead of a living document and useful tool for responsive project management, even though project proposals frequently describe their M&E systems as being “adaptable” and “dynamic” and in spite of the fact that the ADS encourages regular review and suggests routine update of PMPs during the annual portfolio review process. The static nature of PMPs, as described above, limits their utility in highly dynamic conflict programming environments. It is important to note that changing all indicators on a frequent basis can be disruptive to monitoring efforts and long-term learning; therefore, the adaptation of indicators must be weighted for the utility this change will provide.
**Recommendations**

Develop specific guidance emphasizing the utility of identifying new indicators, as appropriate, to respond to dynamic and evolving conflict contexts. Specify the mechanism by which this indicator update can occur through annual PMP review and revision, as may be appropriate. Ensure that all grantees receive USAID PMP guidance, especially the TIPS Note #7, “Preparing a Performance Management Plan.”

**Describe any innovative M&E approaches identified**

**Findings/Observations**

Innovative approaches were selected by identifying the use of a new idea or method, or the creation of a more effective use of program design approach, relative to current practices in relevant projects. Although some of these are established and well known M&E good practices, they are nonetheless considered innovative when they are used in a particularly effective or unique way, such as for systematically performing M&E on project activities that are generally understood to be difficult to monitor or evaluate.

**Use of an Electronic Indicator Database**

*DRC – Addressing a Key Conflict Driver through Reconciliation and Structural Engagement*

The project used an electronic database on land disputes and integrated checks and compliance processes for data quality control. According to the project’s 2011 annual report, the database became “a hub for actors and agencies concerned with land issues,” thus moving beyond being a simple project monitoring tool to becoming a useful feature of the intervention itself and closely tied to its management processes, as well as producing amplifying effects that spread beyond the limited scope of the project itself.

*Morocco – Empowering Youth in Poor Neighborhoods in the Region of Casablanca*

The project used a single database to both manage implementation of the program by tracking basic information about participants (name, site, gender, age, etc.) and also to store “more intangible aspects of the program such as opinions from the participants on how they benefited from the program.” When this type of database is well maintained, its level of detail can be invaluable in later analysis and evaluation and can serve to “connect the dots” between project outputs and associated outcomes.

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38 CDA Reflecting on Peace Practice and “Confronting War”, by Anderson and Olson.

39 Addressing a Key Conflict Driver through Reconciliation and Structural Engagement, Annual Report, p. 9.

40 Empowering Youth in Poor Neighborhoods in the Region of Casablanca, p. 16.
Tracking Contextual Indicators

Timor-Leste – Promoting Security through Community-Police Partnerships

The project monitored crime statistics as part of its M&E plan. Even though the country’s crime statistics were outside of the project’s manageable interest, by tracking crime statistics it gained an additional data point during implementation that could be used by the project to analyze the conflict environment and possibly adjust implementation.

Data Analytics/Text Mining

The use of data analytics and text mining are more common in communication for peacebuilding and media programs.

Israel/West Bank/Gaza – Technology for Peace

The project uses web analytics on its project web sites, electronically tracking numbers of visitors, social media followers, and “supporters.”

Israel/West Bank/Gaza – Press for Peace

This project used a monitoring tool called the “Media Archive System” to generate statistics about the Israeli and Palestinian press, allowing the team to conduct daily monitoring of news items and to more effectively track media trends over time. This tool is a fairly standard approach to Media Content Analysis, tracking information such as title of each item, keywords to ease the search process, captions from each item, extracted text to facilitate the search process, named persons (if there are any), date of the item, and notes that staff adds. In addition, the International Peace and Cooperation Center’s team keeps track of certain properties regarding each media item, such as the outlet where the item appears, number of columns (or minutes) devoted to the item, relationship between the item and accompanying visual images, sources referred to in the item, and its location in the news edition. Other properties that are monitored are the presence of images, the color of headlines and their font size, and the facts recounted in the item.

Participatory Indicator Development/Pre-Testing Indicators

Somalia – People-to-People Environmental Peacebuilding in Somalia

The project planned to pre-test indicators by discussing them with local stakeholders and potential beneficiaries. According to the project work plan, this “is to make sure that the community understanding of key indicators is well understood, before we can imagine of having an impact on such indicators, by so doing we are at the same page with our partners and community members.”

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41 Technology for Peace, PMP, p. 1.
43 Somalia Environmental People-to-People Peacebuilding, Work Plan, p. 11.
M&E Capacity Building

While several projects used local staff or partner organizations to support their M&E efforts, some projects made additional efforts to build local capacity in M&E.

Uganda – Supporting Women’s Engagement in Peace Building Processes in Karamoja, Uganda

“To ensure that field assistants understand the purpose and design of the baseline assessment, ethics of data collection, and their roles in the process, a training strategy was developed by the project team. To support this strategy, the team also drafted a training manual.”44

Yemen – Tribal Conflict Mitigation Program

Tribal leaders “expressed an interest in gaining a better understanding of and training in corruption monitoring, such as reporting on the condition of clinics, schools, and agricultural development,”45 and the project “conducted training with tribal leaders to assist with research interviews.”46

Baseline Surveys

Several projects collected baseline data, including baseline surveys of targeted populations. Most of the projects that collected baseline data did not indicate how the baselines were used, but some used it to set indicator targets or to refine their implementation plans by, for example, targeting implementation in certain regions based on the results of a baseline analysis.

Analysis/Conclusions

Although there were a number of interesting and potentially very powerful uses of innovative M&E approaches, they were often described minimally with little careful attention paid to results that occurred outside of the indicators associated with the results framework.

Recommendations

Further evaluative research would be useful to more carefully describe and assess the impact of these innovative approaches to M&E in order to ascertain if they had an accelerating effect, in some way contributing to the specified objectives of the project; or if they produced other unintended positive outcomes.

44 Supporting Women’s Engagement in Peace Building Processes in Karamoja, Uganda, Second Quarterly Report, p. 5.
Conclusions

- **CMM APS guidance correlates with program design**

CMM has a strong mechanism for shaping P2P programming to be more effective: the APS statement. The 2010 APS introduced the requirement that a clear ToC be identified in every project proposal, and project proposals in that year and subsequent years were more likely to have a clear ToC. A variety of approaches to P2P and types of touch points have been welcomed by the APS and have contributed to PWS, and, occasionally, to PWL. Requiring conflict analysis prompts some implementers to usefully consider political space, and operating appropriately within limited political space is a hallmark of successful P2P programs.

- **Adaptive implementation increases program efficacy**

Projects that reported adaptations to their implementation plans explained that these changes were necessary due to changes in the conflict context, or due to early feedback on project efficacy based on M&E. Adaptation of project plans is possible when warranted, as evidenced by several examples of implementation plans that were altered due to changing circumstances or due to new information generated through M&E.

- **Poor Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting Hinders Learning and Adaptive Implementation**

Despite the innovations noted above, the findings from this study reveal that most APS grantees share a fairly broad and consistent—with a few noteworthy exceptions—lack of conformity with CMM guidance for how P2P programs should be designed, implemented, monitored, evaluated, and reported upon. Many of these identified weaknesses also reflect imperfect integration with more general USAID best practices related to the need for strong M&E systems. Poor M, E, R make learning difficult. Of course, there are also implications for accountability, but learning is the primary and overriding purpose of the learning review to which this desk review contributes. Weak data makes it difficult to provide strong information and analysis that would be most useful to CMM to understand and improve P2P project design and performance. This of course is of concern for this desk review itself, but, more importantly, it has larger implications for CMM’s ability to understand, learn from, and improve overall performance of the APS. Furthermore, poor M&E deprive program implementers of the input they need to adapt their programs effectively to changing conflict contexts, or to otherwise improve program performance. By neglecting appropriate M, E, R, implementers prevent CMM from learning how best to develop the APS in future years, and, even worse, implementers deprive their own project leadership from receiving the feedback and updated conflict analyses that would allow them to appropriately adapt their P2P plans to be more effective.

The desk review relied on the review of an inconsistent and incomplete set of project documents, but from our perspective this study suffers another key weakness: there was no complementary review of USAID or CMM processes and systems for selecting, supporting, reviewing, or overseeing APS projects. This is significant in that a number of the recommendations discussed in this report, and the general recommendations laid out in the following section, necessarily are based on assumptions about how USAID and CMM engage with the APS grantees, and/or why grantees do or do not integrate best practices into the APS projects. These assumptions have been made in an information vacuum where the systems and processes at play are not completely known to us. However, we nevertheless offer the following recommendations, in hopes that they will be helpful to CMM staff who will consider them in the context of their deeper knowledge of current and possible approaches to APS selection, support, review, and oversight.
Furthermore, it is important for the reader to understand and acknowledge that CMM has produced robust and extensive guidance, contained in several key background documents, on how to design, implement, and monitor and evaluate APS projects. When considering the problem of imperfect alignment with guidance—and making recommendations for how this deficiency might be fixed—the ideal frame of reference to inform these recommendations is not completely known given the specific parameters of this study. Further, given the rich content contained in these two publications, which directly address many of the recommendations made in the body of this document and summarized below, the reviewers concluded that the apparent shortcomings of implementers with regard to M, E, R, may reflect more shortcomings in implementer communication of their activities and results, rather than shortcomings in following APS design and implementation guidance.

**Recommendations**

- Improve APS project monitoring, evaluation, and reporting by:
  
  o Setting aside a portion of all APS funds to support these essential portions of project implementation. Rather than offer maximum of $1.2 million grants per project, offer a maximum of $1 million for project activities and a maximum of $200,000 for associated M, E, R.
  
  o Creating a pool of APS Evaluation Specialists to work with implementers in designing, and in some case implementing, the M, E, R for APS projects.
  
  o Developing and distributing widely comprehensive guidance on M&E systems, innovations in M&E for P2P projects, and frameworks that will serve the purpose of allowing rolling context analysis as well as track results at outcome levels, outside of immediate project activities, and linking PWS to PWL where possible. Providing a list of illustrative outcome indicators and field guides for appropriate methods that would be most useful to track outcomes would help implementers—and USAID managers in Missions—conceive and execute such systems. Link this with specific requirements (e.g. Evaluation Policy, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, etc.) and hold implementers accountable for the quality of the results frameworks, outcome level indicators, and M&E systems, as well as their adaptation as warranted. If CMM wishes to learn about touch points in particular, explicitly require that M, E, R include consideration of touch points. While CMM’s recent development of further guidance on ToCs is clear, Missions should consult with the implementers to clarify the ToCs guiding each project, and emphasize the need to integrate them into ongoing project implementation, adapted as necessary due to M&E feedback, and to reflect the ToCs in (certain) project documents.

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47 See especially CMM’s *People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide and Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation*
• **Improve APS project adaptive and innovative implementation by:**

  o Developing specific process guidance on how to perform rolling conflict analyses and examine broader contextual factors that affect not only project implementation and success but could constitute windows of emerging opportunity. As this systematic analysis appears to be already occurring in the format of rolling situational security analysis, introducing a more reflective element to this analysis that would seek to identify windows of opportunity or emergent issues that the project could address likely requires simple awareness raising and conceptual grounding.

  o Developing contingency planning as a regular part of APS proposals and management. Require that APS proposals include contingency plans considering likely shifts in conflict dynamics or potential risks, and appropriate project adaptation. Suggest USAID Missions pre-approve adaptations within the contingency plan, so that rapid shifts in activity plans can be implemented should the need arise. Develop guidance for USAID Missions on how to integrate flexible management of APS projects and to develop greater tolerance for shifting and “adaptive” project activities and objectives. Require that implementers not implement exactly the planned activity if the context has changed significantly. Activities must adapt to changing circumstances.

  o Providing comprehensive guidance that explains the critical need to allow for adaptive implementation of even the best plans, and encourages innovation in project design and implementation phases. Highlight that ToCs are useful to the extent that they allow thoughtful implementation guided by ongoing monitoring, updated conflict analyses, and consideration of contingencies and project adaptation strategies. Highlight that project management in P2P requires adaptation to project feedback and developments in the project context. Illustrate this with examples of successful adaptation. The APS program statement should encourage project designs to innovate as appropriate to their local context, ToC, and the implementers’ unique strengths, and encourage potential grantees to consider touchpoints other than or in addition to face-to-face where social media or other technologies can assist reconciliation.

• **Encourage high-quality P2P programming by:**

  o Providing point values in proposal review for project designs that appropriately assess the project-specific political space for P2P, offer reasonable contingency plans for shifts in that political space, and demonstrate long-term local relationships and sensitivity to local political space by providing letters of recommendation from local partners as appendices to project proposals. If it is not appropriate or advisable for local political participation then a clear explanation for not working with these actors should be given.

The desk review conclusions and recommendations are inherently limited by the data available. However, the desk review does highlight some areas that may be usefully explored in the final field
evaluation portion of the learning review, and in future research by CMM. These recommended areas for research are:

- Identify the range of funds spent, and range of percentage of project budgets spent, on M, E, R for APS projects. Is there a range of support that seems to be required for quality M, E, R?

- Field evaluations should explore the ability of some projects to shift course midway in response to changes in the conflict context or unexpected obstacles or opportunities. How did these projects remain flexible? How can other APS grantees learn from these successes in flexible program implementation? What factors constrain or inhibit flexible and adaptive response?

- How familiar are implementers with P2P guidance and what internal processes exist to regularly reflect on and integrate this guidance in project management and implementation, if any?

- Is “touch point” a meaningful concept to project implementers? How is it understood by them? How would they develop it further, if meaningful?

- To what extent did projects actually follow the progression of activities mapped out through the P2P guide’s 14 guidelines? Why?

- What are the processes of USAID engagement with implementers, what are the strengths and weaknesses, and how could USAID engagement with implementers be improved?
## Annex A: Documents Reviewed

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Developmental Evaluative Learning Review: Synthesis Report
Chapter 2: Desk Review of Global APS Documents
## Annex B: Research Instruments

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reviewer:</th>
<th>PROJECT TITLE</th>
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### QUESTIONS ON GENERAL PROJECT INFO

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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Other comments/findings</th>
<th>Insights</th>
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</table>

**Scale:** 0 - not addressed or evident; 1 - poorly/partially; 2 - adequately; 3 - ideally; N/A - not enough information available

- **Period of performance**
- **Budget level**
- **Number and type of documents reviewed**
- **Category of project activities.** E.g., dialogue projects, work around issues of mutual concern, training program, arts-based, sports-based
- **Touch points during the life of the project:** Actual number that occurred
- **Touch points during the life of the project:** Form of touch point
- **Touch points during the life of the project:** Quality of touch point (Quality refers to the findings about the intensity, duration, stakeholder buy-in, legitimacy, and sustainability of the programming in question)
- **To what extent is there evidence in project documents that the project contributed or achieved PWS?** Briefly describe those contributions.
- **To what extent is there evidence in project documents that the project contributed to PWL?** Briefly describe those contributions.

### QUESTIONS ON PROJECT DESIGN/IMPLEMENTATION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Design:</th>
<th>To what extent has a ToC (or program hypothesis) been clearly presented?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Implementation (part a):</td>
<td>To what extent do project documents provide detail about changing conflict and political dynamics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Implementation (part b):</td>
<td>If so, to what extent did the project change its approach based on the changing dynamics or conditions? That is, to what extent do project documents reflect or explicitly discuss changes in approach?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Approaches:</td>
<td>Describe any innovative program design or implementation approaches identified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If seen, please record any info on the role effective political support or safe political space plays in the project’s effectiveness?</td>
<td></td>
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### QUESTIONS ON PROJECT MONITORING AND EVALUATION

<table>
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<tr>
<th>To what extent are indicators tied to the project’s ToC?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please note any Outcome level indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent did the project develop new indicators to reflect changes in political or conflict dynamics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe any innovative M&amp;E approaches identified?</td>
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</table>
**Annex C: Sampling Strategy**

**Summary of Proposed Sampling Strategy:**

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<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population of Interest (Pol)</th>
<th>Pol Size</th>
<th>Description of Sample Frame</th>
<th>Frame Size</th>
<th>Sampling Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>All APS projects over time</td>
<td>184 (24% WB/Gaza)</td>
<td>All APS projects for which we have: 1) At least 2 quarterly reports, 2) At least one semi-annual report, OR 3) At least one annual report</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Convenience Sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>“Strategic Design” All APS Projects (representativeness is not primary goal)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects with proposals</td>
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<td>Convenience sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>“Innovative Approaches” All APS Projects (representativeness is not primary goal)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects with proposals OR Evaluation reports, AND all projects in Sample 1</td>
<td>~75</td>
<td>Convenience sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>“Monitoring/Indicators” All APS Projects (representativeness is not primary goal)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>All APS projects with PMPs</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Convenience sample</td>
<td>38</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The desk review will address questions related to project design, implementation, and monitoring. While some questions are intended to produce generalized findings applicable across APS projects to the extent possible, most questions aim to produce findings that need not be representative in order to be useful. For instance, even if only one project has a particularly innovative outcome indicator in its PMP, that finding could be highly useful to CMM in producing future APS guidance. Because only a limited number of projects submitted documents for the desk review, all of our samples can be considered “convenience samples.” While this will limit the extent to which we will be able to make generalizable claims about the APS, this strategy will allow us to review a maximal set of relevant project data for each of the questions in the review.

For the questions that are intended to produce generalizable findings, we will review all of the projects that have provided documentation that is likely to contain sufficient evidence to address the question. The questions that will be addressed using this sample are the **“Touch points” and “Adaptive Implementation” questions** (as seen in the desk review data collection instrument): “To what extent do project documents provide detail about changing conflict and political dynamics?” and “To what extent did the project change its approach based on the changing dynamics or conditions?”
Discussion relevant to adaptive implementation is most likely to be present in quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports. As minimum criteria for inclusion in our sample, we recommend that a project have at least: two quarterly reports, one semi-annual report, or one annual report.

Of the 184 APS awards made from 2004-2010, we have received at least one document from 111 projects. Of these projects, 69 meet these criteria for inclusion in this sample.

Because we only have sufficient documentation from 69 of the 184 projects, we are not able to generate a large enough sample to draw conclusions about the APS program as a whole (this non-sampling error is called “under-coverage”). Because the Israel/West Bank/Gaza APS program is significant in size (44 of the 184 awards, or 24% of the APS projects are from Israel/West Bank/Gaza), we will increase the weight of the Israel/West Bank/Gaza projects to 24% for any statistics generated (with the significant caveat of the potential for under-coverage bias, since Israel/West Bank/Gaza documents are underrepresented in our sample).

N.B.: Of the 69 projects that have documents that meet the criteria, only 11 (or 16%) are from Israel/West Bank/Gaza. Nevertheless, for any quantitative generalizations, which, as we have discussed, cannot be confidently assumed to be representative of the APS as a whole, we can show West Bank/Gaza and non-West Bank/Gaza separately to allow for this distinction.

The second type of question in our desk review is not intended to produce generalizable findings; rather we hope to identify cases demonstrating certain characteristics. Data collection for these questions will primarily involve compiling rich qualitative information from project documents. These questions include questions on “Strategic Design,” “Innovative Approaches,” and questions on project monitoring (see data collection instrument for questions). Furthermore, these types of questions are more likely to be addressed in some document types more than in others. We will therefore review all of the projects that have documents that we have identified as most appropriate to each type of question.

For the “Strategic Design” questions, we will review project proposals. We have received eight proposals and will review all eight.

For the “Innovative Approaches” questions, we will review all eight project proposals, all 36 evaluation reports, and the 40 reports we will already be reviewing for the “Adaptive Implementation” questions discussed in the first point above. Altogether (due to non-replacement within the sample), documentation from about 75 projects will be reviewed for evidence of innovative approaches.

For the questions on project monitoring and indicators, we will review all 38 project PMPs that we have received.

Using the two-tiered approach described above, we will be able to observe if there is evidence of a tendency to remain flexible and pursue a “responsive,” adaptive program implementation strategy, a key element of conflict-responsive programming best practices. Where the questions seek to identify innovative or best practices instead, this approach will also cast the net as wide as possible, reviewing all projects with relevant documents and mining them for relevant information. Due to overlap within these samples (1 + 2a + 2b + 2c); we will be reviewing documentation from a total of 94 projects.
Annex D: Scope of Work

PURPOSE
The purpose of the present Task Order is to advance USAID’s technical leadership and learning with respect to conflict mitigation, reconciliation, and people-to-people (P2P) peacebuilding programs through analysis and evaluation of targeted awards and activities under the APS.

BACKGROUND

CMM Office
The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) leads USAID’s efforts to identify, analyze, and address the sources of conflict, instability, and extremism, and to ensure development programs are sensitive to these same dynamics. CMM maintains an active Technical Leadership portfolio to advance analysis and research on the topics of conflict and development. CMM seeks to distill practical lessons from scholarship, evaluation, and experience to improve the quality of development programming and policy making.

Reconciliation APS
CMM manages a grant competition (Annual Program Statement, or APS) in accordance with a Congressional appropriation to provide a central source of funding to “people-to-people” conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs. The APS is intended to support local-level and grassroots organizations in particular, with award amounts of up to $1.2 million for three years or less. In FY 2004, CMM released its first joint State-USAID solicitation to award $8 million to support conflict management and mitigation projects in select priority countries: Gaza/West Bank, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. The Fund has since grown to $26 million annually, with $10 million reserved for Middle East programming and $16 million for global programs. The program has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries.

Funded projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war. They provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust, and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recent conflict. The general Theory of Change (ToC) is that if opposing groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another or, stated differently, as the health of the relationships between the groups improves, the likelihood of violence between them declines.

Programming, Knowledge Management, and Technical Leadership
While CMM manages the APS, the U.S. Government is not the operating unit responsible for immediate management oversight of the funded projects. That responsibility rests with USAID Missions abroad. Nevertheless, CMM actively supports Missions to improve the effectiveness of APS-funded projects through its Technical Leadership and Field Support functions. As part of its Technical Leadership responsibilities, CMM published a number of documents which are relevant to programs funded under the APS, including most notably and recently People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide and Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC). CMM also encourages program implementers and evaluators to consult other key technical guidance documents from organizations other than USAID. Collectively, these documents establish standards for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of P2P peacebuilding programs. Yet, CMM also believes there is room to improve the technical and practical content of these and related publications through continued research and learning. Thus, CMM wishes to study how APS-funded projects conform to or depart from the guidelines outlined in technical publications so that it may adapt its publications or management accordingly.
Knowledge management is a key component of CMM’s role in the Agency and with respect to the reconciliation APS. While USAID Missions in the field monitor the projects in their respective country or region, there has been only limited and ad hoc review of the various projects and the global APS in sum. CMM sees its role as becoming the central hub for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the reconciliation APS globally, as well as managing that knowledge.

Finally, and above and beyond the reconciliation APS, the last two years of technical leadership research—particularly with regard to ToCs—has not been without surprises. Increasingly, CMM has come to be aware of the inherent difficulties of monitoring and evaluating programs grounded in procedural orientations, such as Track I, II, and III negotiation and mediation interventions, where the outcomes are purposefully left undefined at the outset. Many such projects are structured in this fashion to accommodate complex and rapidly changing relationships, where cause and effect only become apparent in retrospect of an event. This conflict problem set and intervention approach makes it difficult to establish baselines, identify counter-factual examples, plan for target outputs, and attribute outcomes and results back to inputs. As a consequence, USAID has begun exploring different methodologies of evaluation beyond those it has traditionally employed. Among the most promising of the methodologies CMM has considered has been that of developmental evaluation—the approach formulated by Michael Quinn Patton. USAID now wishes to explore this and similar methodologies in greater depth by applying it in whole or in phases to a study of programs funded through the reconciliation APS.

**Objectives**

CMM seeks a contractor to conduct analysis and evaluation of the reconciliation APS along several dimensions. The purpose of the activities is not only to learn about the reconciliation APS programs themselves, but also to build USAID’s—and specifically CMM’s—technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the developmental evaluation methodology.

Through this Task Order, CMM aims to establish a collaborative and adaptive working relationship with the contractor that will supersede immediate analysis and evaluation of the Reconciliation APS to encompass research and learning, knowledge management, and strategy development as well.

The requested activities will not be a traditional performance evaluation. Sub-tasks will take place in multiple phases, outlined below. In addition, a standing “Learning Group” will be established as a forum for regular discussion and collaboration between CMM and the contractor. The contractor should assume that Phases are not entirely sequential; activities described under one phase may also take place during other phases as well.

**Phase I: Knowledge Management and Study of the Reconciliation APS**

During the opening Phase of the initiative, the contractor will provide technical and strategic support to CMM to refine learning, evaluation, and research efforts for the remainder of the program. This will include: (1) collecting and organizing the APS’s raw data and reports into a centralized and manageable database or system; (2) conducting an analysis of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports, commenting on any common indicators, approaches, or patterns and drawing attention to any notable innovations or examples providing expert assessment of the overall quality of project monitoring systems, based on reporting; (3) commenting in particular on evidence of attention to gender and conflict analysis; and (4) if sufficient numbers of projects have undergone formal evaluations, conducting a meta-evaluation of those reports and supporting documents.

Presently, project reporting on APS-funded activities is housed at the cognizant USAID field Mission for each grant. No central collection of reports exists. It will be the contractor’s responsibility to compile these reports, including program descriptions, performance monitoring reports, and evaluation reports, into a centralized repository.3
Component #1. The contractor will collect all required reports (relying on reference information to be supplied by CMM) and organize those reports into a rational database, file library, or comparable system to be shared with USAID upon completion of the review.

Component #2. The contractor will carry out review and analysis of project documents to prepare a desk study. The desk study should comment on aspects of the projects and APS program, such as the following:

- Quality and timeliness of performance monitoring and evaluation reports;
- Apparent alignment of projects and activities to the good practices described in USAID’s *People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide* with particular focus on the utilization of conflict and gender analysis in program design and management;
- Apparent contribution of APS-funded projects to “Peace writ Large” effectiveness in select settings, or through case study;

Component #3. The contractor will utilize the raw analysis generated in Components 1 and 2 to produce an expert assessment of the overall quality of project monitoring system. The format of the report for this assessment will be determined based on the process up to that point, but will likely entail a written document of approximately 5-10 pages, excluding annexes, with observations and recommendations addressed to CMM (for improvements to the Reconciliation APS), USAID Field Missions (for management of APS-funded projects), and to applicants and grantees implementing and reporting on the projects.

Component #4. At present, CMM lacks information as to the availability of mid-term and final evaluation reports on APS-funded projects. If sufficient numbers of reports are available then the contractor will prepare a meta-evaluation of approximately 20 pages, excluding annexes, examining methodologies employed, common findings and recommendations, differences across projects and country programs, and changes evidenced in projects over time. USAID may request the contractor to pursue additional, but similar, lines of inquiry prior to the initiation of any meta-evaluation.

In concert with the review and desk study, the contractor and Learning Group will assist CMM to develop, refine, and prioritize evaluation questions for Phase II, assisting CMM to establish criteria and assess options to select a country (or set of countries) for further case study and evaluation in Phase II. The contractor will also review, with CMM input, background conflict analysis and assessment material on those countries selected for evaluation.

**Deliverables**

The contractor will be expected to provide:

- A manageable file system or database collecting and organizing all project reports and indicators, utilizing content collected from USAID Missions; all supporting data must be in formats suitable for easy access on USAID computer systems;
- A written report with analysis of monitoring and evaluation reports, as well as expert assessment of the overall quality of project monitoring systems, per the description in the previous section (this report will serve as the basis for the field evaluation concept notes/inception studies in Phase II);
- As feasible with data availability, a meta-evaluation and report of the Reconciliation APS based on project-level evaluations already conducted.

**Phase II: Evaluative Analysis of Selected Reconciliation APS programs**

In Phase II, the contractor will conduct two field-based performance evaluations of the APS program in
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as one additional country to be determined. It is reasonable to expect that the additional country will be African, with likely candidates being Burundi, Rwanda, or Uganda. However, this does not preclude CMM from selecting a different country elsewhere in Africa, Asia, Latin America, or Eastern Europe. The LG may be consulted as appropriate to assist in country selection.

These country-level evaluations will be similar to one another in terms of purpose, audience, and line of inquiry. However, it should be noted that the APS reserves a substantial amount of funding for the Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and thus there are far more projects in these locations than elsewhere. Contractors will need to adapt the methodology and approach accordingly.

The objective of the Reconciliation APS in the various locations is, as described in the background, to make significant strides toward the overall goal of conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation, while contributing to USAID’s developmental objectives in the region.

The primary purpose for the evaluations in Phase II is to advance CMM and Agency learning. CMM desires evaluation reports with information to help the office improve (a) the design of its APS, (b) the content of its technical publications, and (c) the quality of its technical assistance to Missions. There is no pre-determined method of data collection or analysis, and CMM expects to consult with the evaluator and LG to select an appropriate methodology. It is likely the evaluators will be asked to incorporate at least some elements of a developmental evaluation into their approach. The final report should conform to the criteria outlined in Appendix 1 of USAID’s Evaluation Policy.

The primary audience for the evaluation reports will be CMM, but the target audience will also include the cognizant USAID Mission. A final list of evaluation questions will be developed in the course of Phase I in consultation with these constituencies, and said questions will be provided to the evaluators prior to their deployment. For purposes of illustration, possible questions may include:

- How effective are APS-funded projects at contributing to broad-scale and sustainable peace, or “Peace writ Large”? How, if at all, are APS projects complimenting (or detracting from) other peace efforts by diplomatic, security, and development actors? Do P2P efforts appear to be appropriate responses to the conflicts they address, in terms of addressing conflict drivers identified in strong analysis?

- What APS-funded organizations or projects appear to have been most effective in producing attitudinal and behavioral change in their communities? Do APS-funded projects appear to have led to changes in the attitudes or behaviors of members of the community who were not direct participants in the people-to-people activities?

- What commonalities/differences exist among indicators used in performance management plans, such as level of change or type of change measured?

- How do projects and activities conform to or differ from the good practices described in *People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide* in terms of their design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation practices? Are there particular exemplary projects which could serve as case studies or examples?

The contractors will conduct fieldwork in Israel and the West Bank, as well as in the additional country to be determined, interviewing USAID and U.S. Embassy staff, project staff, project beneficiaries/participants, and other representatives of broader target communities. In the course of the field work, the contractor must observe all applicable U.S. rules and regulations pertinent to operations in the Middle East and in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, including those related to interactions with Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

At the conclusion of field work in each country program, the evaluation team will organize a consultation...
session with APS implementing partners in the country to discuss methodology and technical approach, present substantive findings, and solicit input and feedback. The contractor will document these discussions and share them with the LG.

For each country program evaluated, the contractor should deliver:

- A concept note or inception report produced prior to the field work, summarizing preliminary findings and questions from the program background documents (this document may draw substantially from materials produced in Phase I);
- A detailed evaluation plan outlining design, methods, data analysis plan, and schedule;
- A draft evaluation report for review that conforms to USAID’s Evaluation Policy in format;
- A one-day public consultation workshop/conference for USAID staff, grantees, and implementing partners (approximately 50 people);
- Up to two oral briefings;
- A final evaluation report (in digital format and up to 10 printed copies);
- A flash drive, zip file, or comparable digital supplement with all instruments and data in formats suitable for reanalysis.

Deliverables

For each of the 2-3 country programs evaluated, the contractor should deliver:

- A concept note or inception report produced prior to the field work, per the description in the previous section, summarizing preliminary findings and questions from the program background documents (this document may draw substantially from materials produced in Phase I);
- A detailed evaluation plan outlining design, methods, data analysis plan, and schedule;
- A draft evaluation report for review (in digital format) that conforms to USAID’s Evaluation Policy in format;
- Up to two oral briefings;
- A final evaluation report (in digital format and up to 10 printed copies); and
- A flash drive, zip file, or comparable digital supplement with all instruments and data in formats suitable for reanalysis.

Phase III: Reflective learning

As described in the Background section, Technical Leadership is a core component of CMM’s mandate within USAID, and includes research, analysis, and learning. The primary purpose of Phase III is to build the capacity and knowledge base of USAID, CMM, and the key partners with respect to the methodology and findings from Phases I and II.

Phase III will begin during field evaluations of Phases I and II. During this phase, the contractor (primarily through the LG) will provide technical support to USAID and CMM to deepen office learning and knowledge management in evaluation of peace programs. The contractor may be asked to review technical publications by CMM or third parties and provide assessments or recommendations on those documents’ relationships to the Reconciliation APS. The contractor will also prepare a final report with recommendations for further actions by USAID and CMM.

The contractor will provide logistical and technical support to CMM staff to carry out structured learning and reflection in themes to be developed in Phase I and in response to emerging lessons from
Phase II.

Activities might include:

- Learning Group meetings in Washington, DC;
- A facilitated training/workshop for a group of approximately 30-50 USAID and non-USAID personnel;
- Structured interviews by phone with evaluation and peacebuilding experts;
- Academic literature review;
- Review of USAID documents; or
- Presentation of findings from field work, desk study, or Learning Group deliberations at public conference, such as evaluation conferences or peacebuilding evaluation working group meetings.

Deliverables

The contractor will be expected to provide:

- Consultation services and facilitation support for meetings with USAID personnel, evaluators, and academics in which the contractor may be asked to take notes or draft simple memos capturing outcomes of these meetings, and
- A final report per the description in below in digital format and with up to 10 color printed copies.

The final report may include the following:

- Description of observed strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the Reconciliation APS, with recommendations for improvements to CMM, USAID Missions, and USAID Program Managers (AOTRs) for improving the quality of the program;
- Commentary on how lessons in evaluation of people-to-people and reconciliation programs might be applied to other conflict mitigation intervention strategies;
- Recommendations for improvements to People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, based on documentation review, evaluation findings, and CMM staff consultations, in order to improve its technical validity and its usefulness to Program Managers at USAID and its implementing partners;
- Recommendations as to whether and how USAID can incorporate developmental evaluation, or similar attempts to evaluate in complex settings, into its performance management and evaluation policies and procedures;
- Recommendation as to whether USAID should seek to undertake a quantitative impact evaluation, such as a randomized control trial, of the Reconciliation APS, or a related peace programming; and/or
- Recommendations for how USAID might establish higher-quality, country-level or program-level baselines.
CHAPTER 3: META-EVALUATION AND META-ANALYSIS OF APS DOCUMENTS

Evaluative Learning Review: Meta-Evaluation and Meta-Analysis of Annual Program Statement (APS) People-to-People Grants

October 2013

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Meta-Evaluation and Meta-Analysis of USAID/CMM P2P Program Evaluations

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Acronyms

APS  Annual Program Statement
CBO  Community Based Organization
CDA  Collaborative for Development Action
CMM  Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID
FGD  Focus Group Discussion
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
OTI  USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives
P2P  People-to-People
RPP  Reflecting on Peace Practice Project
SI  Social Impact, Inc.
SOW  Scope of Work
ToC  Theory of Change
UFE  Utilization Focused Evaluation
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
Introduction to the Review

This assessment of the activity evaluations for the people-to-people (P2P) Annual Program Statement (APS) grant program was included as part of a larger evaluation learning effort commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM). The Evaluative Learning Review conducted by CMM and Social Impact included a variety of activities all being undertaken within an overarching developmental evaluation, or action research, framework. This review of APS activity evaluations utilizes a sample of P2P APS grant evaluation reports to assess the degree to which traditional evaluation criteria have been attempted in APS evaluations to date. It should be noted that this assessment does not probe the degree to which the evaluations used a developmental evaluation approach, nor does it assess the related question of how appropriate the evaluation methodologies were in terms of programs operating in and responding to simple, complicated, or complex systems.48

It was intended to provide a richer understanding for the evaluative learning review team and CMM about what evaluations had been conducted on APS activities to date, the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluations, and any findings related to outcomes of the APS programming, as well as to gain insights into better options for future APS activity evaluative efforts and opportunities for skill-building among CMM’s partners.

This assessment of activity evaluations used a modified meta-evaluation and meta-analysis framework, promoted by USAID’s Evaluation Policy and Program, Policy, and Learning office for use in the Agency’s evaluation work. They are described further in the report to frame the review, but should be

48 We utilize the definitions of simple, complicated, and complex situations laid out in the OECD Working Paper #96 by Sean Snyder. He explains, “In simple contexts, cause equals effect. This is the realm of the known. Situations can be clearly defined and appropriate responses identified…Complicated contexts are the realm of expertise and data analysis—the known unknowns. Cause and effect are not self-evident but can be teased out through analysis. The complex is the realm of the unknown unknowns. It is a space of constant flux and unpredictability. There are no right answers, only emergent behaviors.” In his book Developmental Evaluation, Michael Quinn Patton explains this further using a seminal healthcare report by Sholom Glouberman and Brenda Zimmerman. Simple situations or systems are like following a recipe or protocol that carries with it a high assurance of success, as it has been tested and proven. A complicated situation would be sending a rocket to the moon. Specialized expertise and formulas are needed, but rockets are ultimately similar so there is a high degree of certainty in the outcome upon repetition. Complex situations are like raising a child. Formulas and expertise have limited application and every child and parent are unique; there is no assurance in the outcome with each individual child.
considered as an exercise to inform the research of the evaluative learning review rather than a developmental evaluation or action research method.49

Executive Summary

This assessment has been conducted as part of Social Impact, Inc.’s (SI) Evaluative Learning Review of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation’s (CMM) people-to-people (P2P) reconciliation programming. Besa: Catalyzing Strategic Change conducted this Assessment, which consisted of a meta-evaluation and a meta-analysis.

The Assessment was driven by two sets of questions:

1. The meta-evaluation: What methodologies have been used? Using evaluation standards, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation methodologies and products.
2. The meta-synthesis: What can we learn about how to implement an effective P2P program? What can we learn about how well P2P programs are delivering results?

A sample of 10 out of 31 CMM P2P evaluation reports comprised the data set for this Assessment. The Assessment team assessed the quality of the reports against USAID’s Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports, as well as emergent standards from the field of peacebuilding and accuracy criteria from USAID’s Program Evaluations Meta-Evaluation Checklist. The team also mined the evaluation reports for crosscutting lessons learned and information on P2P programming results.

Conclusions

Taken collectively, and using traditional evaluation criteria, the evaluation reports have significant room for improvement in terms of credibly assessing the quality of project implementation, identifying changes that have occurred, and articulating how to improve programming to effect meaningful changes in the future. These conclusions are based on the inconsistent validity of the data and the evaluations’ insufficient focus on informing specific future decisions to be made by USAID. One implication of these findings is that the reports are of limited utility for USAID decision-making and knowledge transfer. Another implication is that the evaluations do not enable double-loop learning that would push project teams to rethink their assumptions.

Meta-Evaluation Summary Conclusions

The Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports states that “High quality, evidence-based evaluation reports with a clear focus on decision-making for USAID and other key partners are critical for improving USAID’s development effectiveness.” The Assessment team found that despite a

49 This introduction and explanation of simple, complicated, and complex systems used within this report has been added by Social Impact, Inc.
relatively consistent inclusion of mixed methods, which is an asset, the standards associated with methodological accuracy were not consistently met. Therefore, the evidence basis for the evaluations, when extant, was not sound.

Driving Question 1: Evaluation methodologies

In this Assessment, evaluation methodologies are defined broadly to include the evaluation purpose, users, questions, approach, and data collection methods. The methodologies were both highly variable and very similar. The majority of the evaluations had two purposes: (1) informing future implementer programming and (2) donor reporting. The reports referenced generic users such as the implementing organization or USAID, but none clearly indicated who should use the evaluation. Similarly, the evaluation questions were not always explicitly given and the questions that the Assessment team was able to identify were not sufficiently clear. The team found that none of the evaluations appeared to be informed by an evaluation approach; instead, the evaluations were designed as mini-research efforts. While the majority of the evaluations used mixed methods, six of the evaluations used a “post-test project group only” design, which is a limited design that cannot ascertain the degree of change because data are gathered only once and only from people involved with the project.

Driving Question 2: Strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation frameworks and products

The Assessment team used the evaluation standards to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation methodologies and products.

Strengths from the evaluation frameworks:

- Eight of the evaluations used mixed methods to inform their evaluations; however, it must be noted that due to the way the reports were structured, it is not clear that multiple data sources were used to inform evaluation questions.
- Six of the evaluations included lists of interviewees in an annex, providing details on some of their sources (but, notably, leaving out information about other sources such as the documents reviewed).

Weaknesses of the evaluation frameworks:

- The evaluations lacked adequate conflict considerations and gender sensitivity.
- None of the methodological descriptions offered a comprehensive or “clear” depiction of the methodologies employed.
- Regarding the thoroughness of the evaluations: None of the evaluations referenced side effects, although three did discuss unexpected things that had happened in the course of the evaluation. Only half of the evaluations offered alternative explanations for some of their findings, and none of those stated that they had conducted a formal factor analysis or that the evaluators had provided the basis for the alternative explanations.

Implications:

The implications of the methodologies findings span several important areas of concern. Without evaluation approaches, the evaluations are not intentional processes set up to optimize the potential utility and/or rigor of the process. Insufficient conflict considerations and gender sensitivity mean that the evaluations risk doing harm and/or overlooking relevant variables and, therefore, not understanding the interaction of the program and context appropriately. Regarding the data sources, the weaknesses identified above mean that consumers are not able to determine whether the evaluations drew on multiple, valid sets of sources to inform the evaluation questions. Additionally, without clear
methodological descriptions, evaluation consumers are not able to assess the source, accuracy, and thoroughness of the findings.

**Strengths of the products:**

- While some components of the evaluation reports limited their accessibility to users, seven of the evaluations communicated their findings effectively with charts and graphs and the majority were organized with headers and written well.
- The majority of evaluations with stated purposes offered recommendations responsive to those purposes [6/7].

**Weaknesses of the products:**

- The majority of the evaluation reports did not instill a sense that the evaluation process was credible or objective [6/10]; but the minority did so by presenting findings objectively and being transparent about evaluation methodology.
- The reports provided insufficient background information about the projects and about the aims of the evaluations. For instance, only one included a Statement of Work as an annex to the evaluation report.
- The reports inconsistently provided evidentiary support for findings.
- Collectively, the reports provided insufficient information about the ramifications of limitations of the evaluations and the reliability of the instruments.

**Implications:**

The lack of sufficient information about the projects and evaluations themselves made the reports inaccessible to readers not directly involved with the process, which has negative implications for USAID's potential broader use of the evaluations. Finally, the evaluations' responsiveness to their respective purposes is a strength; however, it must be noted that only two of the stated purposes pertained to learning, which is out of sync with USAID's broad purposes for commissioning evaluations.

**Meta-Analysis Summary Conclusions**

**Driving Question 3: How to implement P2P programming**

The Assessment team had hoped to extrapolate universal lessons learned about P2P programming; however, they found a broad diversity of lessons and limited agreement across the sample. Only one specific lesson was referenced by more than two evaluations.

**Driving Question 4: Results of P2P programming**

The meta-analysis found that P2P programming had not catalyzed specific common results (understood as changes external to the implementing actor) across the sample. In an effort to provide a synthesis of the evaluations' findings, the team identified several common types of change that programs catalyzed. The majority of the evaluations found that individual-level behavioral changes had been catalyzed as a result of the programming. Likewise, six of the evaluations found that participants had changed their attitudes as a result of programming. Half of the evaluations found that participants had acquired new skills. Three found that knowledge changes had occurred in the participant population and one referenced a functioning change. Only two of these changes, behavioral and attitudinal changes, were credibly claimed by a majority of the evaluations [6/10].

The vast majority of the types of change identified were individual-level changes. Only three specific changes could be interpreted as sociopolitical level changes. This finding has important implications for
P2P programming, as the widely recognized Reflecting on Peace Practice project found that changes effected on the sociopolitical level (community attitudes, relationships, social norms, and behaviors) can have more significant impacts for the broader peace than changes effected on the individual level.

**Recommendations for CMM Consideration**

From a systems perspective, the lack of conformity to evaluation standards that we see in these reports is expected, given the challenges inherent in operating in dynamic systems like the settings of deep-rooted conflict in which P2P programming occurs; within these settings, outcomes and impacts are not always predictable. This suggests that if USAID grantees are to improve their ability to engage in evaluation they may need two different types of skill sets: (1) using methods oriented towards complicated or complex, dynamic settings to help develop effective initiatives; and (2) using more traditional evaluation methodologies within simpler systems. It should be noted, however, that due to the nature of APS grants, funding is often used in complicated and complex conflict systems and so the emphasis on skill-building is a priority for the former.\(^50\)

**Utilization-focused recommendations:**

- **Articulate the decisions to be informed:** Implementing partners, the Mission, and CMM should take care to identify the specific decisions that will be informed by an evaluation to get greater utility out of the evaluations commissioned.

- **Greater CMM oversight:** Identify triggers that catalyze different levels of CMM engagement/oversight in the evaluation process. These triggers could include budgeting over a given amount, programming in a new country context, or innovative pilot processes. CMM’s increased engagement in the evaluation process would start immediately upon grant approval whereby the evaluation design would be considered so that a baseline could be conducted if it was deemed appropriate. Additional engagement points could include sign-off on the Evaluation Terms of Reference, Inception Report, and draft evaluation report.

- **Generate comparability:** Use the Developmental Evaluation process as a catalyst to identify a set of two to four questions that are to be asked across all P2P evaluations unless an exemption is agreed upon. These questions, particularly around how and why P2P programming works, would provide some basis for CMM to “add up” lessons across programs over time.

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\(^{50}\) There is ongoing research into this topic, including USAID’s recent Discussion Note on Complexity Aware Monitoring available here: [http://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/Complexity%20Aware%20Monitoring%202013-12-11%20FINAL.pdf](http://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/Complexity%20Aware%20Monitoring%202013-12-11%20FINAL.pdf) (Note: This introduction to the recommendations was added in by Social Impact, Inc.)
Evaluation approach recommendations:

- **CMM evaluation resource pack:** Develop a resource pack on evaluation options for implementing partners that would automatically be sent to them upon approval of a budget with an evaluation budget line. This pack would include the USAID evaluation standards and possibly an Executive Summary template. The pack could also contain an addendum to the USAID standards that specifically targets conflict and fragile contexts.

- **Make quality evaluation matter:** Establish an incentive for implementing partners to generate high-quality evaluations such as the inclusion of this variable in new grant approvals or the option for a set amount of additional continuation funds.
Background and Purpose

This Assessment has been conducted as part of SI's Evaluative Learning Review of USAID/CMM’s P2P reconciliation programming. P2P is a type of peacebuilding programming that seeks to replace demonization and stereotyping with “mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties”\(^{51}\) in conflict and post-conflict contexts.

This Assessment consisted of a meta-evaluation and a meta-analysis\(^ {52}\) of P2P program evaluations. Meta-evaluation is a process of “delineating, obtaining, and applying descriptive information and judgmental information—about the utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy of an evaluation” to report its strengths and weaknesses.\(^ {53}\) Meta-analysis is a process of analyzing results from multiple sources (in this case, evaluations) to identify patterns and areas of agreement or disagreement.

This review of APS activity evaluations uses a sample of people-to-people APS grant evaluation reports to assess the degree to which traditional evaluation criteria have been attempted in APS evaluations to date. As stated in the introduction, this assessment does not probe the degree to which the evaluations used a developmental evaluation approach, nor does it assess the related question of how appropriate the evaluation methodologies were in terms of programs operating in and responding to complex, open systems. It was intended to provide a richer understanding for the Evaluative Learning Review and CMM about what evaluations had been conducted on APS activities to date, the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluations, and any findings related to outcomes of the programming, as well as to gain insights into better options for future APS activity evaluative efforts and opportunities for skill-building among CMM’s partners. Finally, this assessment should be considered as an exercise to inform the research of the Evaluative Learning Review rather than a developmental evaluation or action research method.

The specific purpose of the meta-evaluation was to assess the quality of the methodologies and products (evaluation reports) of P2P evaluations using traditional evaluation approaches. The driving questions were:

- **What methodologies have been used?** (Note: “methodology” is defined broadly, to include evaluation purpose, audience, criteria, approach, and data collection.)
- **Using evaluation standards, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation methodologies and products.**

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\(^{52}\) This is also commonly called an evaluation synthesis.

The purpose of the meta-analysis was to identify crosscutting lessons learned in P2P programming. The aspirational driving questions\(^54\) were:

- What can we learn about how to implement an effective P2P program?
- What can we learn about how well P2P programs are delivering results?

**About This Report**

This report contains both the meta-evaluation and meta-analysis. It begins with a summary of the assessment methodology, the sample of the evaluation reports, and a description of the standards against which the evaluations were assessed. The following two sections present the conclusions from the meta-evaluation and meta-analysis. The meta-analysis section begins with implementation lessons learned and ends with the analysis on results catalyzed by P2P programming, stating conclusions and then discussing findings in each section.

In this report references to amounts of evidence are given in brackets, indicating how many evaluations out of the total met the criteria (e.g. \([8/10]\) indicates eight of 10 evaluations.) Additionally, the assessment team used the following standardized notation to indicate amounts of evidence:

- **A minority** means that there were three or four findings out of 10
- **Half** indicates that there were five findings out of 10
- **A majority** is six or seven findings out of 10
- **A vast majority** is eight or nine findings out of 10

**Summary of Methodology**

1. **Meta-evaluation data collection and analysis methodology:**

A team of two external consultants conducted this Assessment over the summer of 2013 (consultant biographies are included in Annex 2.) The team drew a sample of 10 evaluations from the 31 evaluations available and used a document analysis to assess the quality of the evaluation methodology and reports against the agreed-upon standards. A detailed methodology section, including a list of standards, is included in Annex 1.

2. **Meta-analysis data collection and analysis methodology:**

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\(^54\) These questions were deemed aspirational as the Assessment team’s ability to answer the questions would be based on the extent to which each evaluation addressed relevant issues.
The meta-analysis used the same dataset (10 evaluation reports) to seek crosscutting lessons learned. As many lessons were not clearly marked, the team had to mine evaluation reports using the following criteria:

- applicable beyond the immediate implementation context or
- central to essential aspects of programming.

The rationale for using these filtering criteria was that inapplicable and tangential statements would not be of as much use for informing future programming decisions.

3. The sample:

The Assessment team and the Assessment users decided to narrow the sample of evaluations to include only final (summative) evaluations in an effort to minimize the number of variables under consideration. Additionally, two reports were withdrawn based on language and level of nuance, bringing the pool of evaluation reports from 31 to 15. Given the time allocated for this project, it was determined that 10 of the 15 evaluations would be included in the Assessment. As the Assessment users had requested that the sample include as much geographic diversity as possible, the evaluations were sorted by region (Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and North Africa) and proportionally selected at random from each region. Table 1 details the evaluations included in this assessment.
Table 1: Evaluations of CMM P2P Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Title, Country</th>
<th>Evaluation Purpose</th>
<th>Program Goal (or “Objectives” If Goal Not Stated) and Project Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building Bridges to Peace, Uganda</td>
<td>“To provide a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the current conditions in the Building Bridges to Peace (BBP) program sites, and, most importantly, of changes made since the program’s start date in May 2009.” [p. 3]</td>
<td>“Address the key causes of conflict in and around northern Karamoja by engaging communities in inter-group dialogues and joint livelihoods projects that build mutual interest and promote reconciliation.” [p. 3] Project budget: $598,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace in the Casamance, Senegal</td>
<td>“The overall objective of the final evaluation of Peace in the Casamance was to measure the degree to which the program’s objectives were achieved.” [p. 5]</td>
<td>Not stated. Project budget: $600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace, Kenya</td>
<td>“This is an external evaluation for donor reporting purposes, but will also act as an important document for the implementing partners [Mercy Corps Kenya] and Youth Consortium Kenya in the implementation of LEAP II and future project identification, design and implementation...” [p. 7]</td>
<td>“Build and strengthen sustainable local mechanisms for conflict mitigation and reconciliation.” “Support 60 inclusive inter- and intra-community reconciliation dialogues that disseminate information about Kenya’s new reform agenda and contribute to peaceful co-existence.” [p. 9] Project budget: $600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland, Ethiopia</td>
<td>“Provide evidence of the impacts of Pact’s support when such is otherwise less immediately obvious.” [p. 4]</td>
<td>“Support inter-ethnic peace among pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and create enabling conditions for development.” [p. 6] Project budget: $750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation of Conflict in Divided Communities, Cote D’Ivoire</td>
<td>“A final evaluation was conducted which measured the results of the intervention.” [p. 4]</td>
<td>Facilitate “reconciliation between divided ethnic and religious groups in targeted areas in Cote d’Ivoire.” Project budget: $498,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Locally Driven Transformation and Collaborative Action, Burundi</td>
<td>“…In order to assess the results, effectives, and impacts of the project, this evaluation should identify the lessons learned and formulate relevant recommendations for the organization to produce future projects.” [p. 8]</td>
<td>$495,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds of Peace, Israel/West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>Not stated.</td>
<td>Not stated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Project Yemen, Yemen</td>
<td>Not stated.</td>
<td>$650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Program, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>“To instill a culture of peace and stability by building the capacity of the community to actively support development in the targeted districts of Yemen.” [p. 4]</td>
<td>$6,948,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Theater for Peace, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan</td>
<td>“An end line evaluation of [Youth Theater for Peace] program results in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan” [p. 6]</td>
<td>$1,199,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Standards selection:

The Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports was selected as the basis for the standards against which the evaluations would be assessed. While this is not a developmental approach, the standards were used because they are tailored to the data source for this meta-evaluation (USAID traditional evaluation reports), are used by USAID as a model for traditional evaluation methodologies and reports, and are accessible to non-evaluator audiences. To improve the flow of the report, the Assessment team lightly reorganized the original standards.

The Assessment team added 15 additional standards to the checklist. As the standards listed in the checklist were intended to be applicable to all types of USAID programming, the team incorporated emergent standards from the field of peacebuilding. The rationale was that the programming assessed in the evaluations took place in conflict and post-conflict settings and therefore strong evaluations would reflect conflict considerations per good practices in the field.

Further, because the checklist was geared towards assessing evaluation reports, it contained limited references to evaluation processes such as methodology and analysis, which would enable the team to assess the quality and accuracy of the evaluations. To fill this gap, the Assessment team added criteria from USAID's Program Evaluations Meta-Evaluation Checklist (hereafter referred to by its author’s name, Stufflebeam). To select these criteria, the team reviewed all of the accuracy standards in the checklist and eliminated standards that were redundant with content and/or that were not feasible given the data source. The Assessment users were included in the final decision regarding standards and agreed that adding accuracy criteria from the aforementioned checklist would strengthen the utility of the meta-evaluation.

5. Limitations:

This Assessment was limited to a review of evaluation reports. It did not include reviews of either evaluation inception reports or interviews with evaluators and stakeholders. As such, the Assessment team was not able to assess the evaluations against the full range of standards detailed in USAID’s Program Evaluation Meta-Evaluation Checklist (C-2); in particular this limited the team's ability to comment on the evaluations' processes or impacts.

The majority of the evaluations did not include Scopes of Work (SOWs) for the evaluations. Without either information about how much time was allocated or a clear articulation of the evaluation objectives, the team’s ability to assess the quality of the evaluations was hindered. Further, the choice to exclude midterm (formative) evaluations may have diminished some of the potential meta-analysis learning as those evaluations may have had more of a process-learning focus.

Due to time constraints, the process included few steps to facilitate and enable use of the Assessment, which meant that other components of the overarching developmental evaluation would need to be relied upon to ensure use.
Meta-Evaluation

The following section follows the order presented in the Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports standards, although the order has been lightly modified to improve the flow of the report and to include the additional standards. Note that if the source of a standard is not the USAID Checklist it will be included in parentheses at the end of the statement of the standard.

Executive Summary

Does the evaluation report begin with a 3 to 5 page stand-alone summary of the purpose, background of the project, main evaluation questions, methods, findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned (if applicable) of the evaluation?

The seven evaluations that included Executive Summaries generally had less than half of the expected content as detailed in the standards. Of the nine required components, the average Executive Summary included four of them in a solid or complete manner. No patterns emerged as to what did and did not get included, suggesting that there is some confusion as to the appropriate content for a CMM Evaluation Executive Summary. The Youth Theatre for Peace evaluation was the positive exception; the Executive Summary covered all critical components, though it stretched long to seven pages.

Introduction

Is there a clear statement of how the evaluation will be used and who the intended users are?

Uses and users were generically referenced in the majority of evaluations, but none would be considered a “clear statement” if CMM adopted Michael Quinn Patton’s interpretation of “use” and “user.” Dr. Patton, author of Utilization-Focused Evaluation, which places use and user as an organizing principle of an evaluation, writes that “Use concerns how real people in the real world apply evaluation findings and experience and learn from the evaluation process.”55 The majority of the evaluations offered generic statements about use [7/10] and users [6/10]; three made no reference at all. In terms of how evaluations were to be used, two intended uses dominated:

1. “Inform future programming of implementer”
2. “Donor reporting purposes”

Both the uses and users in these statements are quite generic in that they neither offer clear direction to an evaluator nor suggest who the future potential decision-makers might be. These are both key elements to guide evaluators and their ability to tailor their communication appropriately.

Is the SOW presented as an annex?

- Does the evaluation address all evaluation questions included in the Statement of Work (SOW)?

- Are any modifications to the SOW (examples: technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline) indicated in the report?

- If so, does the annex include the rationale for any change with the written sign-offs on the changes by the technical officer?

The Checklist has four distinct standards related to SOW; however, they have been amalgamated in this report as the responses are interrelated.

Only one of the 10 evaluations included a SOW and therefore it is the only one that can be assessed confidently against the full set of SOW standards. In that lone case, all evaluation questions were addressed in the evaluation and no modifications were made. A second evaluation did not have the SOW in an annex, but did include an excerpt from the SOW, including the evaluation questions in the Introduction section of the report. A third evaluation referenced narrowing the scope of the evaluation after arriving in country; however, the report provided information neither on the original scope nor the new evaluation questions.

Without the SOW it is difficult for an evaluation consumer to ascertain if the evaluation comprehensively responded to the needs of the commissioner or users. Further, a seasoned consumer can review a SOW to ascertain if the evaluation was set up for success (to be a valid informative process) or failure.

Scope and Methodology

Is there a clear description of the evaluation’s data collection methods (summarized in the text with the full description presented in an annex)?

The Assessment team’s interpretation of what constituted “a clear description” included seven criteria:

1. Number of working days for the evaluation, e.g. 45 work days for each of the three evaluation team members

2. Data collection methods, e.g. focus group discussions and participatory conflict analysis workshop

3. Rationale for methods selection, e.g. participatory conflict analysis workshop was selected so that different opinions could be discussed on what had been the key driving factors of conflict two years ago

4. Amount of data collected, e.g. 450 completed questionnaires from a sample of 985

5. Disaggregation by relevant groups of data, e.g. 90 interviews, 25% female

6. Location of data collection, e.g. Kenema, Bo, and Freetown

7. Data sources, e.g. village elders, small and medium enterprise owners, market women

A strict interpretation of these criteria was used, whereby the evaluation methods description should have comprehensively covered the issue for the criteria to be considered met. For instance, if the
rationale was offered for one data collection method but not for the rest, then this criterion was not deemed met. Further analysis was restricted to the evaluation methods section and did not include additional information located throughout the evaluation report text. Using this strict lens, none of the methodological descriptions offered a comprehensive or “clear” depiction in their methodology section. Using the seven criteria, the mode (the number that occurs more than any other in the set) for met criteria was 2. The average was 2.5, while the best methodology section met four of the criteria. The data for criteria met/evaluation are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria Met</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Adopting a more generous interpretation where any reference to a criteria might be counted, the mode improved to 3 (average 3.6) and the best methodology section met five of the seven criteria (see below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria Met</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Returning to a strict lens a few patterns emerged:

- Working days were almost always omitted. [9/10 did not provide this information.]
- Data collection methods were always referenced [10/10.] However, only a minority [4/10] included their use of document review as a part of the methodology. It is possible that this was not part of their evaluation data collection, but that would be surprising as it is a standard step.
- Only one evaluation provided a clear and comprehensive rationale behind their data collection methods selection.
- Two evaluations provided a detailed accounting of the amount of data collection and only one offered it in a disaggregated form.
- General locations of data collection were provided in half of the descriptions.
- The vast majority [8/10] stated the data sources; however, there was a tendency to be quite general, which made it difficult to make the important distinction of whether these were groups directly involved with the programming or offering an outside perspective.

With regards to the format of methodology descriptions, only one evaluation, Youth Theatre for Peace, offered a summary in the text with a more comprehensive description as an annex. However, the annex in this case was not a good practice example as it was more of a data collection process description than a comprehensive methodological explanation.

Are all tools (questionnaires, checklists, discussion guides, and other data collection instruments) used in the evaluation provided in an annex?

Comprehensive inclusion of all data collection tools was not a regular occurrence among the evaluation sample. Only one—Youth Theatre for Peace—included all of their tools as an annex. Three included some tools but not all, with a preference towards including quantitative tools (e.g., surveys) but not qualitative (e.g., interview protocols.) Two more evaluations referenced tools in the Annex section of the Table of Contents but no annexes were included in the documentation provided to the Assessment team.
The inclusion of tools as part of the evaluation report serves two purposes. First, it enables the user to ascertain the validity of the data collection process. Second, it offers a learning opportunity to the broader field as future evaluators could build from existing tools.

Is the reliability of an instrument reported (including assessing and reporting factors that influenced the reliability, characteristics of the examinees, data collection conditions and evaluator’s biases)? Are reliability problems acknowledged? (Stufflebeam, A3)

None of the evaluation reports explicitly reported the reliability of instruments. Reporting on the reliability of an instrument enables the users to interpret the findings more accurately, which in turn should contribute to a greater degree of confidence in the evaluative process.

Has information about how each data collection procedure was scored, analyzed, and interpreted been documented? (Stufflebeam, A2)

Explaining how data were processed was documented far more consistently for quantitative data collection than for qualitative means. Half of the evaluations explained how their quantitative data collection was processed. Within these five evaluations, two explain their processes for all of their means of data collection. Finally, five offered no explanation on scoring, analysis, and interpretation. The inclusion of data processes enables the consumer to assess the accuracy and thoroughness of the findings.

Good practice example: Building Bridges to Peace—“For the Participatory Assessments, discussion notes were reviewed with both the note-taker and facilitator the same day of the discussion. These notes were then coded, and analyzed manually. In April 2011, survey data were entered in Microsoft Excel. Most cleaning was done in Excel before it was exported to STATA 9 for further cleaning and analysis. Tables and charts were produced through Microsoft Excel 2007. Basic tests were conducted to obtain percentages and figures. Chi square tests were run to explore if there were any significant associations between key variables.” [p. 16]

Are all sources of information properly identified and listed in an annex?

The majority [6/10] of evaluations included lists of interviewees in an annex. Documents reviewed were less commonly included [2/10]; this aligns with the few references that were made to document review in the methodology. Without knowing more about whether document reviews were included in data collection it is not possible to determine if this is an omission or accuracy.

The importance of this standard, similar to earlier ones, is to provide users with an understanding of where data were sourced. Consumers can then determine if they feel that a valid set of data sources was drawn from to respond to the evaluation questions.

Does the evaluation report contain a section describing the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (e.g., selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, small samples, only went to villages near the road, implementer insisted on picking who the team met with, etc.)?

The majority of evaluations [6/10] included some reference to limitations. Only two of the evaluations had distinct limitations sections, while the other four embedded the limitations within the methodology description. Regardless of the formatting choice, limitations were on average quite general, and only one comprehensively explained the consequences of the limitations. Articulating the consequences of a limitation is important as one cannot assume all evaluation users or consumers will be able to infer the ramifications and thus read the resulting report appropriately.
Good practice example: Building Bridges to Peace—“The lack of pre-test data from control groups renders the results somewhat limited in scope. The possibility of assignment bias engenders some threats to the validity of the results...” [p. 17]

Good practice recommends that mitigation strategies be proactively developed in response to limitations to contain the ramifications on the evaluation process. Based on this interpretation of mitigation strategies, two of the evaluation reports articulated mitigation strategies for some of the limitations they discussed.

- **Youth Theatre for Peace (YTP)**—“The program participants are comprised of those who had taken their own initiative to become involved into YTP; thus, it is likely that they would have started with ‘better’ attitudes and behaviors towards conflict issues and those of other ethnicities, religions and nationalities [than the individuals in the comparison group would have]. In order to address this limitation, the survey utilized additional questions for the program participants only in order to best determine if program participation was the cause for positive changes attitudes and behaviors.” [p. 17]

**Does the evaluation design use procedures appropriate for the evaluation questions and the nature of the data?** (Stufflebeam, A6)

All of the evaluations had room for improvement in their evaluation design, ranging from a little to a lot. None of the evaluations appeared to be informed by an evaluation approach/theory (a philosophy and process that informs the design of an evaluation); instead they appeared to have been designed as “mini” research efforts. Though good research is the bedrock of a quality evaluation, an evaluation is more than good research.

The evaluation designs were categorized using the RealWorld Evaluation typology of evaluation designs by Bamberger, Rugh, Mabry [p. 201 edition 1]. The majority [6/10] of the evaluations utilized a “post-test project group only” design. This means that data were gathered only once and only from those involved in some way with the project, e.g., partners, beneficiaries. This is akin to testing participants in a training program only at the end of the course as the sole evaluation activity. One is not able to ascertain degree of change—knowledge levels at the beginning of the training versus knowledge levels at the end—nor if any change that was identified can be attributed to the course, as this would require involving non-participants. This design—post-test project group only—is deemed the weakest of the seven evaluation designs by Bamberger et al.

Two of the evaluations utilized a “post-test project and comparison group” design. Here again, data are only collected once, but from two different groups so that one can attempt to identify the contribution of the programming activities towards change. This design is ranked fifth out of seven (with 1 being strongest and 7 weakest) in the Bamberger typology.

- **Good practice example**: Building Bridges to Peace adopted a “quasi” pretest/post-test model with comparison groups. This is ranked in the top two strongest evaluation designs. In essence data are collected twice: before and after the intervention from both participants and a reasonably equivalent non-participant group. This enables identification of degree of change and a stronger ability to identify why this change came about. It should be noted that it was not a pure design in that the pretest/post-test comparison was quite limited and they changed their post-test tool to improve quality and respond to current needs.

In addition to overall design strength, the appropriateness of the data collection tools for the evaluation questions was also assessed. In other words, the team asked, did the evaluations match how they got the data with what they were trying to learn? Unfortunately the paucity of critical information around
the program scope and scale, evaluation length, and evaluation questions made valid conclusions impossible to reach.

It should be noted that the design weaknesses may not be due to low competency in the evaluation teams. The core decisions related to a pretest (baseline) or the inclusion of a comparison group need to be made when the program is being designed. It is feasible that the evaluators, recruited late in the program, were handed situations where these designs were all that was possible.

**Is the evaluation design conflict and gender sensitive? [Besa inclusion]**

Based on the evaluation reports, none of the evaluations reviewed in this meta-evaluation embodied conflict or gender sensitivity in the design. In terms of gender sensitivity, a minority \[4/10\] provided a gender breakdown of data collected, which is an important start. For instance, in the Peace in the Casamance evaluation, 60 of the 422 respondents to the baseline were women. Two evaluations referenced separating focus group discussion participants by gender. Four made no reference to gender at all. A gender-sensitive process goes beyond these simple steps to include how the evaluation is designed, means of analysis, and implementation actions.

In terms of conflict sensitivity, the majority \[7/10\] of the evaluations made no reference to conflict considerations in the design or implementation of the evaluation. Of the three that did so, two were in terms of how they presented findings. For instance, in the Seeds of Peace evaluation, the survey findings are disaggregated by identity groups, which could be interpreted to show some awareness that the different parties to a conflict have different experiences. Only one evaluation report specifically referenced a conflict consideration as part of its design and this was for evaluation team recruitment. This is an important element but certainly not comprehensive.

**Analysis**

**Are charts and graphs used to present or summarize data where relevant?**

The vast majority \[9/10\] of the reports had at least one chart or graphical presentation of data. Of these nine, seven used charts and graphs throughout the report in an effective manner.

**Are conclusions focused directly on the evaluation questions?** (Stufflebeam, A1)

If the Assessment team’s mining of the reports for evaluation questions was accurate, then the vast majority of evaluations responded to the evaluation questions. That said, the utility of some of the apparent evaluation questions was questionable as they could be interpreted in numerous ways. Therefore, the Assessment team was not able to ascertain if the need behind the question was met. This speaks to the potential utility of the report for the users.

- **Good practice example:** Youth Theatre for Peace—Findings are organized by evaluation questions with the question stated at the start of each section, followed by a general paragraph about the question and then precise findings.

**Findings**

**Are findings specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative and qualitative evidence?**

In the vast majority \[8/10\] of evaluations the findings were specific and concise. Half of the evaluations also offered findings with strong quantitative and/or qualitative evidence, while a minority \[3/10\] inconsistently linked findings with evidence and the final two did not integrate evidence into their findings at all. Without the evidentiary support, users or consumers are unable to interpret the strength of the finding on their own.
As appropriate, does the report indicate confirmatory evidence for findings from multiple sources, data collection methods, and analytic procedures?

The vast majority of the evaluations [8/10] utilized mixed methods in their evaluations. This is a strong asset, as mixed methods are considered the gold standard of the American Evaluation Association. The data collection tools selected were largely classic social science research tools including questionnaires, surveys, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and document review. Two of the evaluations introduced participatory data collection exercises, which are often useful in illiterate or rural contexts.

In terms of whether multiple measures were applied for each evaluation question, the writing style in some of the evaluations made this difficult to judge. Ideally one would know the basis for the answer to each evaluation question—for instance, according to interviews and supported by the survey findings, participants found staff respectful. However, the majority [7/10] of the evaluations did not provide that level of detail to their answers in a consistent manner, so this could not be assessed.

• Good practice example: Rift Valley Local Empowerment—“LEAP achieved 133 percent of its 60-event objective by conducting 72 activities with two or more conflicting parties according to operational records supported by DPC focus group discussions and survey respondents.” [p. 18]

The vast majority [9/10] of evaluations engaged with a variety of stakeholders. Whether the variety was sufficient is difficult to ascertain due to the limited information available on the projects themselves.

Have the program’s side effects been identified and reported? (Stufflebeam A1)

None of the evaluations made any reference to side effects, i.e. unintended positive or negative consequences for the population being served. The unintended positive and negative effects of programming are an important way to learn about change processes and identify unintentional harms to be stopped and avoided. If one changes the definition of side effect to mean anything that happened that was not expected, then three evaluations reference effects on themselves or partner organizations.

• Good Practice Example: Youth Theatre for Peace: “As a result, the partners started to use skills and knowledge gained in YTP in their other projects and programs. For instance, Fidokor started to use a Forum Theater approach in their program with GIZ aimed at youth awareness about the negative impact of drug use.” [pg. 36]

Have plausible alternative explanations of the findings been reported? (Stufflebeam, A1)

Half of the evaluations offer alternative explanations for at least some of the findings. None, however, state that they have conducted a formal factor analysis or the basis for which the alternative explanations have been derived. Filtering findings for alternative explanations is a critical process to reduce positive bias in evaluations, which is key to the credibility of findings.

• Good practice example: Building Bridges to Peace—“Rather than simply a result of the UPDF and disarmament, the impetus for the transformation appears to be fourfold: first, the government’s disarmament program has reduced the number of arms available; second, the increase in UPDF
patrols and detaches has lessened the ability of warriors to raid with complete impunity; third, the cultural dialogues/exchanges have imbued a sense of trust and familiarity of the 'other' community; and fourth, the joint livelihood projects have given the disarmed and reformed youth something to 'do,' in effect, or at least introduced them to new economic opportunities.” [p. 25]

Conclusions

Is every conclusion in the report supported by a clearly defined set of findings?

Conclusions were not consistently supported by clearly defined findings in the majority of evaluations [6/10]. Within this six, it is worth noting that two not only did not provide supporting findings but also drew positive conclusions that are far beyond what the available data would support. Just under half [4/10] of the evaluations did provide a clear link between findings and conclusions in a relatively consistent manner.

Evaluative conclusions are where judgment meets findings. They should offer a valid interpretation of the data to the reader in response to the key questions originally posed for the evaluation. The provision of evidence-based judgment is a key distinguishing feature of evaluation (as compared to research) and should be a significant part of the value offered through the evaluation process.

- Good practice example: Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace—“LEAP far surpassed its objectives in increasing participants’ willingness to interact with people from other ethnic communities. An overwhelming majority (86 percent) of survey respondents claimed a greater willingness to interact with members from other communities than they had two years ago when the baseline survey was completed.” [p. 16]

Recommendations

- Are all recommendations supported by a specific or clearly defined set of findings and conclusions?
- Are the recommendations practical and specific?
- Are the recommendations responsive to the purpose of the evaluation?
- Are the recommendations action-oriented?
- Is it clear who is responsible for each action?

There are five standards associated with recommendations. These have been analyzed collectively due to their overlapping nature. It is worth noting that a minority of evaluations [2/10] did not have separate recommendation sections or clearly identified recommendations. In one of these cases, recommendation-type statements were sparsely woven throughout the text and the Assessment team opted to use these in this analysis.56

56 The Assessment team still opted to use the full pool of 10 evaluations in its calculations for consistency.
The same number of evaluations offered recommendations directly supported by conclusions and findings as did not [5/10].

- **Good practice example:** Recommendations directly followed each conclusion, which was supported by findings. This allowed the reader to easily follow the train of thought of the evaluation.

Ascertaining whether the recommendations were responsive to purpose was complicated by some of the vague statements of purpose. Because two evaluations did not offer a purpose and a third had no recommendations, only seven could be reviewed in this manner. Of this group of seven, six were responsive to the purposes of their evaluation.

When considered on average, recommendations tended to be quite practical and specific [7/10], though most evaluations had a degree of variance in terms of how consistently this standard might be applied across all recommendations. The same held true for the action-oriented standard, with the majority [6/10] offering recommendations that could be acted on. One common challenge in many of the recommendations was that the individual responsible for the action (another standard) was not suitably laid out. Either no entity was referenced [3/10] or it was a generic grouping [3/10] such as “World Education.” Again using a Utilization-Focused Evaluation lens, this is too general or broad to have clarity on responsibility because “World Education” could refer to many potential decision-makers, such as the project team, the Regional Director, or headquarters-based Technical Advisors. The concern is that without specificity the likelihood of uptake diminishes.

- **Good practice example:** Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace—“We recommend that the LEAP team take another look at the average costs for local travel and the food expenses for Peace Dialogues to ensure that they are appropriate to encourage continued DPC dialogues and to consider some kind of stipend for those doing really good work.” [p. 32]

- **Good practice example:** Youth Theatre for Peace—“The sustainability projects and new Drama Clubs should be closely supervised and mentored by partner organization staff members to avoid serious deviation from the original DCT methodology by ‘secondary beneficiaries.’” [p. 37]

**Lessons Learned**

**Did the evaluation include lessons that would be useful for future projects or programs, on the same thematic or in the same country, etc.?**

As half of the evaluations did not include lessons, part of the finding is that lessons are not consistently incorporated into evaluations. Pending the evaluation purpose, this could diminish their utility and the benefit received from the evaluation investment.

In the five evaluations that included lessons learned, four did so in a manner that could be useful for future projects. As with recommendations, there was variance as to the utility of the lessons within each evaluation. The utility would be mostly for an extension or next phase of the same project, as many lessons were very site- or project-specific.

- **Good practice example:** Peace Support Program—“Good training and facilitation are critical for conveying new approaches to governance, politics and conflict mitigation—especially at the grassroots level. But in Sri Lanka, there is a dearth of competent trainers and facilitators. So if the Mission is serious about supporting grassroots participation, USAID and its partners must be prepared to invest the time and money to produce good trainers and facilitators.” [p. 34]
**Bottom Line**

Does the evaluation report give the appearance of a thoughtful, evidence-based and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not, and why?

The evaluations in this meta-evaluation offered quite a mix of overall impressions in terms of the degree of thoughtfulness and evidence basis. Four were identified as thoughtful and evidence-based in their presentation, while one was thoughtful but not evidence-based. This one read like an expert review that, despite the lack of evidence, provided an argumentation that was sound and appeared balanced and insightful. On the other hand, three had strikingly positive overarching conclusions that were so out of step with the findings that they undermined the report. For instance, “This final evaluation clearly demonstrated that the investment of $950,000 by USAID in CMP was a solid decision.” [Conflict Mitigation Project, p. 33] However, many of the intended outcomes were not achieved and people interviewed questioned the relevance of the entire project. The final two evaluations were not consistently evidence-based, which detracted from a sense of thoughtfulness.

All evaluation reports have mastered the art of organization, using headers and sub-headers to guide the reader. In a minority [4/10] of reports, the quality of writing detracted from the ease of reading. For instance, numerous long lists of bullet points, acronym-filled text without acronym lists, typos, or mislabeled headers detracted from the substance of the report.

Does the evaluation report explicitly link the evaluation questions to specific future decisions to be made by USAID leadership, partner governments, and/or other key stakeholders?

With the caveat that only one of the evaluations included its Scope of Work so the Assessment team did not have access to the original evaluation questions, it appeared that none of the evaluations linked the evaluation questions to specific future decisions to be made by USAID. This is not to suggest that none of the reports made recommendations to USAID, as a few did; however, whether these recommendations directly responded to USAID decisions is unknown.

Does the evaluation report convey the sense that the evaluation was undertaken in a manner to ensure credibility, objectivity, transparency, and the generation of high-quality information and knowledge?

The majority of the evaluation reports did not instill a sense that the evaluation process was credible or objective [6/10]. This was due to two factors: inconsistent use of data and overly positive claims about project achievements that were discredited later in the reports. Inconsistent use of data involved both insufficient methodology explanations and a lack of supporting evidence or failure to consistently cite evidence. A minority of the reports instilled a moderate sense of credibility by presenting findings objectively and being transparent about evaluation methodology [4/10]. For example, the Youth Theater for Peace’s methodology section provided details about training partner organization staff prior to including them in data collection processes and eliminating data collected prior to training “according to research principles and ethics” [p. 17].

It must be noted that none of the evaluations included evaluator biographies, which can contribute to credibility.
Report Dissemination

Has a dissemination plan been developed for this report?
The Assessment team could not answer this question as there was insufficient information in the reports to reach a conclusion.

Meta-Analysis

1. How to Implement P2P Programming

The Assessment team generated the information in this meta-analysis by compiling lessons learned and information about implementation and then filtering the compiled list according to two criteria:

1. Is the lesson applicable beyond the immediate implementation context?
2. Is the content of the lesson central to essential aspects of programming?

While the Assessment team had intended to provide crosscutting analysis about the strength of evidence behind common lessons, it became clear on examining the evaluations that the significant variations in the substance and form of the lessons would limit the team’s ability to synthesize them. As the quality of the evaluations and the findings therein were highly variable, there was little utility in linking the lessons to the quality of evidence.

Part of examining the lessons offered in the evaluations involved assessing whether the evaluations were designed in such a way as to enable learning. As to be expected, there was variance across the sample; however, the average evaluation was found to have the potential to enable learning to a degree, though none were explicitly designed to catalyze learning. Learning can be built into an evaluation design at four junctures: evaluation purpose, evaluation criteria, evaluation approach, and questions (also called Lines of Inquiry). Note that in most cases, the evaluation purpose, criteria, and questions are determined by the entity that writes the SOW and not by the evaluators.

Evaluation Purpose: Only two of the reports stated evaluation purposes related to learning or informing future programming.

Evaluation Approach: The approach of the evaluation affects the extent to which an evaluation enables learning. For example, Michael Quinn Patton’s Utilization-Focused Evaluation approach works closely with users to design an evaluation that answers their questions and will be used in decision-making. No approaches were stated nor could any be inferred through the evaluation reports. Without an evaluation approach, these evaluations are research exercises that do not offer a wide range of possible learning steps during or after the evaluation concludes. For instance, “process use” is the ability to learn during the course of the evaluation. This rarely just happens but must be structured into the evaluation process.

Evaluation Criteria and Questions: Evaluation criteria are “the criteria by which a project will be evaluated” and often act as categories of inquiry to organize the evaluation questions (Church and Rogers, 2006, p. 100). None of the evaluation reports included explicit references to evaluation criteria. However, of the criteria implied in the headers of the reports, five of the evaluations had criteria that, when mixed with the right evaluation question, could create a learning opportunity—headers such as the following:

- “effective implementation,”
- “conceptual evaluation,”
- “quality of materials produced,”
The evaluation questions varied significantly across the sample. The Assessment team was able to identify four patterns: evaluations without questions [4/10], evaluation questions that could be inferred to relate to learning [4/10], questions that informed learning [1/10], and evaluations with questions that were not structured to make learning a priority [1/10].

- **Good practice example:** Peace Support Program—“What programmatic ‘dos and don’ts’ can be learned from these programs? What does the experience of these programs suggest about the design of future programs supporting peace processes and participatory local governance?” [p. 9].

**Lessons:**

After applying the aforementioned filtering criteria, it was possible to extract 66 lessons, tips and observations to inform implementation from the 10 evaluation reports. Many of these concepts were tips or observations noted by the evaluators or participants and should not be taken as findings supported by evidence. (For ease of reading in this report, the tips, observations and lessons will all be referred to as “lessons.”) The lessons varied greatly in terms of the level of contextualization and nuance. The presentation and formality of the lessons varied significantly as well, from side comments in a paragraph focused on findings to a formally stated lesson learned.

While the team found lessons in each of the evaluations, it must be noted that some evaluations provided more concepts and stronger rationale and explanation than others (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluations with Greater Quantities of Insights</th>
<th>Evaluations with Lesser Quantities of Insights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Project</td>
<td>Peace in the Casamance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Program</td>
<td>Youth Theater for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland</td>
<td>Reconciliation in Divided Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Locally Driven Transformation</td>
<td>Building Bridges to Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley Local Empowerment</td>
<td>Seeds of Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See full list of lessons in Annex 3

As it was not possible to extrapolate universal lessons learned, the Assessment team grouped the lessons thematically. In the following summary, the most commonly referred to themes are listed first followed by the themes with fewer references. To illustrate the themes, the following section includes summary statements followed by bulleted lists of the lessons that have been paraphrased and combined when appropriate for ease of reading.

Of the lessons about implementation, none were overtly unique to P2P implementation, although all are applicable to P2P implementation. The only **common lesson** (with more than two evaluations
The topic most commonly referred to was **participant characteristics, including age, sex and role in the community** [13 lessons in five evaluations]. The overarching lesson from this theme is that contextual factors need to be carefully considered when designing and implementing programming. As the project designs and contexts differed significantly, many of the lessons in this area lacked utility when read without detailed contextual information. As such, only a selection of accessible lessons has been included here.

- An evaluation for a project that focused on youth theater as a means to conflict prevention commented that more adults needed to be included in the process.
- The report for a project focused on community-wide engagement commented that in patriarchal communities, men are asked to engage in conflict-resolution forums more than women.
- Two evaluations reasoned that women participated in fewer activities because they had other responsibilities that competed for their time.
- One evaluation suggested that programs work directly with opinion shapers to bring them into conflict management.
- Another evaluation noted that the information gap between community members and those who represent the community at dialogues needs to be mitigated.

On the topic of **working with CBOs and local governance bodies**, a number of ideas were presented to improve coordination between partners, work with organizations that include members from both sides of the conflict, and build local partner capacity [12 lessons from six projects.] All of the lessons are included below:

- Two evaluations mentioned that accountability between CBO management and project management needed to be strengthened.
- An evaluation suggested that programming should build the competencies and self-confidence of women in local authorities.
- An evaluation stated that working with CBOs with staff from both sides of the conflict can provide more access to field sites and other implementation opportunities.
- An evaluation noted that management training and grants support strengthened local partners.
- Two evaluations mentioned that local partners were not trained in monitoring and evaluation processes and were asked to use tools they did not understand; this limited their participation.
- One evaluation noted that programs should recognize the role of traditional “peace makers” in conflict resolution.
- An evaluation found that strengthening and formalizing coalitions of CBOs at the community level will build civil society.
- An evaluator commented that projects should avoid establishing new, non-organic entities in the course of implementation and should instead work with pre-existing organizations; if
establishing a new organization cannot be avoided, it is necessary to ensure “top-flight leadership” and oversight practices.

- That evaluation report also noted that the creation of too many committees can become an administrative burden.
- The same evaluation commented that reliance on consensus-based decision-making became problematic.

The area of **programming tactics** (meaning languages, tools, or methods to use) was included in six of the reports [eight lessons from six projects]. These lessons suggest that future design processes should build in opportunities to test the reasonableness of the planned activities. All of the lessons are included below:

- An evaluation concerned with a rural population in Kenya found that participants were better served by aural training than by printed manuals.
- The issue of stipends for participating in peace dialogues warrants further consideration. One evaluation commented on this area twice, noting both that peace commission members felt they needed more financial support and that the project staff felt that the support was appropriate. Another evaluation noted that the payment of honoraria to participants calls into question the commitment and motivation of the recipients.
- An evaluation stated that Drama for Conflict Transformation tools and methods could be effectively used in other applications, including youth empowerment.
- An evaluation noted that radio programming schedules should be publicized.
- An evaluation commented that technology introduced through programming needs to be appropriate for intended users.
- An evaluation suggested that programming in livelihoods begins with assistance with financial planning.

Five evaluations referenced specific technical problems with the **project design**, which included shortcomings related to indicators, baseline studies, lack of conflict analysis, and the need for tools to track results [eight lessons from five projects.] All of the lessons are included below:

- Three evaluations referenced indicators, noting in one case that the indicators were weak (not measurable), in another that the indicators did not articulate impact, as were focused on performance (meaning that the indicators failed to signal whether changes were happening on the ground), and finally that USAID and partners need better measures to track peace processes.
- Three evaluators commented that the projects needed stronger conflict analysis.
- An evaluation noted that the lack of baseline hindered the ability to measure the project’s impact.
- An evaluation noted the need for a database to track all indicators.

Another area within project design is the concept of **relevance**, the extent to which programming is aligned with beneficiary’s needs [four lessons from four projects.] All of the lessons are included below:

- Two evaluations noted that economic factors motivate participation in peacebuilding activities.
• One evaluation noted that in the project’s context, the primary conflicts were within families while the project had targeted inter-community conflict.

• Another evaluation stated that training and awareness of peace should be accompanied by development interventions that meet pressing needs.

The comments around **donor policy** primarily focused on efforts that USAID could take to coordinate actors on a number of levels [five lessons from four projects.] All of the lessons are included below:

• An evaluation advocated for ensuring that the embassy is fully engaged in and supportive of USAID programs that address conflict.

• The same evaluation also advocated for ensuring that Democracy and Governance and OTI programs are made more complementary and mutually reinforcing.

• An evaluation mentioned that USAID and partners need to invest the time and money required to produce good trainers and facilitators.

• An evaluation stated that the need to meet US environmental standards constrained the ability to use local conflict mitigation projects.

• Another evaluation commented that USAID should support the coordination of actors “at home” so that projects can better support each other in the field.

**Community participation or buy-in** was mentioned in three of the reports [three lessons from three projects.] All of the lessons are included below:

• An evaluation stated that community mobilization is necessary to enhance the effectiveness of programming initiatives.

• Another evaluation noted that community buy-in and commitment are necessary to ensure that the project succeeds at recovering and preserving natural resources.

• An evaluation noted that communities should design their own small investments projects so that they feel ownership.

Two evaluations provided applicable insights into **factors that limit effectiveness** [two lessons from two evaluations.] Both of the lessons are included below:

• One evaluation commented that absent influential champions for decentralization and local government reform, policy reform programs will have a limited impact.

• The other evaluation stated that the multiplication effects of a project can be diluted when programming tools are more widely adopted and drift from the central purposes of the project.

Two evaluations commented on issues relating to **implementer neutrality** [two lessons from two projects.] Both of the lessons are included below:

• One evaluation cautioned that the project’s activities in one community could mean that a conflicting community perceives the organization to be aligned with the first community.

• The second evaluation approached this issue from the standpoint of the accessibility of program sites; in this case the site was very difficult for participants from one of the conflicting communities to access, a factor that influenced participants’ perception of the neutrality of the organization.
Two evaluations discussed the importance of coordinating between different types of programming in a given context [two lessons from two projects.] Both of the lessons are included below:

- One evaluation noted that the implementer worked with other organizations on the ground to prevent duplication and maximize impact.
- The other evaluation noted that coordination with actors programming outside the field of reconciliation could strengthen programming as the areas of focus affect the conflict.

Finally, one project provided considerable detail about project staffing considerations, which could be of use to other projects [three lessons from one project.] All of the lessons are included below:

- The evaluation discussed the value of hiring project leadership familiar with the culture, a native speaker who was able to interact with beneficiaries in conservative areas and experienced with conflict management.
- That evaluation also stated that dividing responsibilities for implementation between two female and two male coordinators provided a model of gender equity.
- The same evaluation stated that employing team members native to the project areas lent credibility to the project.

Results of P2P Programming

As a means of assessing the results of P2P programs, the meta-analysis sought to identify common changes effected by programming. The meta-analysis did not find that P2P programming had catalyzed specific common changes across the sample. While this may be due to the fact that the projects were contextually driven, this analysis lacked the evidence base required to pursue that question, as the assessment was limited to a desk review of the evaluation reports.

Absent common specific changes across the sample, the analysis scaled up to the level of types of change in order to synthesize the findings. Changes (defined as concrete differences that are external to the functions of the intervention) were distinguished from project activities, which are actions needed to produce a change. Accordingly, project activities were not included in the results analysis.

The majority of the evaluations found that behavioral changes had been catalyzed as a result of the programming [6/10]. Likewise, six of the evaluations found that participants had changed their attitudes as a result of programming. Half of the evaluations found that participants had acquired new skills [5/10]. Three found that knowledge changes had occurred in the participant population, and one evaluation referenced a functioning change.
This categorization provides some insight into the kind of results P2P is producing; however, it should not be assumed that the majority of the projects catalyzed these changes. In fact, only two of the changes, behavior and attitudinal changes, were credibly claimed by a majority [6/10] of the evaluations; other changes were found far less frequently.

It is important to note that the vast majority of the changes referenced in this section are individual-level changes. Only three of the specific changes could be interpreted as community- or group-level (also called sociopolitical level) changes: decrease in violence, sharing resources, and the implementation of a legislative measure. The field of peacebuilding generally acknowledges that significant, lasting change is effected on the sociopolitical level. (For more information, see the inset box at right.) While P2P programming may pave the way for broader changes by working on the level of individual change, the evaluations reviewed do not indicate that sociopolitical-level change is being catalyzed.

**Findings: The Types of Change**

The following section provides bulleted lists of the changes effected, followed by tables that contain selected examples from the evaluation reports in order to provide details about the changes effected and the sources that indicated the changes.

Six of the evaluations found that behavior changes had been effected. Within this type of change, there were six distinct kinds of behavior changes (see Table 3):

- Participating in conflict resolution–related mechanisms [4/10]
- Interacting with people from the other side of the conflict [3/10]
- CBO collaboration and cooperation [2/10]
- Decreased violence [1/10]
- Increased freedom of movement [1/10]
- Sharing resources across conflicting groups [1/10]

It must be noted that while two evaluations found that CBOs collaborated and cooperated, there are outstanding questions about whether this was actually a change catalyzed by the project or whether the collaboration is a product of the situation that could evaporate when funding is completed. The strength of the claim was not strong enough to enable an unqualified statement.
Table 3: Illustrative Examples of Behavioral Changes from the Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in a conflict resolution-related mechanism:</th>
<th>Interacting with people from the other side of the conflict:</th>
<th>Increased freedom of movement:</th>
<th>Sharing resources:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The final survey with community leaders found that they used conflict management tools related to land management.</td>
<td>The final survey of participants found that 73% indicated that they “actually did interact ‘frequently’ with members of other ethnic communities and 90% said they interacted ‘sometimes’ or ‘frequently.’ This was a vast improvement over the 37% in the baseline survey who were willing to interact.”</td>
<td>Based on a focus group discussion (FGD) question asking whether individuals avoided certain areas during the day or at night, half of the groups said that there was a significant decrease in people reporting that they avoided areas over the midterm assessment. Building Bridges to Peace [p. 6]</td>
<td>The final survey for the evaluation found that the target population shared resources (grazing area, farm land) across conflicting parties significantly more after the project. Building Bridges to Peace [p. 6]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second most common type of change was attitudinal change, with six projects catalyzing five different attitudinal changes (see Table 4). The respective evaluations found that participants had:

- Increased their trust in people from the other side of the conflict [2/10]
- Experienced empathy and listened to the other sides’ views [2/10]
- Were willing to interact with/visit people from the other side of the conflict [2/10]
- Desired to stay involved with conflict issues [1/10]

Table 4: Illustrative Examples of Attitudinal Changes from the Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increased trust:</th>
<th>Listening to the other side:</th>
<th>Willing to interact with people from the other side of the conflict:</th>
<th>Increased commitment to be involved with conflict issues:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nine of 10 FGDs cited increased trust in others and the evaluation survey of the target population and non-target population found a significant decrease in target population reporting that they never trust people from other side of conflict as compared to baseline and an increase in people reporting that they sometimes trust others. Building Bridges to Peace [p. 6]</td>
<td>Surveys of participants found that audience members “emphasized that they have become more tolerant and patient now.” Youth Theater for Peace [p. 31]</td>
<td>The evaluation survey found that “Almost all respondents (98.6%) reported that they would be willing to interact with the conflicting community in the future.” All nine focus groups with participants indicated that there is a benefit to interacting with the conflicting community. Building Bridges to Peace [p. 6]</td>
<td>One of the surveys asked participants, delegation leaders, and parents about a cluster of behavior traits “that the SOP experience might influence in a positive direction.” 53% of seeds responded to the line “commitment to stay involved with issues of coexistence.” Seeds of Peace [p. 22]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three evaluations indicated that their projects had catalyzed knowledge changes. The changes are summarized in this report as:
• Understanding policies [2/10]
• Understanding the root causes of conflict [2/10]
• Understanding conflict-resolution tactics [1/10]
• Decreased perceptions of violence in the community [1/10]

Table 5: Illustrative Examples of Knowledge Changes from the Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understand policies:</th>
<th>Understanding conflict-resolution tactics:</th>
<th>Perceptions of violence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-test with participants that asked questions about current policies in a true/false format found that “the population seems to have basic information on the repatriation process and the elections.” Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation [p. 29]</td>
<td>Survey of radio listeners asked whether they had improved knowledge of strategies and opportunities for collaborative conflict resolution through the shows. The overwhelming majority said that their knowledge had improved. Focus group participants validated this. Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation [p. 16]</td>
<td>Evaluation survey found that people reported that incidents of violence had decreased over the midterm. Building Bridges to Peace [p. 25]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four of the evaluations indicated that their projects catalyzed skills changes, with two of them citing multiple skills changes. The changes were:

• Local authorities are able to use participatory approaches [1/10]
• Development of leadership skills [1/10]
• Ability to communicate about conflict issues in an open and balanced way [1/10]
• Ability to resolve interpersonal conflicts peacefully [1/10]
• Media literacy [1/10]

Table 6: Illustrative Examples of Skills Changes from the Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communicating about conflict issues in an open and balanced way:</th>
<th>Understanding the root causes of conflict:</th>
<th>Media literacy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surveys of theater audiences asked community members whether they were able to speak about conflict issues in an open and balanced way, 60% of adults and 66% of youth were able to speak in an open and balanced way. Youth Theater for Peace [p. 29]</td>
<td>51.3% of local partners engaged via programming were “better equipped to understand the root causes of conflict.” Conflict Mitigation Project [p. 25]</td>
<td>One of the Seeds of Peace evaluations (unspecified in report) found that “53% [of participants] were now much more critical in reading the newspaper or listening to the news.” Seeds of Peace [p. 1]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One functioning change, which legislative measures put into action, was noted [1/10]. Based on interviews conducted in country, the Peace Support Program evaluation found that the project obtained the first ever protection order for a victim of domestic violence.
Annexes

Annex A: Extended Methodology Section

1. Meta-evaluation data collection and analysis methodology:

The Assessment team used a document analysis of the evaluation reports to assess the quality of the methodology and products of P2P evaluations, per the terms for this project.

To compile and analyze the evaluation reports, the Assessment team assessed the documents against the agreed upon standards, creating an analysis template in Excel. In order to ensure that the both team members shared common interpretations of each standard, they conducted an initial review of the same evaluation and then discussed their respective findings. One consequence of the joint review process was that it presented an opportunity to clarify and strengthen the analysis template; the Assessment team added notes on key interpretations into the standards listings, and revisited the initial evaluation accordingly. Next, the team reviewed the evaluations, sorting and categorizing findings in the Excel template. They used the analysis template to translate the evaluation reports contents into comparable information that they could use to draw conclusions across the sample.

2. Meta-analysis data collection and analysis methodology:

The Assessment team used the same dataset as the meta-evaluation to identify the cross-cutting lessons learned on implementing P2P programming and results of P2P programming for the meta-analysis. The team mined the evaluations for lessons learned about implementation, paying particular attention to the “lessons learned” sections but also incorporating information about implementation that was discussed in the findings and conclusion sections of the evaluation reports. The criteria for including implementation information in the analysis were that the information was either: 1) applicable beyond the immediate implementation context or 2) central to essential aspects of programming. Statements that were vague to the extent that they are not actionable were not included because of their lack of utility. For example, the statement “organizational management and external sociopolitical conditions affect the quality effectiveness of programming” was not included because it was not specific enough to be usefully inform policy and future programming. The rationale for this filtering criteria was that inapplicable and tangential statements would have limited utility in informing future programming decisions.

In a similar process, the Assessment team read the reports and extracted concrete changes that had been effected as a result of programming in order to compile the results of P2P programming. These were then analyzed and organized according to type of change.

3. Evaluation team:

The team was composed of two consultants. See Annex 2 for Assessment team biographies.

4. The sample:

Originally, 31 mid-term and final evaluations were listed. Social Impact withdrew six because they were final reports, not evaluation reports. That left Besa with 25 eligible evaluations; of those, one was in Spanish and another was only nine pages long which was deemed to contain an insufficient level of analysis and nuance. Both were removed. That left 23 eligible evaluations. Of those, eight were mid-term evaluations and 15 were final evaluations. Of the eight mid-terms, three evaluated projects that were also covered by final evaluations. As including the same project twice would not aid the aims of the meta-analysis, the Assessment team ruled out those three mid-term evaluations (but kept the final evaluations in the running). This elimination process left Besa with 20 eligible evaluations: five mid-term and 15 final evaluations. Given the time allocated for this project and the average length of the report

Developmental Evaluative Learning Review: Synthesis Report
Chapter 3: Meta-Evaluation and Meta-Analysis of USAID/CMM P2P Program Evaluations

113
(e.g. 40 pages), the evaluators proposed assessing 10 evaluations, half of the eligible pool of evaluations, selected at random from geographic clusters: North Africa, Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe). One reason for doing was that a larger sample size of similar products would strengthen the synthesis because there is one less variable. SI and CMM agreed with this sample.

The final pool of 15 evaluations included 1 in Asia, 1 in North Africa, 1 in Middle East, 2 in Europe and 10 in Africa. From that pool the Asia, North Africa and Middle East evaluations were added to the sample. The team flipped a coin to determine which one of the two European programs and used the field method to select 6 of the 10 Africa programs.

5. Limitations:

This meta-evaluation was limited to a review of evaluation reports. It did not include reviews of either evaluation inception reports or interviews with evaluators and stakeholders. As such, the team was not able to assess the evaluations against a full range of standards, as found in USAID’s Meta-evaluation Checklist. In particular they were not be able to comment on the evaluations’ processes or impacts.

The majority of the reports did not include Scopes of Work (SOW) for the evaluations. Without information about how much time was allocated, the evaluation objectives or lines of inquiry, the consumers’ ability to assess the quality of the evaluations was hindered.

Due to time constraints, the Assessment process included few steps to facilitate and enable use of the meta-evaluation and meta-analysis; this meant that others needed to take a lead on ensuring use.

6. Standards Selection:

To improve the flow of the report, the Assessment team lightly reorganized the original Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports standards. Additionally, the team added several standards to the list and expanded on some of the concepts. As the standards listed in the checklist were intended to be applicable to all types of USAID programming, the team incorporated emergent standards from the field of peacebuilding into the standards used for this meta-evaluation to align with the nature of the programming and CMM’s focus. The rationale behind this decision was that as the programming assessed in the evaluations took place in conflict and post-conflict settings, strong evaluations would reflect conflict considerations.

Additionally, as the checklist was geared towards assessing evaluation reports, it contained limited references to evaluation processes like methodology and analysis, which would enable the team to assess the quality and accuracy of the evaluation methodologies. To fill this gap, the Assessment team added criteria from USAID’s Program Evaluations Meta-evaluation Checklist. To select these criteria, the team reviewed all of the accuracy standards in the checklist and eliminated standards that were redundant with content and that were not feasible given that the data sources for the meta-evaluation were limited to the evaluation reports. The Assessment users were included in the final decision regarding standards and agreed that adding accuracy criteria from the aforementioned checklist would strengthen the utility of the meta-evaluation.

**Standards Added to the Checklist:**

**Emergent Standards from the Field of Peacebuilding:**

Is the evaluation process conflict and gender sensitive?

Is a conflict analysis appropriately incorporated into the assessment of relevance or effectiveness?

Did the evaluation design enable learning?

**Standards from USAID’s Program Evaluations Meta-evaluation Checklist:**
Stufflebeam A1
Have the program’s side effects been identified and reported?
Have plausible alternative explanations of the findings been reported?
Are conclusions focused directly on the evaluation questions?

Stufflebeam A2
Has information about how each data collection procedure was scored, analyzed and interpreted been documented?

Stufflebeam A3
Is the reliability of an instrument reported? Including assessing and reporting factors that influenced the reliability, characteristics of the examinees, data collection conditions and evaluator’s biases? Are reliability problems acknowledged?

Stufflebeam A6
Does the evaluation design use procedures appropriate for the evaluation questions and the nature of the data?
Annex B: Assessment Team Biographies

Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church has been a Lecturer in Human Security at The Fletcher School since 2006. She teaches a series of modules on Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation for Peacebuilding and International Development, a course on Advanced Evaluation and Learning for International Organizations, and a course on Corruption in Conflict Environments. A practitioner-scholar, Cheyanne is the Founder of Besa: Catalyzing Strategic Change, a social enterprise innovating approaches to context analysis and program design, monitoring and evaluation in places experiencing conflict and structural or overt physical violence. Besa specializes in program design derived from systems-based analysis, quality evaluations, rigorous meta-evaluations, and creating assessment, design, monitoring and evaluation systems and structures, as well as building capacity in design, monitoring and evaluation. At Besa, Cheyanne has worked extensively with a wide range of organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE International, Revenue Watch Institute, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, UN Mission in Liberia, the International Development Research Centre, Open Society Foundation, the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, USAID, and the U.S. Department of State.

For the past 15 years, Cheyanne has published extensively on evaluation and peacebuilding, the corruption-conflict nexus, single identity work and policy impact on conflict issues. Her publications include Peacebuilding Evaluation: Not Yet All it Could Be, as part of the Berghoff Handbook for Conflict Transformation; Designing for Results, a practitioner focused manual on design, monitoring and evaluation for peacebuilding funded by USIP; NGOS at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policy in Areas of Conflict, published by Roman & Littlefield, which she co-edited with Professor Mari Fitzduff; and Mind the Gap—Policy Development and Research on Conflict Issues, published by INCORE.

Prior to her current roles, Cheyanne was the West Africa Liaison for the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project of Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), which seeks to improve the effectiveness of peace practice. In this role, Cheyanne worked with the UN Peacebuilding Fund and peacebuilding agencies in Liberia to improve the results of their programming. Cheyanne served as the Director of Institutional Learning at Search for Common Ground (SFCG) where she led the organization’s work to incorporate design, monitoring and evaluation into programming to transform the way the world deals with conflict in 26 countries around the world. Before SFCG, Cheyanne was the Director of Policy and Evaluation at INCORE in Northern Ireland, a research institute that seeks to blend policy and practice to find new answers to violent conflict.

Lillie Ris specializes in research, and program assessment, design and evaluation. She has seven years of experience in program management, including four years of field experience in the Middle East/North Africa where she implemented programming in the areas civil society strengthening, gender, and youth and rural development. As a program manager in Jordan, she developed monitoring tools for USAID and U.S. Department of State programming and led a use-oriented program evaluation. The recipient of a Fulbright Fellowship, she has significant experience conducting independent field research. Lillie is a member of the American Evaluation Association and has received specialized training in evaluation in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings.
Annex C: Meta-analysis: List of Lessons Learned/Tips/Comments from the Evaluations

[Note that the evaluation report is included at the beginning of the paragraph and the page number for the quote is included at the end of the paragraph.]

Participant sex/age

- Reconciliation for Divided Communities: “More older people (85%) than younger people (70%) reported that they had observed a difference in perception from the public in terms of accepting them as conflict managers. Here SFCG defined “young people” as persons between 30-40 and “older people” as over 50. Most chiefs of the villages in the target localities are in the “older” range. The practice in most of the regions is for youth (ages 18-30) to be invited as passive observes to these forums so that they will learn from the experiences of older generation. Hence, youth often do not get a chance to use their skills and express their knowledge and associated with resolving conflicts. Another factor is that older people may consider themselves more knowledgeable in conflict resolution because they are often called to participate in community decision making, which could skew the result reported in their favor.” (7)

- Reconciliation for Divided Communities: “When disaggregated by gender, more men (84%) than women (71%) seemed to be perceived as skilful conflict managers. This could be explained by the fact that traditionally in the patriarchal communities, such as those under study, men are the ones asked to engage in conflict resolution forums.” (7)

- Reconciliation for Divided Communities: men (36%) reported that they had discussed conflicts with counterparts in other communities compared with 25% of female respondents. “This could indicate that older people and men—particularly older men—were most likely to have an opportunity to visit other community leaders and learn from their mediation experiences than youth who would be engaged in an academic or livelihood programs, or women of any age who are the primary caretakers of the households in these communities.” (8)

- Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation: The difference in urban and rural radio listenership rates “can be explained by the poverty and isolation of households in rural areas, where they sometimes do not have access to a radio receptor whereas in town, people have enough money to buy one or can listen to the radio in public places.” (12)

- Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation: Women listen to the radio at a lower rate than men (40.5% as opposed to 52.9%), “this can be explained by the fact that Burundian women have less time to listen to the radio because of domestic tasks, or cannot access it when their husband is home.” (12)

- Youth Theater for Peace: “Attract more adult audience members to Forum Theater performances, in order for the DCT methodology to have a wider impact.” (11)

- Youth Theater for Peace: “Most of the sustainability projects try to include students of younger ages (13-15 years old). The leaders of sustainability projects believe that thus they can ensure longer sustainability of the DCT methodology. These new younger participants will be involved in Drama Clubs and Forum Theater Groups for 3-4 years before leaving the school. They will have enough time to develop their own skills and then transfer their DCT skills to other new participants before leaving the school.” (53)

- Conflict Mitigation: “Although women were included in almost all trainings (the exceptions being the Imam Mosque training and the conflict management training for companions of teachers from Al-Jawf), activities were not specifically designed for their role in conflict or its management. Although
one of the project objectives identified women as a key target group “To utilize women’s role in tribal society to empower them to contribute to the prevention of conflicts in the community,” activities mainstreamed them into project activities. Additionally, only eight of the 38 CBOs were female organizations. While including women in project interventions is important in conservative areas, this is insufficient to “empower” them.” (21)

- **Conflict Mitigation**: Work directly with opinion shapers in communities that have an accepted role in conflict management. This could include working with Mosque Imams, sheikhs and entities such as local councils. (33)

- **Conflict Mitigation**: Engage youth and even children directly in project activities in a consistent and measurable way. This should include involving young people in designing, implementing and following up on project activities. Incorporate a youth mainstreaming approach rather than just a project add-on. (33)

- **Conflict Mitigation**: Develop more specific gender investments. Rather than just ensuring that women are included in all trainings, design activities that directly address the unique role they play in conflict (both positive and negative). For example, work with *waithat* (female religious leaders) and tribal women that are well respected and whom other women seek advice from. (33)

- **Building Bridges**: Youth need to be more involved in dialogues/exchanges

- **Building Bridges**: gap between regular individuals and those who represent community at dialogues needs to be mitigated

**NGO/INGO Coordination**

- **Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation**: “The capacity-building activities on conflict management provided by SFCG, ADRA and ACCORD have had positive accumulating effects. SFCG worked with the other organization to prevent duplication of activities and to ensure that overall the different projects would be complementary.” (18)

- **Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland**: “Pact needs to engage with other organizations that may not be focused on conflict prevention and reconciliation per se, but whose activities impact on the overall environment—such as those focused on rangeland, education or health and nutrition…” (12)

**Programming Tactics (languages to use, tools or methods)**

- **Rift Valley**: “In our experience through Kenya and East Africa, we have found that most Kenyans have a strong oral tradition and are “aural” learners who learn by listening and then by doing—not by reading.” (5)

- **Rift Valley**: Cost of participating in peace dialogues—evaluation report recommends looking at average costs for travel and food expenses (11) Peace Commission members needed more financial support for multiple trips to conflicted groups. “While [participants] reported that the dialogue process worked well, it was strenuous and demanded time away from their income generating work and required expense money beyond that supplied by the LEAP program. There was a sense of “fatigue” with the work from some participants who had attended several dialogues…. MCK Staff reported that in their opinion the DPC’s expenses for travel and dialogues were appropriate and more than enough to cover local travel allowing participants a little something for their labor.” (10)

- **Peace Support Program**: payment of honoraria to participants calls into question the commitment and motivation of the recipients

- **Rift Valley**
- Rift Valley Local Empowerment: Youth Theater for Peace: The lessons learned by local partners showed that the DCT (Drama for Conflict Transformation) tools and methods could be effectively used in other programs and projects, including conflict prevention programs as well as other programs aimed at youth development and empowerment. (57)

- Promoting Locally-Driven Conflict Transformation: Advertise radio programming schedule

- Peace Support Program: Computer-based communication processes proved to be somewhat misguided

- Peace Support Program: Make sure technology introduced through programming is appropriate for intended users

- Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland: “Instead of beginning with infrastructure support to a tourism site, initial activities could have focused more on training and assistance with financial planning.” (22)

**Donor Policy**

- Peace Support Program: Make sure the embassy is fully engaged in and supportive of USAID programs that address the conflict or other political sensitive issues. (34)

- Peace Support Program: Ensure that DG and OTI programs are made more complementary and mutually reinforcing, cross-program complementarity and synergy are rarely among the highest priorities of USAID offices and their implementing partners.

- Peace Support Program: USAID and partners need to invest the time and money to produce good trainers and facilitators.

- Rift Valley: Bureaucracy involving U.S. environmental and approval standards constrained conflict litigation projects using traditional Kenyan methods that for the most part were environmentally beneficial or used standard Kenyan processes. (28)

- Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland: USAID should support coordination of actors in the field “at home” “to ensure that, at minimum, USAID-supported programs are supporting one another and thereby having the potential for great multiplier effects.” (27)

**Design-Technical**

- Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation: “The project has a few conceptual weaknesses—indicators that were not easily measurable. Although it is understood that indicators for conflict transformation are based on opinions and perceptions, these indicators could have been improved. Indicators were only created for results and the global objective, not for intermediate objectives.” (11)

- Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation: a “weakness lies in the fact that no baseline study was conducted, making it more difficult to assess the specific impact of the project.” (12)

- Peace in the Casamance: A good diagnosis of the situation in the intervention zone.

- Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland: intra-governmental dynamic with different levels of government conflicting with each other “A fuller assessment of governmental interests, dynamics and resource divisions could have perhaps prompted examination…not only look at community conflicts, but various other dynamics, between governmental offices both horizontally and vertically, and between community and various government offices…” (20)

- Peace Support Program: USAID and partners need a satisfactory set of indicators and other measures to usefully track processes such as peace processes, legal empowerment, etc.
• Conflict Mitigation: “The project results framework could have been stronger. There was a lack of clarity about the relationship between project goals, sub-goals, strategic objectives and indicators...All indicators in the monitoring plan were performance indicators, with no attempt to articulate impact indicators.” (15)

• Conflict Mitigation: Develop and maintain a project database that tracks all indicators and is developed to reflect the project results framework.

• Conflict Mitigation: Conduct research into the root causes of conflict in targeted project areas, as this is essential in designing activities for high impact at the individual, institutional and community levels. (33)

Duration:

• Reconciliation for Divided Communities: in some communities “trained participants seemed to have been perceived as better conflict managers because SFCG conducted more peace related activities and had remained in those communities with higher percentages for a longer time than in those communities with lower figures.” (6)

• Conflict Mitigation: Training and skills building interventions should be longer to deepen the impact (most CMP trainings were only three days long). Additionally, all trainings should have participants commit themselves to practical actions and then have project follow up activities. Training participants from local CBOs should target fewer numbers and more strategically select organizations and individuals. (33)

• Peace Support Program: 2.5 year timeframe is unrealistic to promote policy reform.

• Rift Valley: Cash for work projects got youth started working together but ended too soon. However, they served as the basis for forming many Self-Help Groups. (28)

Relevance

• Promoting Locally Driven Transformation: “most conflicts in the communities arise between family members. Conflicts related to theft and land conflicts come in second and third position. To manage these conflicts, people primarily use mediation, but also resort to tribunals and the administration when necessary.” (32)

• Rift Valley: Economic breakdown was a strong motivator to getting conflicting communities to talk as they began to realize that they needed each other to deliver goods and services to the community at reasonable prices and as customers and suppliers. (28)

• Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland: “Once the pastoralists realized that they could benefit from the Park’s preservation, they became more included to work with Park management.” (19)

• Conflict Mitigation: Provide substantial tangible investments in communities that address real and pressing development needs (i.e. in water, education, health). While training and spreading awareness are critical aspects of promoting peace, this should be accompanied by relevant and related development interventions. For example, water is currently a cause of many conflicts and Yemen’s water crisis will only continue to increase in the future. Therefore, development interventions that promote conservation and water efficiency are desperately needed and could be combined with conflict mitigation training and awareness activities.

Factors that limit effectiveness

• Peace Support Program: policy reform programs will be limited in impact absent influential champions for decentralization and local government reform.
• **Youth Theater for Peace**: Multiplication of program benefits can get diluted. “There is a certain shortcoming in ‘uncontrolled’ multiplication. According to the program staff, when new Drama Clubs and Forum Theater Groups adapt DCT methodology it often becomes ‘softer,’ touching mostly the problems of youth (such as conflicts between school children, racketeering, ‘bad’ behavior of schoolchildren, and parent/child conflicts), but not deep and serious conflict issues within communities (such as interethnic tensions and conflicts, and conflicts around access to water and land resources). Thus, the methodology has little impact on the community members’ attitudes and behaviors towards such ‘serious’ conflict issues. The reason for making DCT methodology ‘softer’ and avoiding serious conflicts …is that such conflicts are considered politically sensitive in Tajikistan. Therefore, new Drama Clubs and Forum Theater troupes prefer not to touch such issues.” (34)

**Neutrality**

• **Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland**: “Given the Gnangatom’s likely knowledge of Pact’s interventions with the Kara community, it is conceivable that Pact’s image as an independent and neutral facilitator/mediator may be brought into question.” (15)

• **Seeds of Peace**: “For Palestinian Seeds, the issue of accessibility to the Center’s programs is also a strong factor in their views of the Center’s balance. For the last four years of the Intifada…physical access to the Center became severely restricted for Palestinian Seed…most joint programming was conducted in Israeli areas and required the Palestinians to obtain special permits.” (12)

**Project Staffing Considerations**

• **Conflict Mitigation**: “During the project tenure the Country Director for ADRA was Nagi Khalil who is a native Arabic speaker, familiar with Arab culture. This leadership was particularly important for CMP, due to the conservative nature of the project areas and his ability to interact with project beneficiaries” (13) Recruit project management personnel that have an in-depth knowledge of the culture and development context in Yemen with adequate Arabic language skills (at minimum verbal proficiency). Additionally, such an individual should have experience and training in conflict management. These are basic requirements in an initiative addressing conflict at the community level and in working in complex project areas that have high levels of conflict and violence. (33)

• **Conflict Mitigation**: “Responsibilities for project implementation were divided between four Project Coordinators (two males and two females) providing a model of gender equity and facilitating achieving priorities. (13)

• **Conflict Mitigation**: A number of team members were from the project areas. This lent credibility to ADRA as an international organization working in complex areas of Yemen on a sensitive issue like conflict. This legitimacy also greatly facilitated community engagement in the targeted areas” (13) “hiring two coordinators based in the communities (Amran and Ma’rib) and utilizing the ADRA office in Sa’adah ensured that project activities continued, even when Sana’a-based CMP team members had difficulty in traveling there.” (17)

**Working with CBOs/Local Governance Bodies**

• **Peace Support Program**: Place more emphasis on strengthening transparency and curbing corruption; there was little accountability with SAPI and One Text and organizational issues went unaddressed. (30)

• **Rift Valley**: YCK’s two executive leaders are ineffective, untrustworthy, lack transparency in every area, and do not really represent the local grassroots YCK groups and leaders. (28)

• **Peace Support Program**: build competencies and self-confidence of women in Local Authorities. (30)
Promoting Locally Driven: Programming to support a local land commission was successful due to the experience acquired by CNTB members through training sessions, including those organized by SFCG on conflict mitigation; the balanced composition of CNTB staff which gives them legitimacy among different groups in the communities; and the financial means allocated to the commission, which enabled staff members to visit the contested land. (32)

Youth Theater for Peace: IREX support to CBOs (management training, grants support) stimulated a rapid increase in the partner’s organizational capacity. (58)

Youth Theater for Peace: local implementing partners lacked M&E competencies and “were responsible for gathering data for PMEP and specific indicators, but did not clearly understand why they needed to gather certain data.” “The partners were not involved and/or consulted during development of the indicators and monitoring and evaluation plan/mechanisms.” Local partners were not trained and were asked to use tools they did not understand. This limited their participation and their capacity. (36)

Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland: “Special recognition should also be made of the existence and vital role that traditional community “peace makers” are playing in some communities in the CR process—they are providing essential, quick-response first-tier assistance at some community and woreda levels.” (11)

Conflict Mitigation: Clarify reporting (narrative and financial) requirements with local project implementation partners including providing templates. (33)

Conflict Mitigation: Efforts should be invested to strengthen and formalize coalitions of CBOs at the community level to work together to address issues of conflict and foster a culture of peace and tolerance. For example, such investments could build on the experience of the CMP small grants in Munnabeh and Barat Al-Marashi which brought together all CBO partners in the areas (12 and 13 respectively) to cooperate in establishing a youth empowerment association. Such collaborative interactions are desperately needed in Yemeni civil society (although admittedly difficult to achieve) to develop advocacy and policy level impact on an issue as urgent as conflict management. (33)

Peace Support Program: Avoid creating new, non-organic organizations, if it cannot be avoided ensure that it has top-flight leadership and adequate oversight of management. (15)

Peace Support Program: The creation of too many committees can become “an administrative disaster.” (15)

Peace Support Program: Reliance on consensual decision making became problematic. (15)

Community Participation/Buy-In

Reconciliation Cote: “a key lesson learnt has been the need to improve community mobilization in order to enhance the effectiveness of its initiatives.” (9)

Stability For Ethiopia’s Lowland: "There must be 'community buy-in' and commitment for there to be successful and sustainable natural resource recovery and preservation programs." (18)

Conflict Mitigation: Small grants investments hold great potential for sustainability, though they should be implemented in a timely manner so that sufficient follow up is allowed to ensure their stability and impact. This is a solid investment that can provide communities with the kind of material support that is so desperately needed. They allow communities to design their own investments and so have high levels of community ownership. (30)
Annex D: Besa Assessment Proposal

Proposal: CMM People-to-People Meta-evaluation & Meta-analysis

June 17, 2013
Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church and Lillie Ris (referred to as Besa)

1. Purpose of Assignment
The assignment has two distinct elements: a meta-evaluation and a meta-analysis of program and results findings of People-to-People (P2P) programming. The purpose of both is to inform future P2P design, update P2P Guidelines and identify best practices.

Meta-evaluation: Assess the quality of the methodologies and products (evaluation reports) of P2P evaluations.

Driving Questions:
- What methodologies have been used? We define methodology broadly, to include evaluation purpose, audience, criteria, approach and data collection.
- Using evaluation standards, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation methodologies and products?
- What recommendations can we make for improving the methodology and products of evaluations?

Meta-analysis: Identify the cross-cutting lessons learned in P2P programming

Driving Questions:
Our ability to answer these questions will be based on how extensively each evaluation addressed relevant issues. Therefore these driving questions should be understood to be aspirational.
- What can we learn about how to implement an effective P2P program? For instance, what are common challenges or tactics that have worked best?
- What can we learn about how well P2P programs are delivering results?

2. Audience:
- Social Impact developmental evaluation team
- David, Rebekah and Joe Hewitt, CMM

3. Our Working Assumptions
- The evaluations provided in the excel document comprise all available evaluations that CMM has conducted in the area of P2P programming. CMM has not pre-sampled and there are no means of obtaining a broader collection.
There is only one evaluation that was conducted by Social Impact, and given that Besa is separate from Social Impact, there are no conflict of interest concerns.

The substance of this assignment will be based entirely on evaluation reports, with the associated limitations.

SI will handle all logistics involved in organizing meetings with the Learning Group or CMM.

Besa will be part of all substantive conversations with CMM about this assignment.

4. Proposed Process

This listing lays out the steps in the process that we propose to undertake. It should be noted that the ten day total time allocation for the assignment does not allow for very much interactive or 'developmental' type engagement with CMM during the process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps:</th>
<th>Actors:</th>
<th>Deadlines:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Draft assignment proposal</td>
<td>Besa</td>
<td>May 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discuss draft assignment proposal with CMM</td>
<td>Besa, SI, CMM</td>
<td>June 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Update proposal including standards and framework</td>
<td>Besa</td>
<td>June 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Discuss process, standards and framework with CMM and Learning Group and possible prioritization of standards</td>
<td>Besa, SI, CMM, Learning Group</td>
<td>June 24 or 25</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Select evaluations to include</td>
<td>Besa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Analyze evaluations</td>
<td>Besa</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Draft report</td>
<td>Besa</td>
<td>August 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Discuss report with CMM</td>
<td>Besa, SI, CMM</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Finalize report</td>
<td>Besa</td>
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4.1. Standards for Meta-evaluation

See Annex 1: Selecting the Evaluations and Selecting Standards

4.2 Potential Framework for the Meta-analysis

The framework would focus on two areas: How to Implement P2P Programming and Results from P2P Programming. Against these two areas we suggest that we categorize the evidence from the evaluation findings in ways that indicate the degree of agreement across the evaluations (e.g. significant agreement, modest agreement) as well as identifying whether any of the evaluations’ findings contradicted each other.

4.3 Selecting Evaluations

See Annex 1: Selecting the Evaluations and Selecting Standards

5. Limitations

- We will not have access to either evaluation inception reports or interviews with evaluators and stakeholders. As such, we will not be able to assess the evaluations against a full range of standards; in particular we will not be able to comment on the evaluations’ processes or impacts.
Due to time constraints, our process includes few steps to facilitate and enable use of the meta-evaluation and meta-analysis. This will mean that others need to take a lead on ensuring use.

6. Deliverable

Besa will produce a written report, not to exceed 20 pages, that contains strong citations and links to the evaluations reviewed. The draft report will be delivered to Social Impact on August 12, 2013. The final report will be delivered to CMM on (insert final report dates).

Annex I: Selecting the Evaluations and Selecting Standards

Selecting the Evaluations:
Besa did a cursory review of all of the evaluations provided by CMM and found that over one third were not suitable for inclusion in this assignment. The description below walks through our process and offer two options for consideration.

- Originally, 31 mid-term and final evaluations were listed.
- Social Impact withdrew six because they were final reports, not evaluation reports. That left Besa with 25 eligible evaluations.
- Of those 25, one was in Spanish and another was only nine pages long which were deemed to contain an insufficient level of analysis and nuance. Both were removed.
- That left 23 eligible evaluations. Of those, eight are mid-term evaluations and fifteen are final evaluations. Of the eight mid-terms, three evaluate projects also covered by final evaluations. As including the same project twice would not aid the aims of the meta-analysis, we ruled out those three mid-term evaluations (but kept the final evaluations in the running).
- That left Besa with 20 eligible evaluations: five mid-term and fifteen final evaluations. Given the time allocated for this project and the average length of the report (e.g. 40 pages), we propose reading ten evaluations, half of the eligible pool of evaluations.
- There are two options for how we could select them:
  1. Assess five mid-term evaluations and five final evaluations (selected at random from the fifteen)
     - Pros: Provides insight into both mid-term and final evaluations.
     - Cons: Dividing the pool between mid-term and final evaluations means that we will be working with two small groups of evaluations; if the type of evaluation results in very different conclusions, it will be difficult to come up with general lessons. Ultimately, it comes down to whether CMM is comfortable making decisions based on two small groups of evaluations.
  2. Assess ten final evaluations (selected at random from the fifteen)
     - Pros: A larger sample size of similar products strengthens the synthesis because there is one less variable.
     - Cons: We will not be able to assess the mid-term evaluations.
- We had originally thought that it would be possible to sample the evaluations based on geography and conflict type, but given how small the pool has become, that idea is not feasible. Our preference is to work with ten final evaluations.

Selecting the Standards:

There are a number of possible USAID and non-AID standards that could be utilized in this meta-evaluation. After reviewing several, the USAID Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation
Reports and the Meta-evaluation Checklist (C-2) were both deemed strong options. The pros and cons of each option, as well as our preference, are included below.

1. **Use a reduced version of the Meta-evaluation Checklist that reflects the fact that we have access to the evaluation reports only.** (See the attached document.)
   - **Pros:** The level of detail is very comprehensive.
   - **Cons:** We would not be able to use the scoring system because so many aspects of the sub-standards are not applicable given our exclusive focus on the evaluation reports. Additionally, the language of the standards is more technical and less approachable. Finally, we would need to further reduce this list by prioritizing these standards to reflect the scope of the assignment.

2. **Use the Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports with an expanded Scope and Methodology section that engages with the quality of the methodology.**
   - **Pros:** This tool is tailored to our data sources and is more accessible to the meta-evaluation audience.
   - **Cons:** It runs the risk of focusing too much on components of the report itself; we would need to be mindful of assessing overall quality.
   - **Our current sense is that with some additions to the Scope and Methodology section of the Reports Checklist this set of standards offers a more feasible, directly applicable and accessible option.
CHAPTER 4: FIELD STUDY
USAID/WEST BANK GAZA PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT GRANTS

Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study USAID/West Bank Gaza People-to-Person Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants

This publication was produced for USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in Washington, D.C. and the USAID/West Bank Gaza Mission under Contract No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00046. It was produced by Ned Lazarus, Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Maya Kahanoff, and Fakhira Halloun of Social Impact.

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development nor the United States Government.
Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study
USAID/West Bank Gaza People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants

This document (Report No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00046) is available through the Development Experience Clearing House (http://dec.usaid.gov). Additional information can be obtained from:

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Photo Source: Ned Lazarus, SI Team Leader.
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The team would like to thank David Hunsicker and Rebekah Krimmel, the Contracting Officer’s Representatives from CMM, who provided guidance in Washington and accompanied us in the Middle East, making crucial contributions to the project at all stages. The team would also like to thank the staff of the USAID/West Bank Gaza Mission offices in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and the US Embassy in Tel Aviv for receiving us graciously, and taking time to provide us with valuable information and direction in the field. In addition, the team would like to thank the former USAID Mission Director, Mike Harvey, for his time and insight. Additionally, the team would like to recognize CMM’s admirable spirit of reflective practice and self-scrutiny evidenced by commissioning and supporting this evaluation.

We are grateful to Kelly Heindel Skeith, Mathias Kjaer, Gabrielle Plotkin, and Lee Briggs of Social Impact, Inc., for their collegiality and comprehensive support through the entire evaluation process. We also wish to thank Cate Broussard and Justin Guo for their important voluntary contributions to data analysis and drafting, and Aya Mana’a, our team logistician, for her dedication in providing the team with essential logistical and administrative support in the field.

Finally, we would like to thank the Palestinian and Israeli directors and staff of more than two dozen APS-funded projects, whom we met in the course of our research. They were open and generous with us at every turn, sharing their time and decades’ worth of experience and expertise. It is our hope that our work here will contribute, in a meaningful way, to theirs.
## Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Annual Program Statement</td>
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<td>ATC</td>
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<td>Fixed Obligation Grant</td>
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Executive Summary

Introduction

Since 2004, the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in Washington has held an annual Reconciliation Program Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The Fund is a Congressional appropriation to support local-level “people-to-people” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs, and has grown from an initial award pool of $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million specifically allocated for programs in Israel/West Bank/Gaza (IWBG). To date, the APS has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries. Grants range from $500,000 to $1.2 million for projects of 12-36 months in duration; smaller Fixed Obligation Grants (FOGs) also offer up to $100,000 for short-term projects.57

As defined in CMM’s People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, P2P reconciliation programs operate based on the Theory of Change (ToC) that in “communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities…strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.”58 APS projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political affiliations from areas of conflict. They provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust, and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recently ended conflict.

Project Descriptions

In the IWBG region, the APS program has distributed $42.7 million worth of grants since 2004, to fund 60 P2P projects implemented by 42 different organizations, reaching tens of thousands of beneficiaries. Projects selected employ a wide range of intervention approaches and engage a variety of target populations, reflecting the diversity of the Israeli/Palestinian peacebuilding field and CMM’s pluralistic definition of “P2P” work.59 Grantee approaches range from civil society activism, dialogue, economic development, education, empowerment of youth, women and minorities, environmental peacebuilding, human rights and issue advocacy, media, psychosocial work and trauma healing, research, sport, and technological cooperation.

57 CMM Annual Program Statement Call for Proposals 2012 (henceforth APS FY 2012); “Important APS Milestones,” draft document provided to evaluation team by CMM.
59 “There is no single solution to resolving violent conflict.” (P2P Program Guide, p. 7)
**Evaluation Purpose**

Beginning in the fall of 2011, Social Impact, Inc. (SI) began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under APS. The objectives of this review are not only to learn about the APS programs themselves, but also to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the developmental evaluation methodology.

CMM APS managers commissioned this IWBG field evaluation as the first of three separate regional evaluations designed to inform a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of the global APS program—the second evaluation took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2012, and the third in Burundi during summer 2013. The primary purpose for these field evaluations is to advance CMM and broader Agency learning about how to effectively design, implement, and manage APS-type projects in the future. They are intended to analyze how program designs and implementation respond to significant contextual factors and conflict drivers in order to inform more responsive and relevant grant making in the future. The primary audience for this evaluation report is CMM, but the target audience also includes the local USAID Mission, local APS grantees, and scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding.

**Research Methods and Evaluation Questions/Area of Inquiry**

Evaluation design and conduct were guided by the principles of Developmental Evaluation (DE), an approach designed “to inform and support innovative and adaptive development in complex, dynamic environments.” As such, DE is well suited to the study of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding initiatives during a period of profound political upheaval in the Middle East. DE provides conceptual lenses for focused inquiry rather than prescribing research methods; in particular, DE demands attention to a project’s ongoing development within a context defined by emergence, nonlinearity and dynamism. The evaluation team employed traditional qualitative methods—interviews, focus groups, and site visits during the initial field phase, and a survey distributed following fieldwork in order to validate preliminary findings and conclusions. Analytically, the team focused on identifying salient themes regarding four primary areas of inquiry:

- The contemporary context of P2P peacebuilding work in IWBG and features limiting or potentially enhancing project impact;
- Successful “emergent” strategies that APS grantees have adapted in response to the challenges and opportunities of the present context;
- Successes/impacts of APS-funded projects; and
- The ways in which CMM can most effectively support effective, responsive, relevant peacebuilding work in the contemporary regional context, throughout the grant process.

Given finite resources and time in the field, CMM and the evaluation team focused on gathering data from APS project directors and from staff extensively involved in implementation, meeting with 60 total

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personnel from 24 organizations. Organizations were classified according to specific criteria of interest, as determined amongst the team leader, SI, and CMM staff during evaluation design.61

Findings and Conclusions

Overview

Peacebuilding in the Middle East has never been a simple task; today, most Israeli and Palestinian APS grantees report that their work is harder than ever. The prolonged absence of a viable peace process62 up until the resumption of talks in 2013 combined with regional volatility in the wake of the “Arab Spring,” have inspired Israeli and Palestinian societies to turn inward and away from cross-societal engagement. P2P initiatives face emboldened opposition from ideological opponents of reconciliation, abetted by the apathy of silent majorities on both sides.

In this daunting environment, APS grantees have nonetheless persevered and achieved notable successes, responding effectively to contextual challenges, achieving consistently positive results with direct participants and local communities, and establishing promising foundations for broader social-structural impact over time. The latter is particularly true for civil society initiatives aimed at transforming the status of Arab minority citizens and their relations with the Jewish majority in Israel; it is also evident among numerous Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding initiatives focused on clearly defined issues of common concern or shared interest. Moreover, APS grantees in the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and peace education fields have developed sophisticated methodologies, based on complementary uni-national and bi-national tracks of engagement that can serve as models for application in other global contexts of protracted, asymmetric conflict.

APS grants are the most generous in the contemporary field and embody the pluralistic vision outlined in CMM’s P2P Program Guide. APS funding has been essential to sustaining a diverse and vibrant Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding sector through challenging times and creating the potential to “scale up” impact as projects build networks and gain knowledge and traction. The APS selection criteria and grant making priorities developed by CMM and local USAID Mission staff reflect a sound analysis of current dynamics on the ground, in their emphases on linking intervention strategies to broader social-structural changes, framing cross-societal interventions around common interests and shared problems, and on the synergy of uni-national and bi-national elements in program design.63

At the implementation level, grantees widely credited the rigorous USAID grant process for strengthening organizational and administrative capacities. At the same time, grantees consistently cited a number of USAID grant management policies as problematic and significantly complicating their ability to operate effectively in the present environment.

61 See Annex B for detail.

62 It is important to note that the field work for this evaluation was conducted prior to the resumption of formal Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in July 2013. This change has the potential to radically alter the landscape for people-to-people work in the Middle East in the longer-term.

63 APS FY 2009; 2012; “Important APS Milestones.”
USAID policies which are meant to respond to specific policy and security concerns were identified as most problematic and are having unintended programmatic consequences in the local context. However, many of these policies come as a direct result of legislative requirements and therefore are likely not within USAID’s ability to change significantly.64

I. CONTEXT: How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in the IWBG region changed in recent years?

Findings: Prior to 2013, when peace negotiations resumed, the consensus of Israeli and Palestinian APS implementers was that the lack of a “political horizon” promising change in the overall conflict conditions rendered their work progressively more difficult. 65 They cited obstacles that have long been features of the local landscape: stark social and power asymmetries between the two societies, and delegitimization campaigns waged against peacebuilders and peacebuilding per se. P2P has always aroused ideological opposition here; yet the pessimism of mainstream Israeli and Palestinian publics towards the prospect of a peaceful solution emboldened critics to cast the entire field as a relic of the failed “Oslo” process.66 Advocates of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation found themselves with fewer champions in government, media, and civil society, and thus increasingly vulnerable. At the implementation level, these trends manifested in grantees’ struggles to achieve balanced levels of recruitment and engagement among both populations, and to obtain and maintain sufficient societal legitimacy and institutional recognition to operate effectively across the divide. At the same time, the “Arab Spring” revolutions and waves of socioeconomic protest among Israelis and Palestinians have generated increased energy in both societies for addressing internal divisions and social-structural disparities, a trend reflected in the focus and framing of a number of APS-funded initiatives.

Conclusions: During the period in which the field work evaluation was conducted, the context encountered was problematic for P2P initiatives; therefore, framing, design, and evaluation/expectations should be tailored accordingly—both at the project level and the overall APS strategy. The cultivation of

64 Since 2003, each year’s Appropriations Act requires the Secretary of State to establish procedures to ensure that Economic Support Funds (ESF) assistance is not provided to or through any individual or entity the Secretary knows or has reason to believe advocates, plans, sponsors, engages in or has engaged in terrorist activity. Mission Order #21 and the Consulate General’s standard operating anti-terrorism procedures are the procedures that implement the statute. See for example Fiscal Year 2012 FOAA §7039. The full text of Mission Order 21 and other related policy guidance for grantees is available on the USAID/West Bank and Gaza website: http://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/work-with-us/partner-resources

65 As noted above, the field and research portions of this evaluation were conducted prior to the resumption of formal Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in July 2013. The text therefore reflects the state of affairs as they existed at the time of the field research.

enhanced legitimacy, perceived relevance, and institutional support in both Israeli and Palestinian societies is an imperative for APS grantees, for the APS program, and for the Israeli-Palestinian P2P field as a whole. Additionally, effective grant making and intervention strategies must explicitly acknowledge the social and power asymmetries between Israelis and Palestinians, and strive to address the often distinct needs and priorities of both populations. Meeting these challenges is difficult, but possible, as illustrated by the emergent strategies and impacts detailed below.

2. STRATEGIES: Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for adapting to contextual challenges in recent years?

Findings: APS implementers cited a number of framing and programming strategies as effective responses to these contextual challenges, particularly:

1. Framing and designing projects around common interests, shared problems, and/or concrete benefits or changes: In the current climate, projects oriented toward resolving specific issues of shared interest or common concern for both populations—e.g. environmental protection, civic equality, media literacy, educational and societal capacity, professional training, and issue advocacy—are perceived as more legitimate and relevant than dialogue or relationship-building for its own sake, although the latter remain essential methodological elements of meaningful P2P work. This was especially, but not exclusively, true on the Palestinian side.

2. Integration of uni-national/intra-group and bi-national/inter-group elements: The deliberate, sequential integration of uni-national and bi-national encounters is now the industry standard for Israeli/Palestinian intergroup programs. APS grantees emphasized the essential contribution of uni-national preparation and processing phases staged before and often after bi-national encounters. These are seen as necessary and complementary responses to the asymmetry and dissonance between positive intergroup encounter experiences and the inevitable return to separate, unequal everyday realities. At the macro-level, a synergy of uni-national and bi-national consensus-building processes is also seen as an essential element of a sustainable peace process. As one implementer explained, “Both Palestinian and Israeli societies are fragmenting. They each need to address internal divisions while concurrently tackling the Palestinian-Israeli divide.”

3. Persistent, strategic engagement of authorities and institutions: APS grantees widely cited the inertia or resistance of governmental authorities on both sides as a contextual challenge. Yet a number of grantees, through persistent efforts, succeeded in enlisting official support, and thereby reaching broader constituencies and “scaling up” programs to communal, municipal, and even regional levels. These initiatives typically engaged through multiple channels, at multiple levels, and adopted both cooperative and critical approaches as necessary.”

Conclusions: The above strategies, among others, have proven particularly effective in enhancing legitimacy, perceived relevance, and potential impact of projects in the current atmosphere of popular
skepticism, and in some cases, hostility towards P2P. The very same strategies are reflected in the language of CMM publications on peacebuilding strategy and recent APS solicitations, and endorsed by key local USAID Mission staff, all evidence of sound contextual analysis by CMM. However, support for intervention strategies framed around concrete issues and/or social-structural change can be made more explicit by expanding the conceptual framework of reference in official CMM/APS documents beyond exclusive or dominant emphasis on the “contact hypothesis.”

3. IMPACT: In contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond direct participants in activities)? How do projects evaluate their own success? What are features of the context that enhance or limit wider impact?

Findings: APS-funded projects of diverse methodologies commonly report the achievement of positive outcomes with their direct participants and at local/communal levels in terms of sustained participation in the face of opposition, positive attitudinal changes and relationship building, institutional development, and the establishment of “touch points” or forums for meaningful cross-conflict engagement—achievements not to be taken for granted in present context. A number of projects have expanded significantly and established programs across multiple new campuses, communities, and regions.

At the societal level, however, these personal/local/communal successes have not necessarily “added up” or perceptibly influenced prevailing social and political trends. These programs were, of course, never intended to bring about peace in and of themselves, rather they are designed to positively influence dynamics that would contribute in discrete areas to the eventual resolution of the conflict. So while the evidence points to localized successes, more work needs to be done to increase aggregate impacts at the macro level.

Moreover, gaps remain in terms of recruiting participant populations reflective of Israeli and Palestinian societies. While APS projects often explicitly aim to include and empower youth and women, the same cannot be said regarding key constituencies not identified with the political “peace camp,” e.g. traditional and religious, politically conservative, and socioeconomically disadvantaged sectors of Palestinian and Israeli societies. The identification of P2P and “peace” with certain socio-political demographics limits the scope of potential impact to those groups.

Given the diversity of the APS pool in the IWBG region, “success” indicators take different forms for different types of projects. Dialogue, education, and leadership projects point to participants empowered to become peacebuilders and activists; advocacy and media initiatives point to shifts in public discourse or institutional policy generated by focused campaigns; environmental initiatives cite infrastructure built and awareness raised, and potential environmental hazards mitigated or prevented. The wide spectrum of project approaches led some grantees to question CMM’s selection of “changing perceptions” as a “universal indicator” of impact, as numerous initiatives do not primarily evaluate their own impact in such terms.

Conclusions: APS-funded projects are working effectively and achieving positive outcomes and meaningful impacts at personal, local, and in a number of cases, expanding to communal/regional level, all

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70 APS Solicitation and Program Guide.
remarkable achievements given the reality in which they operate. Yet the lack of any macro-political framework for progress and the de-legitimization campaigns against P2P per se—the stigma of “normalization” among Palestinians, and the marginalization of the “peace camp” in Israel—operate on a societal level, blocking efforts to “scale up” micro- and meso-level positive outcomes in more significant ways. In this reality, it is challenging for grassroots Israeli-Palestinian initiatives to achieve large-scale societal impact and it is likely not realistic to expect societal-level results in the immediate term without a significant change in the political context. This is all the more so given the short time horizons of the project funding cycle, the limited scope of participation and capacity, and the upheaval and violent conflict occurring in the surrounding region. A number of projects with focused strategies for institutional change, however, are establishing foundations with potential for broader long-term impact.

4. GRANT MANAGEMENT AND OVERALL IMPACT: How can CMM support effective, responsive, relevant peacebuilding in contemporary context?

Findings: APS grants are lauded as the most generous available in the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian context; there is wide acknowledgement among grantees of the program’s contributions to the resilience and development of their organizations, their strategies, and the field as a whole. It is clear that in present circumstances, the continuation of APS support is essential to the ability of grantees to build on the foundations they have created. Additionally, grantees widely praised the capacity-building effects of USAID’s rigorous standards of evaluation and compliance. 80% of survey respondents agreed that, “Working on a USAID-funded project has helped to build organizational capacity,” especially in terms of administration and financial management.

At the same time, the majority of grantees described certain policies as deeply problematic in the local context. The required “vetting” of vendors and the Anti-Terrorism Certification (ATC) signature are perceived as singling out and thereby alienating Palestinians. Even though measures against providing material support to terrorists are a United States Government-wide requirement derived from Executive Order 1322471, the perception is that Palestinians are specifically targeted by the requirement to sign the ATC. This serves to undermine the legitimacy of the program in the eyes of some and complicates recruitment. Similarly, the structure of prime/sub-grant relationships is described as reinforcing existing power asymmetries because Israeli organizations often serve as the prime grantees with Palestinian organizations as sub-grantees. Related to this is the complaint that USAID’s administrative requirements are described as placing excessive demands on grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and diverting time and resources away from programming. Grantees ranked USAID grant oversight as the most difficult challenge they face in their work, even relative to the contextual issues described above.

It is crucial to emphasize that local USAID Mission staff invest care and effort in guiding grantees through the intricacies of the grant application and management process. Indeed, many grantees praised Mission

staff as understanding the local context, being responsive to concerns, and showing flexibility regarding the necessity to change implementation schedules in response to events. Grantees’ critiques were clearly directed at policies/regulations rather than personnel or performance. The critiques were, nonetheless, emphatic and widespread to the point of near-unanimity, appearing in more than 90% of grantee interviews.

Conclusions: Through the APS program, CMM is providing a critical contribution to sustaining innovative Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding programs through a social-political era characterized by hostility and indifference to P2P and the possibility of peace. This itself represents a significant impact, providing opportunities for tens of thousands of ordinary Israelis and Palestinians to envision alternative futures, learn each other’s narratives and perspectives on core conflict issues, and experience, if temporarily, relations of respect, equality, and constructive engagement across conflict lines.

Given CMM’s prominent footprint in the field and its growing emphasis on high standards of evaluation, the Agency will benefit from evaluating the unintended impact of those administrative policies identified by grantees as negatively affecting their organizational structure, time and resource allocation, everyday operation, and societal legitimacy—enabling, yet simultaneously complicating their already challenging work. As the Do No Harm (DNH) framework cautions, the impact of aid in conflict environments begins with the transfer of funds. The operational practices of aid agencies carry significant, often inadvertent consequences for local partners and must be subject to systematic scrutiny lest they reinforce existing conflict dynamics. In the absence of rigorous review, the question will arise whether current oversight requirements are appropriate for grassroots P2P projects in this context.

To conclude, we echo the contention of a majority of grantees that long-term investment is necessary to achieve lasting impact at communal and societal levels. To date, APS grants have empowered grantees to implement outstanding short-term projects, establish fledgling networks and institutions, design innovative models, and develop adaptive strategies, all in daunting circumstances. With long-term investment in successful programs and strategies and targeted reform of grant management practices, the APS can truly empower embattled Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders, amplify their voices, and increase their influence in society and politics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. CONTEXT

Establish a strategic approach to empowering APS grantees to address macro-level contextual challenges identified in this report, particularly structural asymmetry, societal legitimacy, and governmental relations. Work with grantees, leveraging their strengths and USAID’s resources, to enhance capacity to respond to these issues—as individual initiatives and the local P2P field.

2. PROGRAM STRATEGIES

Continue and expand support for successful strategies identified in this report:

- Projects that effectively integrate uni-national and bi-national elements;
- Projects framed and focused on issues of shared interest/common concern;
- Projects effectively embedding dialogue within larger social change strategies; and
- Projects strategically designed to effect concrete social-structural changes or provide visible benefit to participant individuals and their communities.

Expand the explicit theoretical basis for APS programs, as described in official documents, to reflect the range of approaches and theoretical debates in the field. Recommend that projects be grounded in a valid theoretical framework, including, but not limited to the "contact hypothesis."

Allocate grant support to projects addressing conflict across multiple “fault lines” relevant to the overall conflict dynamic, e.g.

- Israeli-Palestinian (WBG)
- Arab-Jewish citizens of Israel
- Internal Palestinian (religious-secular, Muslim-Christian, West Bank-Gaza, etc.)
- Internal Israeli (religious-secular, socioeconomic, etc.)

Fund initiatives explicitly designed to engage religious, political, or socioeconomic constituencies beyond the traditional “peace camp.”

3. IMPACT AND EVALUATION

Make long-term investments in successful programs and strategies; revise the “innovation” requirement to allow continued support for proven projects.

Revise indicator policy to reflect the diverse types of work already funded by the APS. Develop a list of multiple suggested indicators specifically designed to fit different types of interventions and target populations; use “changing perceptions” as an indicator where appropriate, but should be avoided as a measure of comparability across activities, given the broad range of project types and their respective theories of change.

4. GRANT MANAGEMENT

1. Establish standards for reducing the administrative burden on grantees (and Mission staff), within the confines of United States law and USAID policy, such that APS grants enable grantees to concentrate time and resources on programming, rather than compliance.

2. Evaluate the unintended impacts of grant management policies identified as problematic by majorities of grantees. Each policy can be evaluated in reference to two standards: a) a “DNH” analysis of the impact of these policies on grantees in the contemporary IWBG context, in order to prevent inadvertent reinforcement of existing conflict dynamics; b) analysis of the impact of these policies on the overall goals and impact of the APS program with the aim of deriving measures to mitigate specific unintended impacts.
Introduction

Project Background

The work of conflict management and mitigation takes place, by definition, in volatile contexts in which acts of violence or provocative moves can abruptly transform the operating environment for peacebuilders in the field.

Since 2004, the USAID/CMM in Washington has held an annual Reconciliation Program Fund small-grants competition through an APS. The APS is intended to support local-level and grassroots organizations in particular, with award amounts of up to $1.2 million for three years or less. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, CMM released its first joint State-USAID solicitation to award $8 million to support conflict management and mitigation projects in select priority countries and territories—Gaza/West Bank, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. The Fund has since grown to $26 million annually, with $10 million reserved for Middle East programming and $16 million for global programs. The program has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries.

Funded projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war. They provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust, and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recent conflict. The ToC is that if opposing groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another; as the health of the relationships between the groups improves, the likelihood of violence between them declines.73

From the inception of the APS, CMM has sought to weigh this ToC against accumulating empirical data and the lessons of experience; CMM has devoted significant resources to ensure that the grant making process has been a continuous learning process. Evaluation and research are integral components of CMM’s approach. At the project level, all grantees engage in systematic M&E; at the global/donor/program level, CMM has synthesized the knowledge obtained through experience into reports that identify best practices for future grantees and the wider peacebuilding field.74

In the course of these inquiries, CMM has become increasingly aware of the challenges of monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding programs situated in volatile contexts of protracted conflict, where precise forecasting of operating conditions and project outcomes is an inherently problematic enterprise. In such rapidly-changing situations, mutual perceptions and relationships between conflict parties are inherently sensitive to contextual factors beyond the control of peacebuilding initiatives. As a consequence, CMM has begun exploring evaluation methodologies adapted to the realities of its operating environments, especially the “Developmental Evaluation” (DE) approach formulated by

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73 USAID/CMM Annual Program Statement Request for Proposals (RFP)
Michael Quinn Patton. Designed to inform “innovation occurring in complex, dynamic and relational systems,” DE replaces the classic program evaluation emphasis on pre-ordained outcomes with a focus on “emergent strategy,” studying how initiatives analyze, adapt and respond to evolving contextual challenges. This represents a pilot application of DE methodology to the APS.

This report details the findings of a developmental study of APS-funded projects in IWBG; it is part of a wider study of the global APS program, including an extensive document review, the creation of a Knowledge Management System, and field evaluations of APS-funded initiatives in three diverse contexts—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, and IWBG. DE’s focus on strategic adaptation to dynamic context is particularly apt for examination of projects operating in this volatile area. IWBG has been a central focus of the APS program from the outset, receiving approximately one third of all APS funds on an annual basis.

In the eight years of the APS and the two decades since the 1993 signing of the “Oslo Accords”, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has shifted between periods of intensive, but ultimately unsuccessful negotiation, violent conflict escalation, and protracted political stalemate, resulting in the inexorable entrenchment of what President Obama has called an “unsustainable status quo.” Formal negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians resumed in July 2013, however this evaluation was completed prior to the resumption of negotiations and therefore does not reflect the changes to the political context that may have resulted. But previous Track I developments have defined the operating environment of Track II and III P2P initiatives, generating an atmosphere of increasing acrimony, apathy, and pessimism regarding prospects of reconciliation and conflict resolution. As APS grantees attest in this study, this context magnifies the inherent challenges of working to transform adversarial relationships across conflict lines.

At the same time, Israeli and Palestinian citizens have witnessed profound changes initiated by the recent wave of popular uprisings against neighboring authoritarian regimes, popularly known as the “Arab Spring.” This tide of civil unrest has not, as of yet, generated any significant popular movement on issues of peace and conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Instead, it has inspired a parallel focus, in both Israeli and Palestinian civil societies, on the resolution of “internal” social, economic and political divisions.

The present study is not a strict evaluation of APS-funded projects, but rather an attempt to ascertain—

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through the eyes of the experts working on the ground—the preeminent challenges and opportunities of the contemporary context, the strategies that APS grantees have adapted in response to the present situation, and ultimately—the ways in which CMM can most effectively support effective, responsive, and relevant peacebuilding in the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian reality.

**Evaluation Purpose**

CMM APS managers commissioned this IWBG field evaluation as the first of three separate regional evaluations designed to inform a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of the global APS program. More specifically, this study was conducted in order to enhance the impact, relevance, and responsiveness of future conflict mitigation grant making in the Israeli/Palestinian context, through a DE inquiry into:

a) The contemporary context of P2P peacebuilding work in IWBG;

b) Successful programming strategies that APS grantees have adapted in response to the challenges and opportunities of the present context; and

c) The ways in which CMM can most effectively support effective, responsive, and relevant peacebuilding work in contemporary regional context, throughout the grant process.

CMM seeks to understand which types of project designs and strategies are most relevant in the emergent Israeli/Palestinian and Middle Eastern contexts and what salient contextual factors and conflict drivers should be addressed in the grant making process.

In particular, CMM seeks to understand the effects of contextual changes and emergent strategies on the cumulative impact of APS grant making in the Israeli/Palestinian context. This includes study of project effects at communal and/or societal levels, beyond the level of direct participants in APS-funded programs.

CMM additionally seeks to understand the experiences of grantees with the APS grant process, in order to identify best practices and areas for improvement, and thereby inform future selection and grant management policies.

In addition to informing CMM’s grant making and management and the community of past, present and future APS grantees, this report will provide an updated portrait of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding field of value to practitioners and scholars across the region and beyond.

**Research Methods**

**Introduction**

The DE approach is designed “to inform and support innovative and adaptive development in complex, dynamic environments.” As such, it is especially suited to this exploration of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding initiatives during a period of profound political upheaval in the Middle East. It provides conceptual lenses for focused inquiry rather than prescribing particular research methods; in particular, DE demands attention to a project’s ongoing development within a context defined by emergence,  

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nonlinearity, and dynamism. Thus, the evaluation team employed traditional research methods—interviews, focus groups, site visits, surveys—while focusing analytically on identifying common themes regarding contextual challenges and adaptive strategies, among other key evaluation questions.

In the words of Dr. Quinn Patton, “The only way to truly inquire into unanticipated consequences is through open-ended fieldwork…to find out what’s happening from the perspectives of participants and staff as it unfolds.” Thus, rather than measuring performance according to specified indicators, the evaluation team conducted an open-ended qualitative inquiry in the grounded theory tradition, soliciting candid feedback from the implementer’s perspective to inform future CMM grant making.

Data Collection

CMM aspired to include substantive data from as many current or recent APS grantee organizations as possible, within the logistical and financial scope of the evaluation. The evaluation team employed multiple methods of data collection in a tiered, phased approach designed to maximize breadth and depth of data collection given the range of projects, limited time, and logistical constraints in the field.

Data collection proceeded in three sequential phases, with time reserved for analysis in between:

1) Field Evaluation: During 12 days of fieldwork in Israel and the West Bank (September 3-15, 2012), evaluation team members conducted a) interviews with directors and staff from 20 grantee organizations, b) eight site visits, and c) conversations with USAID Mission and US Embassy staff. This phase culminated in a presentation of preliminary findings at USAID offices in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

2) Focus Groups: Local evaluators facilitated two focus groups with directors and implementing staff of APS grantee organizations—an Arabic-language focus group with Palestinian implementers in Ramallah (September 15, 2012), and a Hebrew-language focus group with Israeli implementers in Tel Aviv (October 25, 2012).

3) Survey: Evaluators designed a 24 question online survey on themes that emerged in data analysis from Phases I-II, in order to validate preliminary findings and conclusions. The survey was distributed to all current and recent APS grantees in late November and was completed by 32 respondents as of January 2013. Analysis of survey responses is integrated throughout the findings section of the report. Survey questions, quantitative, and summary qualitative results are presented in Annex D.

Sampling

Since 2004, the APS program has funded 60 different projects, implemented by 42 different organizations in the IWBG region; 34 in recent cycles (FY 2008-2012). Given finite resources and time in the field, CMM and the evaluation team focused on meeting APS project directors and staff extensively involved in implementation, meeting with 60 total personnel from 25 organizations.

79 See Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis (Sage, 2006).
80 See Annex B for detailed methodology.
Organizations were classified according to specific criteria of interest, as determined amongst the team leader, SI, and CMM staff.81

Limitations and Influences

The evaluation team identified the following limitations of the research design, and potential influences on grantee testimonies:

Time constraints

The scope of the evaluation allowed for less than two weeks of field research, thus limiting the sample and scope of in-depth interviews and site visits;

No systematic incorporation of beneficiaries

Due to time constraints and the goal of casting the widest possible net in terms of grantee organizations, the evaluation team was unable to incorporate the perspectives of project beneficiaries in a systematic manner. Evaluators did meet and converse with beneficiaries during site visits, but this possibility was available with only a small number of organizations.

Inability to travel to Gaza

Due to the political situation, evaluators were unable to travel to Gaza for research purposes, and therefore unable to interview grantees or beneficiaries there or observe the context firsthand.

Presence of USAID staff

Washington-based CMM staff accompanied evaluators to seven interviews in the field, by request and with grantee consent. Their presence constituted a potential influence on grantee testimonies. To mitigate this potential influence, the CMM personnel stated explicitly that they sought and welcomed honest and potentially critical feedback, that details of specific conversations would not be shared with local Mission staff, and that this research contributed solely to evaluation of the APS program, and had no connection to performance evaluation of any individual APS grantee.

Evaluators’ prior relationships

Evaluators were deliberately selected on the basis of their extensive prior experience working in and researching the Israeli/Palestinian peacebuilding field. Evaluators therefore had prior collegial or personal connections to a number of grantee organizations and individual staff members. In order to mitigate the potential influence of these ties on grantee testimonies, two or more evaluators were present at each interview in which a prior relationship between an evaluator and a grantee, and these interviews were led by evaluators without any prior relationship to the organizations or individuals in question.

Language

The majority of interviews (14/20) were conducted primarily in English, which was often not the native language of interviewees. All interviewees were given the option to conduct discussions in Arabic or Hebrew, and all who opted for English asserted their comfort with the language and encountered little

81 See Annex B for more details.
or no difficulty expressing their views effectively. In cases in which Arabic or Hebrew was deemed preferable or necessary, evaluators with appropriate linguistic capacity conducted the interview.\textsuperscript{82}

**Findings and Conclusions**

The team’s findings represent first and foremost the “front line” experiences of contemporary P2P peacebuilding in the IWBG region. The directors and staff of APS grantee organizations and local USAID Mission staff are the expert witnesses, providing the majority of the data through interviews, focus groups, and survey responses as detailed above. It is important to note that these findings are derived first of all from the insights of Israeli and Palestinian implementers of APS grants.\textsuperscript{83} The implementers are a diverse group in terms of political orientations and peacebuilding strategies; the degrees of consensus that emerged among them, around the common themes identified below, are therefore worthy of note.

Findings and conclusions will be presented regarding each of the evaluation’s primary areas of inquiry, as these evolved during the field phase through data collection from grantees and USAID staff. Overall recommendations are found at the end of the report. Areas of inquiry include: Contextual Challenges; Impact; Strategies; and USAID Grant Management.

In practice, each area of inquiry is linked to the others; contextual challenges demand strategic responses; adaptive strategies result in enhanced impact; USAID grant policies affect grantees’ capacities to respond strategically to context and achieve desired outcomes. The ensuing sections will, therefore, highlight linkages between these areas of inquiry where appropriate.

Data will be identified according to source (e.g. interview, focus group, survey); respondents will be identified only by nationality and/or project orientation, in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

1. **Contextual Challenges**

Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding has never been a simple endeavor; however, the consensus of APS grantees is that in 2012, it is harder than ever. 77% of survey respondents agreed that in today’s Israeli-Palestinian context, the work of peacebuilding is “more difficult than 3-5 years ago.” This section will describe the primary contextual challenges identified by APS implementers, linking regional macro-political trends to their everyday effects on the ground. It is essential to begin with in-depth contextual analysis, as the achievements of APS grantees and the program can only be truly evaluated, and appreciated, in light of the obstacles they face in the field. It is equally important to state that the challenges described make this work not only more difficult, but all the more important.

\textsuperscript{82} The evaluation team included one trilingual member fluent in Arabic, English, and Hebrew, two members with bilingual English/Hebrew capacity, and one member with bilingual English/Arabic capacity.

\textsuperscript{83} APS grantees—directors and implementing staff—provided testimony in all phases of the research. The evaluation team gathered data from local USAID Mission staff through a series of meetings and interviews in the field phase, and through comments on the draft report.
Macro-Level: Crosswinds

Two starkly contrasting trends characterize the macro-political atmosphere of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years. At the regional level, unprecedented eruptions of popular protest have challenged and transformed regimes across the Middle East, producing inspiring images of mobilized citizens demanding fundamental political change. At the time of the evaluation in 2012, the political context was particularly challenging, coming on the heels of two wars and a prisoner exchange between Israel and the Hamas regime in Gaza, continued expansion of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO)’s campaigns for United Nations recognition of Palestinian statehood, all of which entrenched the conflict dynamics on the ground.

As peacebuilders, Israeli and Palestinian APS implementers often described shared contextual challenges that were experienced mutually, but differently, on both sides of the conflict divide. The stagnation of the peace process and violent escalations between Israel and Hamas in Gaza at the time of the evaluation, the ongoing expansion of Israeli settlements, the hardening of public attitudes—all of these impact both Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders. At the same time, these issues are articulated differently in Israeli and Palestinian societies, due to social and power asymmetries.

According to interviewees, these powerful “crosswinds” at the macro level exert profound effects on the work of P2P peacebuilding at grassroots and civil society levels. On the one hand, the “Arab Spring” uprisings infused energy into protest movements focused on addressing the internal divisions of Israeli and Palestinian societies. Hebrew adaptations of chants from Cairo’s Tahrir Square echoed in the streets of Israel’s cities in the summer of 2011, which saw the largest sustained wave of popular protest in the country’s history—all focused on social justice and rectifying economic inequality between Israelis. Simultaneously, Palestinian youth demonstrated throughout Gaza and the West Bank for unity and reconciliation between their dominant political factions, Fatah and Hamas, while 2012 witnessed a brief wave of internal socioeconomic protest throughout areas governed by the Palestinian Authority (PA).

These themes of internal reconciliation and social justice animate a number of APS-funded programs, particularly civil society initiatives and projects aimed at rectifying structural dimensions of inequality between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. A director of one such project framed his youth empowerment work in terms of global and regional tides of protest:

“Every youth is connected through social networks—Arab youth watch what is happening—the Arab Spring, yes we can, occupy wall street, social revolutions…if we want future political and economic stability, we need to hear the voice of the Arab youth.”

This internal/socioeconomic framing was also salient for directors of joint Israeli-Palestinian projects, who recognized, in the words of an Israeli implementer, that, “It wasn’t the peace process that brought 10% of the Israeli population into the streets last year, it was the [cost of living].” As detailed in ensuing sections, joint project implementers universally reported integrating uni-national, “internal” components into their bi-national Israeli-Palestinian programs. They described these uni-national components as essential complements to effective cross-conflict peacebuilding. A number of interviewees illustrated the importance of uni-national work with variations on the classic “bridge” metaphor of peacebuilding, explaining that a stable bridge must be established on solid foundations, or that a level bridge cannot be established between pillars of drastically unequal height.

On the other hand, the absence of any prospect of political progress on the conflict up until negotiations resumed in 2013 generated an increasingly challenging context for joint projects bringing together Israelis and Palestinians—the majority of APS grantees. These cross-conflict initiatives reported engaging in perpetual struggles to break through widespread apathy in order to secure participation, recognition and support in both societies, while enduring the constant criticism of politically ascendant ideological opponents.
P2P projects are often treated as *a priori* suspect in public discourse, peacebuilders forced to engage in a constant rearguard struggle to obtain societal legitimacy. In the words of a Palestinian implementer, “it feels lonely” for peacebuilders today.

On the level of project implementation, the pressures of this political climate are manifested through a number of issues emphasized by APS implementers. In the ensuing sections, we will present the primary contextual challenges identified by majorities of grantees.

**Project-Level Challenges**

In interviews and focus groups, APS grantees repeatedly cited certain issues as challenges to successful project implementation. In particular, they cited social and power asymmetries, struggles for societal legitimacy, participant recruitment, government relations, and certain USAID grant management policies. Table 1 lists the percentages of interviewees who cited particular challenges as salient. Table 2 details survey respondents’ mean “difficulty ratings” for a list of ten challenges compiled from interview and focus group data. Each chart also includes data regarding general USAID administrative requirements, as this was cited as an equally salient challenge.84

**Table 1. Percentages of Interviewees Citing Specific Contextual Challenges**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY CHALLENGES</th>
<th>All Interviewees</th>
<th>Israeli-Palestinian Initiatives</th>
<th>Arab-Jewish Initiatives in Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size (# of projects)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Asymmetry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Legitimacy/ Anti-Normalization</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Governmental Relations</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID: Administrative Requirements</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Table 2. Survey Respondents: Most Difficult Challenges to Successful Project Implementation**

(Respondents rated the difficulty of challenges on a scale of 1–5, with 1 least and 5 most difficult).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Respondent groups</th>
<th>All survey respondents</th>
<th>Israeli-Palestinian Initiatives</th>
<th>Arab-Jewish Initiatives in Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. USAID Overall Administrative Requirements</td>
<td>3.41 (5)</td>
<td>3.42 (rank: 1)</td>
<td>3.46 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Opposition: Palestinian Society</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.32 (2)</td>
<td>2.50 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Recruitment: Israeli Jews</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.53 (4)</td>
<td>3.08 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 Findings on USAID grant management policies in Section 4
In the ensuing section, we will explore the primary contextual challenges in detail, presenting the percentages of interviewees and survey respondents who emphasized each theme, relating the findings to relevant scholarship, and providing quotes to illustrate widely shared sentiments.

**A Broken Mirror: the Prism of Asymmetry**

90% of all APS grantee interviewees cited social and power asymmetries between Israelis and Palestinians, or Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel, as a primary contextual challenge.

While Israelis and Palestinians inhabit the same geographical territory, they conduct their everyday lives in “parallel realities,” in distinct cultural, historical, linguistic and social frameworks and starkly disparate material and political conditions. Both Israeli and Palestinian civilian populations live under chronic threats of violence, as was illustrated by the sudden escalations of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, and Palestinian rocket attacks on surrounding Israeli communities in November-December 2012. Yet beyond this level of mutual vulnerability, a separate and unequal status quo prevails between the economically developed, democratically governed and militarily powerful State of Israel and the stateless Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in semi-autonomous enclaves of territory surrounded by Israeli security barriers, military camps and settlements, and lacking control over their borders, movement or natural resources. Structural asymmetry also prevails within Israel between the Jewish majority and Arab minority, a legacy of decades of discriminatory resource allocation and institutionalized social and political exclusion of Arab citizens.

Conflict dynamics can often be understood as a mirror image—a back-and-forth between adversarial parties driven by an “ethos of conflict”—including mutually exclusive historical narratives, defensive psychological responses and hostile political rhetoric that are almost identical in terms of selective

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Opposition: Israeli Society</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.47 (5) 2.46 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Israeli Gov’t/ IDF Relations</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.37 (6) 2.23 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Recruitment: Palestinians</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.68 (3) 2.08 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Recruitment: Arab Citizens of Israel</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.72 (9) 2.62 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Cross-Conflict Staff Relations</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.95 (8) 1.92 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Palestinian Authority Relations</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.16 (7) 1.54 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Opposition: Arab Citizens of Israel</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.63 (10) 2.31 (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviewees suggested variations on the classic “bridge” metaphor of peacebuilding, explaining that a stable bridge must be established on solidly balanced foundations, or that a level bridge cannot be established between pillars of drastically unequal height.

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85 The term denotes the quality of relations between Palestinian/Arab and Israeli/Jewish project staff or partners.


information processing, de-legitimization of the other and zero-sum framing of the conflict.\textsuperscript{88} This adversarial dynamic, described by Kelman as “negative identity interdependence,” certainly pertains to the Israeli-Palestinian case, yet it is only part of the picture.\textsuperscript{89} All aspects of Israeli-Palestinian interaction, including peacebuilding initiatives, are refracted through the prisms of cultural difference and the stark imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, often resulting in divergent narratives or perceptions of the same issue, process, or event.

It is important to note asymmetry as a challenge in itself, as it was described by the majority of Israeli and Palestinian interviewees. It is also crucial to note its corollary influence on other contextual challenges and peacebuilding strategies, and indeed on the overall approach to APS grant making. The Conflict Analysis and Resolution field is theoretically oriented towards resolving the root causes of conflicts by addressing fundamental human needs that are undermined or threatened, including physical and socioeconomic security and psychological needs related to the legitimation and expression of identity and culture.\textsuperscript{90} In this case, successful, strategic grant making and effective intervention design must recognize the different priorities of Israeli and Palestinian populations, while working to address the legitimate needs of both sides.\textsuperscript{91} This is challenging, but as the work of many APS grantees illustrates, it is both possible and effective.

Scholars have noted the profound influence of imbalances of social and political power on peacebuilding interventions, including dialogues between majority and minority citizens in the United States and United Kingdom, Arab-Jewish encounters and peace education in Israel, and joint Israeli-Palestinian organizational partnerships.\textsuperscript{92} The impact of asymmetry is described as particularly important at two levels: participant motivations and expectations, and organizational dynamics.

\textit{Divergent Motivations and Expectations}

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, asymmetrical visions of the goals of peacebuilding have typically manifested in terms of Palestinian participants seeking empowerment and emphasizing structural change or political mobilization, in contrast to Israeli participants seeking to “humanize” perceptions, to reduce intergroup hostility, and to enhance their senses of legitimacy and security. Palestinian participants predominantly evaluate the success of cross-conflict engagement in terms of achieving concrete change or inspiring opposition to the Israeli occupation and other policies vis-à-vis Arabs and Palestinians. Israeli participants, by contrast, predominantly define success in terms of building cross-conflict relationships

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and securing legitimacy, acceptance and declared opposition to anti-Israeli violence from Palestinians.\footnote{93} In terms of visceral responses to dialogue, a recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study found that a dialogical interaction enhanced empathy between Israelis and Palestinians, but through divergent mechanisms. For a majority of Israeli subjects, \textit{listening} to Palestinians tell personal stories of suffering inspired them to feel increased empathy toward Palestinians in general. The majority of Palestinian subjects, by contrast, experienced increased empathy for Israelis after \textit{telling} their own stories to an Israeli listener and eliciting an empathetic response.\footnote{94, 95}

For APS-funded initiatives, these differences currently manifest in asymmetrical patterns of participant recruitment and retention. APS Implementers described certain projects as attracting more Palestinian/Arab participants, while others appealed more to Israelis/Jews, due to programmatic content or relevant structural disparities. For example, bilingual school programs in Israel quickly filled their quotas of Arab applicants, as these schools often represented the highest quality education locally available to Arab families. The same schools met greater difficulty recruiting Jewish students, who could choose from a plethora of high quality educational options. Dialogue encounter programs reported uneven recruitment as well, although not in a uniform pattern—some programs elicited more enthusiastic Jewish/Israeli participation, others more enthusiasm among Arab/Palestinian participants.

Overall, survey respondents described participant recruitment as a salient challenge, yet with a divergence between projects working with Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel versus Israeli-Palestinian projects working across the Green Line. Among projects bringing together Israelis and Palestinians, recruitment of Palestinians (2.68) and of Israeli Jews (2.53) received similar difficulty ratings, ranking second and third most difficult among contextual challenges. For Arab-Jewish initiatives in Israel, however, the recruitment of Jewish participants was rated the most difficult of all programming challenges, with a mean difficulty rating of 3.08, as compared to 2.62 for recruitment of Arab participants. As one implementer explained, “Generally speaking, in some Jewish schools there were students who did not want to meet the Arab students, while in the Arab schools, every single student was present at the meeting.”


\footnote{94} Emile Bruneau, Roy Cohen, and Rebecca Saxe, "Israelis and Palestinians Benefit Asymmetrically from Dyadic Encounters,” Unpublished Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. Used by permission of author.

\footnote{95} These general trends do not apply to all individual Israeli and Palestinians, but have been repeatedly confirmed by scholars of intergroup contact as collective tendencies (Rouhana and Korper 1997; Abu-Nimer 1999). At the same time, Israelis of certain political backgrounds may exhibit responses more akin to Palestinians in terms of needing to experience a degree of acknowledgment from the other side as a prerequisite to exhibiting empathy.
Asymmetry and Organizational Dynamics

A recent study of Israeli-Palestinian joint partnerships cited structural asymmetry as often generating problematic organizational dynamics, with Israelis assuming dominant roles, often by default due to structurally-derived gaps in education, language, experience, and training and related, culturally-derived gaps in assertiveness and confidence. As one international staff member observed, “there’s a difference in social capital…that’s a direct result of the dynamics of the conflict.”

An Israeli implementer echoed this assessment, explaining that, “In the last five years, we tried to work with one Palestinian partner, but it wasn’t equal. We don’t live under occupation, their movements are limited, they don’t have educational opportunities.” Another Israeli implementer acknowledged the issue as fundamental, stating that, “[If] the working relations…are not good, or the Israelis are controlling the Palestinians—the whole project will not work. This is basic.”

In survey responses, however, APS grantees were remarkably sanguine about the quality of relations between Israeli and Palestinian or Arab and Jewish staff. This issue was ranked among the least important challenges, with 65.5% of respondents describing cross-cultural staff relationships as “not a problem at all” or “a rare, minor issue”—a remarkable finding given the context and the findings of previous research. A number of interviewees did express awareness of the issue as a potential problem, and explained deliberate measures that they have taken to address it. One Israeli implementer emphasized her project’s investment in communication with Palestinian partners, stating that, “We’ve been trying to do things that will balance the power between all sides…really to be as transparent as we can with all of our partners—we’ve started our own [organizational] dialogue, to try and build trust.”

A number of grantees also described APS grant implementation as affecting structural imbalances at the organizational level—both positively and negatively. On the positive side, one grantee credited APS funding with providing essential resources that have enabled them to address inherent capacity gaps between Israeli and Palestinian staff:

“One of our challenges is manpower—before [the APS grant], the level of funding that we got was never enough really to employ the number of people involved in these programs…The criticism in the past was that the Israeli is dominant, and the Palestinian is a translator, or is very passive. By training Palestinian [staff], and hiring [other] professional translators, then the Palestinian [staff] don’t have to play that translator role, and the Palestinian and Israeli [staff] have equal roles—so the [USAID/APS] funding has made it really successful in that aspect.”

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96 Gawerc, Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships.

97 It is important to note that the survey itself received an asymmetrical response rate — only four Palestinian implementers responded to the survey, as opposed to five internationals, six Arab citizens of Israel and 17 Israeli Jews. Among Palestinian respondents, relations between Israeli and Palestinian project staff were rated slightly more challenging than by other respondents (2.5/5 mean rating for Palestinians vs. 1.86 for Israeli Jews, 1.83 for Arab citizens of Israel), but Palestinians still ranked this issue as a relatively low priority, only 9th out of 15 challenges.
In this case, APS funding enabled this organization to effectively address the pre-existing imbalance between Israeli and Palestinian staff—in a metaphorical sense, to raise the foundations on one side in order to build a more level bridge.

In cases in which an Israeli organization served as prime grantee with a Palestinian sub-contractor, by contrast, grantees described the issues of differential capacity and inter-organizational dynamics as highly problematic—and inadvertently made more so by USAID regulations. All current primes are Israeli or international organizations overseeing Palestinian sub-contractors; there is not a single Palestinian prime overseeing an Israeli sub.

It is important to emphasize that the local USAID Mission has made repeated efforts to enlist Palestinian organizations as primes, conducting two bidders’ conferences in the West Bank and encouraging Palestinian NGOs to apply, so far to no avail. Moreover, Israeli and Palestinian applicants freely select their own status in grant applications, and repeatedly choose this particular configuration. Hence, the absence of Palestinian primes appears to be a consequence of structural asymmetry and not USAID policy. It seems to be evidence above all of the divergent levels of “social capital” and organizational capacity between Israelis and Palestinian NGOs.

Nonetheless, once Israeli and Palestinian grantees enter a prime-sub agreement, the regulations of the grant oversight process unintentionally risk reinforcing existing conflict dynamics. Because USAID direct capacity building support is only provided to prime organizations, Palestinian organizations also miss the opportunity to benefit from resources that would strengthen them organizationally, thus reinforcing the status quo. And Israeli implementers often expressed profound discomfort with the degree to which USAID grant regulations require them to audit their Palestinian counterparts. One Israeli prime expressed a common sentiment, explaining that,

“Because we are the prime organization in the grant, and our Palestinian partners are the sub-organization, and USAID policy requires that they will communicate only with us [as the prime], this has created a situation that we are the supervisors of the Palestinians. It has put us in an impossible situation that reinforces the asymmetry and entrenches the existing power relations.”

All seven Israeli primes cited USAID’s prime/sub grantee policies as a factor that complicated their working relations with Palestinian partners. All seven urged USAID to explore revising these policies in a manner that will help equalize, rather than reinforce, the existing conflict dynamic by devising mechanisms that provide partners with equal status and direct reporting vis-à-vis their relationship with USAID.

It is crucial to note that there are four Palestinian APS grantee organizations; there are none, however, serving as primes in the context of a prime-sub partnership agreement (out of eight total current prime-sub contracts). Additionally, one Palestinian peacebuilder noted that his organization works as a sub-grantee on their APS grant, but they do work as a prime grantee with Israeli sub-contractors on other USAID grants. At the same time, he could not identify another Palestinian organization with that status.
An additional area in which USAID policies are seen as reinforcing asymmetry is the location of USAID facilities exclusively in Israeli areas—Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem. A number of Palestinian grantees recommended establishing some kind of accessible presence in Palestinian areas, so that Palestinian implementers will not be forced to cross Israeli checkpoints into Israel or West Jerusalem for each and every USAID event. One Palestinian implementer strongly urged the evaluation team to recommend that USAID open an office in Palestinian areas:

“They cannot reach people in Nablus if they are in Tel Aviv. I understand that they have security problems, but they can find a way. Their office is...accessible to Israelis, but not accessible to Palestinians. This is not enough. You need to be among the people and have daily communication. You exclude partially the people—and then you come explaining that they have less capacity or ability to make good applications. Be among them, train them, help them, have an office in Ramallah, the same that you have in Israel, and then check how things will change.”

Conclusions

Asymmetry is a defining feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of peacebuilding in this context; effective grant making and intervention strategies in this region must explicitly acknowledge and address the existing social and power asymmetries, and strive to legitimize the needs and priorities of both populations. USAID’s own policies exert a meaningful effect on issues of asymmetry. At the grant making level, APS investments in projects explicitly aimed at addressing imbalances between Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel or Israelis and Palestinians are relevant for the present context. At the project level, APS resources and capacity-building efforts have provided a “balancing” effect for a number of grantee organizations and partnerships. At the same time, the prime-sub management relationship, as well as perceptions around the vetting and the anti-terror certification are seen as reinforcing existing power relations and conflict dynamics, and thereby somewhat tarnishing the image and reducing the overall potential impact of the APS.

The Struggle for Legitimacy: Political Marginalization and Anti-“Normalization”

100% of APS grantees working in joint Israeli-Palestinian projects, and 80% of all grantees, described struggles for internal societal legitimacy as a primary contextual challenge. Both Israeli and Palestinian implementers portrayed their projects as facing tides of marginalization or de-legitimization from critics in their own societies—at times escalating to public denunciations, vandalism of facilities, and threats to staff and participants. Among Palestinians, this legitimacy crisis is driven by a resurgent “anti-normalization” campaign that caricatures most or all cooperative engagement with Israeli Jews as acquiescence to occupation. Among Israelis, extremist elements have committed “price tag” vandalism attacks against multiple APS grantee organizations, while P2P work is increasingly portrayed as irrelevant and outside the mainstream.99 In the face of these pressures, governmental and civil society support has

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99 According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, “The ‘price-tag’ policy was adopted by Israeli settlers and right-wing activists, intended to pressure the government away from making concessions regarding settlement building in the
been uneven and unreliable, deepening challenges to recruitment and retention of participants and to effective public outreach.

Scholars of intergroup relations have long described societal legitimacy, or support from recognized authorities, as vital to the success of intergroup encounters—one of several favorable conditions for productive cross-conflict contact identified in the literature. Paradoxically, such support is often elusive in the very situations of intergroup conflict which necessitate intergroup interventions. In the contemporary Israeli/Palestinian context, societal support is increasingly elusive at both official/government and popular/communal levels, among both Israelis and Palestinians. There is not blanket hostility in either case, but rather a drumbeat of de-legitimization that renders official sanction or public support for peacebuilding fragile and subject to constant criticism from hostile elements.

This contextual challenge is new in degree rather than kind, a perennial problem exacerbated by current conditions on the ground. Studies of Israeli-Palestinian post-Oslo peacebuilding have consistently cited “legitimacy deficit disorder” as a condition endemic to the field. Herbert Kelman described the Israeli-Palestinian relational dynamic as one of “negative identity interdependence,” a zero-sum equation in which the validation of one side’s identity or humanity is perceived as inherently de-legitimizing the other side. In such a situation, P2P projects aspiring to “humanize” the other, to include both conflict narratives, or to treat the “enemy” as a legitimate interlocutor, can be seen as inherently suspect.

For projects working across the Israeli-Palestinian divide, responding strategically to such criticism is especially difficult, as these initiatives need to simultaneously maintain a degree of legitimacy in both societies in order to operate. The dominant mutually exclusive vision of legitimacy generates a catch-22 situation, a “seesaw” effect in which an organization that moves to burnish its reputation on one side of the conflict thereby undermines its reputation on the other side. In practice, the steps that peacebuilders take to build legitimacy among Israelis are often exploited by critics to undermine their legitimacy among Palestinians, and vice versa.

Anti-Normalization

Palestinian peacebuilders are acutely vulnerable to the anti-normalization stigma, which is often applied through public censure and can have debilitating social and economic repercussions for individuals and organizations.100 For years the Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) organization has published a blacklist of groups it accuses of “normalizing relations” with Israelis, a list that cites many APS grantees by name, and others by association.101 “Anti-normalization” advocates among Palestinians


and in the Arab World have been persistent critics of P2P peacebuilding initiatives for decades; in recent years, the failure of Oslo and political impasse have amplified the voices of anti-normalization forces in Palestinian society.

This is thoroughly reflected in the data; “anti-normalization” was unanimously cited as a challenge by all 15 interviewees working on joint Israeli-Palestinian projects and in both focus groups. Survey respondents engaged in Israeli-Palestinian joint work cited “Opposition in Palestinian Society” as the most difficult contextual [non-USAID related] challenge. 71% of survey respondents stated that this issue is more difficult today than three to five years ago.

In practical terms, a number of grantees described “anti-normalization” demonstrations taking place outside their events or facilities; some implementers were forced to cancel, postpone or relocate meetings. One Palestinian implementer explained, “We wanted to have a meeting in Ramallah, and they came and kicked us out. At the Ambassador Hotel…[Palestinian anti-normalization activists] came and threatened the hotel not to run this meeting, because it’s normalization.” An Israeli implementer described relocating meetings from a Palestinian metropolitan area to a remote facility, due to threats. Another Israeli implementer canceled a second round of scheduled bi-national meetings, despite the success of the first round due to outside pressures to not allow the two sides to meet.

All implementers of joint Israeli-Palestinian projects spoke of pressures being applied on Palestinian participants and/or staff to boycott specific initiatives and/or P2P engagement with Israelis in general. One APS grantee repeatedly negotiated sub-contracts with multiple Palestinian partner institutions, only to receive rejections at the last minute:

“We found a partner who had experience with CMM…but at some point, he started to get threats from local people…And during those months, this anti-normalization campaign got much, much stronger. So at some point…he told us that he gives up, he doesn’t want to get into trouble, and he’s sorry, it’s really at the last minute, and he hoped that we would find another partner…So then we decided to go community to community, and look for the local people we can work with.

When we were in our vetting process with the partners in [West Bank]—both schools were very keen to get into the program—but then they started to get threats. The priest got threats that this is part of the normalization…And no matter how we tried to think of creative ways, together, you don’t need to show our logos, etc. It didn’t work out in the end. We got an email, sorry guys, We cannot take part in the program.”


It is crucial to emphasize that despite these intense pressures, APS-funded initiatives have persevered—the vast majority of implementers adapted as necessary and successfully implemented their projects. A number of grantees described effective strategies that they have developed to counter this criticism. Nonetheless, strategic thinking about this problem must go beyond the level of individual projects; the struggle for legitimacy in Palestinian society is becoming an existential issue for APS grantees and the entire peacebuilding field. One Palestinian implementer urged USAID to engage groups in Palestinian civil society currently opposed to joint work, stating, “This is something that USAID, if they want to continue any program between Israelis and Palestinians, cross-border, they need to be sensitive about the normalization issue, they need to work with the non-converted….otherwise there will be no partners left in the West Bank.”

In such a climate, there are strategies through which Palestinian peacebuilders work to enhance their societal legitimacy. First, by effecting concrete change—especially visible rollback of Israeli occupation at a local level, or tangible enhancement of Palestinian opportunity or quality of life. Second, by outspoken advocacy of Palestinian interests and, for programs involved in dialogue, through publicly visible validation of Palestinian perspectives by Israeli partners. Both of these strategies effectively counter the common “anti-normalization” critique that P2P programs somehow inherently serve Israeli interests or legitimize the status quo. Both of these strategies are effectively employed by some APS grantee organizations—but, given the “seesaw effect,” often at the expense of building broader legitimacy in Israeli society.

*Marginalization From The Israeli Mainstream*

While Israeli implementers do not typically experience the blacklisting and socioeconomic repercussions endured by Palestinian peacebuilders, they face a growing two-pronged challenge to their societal legitimacy—an increasingly vocal and mobilized minority of ideological opponents, on the one hand, and an increasingly indifferent silent majority on the other. Israeli implementers report enduring public accusations of disloyalty and acts of vandalism from extreme elements, while simultaneously being excluded from media coverage and treated with apathy and incomprehension in “mainstream” political discussion and social circles.

In terms of opposition, a number of APS grantee institutions in Israel reported receiving threats or having facilities vandalized in “price tag” attacks carried out by radical Right militants. In the civil society sphere, APS-sponsored educational projects involving cross-conflict encounters, or presenting Israeli students with Palestinian perspectives, often faced condemnation by so-called “watchdog” organizations. It must be emphasized that notwithstanding this type of opposition, APS-funded projects reported persevering and succeeding with their work on campuses. At the same time, such insinuations of disloyalty have branded the field with an aura of controversy, making work in educational settings more difficult. One APS grantee recalled being surprised by the challenges of recruiting participants openly on a university campus:

“I hadn’t anticipated that it would be hard for us to recruit on campuses, to advertise openly—they will say you can’t post flyers here, it’s a ‘politics-free zone’.”...At [one Israeli] University—we were shocked—we thought they’ll be happy to get us in—[the] university even has an Arab center for equality rights and democracy, established in the 1970s—when we approached them, they said you cannot create any dialogue groups in this university.”

One Israeli implementer echoed this sense that the ground has shifted in terms of the public legitimacy of peacebuilding, by comparing his personal experience as a teen-aged dialogue participant in the 1990s with the experiences of youth participants in dialogue today:

“It has not become any easier in Israel to become an advocate of this kind of encounters. When I was a [youth] participant, we used to do these kinds of encounters in school. But now, my [youth participants], they say I would like to, ‘but I’m afraid.’ They use that word, afraid—I’m afraid what people will think, I
feel threatened if they think I’m an Arab lover, a left winger…to be honest, I find [participants] today much braver than I was as a youth. They come [to dialogue] when there’s tons of criticism, in [the Palestinian Territories] and Israel.”

Our interviewees expressed a clear sense that it is peacebuilders, and not their critics, who are on the defensive in the public sphere. The majority of survey respondents described the issue of legitimacy in Israeli society as more difficult than three to five years ago; none described it as “easier.”

In addition to this emboldened opposition, numerous interviewees described a perceived indifference of Israeli mainstream media and society towards anything associated with “peace.” At an APS-sponsored meeting between Israeli and Palestinian media professionals, facilitators asked participants whether they had discussed their participation in cross-conflict dialogue with their personal social circles. The Israeli participants repeatedly stated that their colleagues, friends and family expressed little opposition, but equally scant interest in the content of their discussions with Palestinians.

A number of interviewees described this apathy as both reflected and reinforced by the media, which they portrayed as uninterested in positive Israeli-Palestinian contact. One APS implementer noted differential interest from Hebrew and Arabic news organizations, explaining that, “We didn’t make it into the Hebrew press. There was less interest by the Hebrew press than the Arabic press—less interest to publish something positive on the issue. We offered, and there was no response.” At a joint presentation by Israeli and Palestinian APS implementers on an Israeli college campus, one student asked why she had never heard of this type of joint project before. The Israeli presenter responded by saying, “if my Palestinian colleague and I stand up and fight in front of you, there will be six media networks here in five minutes to cover it. If we have a serious, peaceful discussion of the conflict, that doesn’t interest them.”

APS-funded initiatives have achieved numerous successes in breaking through apathy and garnering coverage in Israeli media. Recently, for example, one of Israel’s major networks aired a 90-minute documentary, “Two-Sided Story,” depicting the APS-funded “History Through the Human Eye” dialogue project of the Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families Forum. Nonetheless, this impression of indifference, on the part of the media and general public, was widespread among interviewees.

Unintended Impacts: USAID Policy and Societal Legitimacy

As with the issue of structural asymmetry, the legitimacy crisis is an issue endemic to the conflict context. USAID is not responsible for the issue, nor could the Agency be expected to resolve it. Nonetheless, as a third-party intervening in the conflict, it is incumbent upon USAID to analyze its own role within the existing conflict dynamic, and to identify any unintended consequences of its intervention. On the issue of societal legitimacy, APS grantees consistently identified two aspects of USAID policy as leading to unintended, detrimental effects—in this case, further compromising their legitimacy, particularly in Palestinian society, where APS grantees are most vulnerable. Perceptions
around 1) the required vetting process for participants and vendors and 2) the requirement that first-tier organizations sign the ATC serve to stigmatize the assistance being provided by USAID through the APS.104

USAID's adheres to a Congressionally mandated “vetting” policy, which requires the submission of personal information by most participants (Israeli and Palestinian) in APS-funded activities and certain vendors of materials used by APS grantees for review by US authorities. When vetting is triggered, official approval must be received before activities can proceed.105 The process, according to APS implementers, can take weeks. 90% of interviewees described vetting as problematic, raising a number of logistical and social/political concerns (detailed in Section 4).

In terms of societal legitimacy, grantees repeatedly emphasized the negative impact of the vetting process on their reputation and relationships in the Palestinian community. Given the pre-existing controversy surrounding peacebuilding initiatives, particularly in Palestinian society, it is uncomfortable—to say the least—for APS grantees to begin their interface with prospective participants and vendors by demanding personal information for US government scrutiny. As one implementer explained, “We are trying to foster positive relationships with the people we want to participate in our programs. When we start off those relationships by asking people for information in order to run a terrorist background check on them, it is…counterproductive to our goals.” Multiple interviewees described vetting as preemptively undermining trust; in the words of one implementer, “[vetting] destroys trust before you start.” Interviewees described vetting as hindering recruiting and even preventing projects; as one Israeli implementer testified, “CMM was created to support…cross-boundary projects. But then there was the matter of the vetting, and subsequently we had [fewer] participants and [fewer] projects.” Survey respondents ranked vetting among the three most difficult challenges they face (2.79/5), equally as difficult as the legitimacy problem in Palestinian society (2.82). Among Israeli/Palestinian projects, vetting received an especially high 3.32 difficulty rating.

Grantees described the effects of the ATC in essentially identical terms. This policy requires that organizations sign the ATC, a legal document stating that they have not provided and will not knowingly provide material support to terrorists. Multiple APS implementers recalled prospective Palestinian participants and vendors expressing personal offense, refusing to sign and withdrawing from APS-funded projects. It is perceived by some as implying Palestinian support for terrorism. Another Palestinian implementer indicated that the ATC has inspired public condemnation of USAID in the media. Other implementers echoed the sense that the vetting and ATC policies exacerbate Palestinian opposition to peacebuilding and resentment toward the United States.

Thus, in a manner reminiscent of the interaction of USAID’s prime-sub policy with structural asymmetry, vetting and the ATC are perceived as reinforcing harmful aspects of the conflict dynamic. This impact is of course unintended; USAID applies vetting and ATC policies equally to all Israeli and

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104 Under USAID’s Mission Order 21, all prime grantees, in addition to any sub-grantees who are receiving cash grants, are required to sign the ATC. Individual participants are not required to sign the ATC, despite some perceptions to the contrary.

105 Note: There is a $25,000 threshold for vetting. Smaller vendors do not typically cross this threshold.
Palestinian prime grantees, but in this asymmetric context, the political implications are different for each group. The vetting and ATC policies exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of peacebuilding initiatives in Palestinian society, yet that carries implications across the joint partnerships, for overall project success and the reputations of grantees and USAID. “When we’re working so hard trying to get people to be part of the Palestinian programs,” a Palestinian implementer explained, “it makes that work so much harder.”

Conclusions

The cultivation of legitimacy in both Israeli and Palestinian societies is an imperative for APS grantees, and for the field as a whole. This chronic legitimacy crisis, rather than the performance of any individual peacebuilding initiative, is the key obstacle preventing grantees and the APS program from achieving wider impact. Indeed, as detailed below, APS-funded projects have achieved positive outcomes with their direct participants and local/communal impact. Yet the de-legitimization of peacebuilding—the stigma of “normalization” among Palestinians, and the marginalization of the “peace camp” in Israel—operates on a societal level, frustrating efforts to “scale up” their micro- and meso-level positive outcomes. Indeed, in this environment, APS grantees’ widespread achievement of micro- and meso-level success is remarkable and not to be taken for granted, as illustrated below.

2. Impact

Despite the formidable contextual challenges detailed above, positive peacebuilding outcomes were evident throughout the team’s site visits and encounters in the field and in documentation provided by implementers and USAID. APS grantees have devised adaptive strategies in response to contextual pressures, and demonstrated evidence of significant achievements, all the more remarkable given the current climate of opinion.

For several years, CMM has required grantees to set their sights on impact beyond their direct participants. The FY 2009 APS instructs applicants to “link the proposed activities to a higher-level decision-making and policy change agenda that seeks to impact a broader community beyond just the

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106 In practice, the vetting requirements are actually more stringent for Israeli participants in trainee programs managed by USAID, because Mission Order 21 states that “[n]on-U.S. individuals for whom USAID finances (a) training, study tours or invitational travel in the U.S. or third countries” need to be vetted. Under this definition, written for implementation of assistance programming in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel qualifies as a “third country”, thus requiring all participants be vetted. Whereas for activities that take place in West Bank/Gaza, trainees are only vetted when activities last more than five consecutive work days. Amended and Restated Mission Order No. 21, V.A.(3), pg. 4.

107 Terms such as “outcomes,” “impact” and “success” are defined in diverse ways by practitioners, evaluators and scholars (Pearson d’Estree et al. 2000; Church and Shouldice 2001). In this section, the team defines “outcomes” as direct results of a specific intervention on direct participants, and “impacts” as effects or products of such interventions that result in further-reaching, longer-term influence extending beyond direct participants to the communal, institutional or wider governmental and societal levels (Kelman 2005; Spurk 2009). The team sees both of the above as tantamount to degrees of “success,” particularly in light of the present context (Ross 2000).
In interviews, APS implementers typically articulated such linkages effectively, and in a number of cases provided evidence of such “scaling up” (detail below).

The FY 2012 APS further identifies “the most effective people-to-people projects to be those that explicitly and purposefully create linkages between their immediate objectives and high-level or large-scale peace processes or structural reforms.” On this point, for the purposes of evaluating impact, it is important to reiterate that there has not been a consistent “large-scale peace process” to which activities can be linked, excepting brief interludes, for more than a decade. Hence, it should not be surprising that the effects of APS projects are evident primarily at the interpersonal and local/communal levels—which is the intended purpose of these projects—and larger expectations are likely unrealistic. Indeed, CMM’s P2P program guide acknowledges that, “[i]t is not realistic to expect USAID or its implementing partners to achieve the delivery of peace writ-large from a singular peacebuilding program, let alone on a timeframe nicely aligned with fiscal cycles. The goal in most cases must be an incremental step on the path to larger impact.” A number of APS-funded initiatives have clearly taken such “incremental steps,” establishing solid foundations with potential for larger-scale, longer-term impact in terms of structural reform. Though it is too early to gauge, we identify several examples of this potential in “impact profiles” below.

While this study’s scope and developmental methodology did not allow for thorough performance audits of individual projects, evaluators noted substantial achievements of APS grantees, enabled through support of the APS program. This section will provide generalized examples of positive outcomes and foundations for larger impact achieved, listed according to some of the primary peacebuilding approaches funded through the APS, and with the caveat that—due to limited time in the field—this is only a partial list. It will then outline successful “emergent” strategies that have contributed to these achievements.

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108 APS FY 2009, cited from “Important APS Milestones 2012,” draft document provided to evaluators by CMM.
111 Terms such as “outcomes,” “impact” and “success” are defined in diverse ways by practitioners, evaluators and scholars (Pearson d’Estree et al. 2000; Church and Shouldice 2001). In this section, the team defines “outcomes” as direct results of a specific intervention on direct participants, and “impacts” as effects or products of such interventions that result in further-reaching, longer-term influence extending beyond direct participants to the communal, institutional or wider governmental and societal levels (Kelman 2005; Spurk 2009). The team sees both of the above as tantamount to degrees of “success,” particularly in light of the present context (Ross 2000).
**Achievements: Positive Outcomes and Foundations for Longer-Term Impact**

**Diverse Approaches, Multiple Contributions**

**Environment**: APS-funded projects have facilitated strategic partnerships on environmental issues between Israeli and Palestinian individuals, municipalities and communities, establishing programs to engage youth from both sides and the wider region in environmental action, and engaging in creative problem-solving to protect the water, air, and landscape that they share regardless of barriers or borders. These environmental initiatives have resulted in regional partnerships developing alternative energy sources, in joint wastewater disposal and pollution reduction systems, and in concrete policy changes including the prevention of potential environmental damage by halting planned construction of Israel’s Separation Barrier in at least two locations. In the process, they have pursued organizing strategies that engaged local and national governing institutions, developed vital infrastructure and meaningfully reduced environmental hazards, including preserving water sources in use since biblical times.112

**Education**: APS grantees have designed innovative educational models and programs, developing projects transforming the way that Arabic is taught and bringing Arab teachers into Israeli Jewish schools; building a growing network of bilingual schools that foster cross-cultural communities in multiple Israeli localities; sport education providing a catalyst for empowering youth from peripheral areas, especially young women, both uni-nationally and across conflict lines; using technological and professional training as a catalyst for cross-conflict engagement; and designing cutting-edge courses that combine academic research, intergroup dialogue, professional training and joint action projects.

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### Impact Profile: The Abraham Fund Initiatives

**Project: Language as a Cultural Bridge**

Content: Aims to transform the way Arabic is taught to Jewish students in the Israeli school system, by training and placing outstanding Arab teachers in Jewish-majority schools. Teachers implement original curriculum aimed at fostering conversational facility and cultural knowledge, blending language instruction, exposure to music and literature, and facilitated encounters with peer classes from Arab communities.

**Results**: Program now being implemented at 5th-6th grade level in more than 200 schools across Israel; adopted as official curriculum for North and Haifa regional districts. Mid-term evaluation revealed wide satisfaction at all levels—90% or more of participating principals reported improved student performance, parental support and successful integration of Arab teachers in Jewish-majority school, and recommended national adoption of the program; 95% of Arab teachers reported successful integration at school and 89% reported that their work positively changed students’ perceptions of Arabic language, culture and people.

[Sources: Annual Reports, Mid-Term Evaluation by Henrietta Szold Foundation (Hebrew)]

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**Civil Society in Israel**: APS-funded civil society and advocacy groups inside Israel are working together to push local government and institutions to fight discrimination, to equalize resource distribution, and

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improve policing and services, for the mutual benefit of all citizens, not waiting for the national government to take responsibility. In the process, these initiatives building an active civil society aimed at transforming citizenship and establishing shared civic space for Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.

**Dialogue Methodology:** APS-funded dialogue and peace education initiatives have developed explicit topical focus and elaborate methodologies, re-visioning the work of dialogue to direct its power of personal transformation toward motivating, educating and training effective advocates of social, cultural and structural change. One does not find APS grantees doing “dialogue” for its own sake. Veteran practitioners and organizations have internalized through years of experience, evaluation and self-critique that dialogue is always necessary but never sufficient; it is a powerful educational mechanism but not, by itself, a strategy for change. Conscious of the critique that such interventions can change perceptions among participants at the interpersonal level without achieving wider impact, most APS dialogue/education programs target specific groups of participants and focus on core conflict issues. Their curricula integrate uni-national and bi-national components, and combine intergroup encounters with professional training, specific academic or theoretical focus and encourage or require participants to design joint projects aimed at advancing social change.

### Impact Profile: Parents Circle Families Forum—Bereaved Israeli and Palestinian Families Supporting Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance

**Project:** The Israeli Palestinian Narratives Project: History through the Human Eye.

**Content:** 12 Israeli-Palestinian “parallel narrative working groups” with 20-30 participants each, designed “To promote reconciliation through a more profound knowledge of each other's historic, national and personal narrative.” Curriculum of 4-5 full-day meetings, featuring joint lectures by Israeli and Palestinian historians, joint visits to sites of destroyed pre-1948 Palestinian village, and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum in Israel, and dialogue sessions facilitated by specially trained Israeli and Palestinian members of the Bereaved Families Forum at each meeting.

**Results:** Pioneering methodology and curriculum developed for narrative-focused intergroup dialogue. 94% of participants described program as “very interesting,” 88% as “valuable.” 86% reported “increased belief in the possibility of reconciliation”; 89% “increased willingness to engage in peacebuilding”; 77% “increased support for peace.” The program is documented in the 90-minute film, Two-Sided Story, broadcast on Israel Channel Two in January 2013.

**Quotes:** “I have never been exposed to the Israeli narrative before; I had heard the short version and never dug deeper…we felt the human tragedy, and I would have liked it to be longer in order to know more.” “I left with essential, useful knowledge.” “One of the best, most powerful meetings… during all my years of [peace] activity, impact-wise.”

[Sources: Interviews, Quarterly Reports, Mid-Term Report by Kahanoff and Shibly]

**Media:** APS-funded media projects have brought to wider local and international audiences through film, radio, social networks and online platforms, providing alternative perspectives, the voices and untold stories of Israelis and Palestinians engaged in the everyday work of peacebuilding and nonviolence.

**Foundations for Broader Impact**

**Expansion of Participation/Recruitment:** Despite the recruitment challenges cited by numerous grantees, the vast majority of projects achieved or surpassed their recruitment goals, and many reported growth—sometimes profound—in participation and public demand in recent years. Among many other examples, the “Good Water Neighbors” environmental project partnering Israeli and Palestinian communities to solve shared environmental problems grew from 9 to 28 participant communities; the bilingual school network operated by the Hand in Hand Center for Arab-Jewish Education grew from a single campus to growing schools in five Israeli cities and three additional start-up community programs; the “Language as a Cultural Bridge” project of the Abraham Fund Initiatives grew from a pilot in two
municipalities to official adoption by two regional school districts and implementation in over 200 schools.

**Impact Profile: EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East**

**Project:** Good Water Neighbors: Cross Border Community Reconciliation Based on Shared Water Sources and Common Environmental Issues.

**Content:** Establishes multi-dimensional partnerships for environmental problem-solving and sustainable water management between neighboring Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian communities. APS grants have funded the implementation of cooperation agreements establishing and operating wastewater treatment, pollution reduction, sanitation, water source rehabilitation, educational “ecofacilities,” youth programs, advocacy campaigns, research projects and shared “Neighbors Path” environmental awareness hiking trail programs.

**Results:** Good Water Neighbors has expanded to 28 current participant communities in 10 regional concentrations, involving hundreds of local officials, building infrastructure and programs reaching tens of thousands of beneficiaries. “Neighbors Path” environmental awareness hiking trails established for 21 communities, conducting more than 500 tours with over 15,000 participants. In two locations, Israeli and Palestinian partner communities led sustained, successful joint advocacy campaigns to prevent construction of Israel’s Separation Barrier in areas of ecological and historical value on their “Neighbors Path.”

[Sources: Grantee interviews, reports in Haaretz and Christian Science Monitor.]

**Institutional/Official Recognition:** In interviews, APS grantees described facing severe challenges in soliciting governmental support for projects, due to bureaucratic inertia, political sensitivities, or both. Nonetheless, numerous implementers—through perseverance and effective engagement—succeeded in garnering official recognition and in some cases endorsement, financial support, policy changes and adoption of projects and models by relevant Ministries. In the best cases, official adoption led to scaling projects up from the local to the regional level, with potential for national adoption. These successes were achieved through sustained campaigns of local community mobilization, network building and persistent engagement of relevant authorities at multiple levels to obtain official recognition, resource allocation and policy changes. In one particularly sensitive example, the “Policing in Divided Societies” project of The Abraham Fund Initiatives has led to design and implementation of community/minority policing training by the Israel Police and convened an unprecedented Round Table Forum on the issue involving dozens of mayors of major Arab municipalities, civil society representatives and the top leadership of the police.

**Establishment of “Touch points”—Public Space for Peacebuilding:** The work of APS grantees has established myriad temporary and permanent public spaces, concrete and virtual, that provide “touch points” for Arab/Palestinian and Jewish/Israeli citizens to engage in dialogue, strategizing and advocacy for change, while providing concrete or virtual embodiment of cross-conflict engagement and nonviolent discourse in the public space. Among dozens of other examples, the Jaffa Convention organized by the Citizens’ Accord Forum Between Jews and Arabs in Israel has become a unique annual gathering of key stakeholders from government, civil society, and academia for focused examinations of critical issues in the relations of Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel and of Arab citizens to the state.

**Building Networks of Educated, Motivated Agents of Change:** Graduates of dialogue and peace education programs are counted among the directors and staff of multiple APS grantee projects, on the Mission staff, and in some cases as prominent public advocates of cross-conflict engagement and change—all providing living examples of the long-term impact of effective youth empowerment and peace education work. Research has found that adult activists and peacebuilders commonly cite their participation as youth in intergroup dialogue and other cross-conflict initiatives as a direct inspiration for their adult engagement in the field, as indeed occurred with multiple interviewees in this evaluation.
**Self-Assessments of APS Grantees**

On the survey, respondents were asked to rate on a five-point scale the success of their projects at a number of different levels. Their self-assessments, displayed in Table 3, mirror the evaluation team’s conclusions from the field phase. Despite the challenging context, the majority of APS-funded projects are working effectively and often innovatively, adapting methodology through practice, and achieving positive outcomes for direct participants and contributions to peacebuilding at micro/personal and local/communal levels. Impact remains elusive, however, at societal/national/political levels, a condition that stems largely from the macro-contextual challenges identified above.

*Table 3. Self-Assessments of Success: Survey Respondents (n = 26)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION: “How do you rate the success of your organization’s USAID-funded project in the following aspects?”</th>
<th>Mean Rating (1/5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing project activities as originally envisioned</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing positive experiences for direct participants</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving the project’s intended objectives/outcomes</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to peacebuilding at an interpersonal/grassroots level</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to unexpected events and contextual challenges</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching individuals/groups not previously engaged in peacebuilding</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to peacebuilding at a local community/institutional level</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influencing individuals/groups beyond your direct participants</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to peacebuilding at the civil society level</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to peacebuilding at the national political level</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is crucially important to note that few, if any, interviewees appeared content with the level of successes presented here. One APS grantee, the director of an Israeli-Palestinian youth dialogue program, embodied a widespread desire to have impact at “the next level”:

“We are at a point now where the structure of our programming has adapted to the conflict…What we do know, and there’s evidence and there’s been research…participants in our programs do go through an attitudinal change process, and many remain active the field for years as graduates. The question is how do they effect change in the broader conflict? We know that we effect change on an individual basis. I know that our graduates have stronger positive feelings toward the other, they know the other narrative, they have empathetic understanding of the other. The question is, what do we need to equip young people with, in order to take those individual changes and effect change or engage in collective action?”

A similar urgency animated the testimonies of the majority of peacebuilders interviewed, the desire that direct project outcomes will contribute to broader change. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge and value the development of proven models, the institutions and networks established, the micro- and meso-level changes created through the work of APS-funded initiatives. The project director quoted above is himself an indicator of long-term impact at the personal level; he and his entire program staff had themselves started their paths in peacebuilding as youth participants in the same program, 10-15 years and four wars ago.

**Conclusions**

The work of APS grantees has registered consistently positive impacts at the levels of direct participants and local communities. Their work has resulted in opportunities for meaningful, constructive engagement between tens of thousands of Israeli and Palestinians and Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel,
and had tangible positive impacts in dozens of areas throughout the region. In the present context, particularly, such continued participation and in some cases, growing demand for programs is not to be taken for granted. Moreover, when initiatives have been effectively linked to realistically achievable opportunities for concrete social-structural change, effects have been significant—such as the establishment or upgrading of environmental infrastructure, reform of educational policy, the establishment of educational and economic opportunities for local communities, and even re-routing of the Separation Barrier. Additionally, the motivation and training of new cadres of effective advocates for peacebuilding lays a crucial foundation for the continuation of effective P2P work in the future.

The ensuing section will outline project strategies that have proved effective in contributing to these positive outcomes in the present context; strategies that show promise for “scaling up” to achieve broader impact; and the ways in which USAID can most effectively support ongoing innovation and improvement, and enhance the impact of the APS program going forward.

3. Successful Strategies

Grantees identified a number of strategies as contributing effectively to mitigating the contextual challenges and achieving the positive outcomes detailed above. In the cases highlighted here, the successful strategies articulated by grantees are spelled out in the language of recent APS proposals and CMM’s P2P Program Guide—evidence that these documents indeed reflect the “state of the art” in terms of P2P programming design.

Table 4 illustrates the percentages of interviewees who emphasized key themes related to program strategy. Below is a detailed analysis of interview and survey responses, including quotes illustrative of widely shared sentiment or experience.

Table 4. Percentages of Interviewees Citing Key Themes Regarding Programming/Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Strategy Themes</th>
<th>All Interviewees</th>
<th>Israeli-Palestinian Projects</th>
<th>Arab-Jewish Orgs in Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size (projects)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete Changes/ Common Interest</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uni-national Component</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-national Component</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Framing: Working for Concrete Changes on Issues of Common Interest: In the current political climate, projects oriented toward resolving specific issues of shared interest or common concern for both populations—e.g. environmental protection, civic equality, media literacy, educational and societal capacity, professional training, trauma healing, issue advocacy—are widely perceived as more legitimate
and effective than dialogue or relationship-building for its own sake. CMM officially endorses this approach, explicitly recommending the identification of common interests in recent APS solicitations.113

This is especially true in Palestinian society, where joint projects without clear goals are vulnerable to the charge of “normalization” or acceptance of the status quo. “You cannot bring them now just by dialogue,” explained a Palestinian implementer, “not a meeting for the sake of a meeting, but with the purpose of building actual projects, producing something.” Another Palestinian implementer cited this as a criterion for participation: “In the political context, the fact that this is practical and action-oriented gives a response to the accusations of normalization. If it’s practical and beneficial for our society, then we come; a project, not just talk—action.” An Israeli implementer echoed this effect on Palestinian participation, stating that due to anti-normalization pressures, some do fear participating in projects with Israelis, but “on environmental issues, we have no problems with Palestinians cooperating or being involved.”

This framing is of increasing importance among Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel as well, who increasingly mirror the skepticism of Palestinians regarding initiatives labeled as dialogue or relationship-building for its own sake. An Israeli implementer working on environmental issues explained the effect of framing around mutual interest, and focusing on changes that can be feasibly and visibly achieved:

“You must identify the self-interest from the outset. Otherwise, you’re gonna fail. If you cannot enable a resident, a schoolteacher, a mayor—to explain why they choose to work with the other side—it will become a one-time action. That’s the reality of the level of animosity on the street…Because we deal with concrete issues—we don’t say you’re going to be a peacemaker—we say you’re going to improve your water, your sewerage. Not only do we enable someone to defend their actions—they can convince other people. And that’s how to be a peacemaker.”

Projects that can achieve concrete changes or visible benefits are therefore effective in countering anti-normalization and political marginalization, and attracting, motivating, and cultivating societal support for participants to engage with their communities and produce the desired “ripple effects” that achieve wider and longer-term impact. Many interviewees echoed the enthusiastic recommendation of one survey respondent, who urged USAID to continue emphasizing the “identification of common interests in its projects, a common interest for both Israelis and Palestinians, where each side can easily feel the benefits of working together.”

It is crucial to note that this is a reframing, not a refusal, of intergroup dialogue. In order to effectively address issues of common interest, such issues must be identified, strategies must be mutually developed, implemented, and modified, and results analyzed and evaluated—all through intergroup communication processes, i.e. dialogue. This reframed approach typically requires, topically and strategically focused intergroup dialogue as a means to achieving clearly defined ends. For Arab-Jewish and Israeli-Palestinian intergroup engagement, dialogue remains absolutely necessary, even though the consensus now acknowledges that it is not sufficient.

113 APS FY 2012.
2. Integration of Uni-national/Intra-group and Bi-national/Inter-group Approaches: The deliberate, sequential integration of uni-national/intra-group and bi-national/inter-group encounters is now the industry standard for intergroup programs. APS grantees universally emphasized the essential contribution of uni-national preparation and processing phases staged before and often after cross-conflict or bi-national encounters. This resonates with CMM’s instructions for P2P program design first articulated in the 2010 APS, which states, “for those applications that utilize a cross-border approach, support on issues of mutual interest should be built within communities on respective sides of the border prior to engaging in cross-border dialogue in order to strengthen chances for success.”

APS grantees describe these intragroup sessions as necessary and complementary responses to the dissonance between positive intergroup encounter experiences and separate, unequal everyday realities. As one implementer explained, “Uni-national frameworks are a necessity, because [intergroup] meetings are exceptional, and there is a difference and segregation between [participants] in real life.”

Grantees cited a number of different reasons for their increased emphasis on intra-group elements in this classically intergroup field. First, intra-group discussions are characterized as crucial in terms of enhancing the dialogue process. In particular, they are seen as essential in preparation for an intergroup meeting. A Palestinian grantee emphasized the importance of group- and skill-building in advance, stating that uni-national meetings give participants, “the skills, the maturity, the language, the terms…to meet with Israelis. Another Palestinian implementer emphasized the importance of emotional/psychological preparation, due to the controversy and tension inherent in cross-conflict engagement:

“It is important not to go to bi-national dialogue immediately. Lots of frustrations of the Palestinians, and fears that this will lead to expulsion from the university, that it will influence their studies or their reputations. So after we recruit the students, we run only uni-national for a longer time, as long as needed, before we bring them together.”

After an intergroup encounter, grantees value uni-national meetings as spaces for participants to process their experiences. As an Israeli implementer explained, “I find that the uni-national programs are very reinforcing, because the Israelis and Palestinians have the opportunity to elaborate in a much safer zone…as a reliving, as a way to analyze what you’re going through together.”

Uni-national work is also explained as a response to the asymmetry of the situation, and the different needs that each side brings to the intergroup process—as articulated by an Israeli grantee:

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“As a grassroots program in [the West Bank], we try to tell our people, before we talk about peace between Palestinians and Israel, we talk about the internal peace – because if we can’t achieve internal peace, then we can’t achieve peace with the Israelis… We are working on two sides - on one hand, internal peace, and the other hand, peace between Palestinians and Israelis.”

- Palestinian implementer

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APS FY 2010, quoted from “Important APS Milestones 2012.” The P2P program guide additionally asserts that “Before such face-to-face encounters can occur constructively, it is frequently helpful to first lay a psychological and social foundation for the cross-conflict exchange through separate activities for the respective groups” (p. 14).
“For [Jewish Israelis], uni-national work focuses on working through cognitive dissonances and accusations, and aims at taking responsibility. For Palestinians, it means creating a particularistic identity. The Arabs feel that the existing atmosphere does not allow them to develop their own particularistic identity and that this takes a heavy toll among young people. Lacking the legitimacy to develop a unified identity of which they can be proud, they may move in radical directions.”

Yet beyond enhancement of the intergroup process, numerous grantees described uni-national meetings as critical dialogue forums in their own right—spaces for dealing with “internal” issues of societal fragmentation and intra-group conflict. An Israeli implementer testified that, “I deal a lot in the uni-nationals with the issues of left and right wing in Israel.” A Palestinian grantee described “internal peace” as a pre-requisite for Israeli-Palestinian peace:

“As a grassroots program,…we try to tell our people, before we talk about peace between Palestinians and Israel, we talk about the internal peace—because if we can’t achieve internal peace, then we can’t achieve peace with the Israelis…We are working on two sides—one hand, internal peace, and the other hand, peace between Palestinians and Israelis.”

An Israeli implementer likewise described rectifying the relationship of Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel as necessary for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Another Israeli grantee went so far as to reverse the common conception of uni-national meetings as secondary priorities, saying, “I consider joint dialogue as something which nourishes the uni-national framework.” The prevailing sentiment, however, was one of synthesis, as articulated by a survey respondent: “Both Palestinian and Israeli societies are fragmenting. They each need to address internal divisions while concurrently tackling the Palestinian-Israeli divide.”

3. The Continued Importance of Bi-National Engagement: A few grantees advocated an entirely uni-national focus, primarily on the Palestinian side. The large majority of implementers, however, valued synergistic engagement on both tracks. As one Palestinian interviewee explained, “There’s a benefit to both uni-national and bi-national—you can’t be isolated completely. If I don’t speak to Israelis, then I don’t challenge them—[then] I’m thinking by myself.” One survey respondent echoed this sentiment, asserting that, “Peacebuilding is, in my opinion, not effective if it happens only on one side.” A Palestinian interviewee stated that, “It is impossible to imagine how we can reach a peaceful solution without reaching each other, contacting each other, knowing each other.”

Indeed, multiple grantees argued that bi-national engagement is more important than ever, in light of the reality of increased separation. As a Palestinian implementer explained:

“There is zero interaction with the other side [today]…it’s not like [previous] generations, where there were open borders. This generation of Palestinians and Israelis has this wall between them—and that’s what we’re trying to do—is reestablish that contact, and to organize tours for Israelis to see what life is like on the other side…”

A survey respondent emphasized the importance of synthesis, explaining that, “[the situation] has to be matched by a parallel approach—working separately but together—there are internal dynamics happening, we have to recognize them and work with them.” According to the large majority of APS

“"In the past, our client was the participants. Today, our client is the decision maker. We have many more participants now—but they are the laboratory. We want to get the lessons learned from success, and scale it up.”

- Israeli Implementer
grantees, uni-national/bi-national synthesis is no longer a controversy within the field, but a consensus of best practice, whether between Israelis and Palestinians or between Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel.

4. Strategic Engagement of Authorities and Institutions:

Securing official support is often as difficult as it is valuable for projects struggling to establish societal legitimacy. For many grantees, this has required perseverance through periods of rejection, and engagement at multiple levels over significant periods of time. As one grantee explained, “To succeed in this, you need stubbornness, because nothing will move if you don’t keep pushing - because you’re not going to get there overnight.” Through patient, stubborn, strategic engagement, a number of grantees have succeeded in enlisting official support from multiple authorities, and subsequently reaching broader constituencies and “scaling up” programs to communal, municipal and even regional levels.

One repeat APS grantee has reworked its operational strategy around the belief that, “Social change can be achieved by getting the Israeli government to do something and to act.” The organization, a veteran in the field of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel, moved from being a “projects organization” to a three-part strategy: Identifying needs, developing pilot programs to address the needs, and once a model is proven successful—engaging in intensive advocacy and lobbying until the model is adopted, financed and implemented by the government in partnership with the organization. According to an organizational director, government engagement is integrated throughout the process:

“From the start, we get representatives from the government, to be part of the steering committee. We start the buy-in process very early. We want you to be part of the designing mechanism…[then we work] To illuminate an issue, to understand, to define, to illustrate, to develop the language, to demonstrate the implications—what are the potential benefits of doing something—and what can be done…the dangers and the potentials. And to bring before the government a variety of possibilities and alternatives, in regard to the how—how they can do it.”

This strategy has multiplied impact for multiple initiatives; a labor-force training and employment program for Arab women has grown from 3 to 38 participant municipalities; a program bringing outstanding Arab teachers to teach the Arabic language in Jewish schools has been adopted by the Northern district of the Ministry of Education, growing from six pilot classrooms to more than 200 schools around the country; a project working on the charged issue of Israeli policing in Arab communities has been adopted by the police, and the mayors and councils of major Arab municipalities. “In the past, our client was the participants,” explained an organizational director. “Today, our client is the decision maker. We have many more participants now, but they are the laboratory. We want to get the lessons learned from success, and scale it up.”

To be sure, this organization’s process of engagement has been fraught with difficulty, for the same reasons emphasized in previous sections. Personal contacts built through great investments of time have disappeared with changes in government; newly elected officials have rejected projects approved by the previous occupant. Yet by continuing work with lower-level contacts and local officials, “We managed to push and advocate and get through some of the recommendations.” When contentious issues arose during project implementation that threatened to end it—through negotiations with multiple contacts and the support of participant schools, the crisis was resolved and the program has continued to thrive.

Other grantees have exemplified this combination of patience and persistence in pushing government to change; one explained that, “It took us three years to convince the Israeli government that they can support our activity…we should not give in to despair!” Another implementer described the
government as simultaneously a partner for cooperation, and an obstacle to be overcome: “I suggest not looking at these issues as binary matters, as an either/or situation. The challenge is to find partners [inside the government], and form significant partnerships with them.”

This strategy appeared more popular for Arab-Jewish Initiatives working in Israel. Regional or country-wide official adoption has never been an option for most Israeli-Palestinian initiatives, which must simultaneously navigate Israel’s political and security systems and both Israeli and Palestinian authorities. Nonetheless, the director of one APS-funded initiative sees their project building capacity that the governments will need in the future:

“When the governments wake up and figure out how to work together—we will then give them a regional plan. Here’s the plan on the technical level so here go implement. We’ve done the work on the ground and can show you the technical infrastructure—now go implement...[We have] people in these countries—they know each other, they work and trust each other. Governments can reach down, draw down and implement the projects from the political end.”

5. Long-Term Support for Continuity, Knowledge, Model, and Network Building: If patience, persistence, and proven strategy are the keys to securing official support, they are all the more crucial to achieving long-term impact. It is not coincidental that veteran organizations, which have often received multiple APS grants, have achieved many of the most prominent successes noted in this report, in terms of concrete change, institutional engagement, establishment of permanent public spaces and institutions, and methodological sophistication. It takes significant time for a program to train competent staff, to build social networks and a public reputation, to pilot and refine methods, and to secure public recognition and institutional support. Like government support, those objectives are achieved through patience, perseverance, ongoing strategic adaptation and expansion of activities and participant populations. The knowledge, repertoire, reputation built through experience and demonstrated commitment are valuable assets for specific organizations and the entire peacebuilding field. Programs cannot be expected to produce societal-level impact in the space of a single grant-cycle; however, long-term investment in successful models, organizations, and strategies can and will effect enduring change.

CMM’s P2P program guide eloquently describes these constraints:

“While peacebuilding requires sustained and long-term efforts, government funding cycles occur on a shorter cycle. As a result, the designs of peacebuilding interventions reflect funding cycles rather than the temporal needs of the peacebuilding intervention. P2P programming is based on a theory of change which depends on the community and key actors realizing attitudinal change, mutual understanding, and positive interaction. This organic process of change occurs over time through recurring constructive engagement, which can be both expensive and lengthy.”

Yet CMM’s awareness of the issue was not apparent to APS grantees on the ground, majorities of whom expressed criticism of current funding constraints. 55% of interviewees, and 67% of Israeli-Palestinian projects, criticized the “innovation requirement” of the APS—the requirement that limits grants for a particular project to a single three-year cycle. Grantees spoke in severe terms and indicated that the

inability to extend projects beyond a single two- or three-year grant cycle had created an atmosphere of uncertainty that limited expectations and commitment and foreclosed potential for lasting impact. A number of interviewees told of participants disappointed by the failure to continue successful programs. In one Israeli-Palestinian media training program, an implementer lamented that, “after two years, the journalists started to write differently—but then the program ended.”

Another implementer estimated that, “if you want to have any impact in any community, you need five or ten years, you need a long process of evaluation—it’s called grassroots, you need to let things grow, it takes time.”

The same investment of time was recommended for educational processes, as explained by one implementer: “The minimal time span is three to five years—it takes time to build the staff, the discourse…continuity—two years is not enough. There’s no understanding that an educational process demands time, as well as money.” One APS-funded initiative designed multi-faceted graduate programs combining intergroup dialogue with professional training and intensive courses taught by leading Israeli and Palestinian academics. After a grant cycle, they felt that they finally had developed and refined a successful model—and the project ended. “Professors in universities teach a course at least three years, improve it—and then teach it the rest of their lives,” they explained; “That is how we need to work, to learn from experience and then build on success.”

In addition to the “innovation requirement,” some programs cited the “unique participants” requirement—the need to continually start from scratch with new participants—as detrimental to long-term impact. As one Israeli implementer explained:

“Once I’ve done a program, I can’t continue with [participants] who have already gone through the process, who have built relationships, who are hungry for follow-up and expanding their knowledge. I have to start from scratch with new people again. This keeps us from using what we know from the field. We’ve worked in this for 30 years and we know what works.”

That assertion is supported by research. The most extensive empirical studies of Israeli-Palestinian peace education uniformly conclude that, even in this hostile context, educational interventions can achieve long-term impact, but only through long-term follow-up and sustained support.116

A number of grantees offered recommendations for extending the APS—creating a five-year grant for educational programs, or an extension clause for models proven successful.

Understanding that USAID is constrained by complex funding and accountability requirements, the evaluation team recognizes that significantly extended timetables for grants may not be feasible. However, the team concurs with the strong sentiments expressed by grantees—the “start-up” funding model is not appropriate for grassroots peacebuilding in this context. Innovation is important, but peacebuilding is more akin to long-term community building and organizing than “social entrepreneurship.” If it is possible, USAID might do well to dedicate the long-term APS appropriation to build sustainable long-term frameworks from its successful innovations.

**Conclusions**

The strategies listed above, among others, have proven particularly effective in enhancing legitimacy, perceived relevance, and potential impact of projects in the current atmosphere of popular skepticism, and in some cases, hostility towards P2P. The very same strategies are reflected in the language of recent APS solicitations and endorsed by key local USAID Mission staff, evidence of sound contextual analysis by CMM. These strategies, developed in such a challenging operational environment, carry potential for replication in other contexts of ongoing conflict. As such, they constitute important contributions of the APS program to the global peacebuilding field.

Regarding CMM’s role, support for strategies framed around concrete issues and/or social-structural change can be made more explicit by expanding the conceptual framework of reference in official CMM APS documents beyond exclusive or dominant emphasis on the “contact hypothesis.” Additionally, the time limits of the current project cycle and the “innovation” requirement limit implementers’ ability to bring successful strategies to reach their full potential impact in the field.

**4. USAID Grant Management**

**Table 5. Percentages of Interviewees Citing Key Themes Regarding USAID Grant Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRANT MANAGEMENT THEMES</th>
<th>All Interviewees</th>
<th>Israeli-Palestinian Orgs and Projects</th>
<th>Arab-Jewish Orgs in Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID — Positive Assessments</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge: Bureaucracy</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge: Vetting</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge: ATC</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge: Limited Grant Length</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge: Culture/ Communication with USAID</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A paradox defines Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders’ descriptions of their experiences as APS grantees. Almost universally, grantees expressed profound appreciation for the magnitude of APS grants and the vital resources the APS has provided to the entire peacebuilding field; grantees also praised the contextual fluency of the local USAID Mission staff and the capacity-building effects of the USAID grant process. At the same time, grantees criticized USAID management and oversight practices that, in their eyes, have magnified the challenges they face and impaired their capacities to achieve the very objectives to which APS resources are originally dedicated.

In the big picture, APS grants are lauded as the most generous available in the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian context; there is almost unanimous acknowledgement among grantees that the APS program has contributed to the resilience and development of their organizations. As, their strategies and the

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117 APS solicitation and Program Guide.
field as a whole. Additionally, as Tables 6a and 6b illustrate, 80% of survey respondents asserted that “working on a USAID project has helped to build organizational capacity,” primarily in terms of administrative and financial management, monitoring and evaluation, and strategic planning.

**Tables 6a and 6b. USAID Contributions to Organizational Capacity Building: Survey Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION: “Has working on a USAID-funded project helped to build your organizational capacity?” (25 respondents)</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, very helpful</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, somewhat helpful</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very helpful</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not helpful at all</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION: “What organizational areas were improved through your work with USAID?” (23 respondents)</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Financial Management</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term Strategic Planning</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Communication</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking and Sharing Knowledge with Similar Groups</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Participant Populations</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Local Government Institutions</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, however, USAID’s administrative policies evoke emphatic criticism. 90% of grantees describe these as imposing unsustainable burdens on their organizational structure, time and resource allocation, and everyday operation, enabling yet simultaneously complicating their already demanding work. As one survey respondent explained, “While the funding helped us to grow as an organization and thus became stronger/more effective, the same funding from another source would have been much more efficiently used given the bureaucratic hurdles involved with USAID-related support.”

As detailed in previous sections, specific criticisms are directed at specific policies—for example, the Vetting and ATC policies are cited as undermining recruiting efforts and reinforcing negative images of peacebuilding and USAID itself in the Palestinian community, and rendering it impossible to include participants from politically opposed constituencies, precisely the people it is strategically necessary to reach. Above all, however, grantees described the sheer burden of overall administrative requirements as excessive to the point of being detrimental. Interviewees repeatedly described USAID’s regulations as imposing disproportionate burdens on small organizations and shifting focus away from programming. As one grantee explained, “the administrative aspects of the project are so intensive that…instead of investing 10% of time on administration and 90% on activities, I invest 60% on bureaucracy and maybe 40% on activities—and it should be vice versa.”

As Table 7 illustrates, clear majorities of survey respondents rated USAID as “somewhat more challenging” or “much more difficult” than other funders regarding multiple forms of oversight.
Table 7. Comparison of USAID Administrative Process with Other Donors: Survey Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>[USAID is]</th>
<th>Ordinary, More or Less the Same</th>
<th>Somewhat More Challenging</th>
<th>Much More Difficult</th>
<th>Response Average (/4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounting/Financial Management</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Application Process</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grant Relationship</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous grantees emphasized the sense that USAID regulations are not designed for the grassroots NGOs that make up most of the Israeli/Palestinian peacebuilding field. As one survey respondent explained:

“As an organization which mainly focuses on grassroots work the amount of administrative work is not proportional to the work on the ground, as well as it in some ways changes our approach of work as an organization (in a negative sense). All of a sudden we have a full position of someone who is just doing [USAID compliance] work. These demands are nothing like any of our other many donors. Furthermore in our experience these high demands steer away the focus/attention from the work on the ground- as they take a lot of the time and energies from those who do the work in the field.”

One interviewee despaired of the situation, “For a project like ours, it’s an overkill [sic] to impose this kind of bureaucracy…we cannot handle [it]. You cannot treat a one million dollar project like a ten million dollar project. It’s unproductive and it’s detrimental to CMM’s interests.” Multiple interviewees stated that they would advise small organizations to avoid USAID grants; in the words of one implementer, “If you’re not a large organization, you can’t cope with these rules. The vetting, tremendous inflexibility, tremendous bureaucracy—if you’re a small organization, I would not advise you to take a grant from CMM.” These sentiments were nearly unanimous among interviewees and survey respondents, and typically expressed in no uncertain terms.
CMM has taken significant steps to address these concerns, by providing frequent training sessions to assist with administrative compliance, and by introducing FOGs in 2011. These grants, offering up to $100,000 for shorter-term projects with reduced oversight, were “introduced to make application process easier for smaller organizations, coinciding with USAID’s broader efforts to reach local grassroots organizations through USAID Forward.”

Local USAID Mission staff are well aware of these issues; they advise applicants of the rigorous nature of oversight in advance, and devote significant proportions of their own staff time to training grantees, both individually and through mandatory training sessions for all grantees, to perform the myriad tasks necessary to fulfill oversight requirements. Yet this further underscores the complex nature of the regulation regime—Mission staff, like grantees, are forced to allocate disproportionate time and resources to administrative oversight rather than focusing on supporting effective peacebuilding in the field.

USAID is fully aware of the additional management burden administering a USAID award creates. As such, USAID allows for the payment of the salaries for an additional compliance officer under the awards, usually up to a half-time position. But even the addition of a compliance officer was insufficient for some organizations to manage the load; a repeat grantee organization reported the resignation of a leading program officer, who cited inability to focus on programming due to the administrative burden, this despite having a compliance officer on staff. Such outcomes are not in the interest of the grantees, USAID, or the goals of the APS program.

Some expressed awareness that local USAID Mission staff are not responsible for the regulation requirements, and that they may not be empowered to change it. As one survey respondent stated, “While I feel that the USAID staff do understand the local context, its seems beyond their control to address changes to their requirements that would make working in the local context more feasible (vetting, ATC, branding and marking etc.).” Another survey respondent explained, “The USAID staff with whom we have had contact have tried to show flexibility where possible and on a personal level seem to have an understanding of the complexities on the ground. The problem is that they are bound by very stringent rules.”

Such views, voiced by multiple grantees, portray rigid oversight requirements as detracting from the work of both Mission staff and grantees, neither of whom possess the agency to enact changes that both understand as necessary for effective work. This framing articulates a profound sense of disempowerment on the part of parties immersed in the local context vis-à-vis decision-making authority at USAID—a spirit at odds with the principle articulated in the 2012 APS, which states that “peacebuilding is most effective when locally owned.”

Multiple interviewees interpreted the oversight regime as signaling a lack of trust or respect; as one said, “There’s not a drop of trust [from USAID] in our work—they want to check, they don’t believe—there

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118 “Important APS Milestones.”
119 APS FY12, p.7.
is a difficulty they have to respect our methods, our work—not to interfere in meetings. [Our] organization also has rules of work and needs that they have to respect.”

One survey respondent encapsulated the overall dynamic as precluding a genuine sense of “partnership” between grantees and the Agency, saying, “In terms of calling our relationship with USAID a ‘partnership,’ I appreciate that USAID is going through a reflective process by doing this evaluation…but in general, our relationship is really only a transactional relationship where we comply with rules and regulations that have little room for change.” This opinion was not universal; 52% of survey respondents agreed with the statement, “our relationship with CMM is a partnership.” However, grantees most often described the same relationship in explicitly hierarchical or bureaucratic terms - particularly in interviews and open-ended survey responses. Moreover, both grantees and USAID staff repeatedly expressed doubt that any of the controversial USAID regulations could actually be changed in practice. Such skepticism about the possibility of changing administrative regulations ill befits organizations—whether grantees or USAID itself—dedicated to changing the dynamics of larger conflicts.

As the DNH framework cautions, the impact of aid in conflict environments only begins with the transfer of funds. The operational practices of aid agencies carry significant, often unintended consequences for local partners and must be subject to systematic scrutiny.120 Given CMM’s endorsement of DNH and USAID’s internal emphasis on evaluation quality, it is imperative to rigorously assess the effects of the Agency’s own grant management policies on overall impact.121

Conclusions

This section’s findings raise questions regarding the utility of specific practices as well as the overall burden of USAID administrative requirements, which are counter-productive to the strategic objectives of APS grantees and the APS program alike. These policies, as well as the requirement that (predominantly Israeli) prime grantees supervise (predominantly Palestinian) sub-grantees further complicate the inherently sensitive working relationships of Israeli and Palestinian partners.

These policies are harmful not solely because they place excessive demands on organizations working in an incomparably challenging environment, but because it puts additional strains on embattled organizations already facing significant challenges in the environment in which they operate. In contextual analysis, these policies exacerbate the legitimacy deficit and structural asymmetry that APS grantees, scholars and practitioners all cite as the paramount challenges of the Israeli/Palestinian peacebuilding field.122

Additionally, the time horizon of single APS grants is too narrow to achieve significant influence beyond direct participant and local communal levels. This problem is symptomatic of the field and by no means

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120 Anderson and Olson, Confronting War1999; CDA.


unique to the APS—indeed, CMM’s *P2P Program Guide* explicitly states that it is unrealistic to expect initiatives to “produce long-term results with short-term resources…let alone on a timeframe nicely aligned with fiscal cycles.” This common problem is amplified, however, by the “innovation requirement” of the APS—the mandate that organizations design new projects in order to solicit new funding. Grantees expend prodigious efforts in order to secure and manage a single APS grant. Once that investment is made and the steep USAID organizational learning curve is overcome through experience, then sustaining support for successful projects becomes a clear interest of both donor and grantees.

Studies of peace education interventions in conflict contexts emphasize that long-term programming is crucial to achieving lasting impact. A hostile context inexorably erodes the positive effects of an initial encounter program for most participants; however, follow-up programs provide a “restorative” effect for some, and sustained follow-up can lead to lifelong impact. Long-term investment is necessary to achieve lasting impact at the personal level; it is all the more so to inspire change at communal and societal levels. To date, APS grants have empowered grantees to implement outstanding short-term projects, establish fledgling networks and institutions, design innovative models and develop adaptive strategies, all in daunting circumstances. With long-term investment in successful programs and strategies, strategic advocacy, and targeted reform of grant management practices, the APS has the potential to truly empower peacebuilders, amplify their voices, and increase their influence in Israeli and Palestinian society and politics.

**Recommendations**

1. **Context**

Establish a strategic approach to empowering APS grantees to address macro-level contextual challenges identified in this report, particularly structural asymmetry and societal legitimacy. Work with grantees, leveraging their strengths and USAID’s resources, to enhance capacity to respond to these issues—as individual initiatives and jointly across the local P2P field.

2. **Program Strategies**

Continue and expand support for successful strategies identified in recent APS documents and validated in this report:

- Projects that effectively integrate uni-national and bi-national elements;
- Projects framed and focused on issues of shared interest/common concern;
- Projects effectively embedding dialogue within larger social change strategies; and

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123 *P2P Program Guide*, p. 25.

• Projects strategically designed to effect concrete social-structural changes or provide visible benefit to participant individuals and their communities.

Expand the explicit theoretical basis for APS programs, as described in official documents, to reflect the range of approaches and theoretical debates in the field. Recommend that projects be grounded in a valid theoretical framework, including but not limited to the “contact hypothesis.”

Allocate grant support to projects addressing conflict across multiple “fault lines” relevant to the overall conflict dynamic, e.g.
  • Israeli-Palestinian
  • Arab-Jewish citizens of Israel
  • Internal Palestinian (religious-secular, Muslim-Christian, West Bank-Gaza, etc.)

Internal Israeli (religious-secular, socioeconomic, etc.) fund initiatives explicitly designed to engage religious, political, or socioeconomic constituencies beyond the traditional “peace camp.”

3. Impact and Evaluation

Make long-term investments in successful programs and strategies; revise the “innovation” requirement to allow continued support for proven projects.

Revise indicator policy to reflect the diverse types of work already funded by the APS. Develop a list of multiple suggested indicators specifically designed to fit different types of interventions and target populations; use “changing perceptions” as an indicator where appropriate, but should be avoided as a measure of comparability across activities, given the broad range of project types and their respective theories of change.

4. Grant Management

Establish standards for reducing the administrative burden on grantees (and Mission staff), within the confines of United States law and USAID policy, such that APS grants enable grantees to concentrate time and resources on programming, rather than compliance.

Evaluate the unintended impacts of grant management policies identified as problematic by majorities of grantees. Each policy can be evaluated in reference to two standards: a) a “DNH” analysis of the impact of these policies on grantees in the contemporary IWBG context, in order to prevent inadvertent reinforcement of existing conflict dynamics; b) analysis of the impact of these policies on the overall goals and impact of the APS program with the aim of deriving measures to mitigate specific unintended impacts.
Annexes

Annex A: Evaluation Methods and Limitations

Methodology: Research Schedule and Charts

(For detailed description of methodology and limitations, see methodology section of report)

Table I: Research Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>TIER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field I</td>
<td>September 3-15</td>
<td>Interviews, site visits</td>
<td>Tiers I &amp; II, Mission staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field II: Out-Brief</td>
<td>September 14</td>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings,</td>
<td>Tier III (All APS grantees), Mission staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td></td>
<td>facilitated discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field III: Focus</td>
<td>September 15</td>
<td>Focus Groups</td>
<td>Sept 15: Palestinian implementers (4 projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>(Ramallah)</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 25: Israeli implementers (5 projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 25 (Tel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Field Data</td>
<td>September 16-</td>
<td>Data analysis, survey design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Design</td>
<td>November-December</td>
<td>Online survey distribution</td>
<td>Tier III (All APS grantees).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis &amp; Reporting</td>
<td>December-January</td>
<td>Final data analysis, report drafting, CMM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2013)</td>
<td>review, report submission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Groups/projects</td>
<td>Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I — Maximum Depth</td>
<td>Interviews, site visits (as possible), focus groups, out-brief consultation, surveys, document review</td>
<td>I. CMM/Mission staff&lt;br&gt;II. Repeat Grantees&lt;br&gt;III. Projects focused on Issues of Shared Interest/Common Concern&lt;br&gt;IV. Projects with communal or societal impact strategies&lt;br&gt;V. Inclusion of Israeli, Palestinian and joint organizations</td>
<td>I. Mission staff responsible for APS implementation&lt;br&gt;II. Project directors, key implementing staff and possibly beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II — Focus Groups</td>
<td>Focus groups, out-brief consultation, surveys, document review</td>
<td>o Israeli implementers&lt;br&gt;o Palestinian implementers</td>
<td>Project directors and/or key implementing staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III — All APS Grantees</td>
<td>Out-brief consultation, surveys</td>
<td>All APS Grantees</td>
<td>Project directors and/or key implementing staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B: Methodology

The DE approach is designed “to inform and support innovative and adaptive development in complex, dynamic environments.” As such, it is especially suited to this exploration of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding initiatives during a period of profound political upheaval in the Middle East. Effective peacebuilding in a context of entrenched conflict is driven, by nature, by an aspiration to transform existing realities and establish new relational dynamics—hence, peacebuilding inherently seeks to innovate; conflict, of course, is inherently complex.

DE provides conceptual lenses for focused inquiry rather than prescribing particular research methods; in particular, DE demands attention to a project’s ongoing development within a context defined by emergence, nonlinearity and dynamism. Thus, the team employed traditional research methods—interviews, focus groups, site visits, surveys—while focusing analytically on identifying common themes regarding contextual challenges and adaptive strategies, among other key evaluation questions.

In the words of Dr. Quinn Patton, “The only way to truly inquire into unanticipated consequences is through open-ended fieldwork….to find out what’s happening from the perspectives of participants and staff as it unfolds.” Thus, rather than measuring performance according to specified indicators, the evaluation team conducted an open-ended qualitative inquiry in the grounded theory tradition—soliciting candid feedback from the implementer’s perspective to inform future CMM grant making.

CMM aspired to include substantive data from as many current or recent APS grantee organizations as possible, within the logistical and financial scope of the evaluation. The evaluation team employed multiple methods of data collection in a tiered, phased approach designed to maximize breadth and depth of data collection given the range of projects, limited time and logistical constraints in the field.

Data Collection

Data Collection proceeded in three consecutive phases, with time reserved for analysis in between:

1) Field Evaluation: During 12 days of fieldwork in Israel and the West Bank (September 3-15), evaluation team members conducted interviews with directors and staff from 20 grantee organizations and seven project site visits, as well as informational meetings with USAID Mission and US Embassy staff. This phase culminated in a presentation and discussion of preliminary findings with APS grantees and Mission staff, at the USAID office in Jerusalem on September 14th.

Given the contextual sensitivity demanded by a developmental approach, the evaluation team conducted seven site visits and held interviews, whenever possible, at the offices of grantee organizations. Evaluators conducted research in the Haifa, Jericho, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Tel-Aviv/Jaffa areas and the campuses of Givat Haviva and Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salaam.

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126 See Kathy Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis* (Sage, 2006).
2) Focus Groups: Local evaluators facilitated a pair of focus groups with directors and staff of APS grantee organizations—an Arabic-language focus group with Palestinian implementers in Ramallah (September 15), and a Hebrew-language focus group with Israeli implementers in Tel Aviv (October 25).

3) Survey: Evaluators designed a 24 question online survey focused on salient themes that emerged in data analysis from Phases I-II. The survey was distributed to all current and recent APS grantees in late November.
### Annex C: Survey Results

#### SECTION I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

What types of peacebuilding work does your organization perform? Please mark all that apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Empowerment</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Training</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Leadership</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosocial/Trauma Healing</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question: 31

skipped question: 1
### Which term best describes your participant population? Mark all that apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National Israeli-Palestinian</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Israeli Jews and Palestinians from East Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Jewish citizens in Israel</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Identity: Palestinians</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(involving only Palestinians in East Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**answered question** 29  
**skipped question** 3

### Which term best describes your organization? Please choose one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli organization</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Bi-National Israeli-Palestinian organization (Israeli-Palestinian partnership)</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint partnership of Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian organization in Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please explain)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**answered question** 27  
**skipped question** 5
Please mark the choice that best describes your identity and citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish citizen of Israel</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab citizen of Israel</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>61(^{27})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (please note citizenship below)</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian from East Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 31
 skipped question 1

Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 31
 skipped question 1

Has your organization received two or more grants from USAID or the US Embassy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know/not sure</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 31
 skipped question 1

\(^{27}\) Figures have been revised to reflect information provided in the “other, please specify” category – 4 respondents stated that they identify as “Palestinian citizens of Israel.”
### How often did you personally interact with USAID staff during the grant period?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently (every week)</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantly (every day)</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If none of the above choices are correct in your case, please explain your level of interaction with CMM staff.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*answered question: 31, skipped question: 1*

### Were you personally interviewed by the Social Impact evaluation team between September 4-14?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*answered question: 30, skipped question: 2*
## SECTION II — PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: CONTEXT AND STRATEGY

In previous interviews, some grantee organizations have described the following factors as challenges for their work. For this question, please rate the degree to which each factor is, or is not, a significant challenge to the successful implementation of your project.

**Answer Options**

1. Not an issue for my project at all
2. A rare, minor issue for my project.
3. Sometimes a significant issue for my project
4. Often a serious issue for my project
5. A constant, difficult issue for my project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Rating Average</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall USAID administrative requirements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism/opposition to your work in Palestinian society</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Vetting requirements</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Israeli Jewish participants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism/opposition to your work in Israeli Jewish society</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID indicator development policy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Palestinian participants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the Israeli government or security forces</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID length of grants (1-3 years) policy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Arab citizens of Israel as Participants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USAID Anti-Terror Certification (ATC) requirement\textsuperscript{128} & 14 & 5 & 5 & 4 & 1 & 2.07 & 29 \\
Relations between Israeli Jewish and Arab/Palestinian project staff or partner organizations & 13 & 6 & 8 & 1 & 1 & 2.00 & 29 \\
Relations with the Palestinian Authority & 13 & 6 & 8 & 1 & 1 & 2.00 & 29 \\
Criticism/opposition to your work among Arab citizens of Israel & 12 & 9 & 6 & 1 & 1 & 1.97 & 29 \\
USAID prime/sub grantee policy & 13 & 8 & 5 & 2 & 0 & 1.86 & 28 \\

\textbf{Explain your “most difficult” ratings.}

Top 5 Common Themes in Open-Ended Comments (18 Total Responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Total Comments (/18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Overall USAID oversight</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Palestinian opposition/Anti-normalization</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vetting/ATC</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Indicators</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recruitment/Retention of Participants</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Israeli apathy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Length of Grants</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{128} From open-ended responses, it is apparent that a number of respondents conflate the ATC policy with “vetting,” i.e. they consider ATC part of vetting and may have offered their opinion of it under that heading.
This question is intended to understand how the context of peacebuilding work has changed in recent years. Do you find the following issues more difficult, or less difficult, for your project today, in comparison to 3-5 years ago?

**Answer Options**

1. Much more difficult
2. Somewhat more difficult
3. The same difficulty
4. Somewhat easier
5. Much easier
6. This was always easy/never difficult
N/A: I don’t know/not applicable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Rating Average</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy in Palestinian society</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall ability to do successful peace work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Israeli government or security forces</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruiting Palestinian participants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Legitimacy among Arab citizens of Israel</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Legitimacy in Israeli Jewish society</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relations with Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>Recruiting Arab citizens of Israel as participants</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*answered question* 29

*skipped question* 3
What do you expect will be the influence, if any, of the current crisis (November escalation of violence in and around the Gaza Strip) on your project and/or your organization? Do you plan to address any issues related to that crisis, and if so, how?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes re: Effects of December 2012 Gaza Escalation</th>
<th>Total Comments (1/23)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Opportunities for engagement/increased interest</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Deferral/revision/cancellation of programs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recruitment issues</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No major effect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Polarization of staff/participants</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In your opinion, how important is bringing the following groups together for people-to-people peacebuilding in today’s context?

Answer Options

- 1- Not at all important
- 2- Not very important
- 3- Somewhat important
- 4- Important
- 5- Very important

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Rating Average</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bi-National Israeli-Palestinian:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israeli Jews with Palestinians from J’lem/West Bank/Gaza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<td>Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>.84</td>
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<td>Palestinian single-identity:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians in J’lem/West Bank/Gaza focusing on issues in Palestinian society</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Israeli Jewish single-identity:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israeli Jews focusing on issues in Israeli Jewish society;</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab citizens of Israel, single-identity</td>
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<td>3.92</td>
<td>.98</td>
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</table>

answered question 26

skipped question 6
What are the main reasons for your highest or lowest ratings? Please explain.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Themes re: Which groups to bring together</th>
<th>Total Comments (/19)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bi-national Israeli/Palestinian</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. All of the above (uni- &amp; bi-national)</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Critiques of bi-national P2P approaches</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SECTION III: PROGRAMMING STRATEGIES

How do you rate the success of your organization’s USAID-funded project(s) in the following aspects?

Answer Options

1- No success at all
2- Not very successful
3- Mixed
4- Moderately successful
5- Highly successful
6- Not applicable/ Don’t know

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate your organization’s success in:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Rating Average</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing the project activities as you originally envisioned</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing positive experiences for direct participants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achieving the project’s intended objectives/ outcomes</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contributing to peacebuilding at an interpersonal/ grassroots level</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to unexpected events and contextual challenges</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reaching individuals/groups who were not previously engaged in peacebuilding</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contributing to peacebuilding at a</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>
Influencing individuals/groups beyond your direct participants

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudinal/perceptual change</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social action/activism/behavioral change</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s too early to assess</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader Social/Structural/Political Impact</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation Level/Local Legitimacy</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In your opinion, how important are the following types of peacebuilding work in today’s context?

**Answer Options**

1. Not at all important
2. Not very important
3. Somewhat important
4. Important
5. Very important

N/A: I don’t know.

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<th>Rank the importance of peacebuilding work:</th>
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<th>4</th>
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Empowerment</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>4.65</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>4.21</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychosocial/ Trauma Healing</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Sport</td>
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</table>

answered question 26

skipped question 6
### Has your organization received grants from other sources besides USAID, either before or after the CMM Grant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
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</table>

answered question: 27

skipped question: 5

### From what other types of institutions has your organization received grants?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private international or foreign foundations</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Government</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Israeli or Palestinian) non-governmental donors/foundations</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International institutions (UN, World Bank, etc.)</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Israeli government or Palestinian Authority) institutions</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (Middle Eastern) institutions or foundations</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Donor</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question: 22

skipped question: 10
If your organization has received support from other funders, how would you describe the following aspects of the USAID process in comparison to other donors?

**Answer Options**

1. **USAID is simple, straightforward**
2. **USAID is ordinary, more or less the same as others**
3. **USAID is somewhat more challenging**
4. **USAID is much more difficult**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compare USAID on Aspects of Grant Process</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Response Average</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application Process</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accounting/Financial Management</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Grant Relationship</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.14</td>
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</table>

*answered question* 22

*skipped question* 10
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.

Answer Options

1- Strongly Agree
2- Agree
3- Mixed/Neither Agree nor Disagree
4- Disagree
5- Strongly Disagree
6- Don’t Know

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We became a better, stronger and/or more effective organization by working with USAID</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID is helpful with all parts of the grant process</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID support is strengthening the peacebuilding sector in this region</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>USAID staff understand the local context</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Our working relationship with USAID is a partnership</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID is flexible when it is necessary to make changes in project implementation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID is willing to take risks and to support innovative programs</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>The mandatory training sessions organized by USAID are useful</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID understands how to work effectively in a complex, dynamic conflict environment</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</table>
### Has working on a USAID-funded project helped to build your organizational capacity?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Very helpful</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat helpful</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very helpful</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not helpful at all</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 25

skipped question 7

### If yes, what organizational areas where improved through your work with USAID? (Select all that apply)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Answer Options</th>
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answered question 26

skipped question 6
Annex D: Sources of Information

Interviews and Focus Groups: Personnel

Interviews and focus groups included 63 total APS grantee organizational personnel:

- 23 Project Directors
- 40 Project Staff
- 35 Israeli Jews
- 17 Palestinians
- 9 Arab citizens of Israel
- 4 Internationals

Additionally, the team gathered data from 12 USAID Mission-Tel Aviv and US Embassy Staff involved in management, monitoring, selection and supervision of the APS program.

Interviews and Focus Groups: Organizations

1. Abraham Fund Initiatives
2. Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace
3. All for Peace Radio
4. Arava Institute for Environmental Studies
5. Catholic Relief Services
6. Center for Democracy and Community Development
7. Center for Educational Technology - Israel
8. Citizens’ Accord Forum Between Jews and Arabs in Israel
9. Economic Cooperation Foundation
10. Friends of the Earth - Middle East
11. Givat Haviva
12. Hand in Hand: Center for Jewish-Arab Education in Israel
13. Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)
14. Just Vision
15. Keshev: The Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel
16. Merchavim: The Institute for the Advancement of Shared Citizenship in Israel
17. Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salaam
18. Parents Circle Families Forum—Bereaved Families Supporting Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance
19. Peres Center for Peace
20. Right to Play - Palestine
21. Seeds of Peace
22. Sikkuy—The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality in Israel
23. Tawasul
24. Windows: Channels for Communication

Site Visits


Since 2004, the APS program has funded 60 different projects, implemented by 42 different organizations in the IWBG region; 34 in recent cycles (FY 2008-2012). Given finite resources and time in the field, CMM and the evaluation team focused on meeting APS project directors and staff extensively involved in implementation - meeting with 60 total personnel from 25 organizations. Organizations were classified according to specific criteria of interest, as determined amongst the team leader, SI, and CMM staff during evaluation design, and selected for three tiers of research priority:

**Tier I: In-Depth Research (Interviews, Site Visits)—20 Organizations**

*Repeat APS grantees:* Ten organizations have secured two or more APS grants since 2004; these organizations were selected for in-depth interviews and site visits where possible, given their extensive working experience in the field and with CMM;

*Shared Issue Focus or Target Population:* The evaluation team identified “thematic clusters” of projects sharing specific issue areas, methodologies and/or target populations of interest with *repeat grantee organizations*, and prioritized ten of these organizations for in-depth research. The themes selected included: Civil Society, Environment, Media, Arab Minority-Jewish Majority Issues in Israel, “Mixed Cities,” Single Identity/Uni-national work, Dialogue/Education, Sport.

*Organizational Identity/Structure:* APS grants have gone to a number of organizational types—bi-national Israeli-Palestinian partnerships, Arab-Jewish partnerships in Israel, uni-national Palestinian or Israeli organizations, and international organizations working with local sub-contractors. The team included all of the above organizational types in the research sample by design.

*Communal or Societal Impact Strategy:* The majority of APS grantees in the IWBG region work primarily at the grassroots level; CMM and the evaluation team selected a number of grantees implementing projects explicitly designed to effect change at a communal or societal level.

The evaluation team conducted semi-structured, open-ended interviews with the directors and/or staff primarily responsible for implementation and management of 20 APS-funded projects—60 interviewees in total. 13 interviews were conducted at grantee’s offices or project sites; eight interviews took place at hotel facilities, by grantee request and/or due to logistical necessity. Multiple members of the evaluation team were present for 18 interviews; three interviews were conducted by individual team members, due to logistical necessity. Interviews were structured according to the protocol established by the evaluation team; evaluators added targeted clarifying questions as necessary. 14 interviews were conducted primarily in English; three were conducted primarily in Arabic, three in Hebrew, due to interviewee request or the linguistic facility of specific interview teams. Washington-based CMM staff accompanied the evaluation team, with grantee consent, on seven interviews.

**Tier II: Focus Groups and Additional Research—Five (additional) Organizations**

The focus groups were designed to provide comfortable, uni-national forums for APS implementers to present and discuss experiences, contextual analyses, and perspectives on the evaluation questions and
themes emerging from Phase I data. The evaluation team sought to include, in each focus group, organizations and personnel who had not participated in Phase I research, in order to broaden the sample. In addition to including new individual perspectives, the Israeli focus group added the additional topical area of joint economic development.

Tier III: Out-Brief Consultation and Survey—All recent APS grantees

All recent APS grantees (FY 2008-2012) received via email a) invitations to the evaluation team’s presentation of preliminary findings in Jerusalem, and b) requests for the 1-2 staff members most directly involved in implementation and/or management of APS-funded grant projects complete the online survey. 32 grantees responded to the survey; 22-29 respondents answered most substantive questions. See “Annexes” for survey questions and quantitative results.

Analysis

Survey Respondents

31 APS grantee organizational personnel completed the online survey, among them:

- 17 Israeli Jews
- 6 Arab citizens of Israel129
- 4 Palestinians
- 4 Internationals
- 18 Women
- 13 Men

Respondents were not asked to specify organizational affiliations or staff position, in order to protect personal and organizational identity and preserve anonymity and confidentiality.

During the field phase, evaluators created audio recordings and detailed notes of all interviews and focus groups. The evaluation team engaged in debrief discussions to share impressions and identify emergent themes of grantee testimonies, in advance of presenting preliminary findings on September 14th.

After completion of the field phase and focus groups, evaluators conducted thematic analysis of all interview and focus group transcripts, coding data relevant to each evaluation question and a number of widely shared themes (see findings). Evaluators compiled files of quotes according to salient themes (taking editorial measures to protect the anonymity of interviewees. Additionally, evaluators compiled a chart to track the salience of themes among the total research sample.

In order to enhance analytical perspective, guard against bias and threats to validity, data collection and analysis were systematically triangulated across methods, sources and researchers at every stage of

129 “Arab citizens of Israel” is the term of official USG discourse; four of six respondents in this category emphasized that they identify themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel.
research. All team members participated in drafting interview and focus group protocols. Two or more researchers were present at 18 of 20 interviews and both focus groups. At least two team members reviewed the content of every interview and both focus groups. All team members participated in development of the online survey and analysis of responses.

**Limitations and Influences**

The evaluation team identified the following limitations of the research design, and potential influences on grantee testimonies:

*Time constraints*

The scope of the evaluation allowed for less than two weeks of field research, thus limiting the sample and scope of in-depth interviews and site visits;

*No systematic incorporation of beneficiaries*

Due to time constraints and the goal of casting the widest possible net in terms of grantee organizations, the evaluation team was unable to incorporate the perspectives of project beneficiaries in a systematic manner. Evaluators did meet and converse with beneficiaries while on site visits, but this possibility was available with only a small number of organizations.

*Inability to travel to Gaza*

Due to the political situation, evaluators were unable to travel to Gaza for research purposes, and therefore unable to interview grantees or beneficiaries there or indeed to observe the context firsthand.

*Presence of USAID staff*

Washington-based CMM staff accompanied evaluators to seven interviews in the field, by request and with grantee consent. Their presence constituted a potential influence on grantee testimonies. To mitigate this potential influence, the CMM personnel stated explicitly that they sought and welcomed honest and potentially critical feedback, that details of specific conversations would not be shared with local CMM Mission staff, and that this research contributed solely to evaluation of the APS program, and had no connection to performance evaluation of any individual APS grantee.

*Evaluators’ prior relationships*

Evaluators were deliberately selected on the basis of their extensive prior experience working in and researching the Israeli/Palestinian peacebuilding field. Evaluators therefore had prior collegial or personal connections to a number of grantee organizations and individual staff members. In order to mitigate the potential influence of these ties on grantee testimonies, two or more evaluators were present at each interview in which a prior relationship between an evaluator and a grantee, and these interviews were led by evaluators without any prior relationship to the organizations or individuals in question.
Language

The majority of interviews (14/20) were conducted primarily in English, which was often not the native language of interviewees. All interviewees were given the option to conduct discussions in Arabic or Hebrew, and all who opted for English asserted their comfort with the language and encountered little or no difficulty expressing their views effectively. In cases in which Arabic or Hebrew was deemed preferable or necessary, evaluators with appropriate linguistic capacity conducted the interview.\textsuperscript{130}

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation centered on the three primary evaluation questions, each with individual sub questions, presented below.

1. How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in Israel/WB/G changed in recent years, due to Israeli/Palestinian and regional political developments?
   a. What have been the contextual factors—at local, national and regional levels—that have most influenced project strategy, design, and outcomes?

2. How have APS-funded projects sought to analyze, adapt programming, assess impact and remain relevant as the conflict context has evolved in recent years?
   b. How have projects adapted/responded to challenges and opportunities that have emerged in the wider conflict context?
      i. Design, implementation, outcome, strategy, theories of change
   c. How do projects measure effectiveness/impact? How has that evolved in response to context?
   d. Which adaptive strategies have proved effective and/or ineffective?
   e. Which types of projects are most relevant in contemporary context?
   f. Are APS projects integrating the guidelines from ‘People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide? Which guidelines, why and why not? Are those guidelines still relevant? Have APS projects developed these further?

3. In contemporary context, are APS projects producing effects at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?
   g. Are APS projects appropriate responses to recently identified drivers of conflict in the Israel/West Bank/Gaza conflict context?

\textsuperscript{130} The evaluation team included one trilingual member, two members with bilingual English/Hebrew capacity and one member with bilingual English/Arabic capacity.
h. Are APS projects designed in response to a dynamic analysis of the conflict environment?

i. Are project type vis-à-vis identified conflict drivers, and also adaptability, significant determinants of impact?

j. Is there effective synergy between different projects and/or funders—a cumulative effect?

4. How do APS grantees experience the grant process? How can CMM most effectively strengthen grantee capacity and enhance project impact in the contemporary context?131

k. What CMM policies or practices do grantees identify as most effective/beneficial?

l. What CMM policies or practices do grantees recommend changing, why, and how?

m. How does CMM evaluate the effects of grant management policies and practices on the overall impact of the APS.

131 This was not part of the original three evaluation questions mentioned throughout the report, but rather emerged during the field evaluations in response to the data gathered during the course of the field work. In the spirit of developmental evaluation, this was incorporated as a fourth, unofficial question.
CHAPTER 5: FIELD STUDY
USAID/BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT GRANTS

Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study
USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants

This publication was produced for USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in Washington, D.C. and the USAID/Bosnia Mission under Contract No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00046. It was produced by Lee Briggs, Miki Jacevic, Kristie Evenson, and Vahidin Omanovic of Social Impact.

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development nor the United States Government.
Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants

This document (Report No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00046) is available through the Development Experience Clearing House (http://dec.usaid.gov). Additional information can be obtained from:

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Photo Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Acknowledgments

This evaluation was made possible through the assistance of many people who contributed to planning, fieldwork, data collection, analysis, and final report writing. The evaluation team would like to acknowledge several individuals and organizations whose contributions were instrumental to making this effort a success.

The team would like to thank David Hunsicker, the Contracting Officer’s Representative from USAID/CMM, as well as other CMM colleagues, Rebekah Krimmel and Joe Hewitt. Special thanks go to Jose Garzon, Deputy Director for CMM, who accompanied the team into the field and made substantive contributions to the data collection and analysis, as well as written contributions to this report.

The team would also like to thank the staff at USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Mirjana Popovic-Valjevac, whose leadership, commitment, and generous engagement throughout the process ensured the evaluation’s success. In addition, the team would like to thank the USAID/Mission Director, David Barth, for providing us with both his time and insight.

The team received extensive support and openness from staff and project participants of each of the implementing partners in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Catholic Relief Services, Mozaik Community Development Foundation, Public International Law and Policy Group, Save the Children, Small Steps, and YouthBuild International. We thank all of the interviewees for their openness to meet with the evaluation team and their willingness to give us their time and perspectives on their projects. Without this critical resource, this evaluation could not have been completed.

Finally, the team wishes to recognize the tireless contribution of Mirha Jacevic, the team logistician. Her dedication, attention to detail, and unflagging work ethic in scheduling and arranging all activities and providing overall logistical and administrative support was a critical piece of this successful evaluation effort.
Acronyms

APS  Annual Program Statement
BiH  Bosnia-Herzegovina
CDA  Collaborative for Development Action
CRS  Catholic Relief Services
CSO  Civil Society Organization
DCHA  Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DPA  Dayton Peace Accords
EU  European Union
IDEA  Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IPA  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (EU)
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
OHR  Office of the High Representative
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTI  USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives
P2P  People-to-People
PILPG  Public International Law & Policy Group
RPP  Reflecting on Peace Practice Project
RS  Republika Srpska (one of the entities comprising BiH, the other being the Federation)
SI  Social Impact, Inc.
SOW  Scope of Work
STC  Save the Children
TJ  Transitional Justice
ToC  Theory of Change
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
Glossary

**Annual Program Statement (APS):** When USAID intends to support a variety of creative approaches towards developing methodologies to assess and implement development objective activities, the Agency may use an APS to generate competition for these awards. When this mechanism is used, USAID will publish an APS at least once a year, either with an open-ended response time or a closing date of at least six months after issuance. (USAID ADS 303.3.5.4)

**Conflict:** USAID definition: “Conflict is an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles.” A more nuanced definition, paraphrased and slightly expanded, originally provided by Dr. Dennis Sandole: “A relational dynamic between individuals or groups wherein two or more parties with perceived mutually incompatible goals seek to undermine each other's goal seeking ability while also ensuring achievement of their own goals.”

Conflict is inevitable in all societies, and may in fact be positive and creative if processes for problem solving and accommodation exist; in the absence of such mechanisms, conflict often turns violent. Analysts of conflict focus tremendous attention on understanding the various forces at play within a society that affect the choice of using violence to further opinions, principles, objectives, or interests. (CMM Conflict 102 Definitions)

**Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM):** USAID created CMM in 2002 within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) to expand and improve USAID’s capacity to address the causes and consequences of violent conflict. CMM is responsible for conflict assessment, field support, technical leadership training, and inter-agency/donor outreach on conflict and related topics. On behalf of USAID, CMM manages an Annual Program Statement for Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Programs and Activities.

**Conflict Transformation:** The concept of conflict transformation used in this report relates primarily to transformation within situations of “protracted social conflict.” This term was first coined by Edward Azar in the late 1970s and is now widely used to describe long, enduring ethno-political conflicts sharing common features. According to Azar, such conflicts have four key characteristics:

- They are conflicts between identity groups, of which at least one group feels that their basic needs for equality of access to resources or institutions, security, or political participation are not being met.
- They are about access to or control over State-related power and often take the form of an asymmetric conflict between a government and an insurgent party, but may also occur where competing ethnicized interest groups jockey for dominance over the machinery of the State.
- They cannot be understood without also understanding various types of international linkages affecting the course of events (e.g., kin states, diasporas, international intrusions, regional political-economies, etc.).
- They are often based on deeply-rooted and antagonistic group histories and perceived grievances, traumas, and justifications.

Conflict Transformation requires that individuals or groups involved in conflict should be enabled to deal constructively with the underlying causes of conflict and develop strategies, which overcome or eliminate these causes. Conflict Transformation refers to actions that seek to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of conflict by addressing conflict drivers over the long-term with the aim to transform negative ways of dealing with conflict into positive, constructive ones. This concept of
conflict transformation stresses structural, behavioral, and attitudinal aspects of conflict and refers to both processes and structures—as well as the collective behavior of groups of individuals—required to move from latent or manifest violent conflict towards “just peace.”

The concept of Conflict Transformation can also apply at the individual level and refers to the progression made by individuals from being nationalistic and solely ethnically-identified, and thinking, feeling, and behaving in ways that demonstrates this exclusionary and antagonistic orientation, to being post-nationalistic and self-identified with a conception of mutual humanity that is transcendent of ethnically-derived identity. It is often necessary for individuals to go through a psycho-traumatic healing process, learn alternative or counter-narratives to nationalistic histories, grieve past trauma, and intentionally embrace forgiveness before this personal transformation can occur.

Developmental Evaluation: An evaluation methodology and approach, developed by Michael Quinn Patton, which emphasizes the learning function of evaluation and allows for flexibility of evaluation application in the context of complex dynamic systems, uncertainty, nonlinearity, and emergence of unanticipated information or outcomes. It is distinct from more traditional methods that emphasize accountability and seek to measure effectiveness or impact against pre-established targets or objectives. By contrast, a Developmental Evaluation can look retrospectively and identify lessons learned or achievements that were not necessarily anticipated at the outset of the program and can integrate unintended outcomes into the learning analysis to affect ongoing program development and improve effectiveness.

Latent Conflict: Conflict that is submerged and obscured because it is not expressed through overt behavior. Latent conflict can include such subtle conflict dynamics as perceived injustice, structural inequalities, and power imbalances. Latent conflict, if left unaddressed, can be a preceding cause or underlying condition that leads to manifest conflict. Negative Peace, originally described by Johan Galtung, wherein there is the absence of overt violence and open war while underlying issues of injustice and animosity remain at play, is an example of latent conflict.

Manifest Conflict: Conflict expressed as overt and evident behavior, which can take many forms including behavior that is preliminary to violent force, such as intimidation, explicit threats, and non-violent aggression up to and including explicit acts of violence and open warfare.

Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding refers to the long-term project of building peaceful, stable communities and societies. This requires building on a firm foundation of justice and reconciliation. The process needs to strengthen and restore relationships and transform unjust institutions and systems. The focus on relationships and the process of how we achieve justice and build peace is unique to peacebuilding.

Peace Writ Large: The larger conflict context beyond the immediate geographic and social context of inherently limited project activities. This larger context often produces drivers that resonate across

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large populations and can erupt into manifest conflict at local or higher levels. The “immediate context” can be conceived as a local geographic environment, such as a village, town, or community, or it can be conceived as a limited social environment, such as a particular sector or sub-sector within a larger and more complex social system, for example municipal government; religious actors and institutions; the business community, the media, or youth; or the educational sector. The immediate context may be limited by both geography and sector. The “larger context” mentioned above can be conceptualized as the top-most levels of social organization, such as national government (or, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it may include Canton-level or Entity-level institutions) or other significant national level institutions, or it can be conceived as social groupings much broader than geographically delineated (for example, people living in one municipality) and sectorally narrow sub-groups (for example, people affiliated through membership in one specific institution). Peace Writ Large is a project or program effect that produces changes at macro-societal levels that affect large segments of the population.134

People-to-People (P2P) Programming: People-to-People (P2P) programs are one approach among many to conflict mitigation. While P2P programs vary, most entail bringing together representatives of conflict-affected groups to interact purposefully in a safe space. P2P projects generally address patterns of prejudice and demonization that reinforce the perceived differences between groups and hinder the development of positive and productive relationships among parties to a conflict. The aim of P2P programs is to create opportunities for interactions between conflicting groups that promote mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.

Reconciliation: Reconciliation is the ultimate goal of peacebuilding. It occurs when disputants develop a new relationship based on four components identified by John Paul Lederach: truth, justice, mercy, and peace. Reconciliation is “A [social] space, a place or location of encounter where parties to a conflict meet, built on and oriented towards the relational aspects of a conflict.”135

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) defines it as “a process through which society moves from a divided past to a shared future.”136 A definition posited by Dr. Krishna Kumar, a senior social scientist with USAID, is “social reconciliation interventions are specifically designed to foster intergroup understanding, strengthen nonviolent conflict resolution mechanisms, and heal the wounds of war. They differ from conventional projects and programs in that their primary objective is to promote social reconciliation, and not to provide services or advance economic, social, or political development.”137

The multiple definitions provided above demonstrate an important aspect of reconciliation: it is both a social process and a goal of that process.

Reconciliation is focused on: 1) building relationships between antagonists; 2) creating a space for encounter by the parties for acknowledging the past and envisioning the future, and; 3) it requires work outside the mainstream of international political traditions, discourse, and modalities to find innovative solutions. Reconciliation seeks to restore and transform relationships that have been harmed by conflict so that they reflect a shared humanity and seek a future based upon, in Lederach’s words, “truth, justice, mercy, and peace.”

Both individual and communal/institutional work is required, but it is at the individual level where reconciliation ultimately resides.

Reconciliation programs can take many forms, such as analytical problem-solving workshops, psycho-trauma counseling and grief work, or dialogue processes designed to acknowledge grievances, build trust, and find forgiveness. But in general, there are five strands (and perhaps stages) of reconciliation identified in the academic literature on the subject:

- Acknowledging and dealing with the past, leading to personal transformation.
- Building positive relationships across formerly unbridgeable social divides.
- Developing a shared vision of a fair, diverse, and inter-dependent society.
- Significant attitudinal and cultural change at individual, communal, and societal levels.
- Achieving substantial social and political change.

Reconciliation has an inherently forward looking focus: how do we live together now and onwards, and how do we strengthen our shared social fabric so we are able to resist future tensions.

**Theory of Change (ToC):** A Theory of Change (ToC) explains why we think certain program activities will produce desired change in a given conflict context. A ToC is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, to clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing, state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be, fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict, and describe how our planned activities will produce the intended outcomes. (USAID Guide on Theories of Change, forthcoming)

**Transitional Justice:** Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses, or, in the case of violent conflict, war crimes. These measures may include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.

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139 Ibid. Some minor modification to Lederach’s definition has been added for clarity.

Executive Summary

Introduction

Since 2004, CMM has managed an annual Reconciliation Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The Reconciliation Fund is a Congressional appropriation to support local-level “people-to-people” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and has grown from an initial award pool of $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million specifically allocated for programs inside Israel/West Bank/Gaza. To date, the APS has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries.

As defined in CMM’s People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, P2P reconciliation programs operate based on the Theory of Change (ToC) that in “communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities…strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.” APS projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political affiliations from areas of conflict. They provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust, and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recently ended conflict.

Project Descriptions

In BiH, six grantees have received funding since 2008, with four still being implemented at the time of this evaluation activity, and each had very different visions, mandates, and operational modalities as briefly described below.

- **Save the Children (STC), “Prevention of Violence involving children and promotion of respect for differences in BiH through the education system.”** A school-reform project aimed to promote “inclusive” schools, which focused primarily on reduction of school violence, but also included integration of children of different ethnic groups. It sought to develop inclusive management systems through a process of community engagement and mobilization to participate in school management at the community level.

- **Small Steps, “Interfaith Dialogue and Diversity Training.”** Brought together religious leaders and clerics and community leaders from the three main Bosnian faith traditions to explore the theological underpinnings in each religion that promote diversity, tolerance, forgiveness, and peace, and thus create unifying frames of reference. Activities aimed to equip community leaders with alternative narratives, which support peace and reconciliation, and to familiarize them with principles of peace embedded within other traditions.

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• Catholic Relief Services (CRS), “Choosing Peace Together.” This project had two primary components, psychosocial assistance and trauma recovery, as well as joint-advocacy by multi-ethnic groups with common interests and the establishment and facilitation of a network of peacebuilding organizations.

• Mozaik Community Development Foundation, “YouthBanks: Peacing the Future Together.” This project aimed to establish “youth banks,” which enable ethnically and gender mixed groups of youth, led by the youth themselves, to work on small-scale local community-development projects that are developed, approved, and implemented by youth themselves.

• Public International Law and Policy Group’s (PILPG), “Constitutional Reform in BiH: Engaging Civil Society.” Project focused on smaller parts of the constitutional reform process and ways to make these issues real for ordinary people.

• YouthBuild, “Youth Building Futures in the Brcko District.” Project worked primarily through youth (many of them unemployed) to identify and implement small-scale, local-level community development projects with the aim of making youth more employable by establishing networking relationships with local employers and providing training and support in addition to providing labor on development projects as community service.

Evaluation Purpose

Beginning in the fall of 2011, Social Impact, Inc. (SI) began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under APS. The objectives of this review are not only to learn about the APS programs themselves, but also to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the “developmental evaluation” (DE) methodology.

The evaluation of the Annual Program Statement (APS) projects in BiH is second in the series of three field evaluations—the first took place in Israel and West Bank in September 2012 and the third will take place in Burundi during summer 2013. The primary purpose for these field evaluations is to advance CMM and broader Agency learning about how to effectively design, implement, and manage APS-type projects in future. They are intended to analyze how program designs and implementation respond to significant contextual factors and conflict drivers in order to inform more responsive and relevant grant making in the future. The primary audience for this evaluation report is CMM, but the target audience also includes USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Research Methods and Evaluation Questions

The evaluation employed a non-experimental, multi-level, qualitative mixed methods design using document review, key informant interviews, and small group interviews.

The evaluation centered on the three primary evaluation questions listed below. Each primary question had individual sub-questions that can be found in the main body of the report.

1. How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?

2. Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping and adapting to changes in the context in recent years?

3. In the contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?
Findings and Conclusions

1. How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?

Findings: The overall context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH has not significantly changed in the past four years; however, certain trends that were present earlier continue and these have exposed new challenges and opportunities to and for peacebuilders.

Conclusions: The primary negative trends have prompted more people to see the need for a different way of doing things; enough time has passed (and too much time has passed) for war-related traumas to continue to define people. There is a craving for normalcy, and this has created a fertile opening for peacebuilding interventions. The willingness of government, local business, and a variety of civil society associations to work together, often across the ethnic divide, is a sign of strengthened social trust at these levels. This represents an important opening, which also can be potentially harnessed for more effective peacebuilding work. The context is ripe for Bosnian-led reconciliation interventions if both timely and strategic.

2. Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping and adapting to changes in the context in recent years?

Findings: All of the projects in their own way were able to be flexible and were appropriate, to one degree or another, in addressing the conflict drivers and dynamics, whether interacting with youth, civil society leaders, or religious and community leaders. However, only one of these projects—the psycho-trauma healing project delivered by CRS—had a specific and intentional reconciliation emphasis as an objective. The others had an ad-hoc approach to reconciliation and generally had relatively weak reconciliation outcomes as a result.

Conclusions: The APS projects conducted in BiH to a greater or lesser degree were appropriate responses to the contextual factors. However, there appeared not to have been a careful conflict analysis/mapping on any scale that had strategically identified these drivers before the interventions. These projects addressed these drivers, but not as intentionally as they could have, which diluted reconciliation results that were both possible in affecting individual drivers and in seeing how these together represented a strategy addressing the conflict drivers.

3. In the contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)?

Findings: There is evidence of some limited progress at the community level and quite extensive evidence of personal transformation at the individual level. However, the evidence suggests that the APS projects are making minimal, if any, contributions at the societal level. No observations were made that support the conclusion that there has been any significant effect from APS projects at the top level. Given the extremely limited scope and reach of most projects, and the minimal resources made available through the small grants of the APS mechanism, there simply is not enough input into the system to find evidence of traction that could add up to a top-level result. However, it should be noted that the evaluation team does not intend to say that the APS had no impact on the overall context, but simply that they could not find sufficient evidence of any significant impact given their evaluation design and resources. The APS may well have contributed in some small way, but that impact appears to have been minimal at best—“a drop in the ocean”—and cannot be said to have changed the overall context in any significant way.

Conclusions: If only partially addressing the main drivers of conflict, than an APS-like activity for BiH would need to engage a far larger segment of the Bosnian population in a far more strategic way.
lesson learned here is that such calcified systems are impervious to the sorts of interventions the APS funded, both because of off-target primarily development focused projects (with four out of six projects) and lack of sufficient scale and reach due to inadequate resources (with all projects). Either the APS objectives accordingly then become focused on more local reconciliation goals that can be amplified or strategically link up with other development efforts to address the other issues driving the conflict.

**Recommendations**

1. Focus on developing primary and intentional process-based components, not relying on secondary by-products or side effects from “Simple Contact.”

2. USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina Mission staff needs robust capacity development on reconciliation.

3. More careful and critical examination, from a reconciliation lens, of proposed project (and internal capacities of grantees) is required- not mere proposal review.

4. Support an approach that engages and empowers “outsiders” and non-traditional implementers.

5. Sustained engagement between CMM and Mission managers is required to provide necessary support to produce a focused conflict analysis and target programming opportunities within the manageable interest of the Mission.

6. At the political level, United States Government (USG) clarity and intention on peacebuilding modalities is required.
Introduction

Since 2004, the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) has managed an annual Reconciliation Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The Reconciliation Fund is a Congressional appropriation to support local-level “people-to-people” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and has grown from an initial award pool of $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million specifically allocated for programs inside Israel/West Bank/Gaza. To date, the APS has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries.

APS projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political affiliations from areas of civil conflict and war; providing opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust; and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recent conflict. The underlying Theory of Change (ToC) is that if opposing groups are given the opportunity to interact, they will better understand and appreciate one another; or, stated another way, as the health of the relationships between the groups improves, the likelihood of violence between them declines.

Country Context

Seventeen years after the war has ended, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is a country that is stable but not at peace with its past, present, or its future. The violent conflict from 1992-1995 uprooted a significant portion of the roughly four million citizens leaving approximately 100,000 dead and over two million as refugees or displaced persons in their own country.142 Ethnic cleansing of neighbors and relocation to concentration camps, mass-kilings, protracted sieges of towns and cities (most notably, in the eyes of the international community, the siege of Sarajevo) and carving up of the territory into ethnically-dominated fiefdoms, were all methods and products of the war. The conflict ended through international intervention, codified in the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) signed in December 1995, and many of the physical reminders of the war have been addressed. Much of the infrastructure was rebuilt, many displaced persons returned to their homes, and, perhaps most significantly, the security situation was and remains stabilized.

While the DPA succeeded in ending the war, the peace agreement’s implementation did not allow Bosnian citizens to develop a common vision of their state and its future and nor do they now have a shared understanding of the violent conflict that they suffered. Their “untouchable” narratives and separate versions of grievances and justifications that produced the war have perpetuated and nurtured an entire post-war generation of young Bosnians to be ignorant—if not distrusting, fearful, and antagonistic—of their fellow citizens. Additionally, fossilized patronage networks based on the main ethnic identities permeate almost all layers of social, political, and economic life in BiH. International attention—and support to push for a more functional and democratic system—continues to wane by

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142 Sarajevo Research and Documentation Center – IDC.org.ba (website temporarily is down).
the year, with international complacency to settle for the relative stability reached to date only adding to the challenges.

Despite this context, there are opportunities for meaningful peacebuilding efforts in BiH.\textsuperscript{143} Top-down peacebuilding has little immediate prospect, partly due to the incentive structures in place which reinforce the power of the elites and buttress their nationalist narratives. At the same time, individual level reconciliation and peacebuilding has progressed since after the war, and such messages appear now to appeal to a broader segment of the population, at least at the local level. How these diffuse out and ripple upwards in the next few years could improve not only the immediate realities of citizens’ lives, but also the function of the State.

**Project Descriptions**

As defined in CMM’s *People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide*, P2P reconciliation programs operate based on the ToC that in “communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities…[Building or rebuilding] strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.”\textsuperscript{144} Thus, by creating a safe space where representatives from conflicting groups can interact, prejudices and perceived differences of “others” can be confronted, challenged, and hopefully ultimately replaced by “mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.”\textsuperscript{145} APS projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political affiliations from areas of conflict. They provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust, and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recently ended conflict.

In BiH, six grantees have received funding since 2008, with four still being implemented at the time of this evaluation activity; each of them had very different visions, mandates, and operational modalities. This is partly explained by the APS’s nature as a small grants competition, with grant proposals produced by diverse actors resulting in a lack of consistency in approach that makes it hard to conceive of the APS as a “program.” These six projects are:

- **Save the Children (STC), “Prevention of Violence involving children and promotion of respect for differences in BiH through the education system.”** This was a school-reform project that aimed to promote “inclusive” schools, which focused primarily on reduction of school 143 This assessment is a key conclusion of this report. It is also shared by the authors of the July, 2010 youth assessment, “You(th) the People” and numerous expert practitioners met with during field activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See also, “Special Report: Facing the Past and Access to Justice from a Public Perspective.” UNDP Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2010.


violence but also included integration of children of different ethnic groups. It sought to develop inclusive management systems through a process of community engagement and mobilization to participate in school management at the community level.

- **Small Steps, “Interfaith Dialogue and Diversity Training.”** This project brought together religious leaders and clerics and community leaders who were laypersons from the three main Bosnian faith traditions to explore the theological underpinnings in each religion that promote diversity, tolerance, forgiveness, and peace, and thus create unifying frames of reference. Activities aimed to equip community leaders with alternative narratives, rooted in their spiritual tradition, which support peace and reconciliation and to familiarize them with principles of peace embedded within other traditions.

- **Catholic Relief Services (CRS), “Choosing Peace Together.”** This project had two primary components, psychosocial assistance and trauma recovery, as well as joint-advocacy by multi-ethnic groups with common interests and the establishment and facilitation of a network of peacebuilding organizations. The most interesting result in regards to reconciliation impact emerged spontaneously when trauma victims and war camp-survivors, as part of their healing, decided to conduct “speaking out” events in which representatives from each ethnic group shared stories in public venues to large audiences of citizens.

- **Mozaik Community Development Foundation, “YouthBanks: Peacing the Future Together.”** This project aimed to establish “youth banks,” which enable ethnically and gender mixed groups of youth, led by the youth themselves, to work on small-scale local community-development projects that are developed, approved, and implemented by youth themselves. Many of the resources required to complete these projects are mobilized from the local community, including contributions from the municipality’s budget.

- **Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG), “Constitutional Reform in BiH: Engaging Civil Society.”** PILPG initially planned to work to address comprehensive constitutional reform through mobilizing and providing technical assistance to Bosnian civil society actors concerned with advocacy and reform. It was quickly recognized that, given the entrenched and monolithic resistance to reform at this level, it was more appropriate to focus on smaller parts of the constitutional reform process and ways to make these issues real for ordinary people. This shift in focus allowed PILPG to make some progress in organizing pressure groups around shared key issues and even allowed for some minimal progress on specific efforts at constitutional reform.

- **YouthBuild, “Youth Building Futures in the Brcko District.”** Similar to Mozaik’s YouthBanks project, YouthBuild worked primarily through youth (many of them unemployed) to identify and implement small-scale, local-level community development projects. The project aims to make youth more employable by establishing networking relationships with local employers and providing training and support in addition to providing labor on development projects as community service.
Table 1: USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina APS Funded Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementer</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Award Amt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Prevention of Violence involving children and promotion of respect for differences in BiH through the education system</td>
<td>Ilijaš, Pale, Kotor Varoš, Gradiška, prijedor, Bihać, Ugljevik, Brčko, Derventa, Goražde, Rudo, Čapljina, Konjic, Ljubuški, Srebrenica, Kladanj, Vitez, Trebinje, Lukavac, Gračanica, Maglaj, Žepče and five additional municipalities</td>
<td>September 2008-2010</td>
<td>$587,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Steps</td>
<td>Interfaith Dialogue and Diversity Training</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>$535,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* received $100,000 for 8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>Choosing Peace Together</td>
<td>Sarajevo with activities occurring in other areas</td>
<td>January 2010- April 2014</td>
<td>$1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozaik Community Development Foundation</td>
<td>YouthBanks: Peacing the Future Together</td>
<td>Doboj Jug, Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, Kotor Varos, Kozarska Dubica, Novi Grad, Novi Travnik, Srbac, Sipovo, Zavidovici and Zepce</td>
<td>February 2010- February 2012</td>
<td>$595,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public International Law and Policy Group</td>
<td>Constitutional Reform in BiH: Engaging Civil Society</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>February 2011- 2013</td>
<td>$788,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YouthBuild</td>
<td>Youth Build Youth Building Futures in the Brcko District</td>
<td>Brcko District, Lopare, Celic, Gradaca, and Pelagicevo municipalities</td>
<td>April 2011- December 2013</td>
<td>$1,173,559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Funding, 2008-2014 : $4,980,484

Evaluation Purpose

Beginning in the fall of 2011, Social Impact, Inc. (SI) began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under APS. The objectives of this review are not only to learn about the APS programs themselves but also to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the “developmental evaluation” methodology (see Annex B: Methodology for additional detail).

The evaluation of the APS projects in BiH is second in the series of three field evaluations—the first took place in Israel and West Bank in September 2012 and the third will take place in Burundi during June 2013. The primary purpose for these field evaluations is to advance CMM and broader Agency learning about how to effectivly design, implement, and manage APS-type projects in future. They are intended to analyze how program designs and implementation respond to significant contextual factors and conflict drivers in order to inform more responsive and relevant grant making in the future. The primary audience for this evaluation report is CMM, but the target audience also includes USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Research Methods

The evaluation employed a non-experimental, multi-level, qualitative-dominant mixed methods design using document review, key informant interviews, and small group interviews. Through these methods, the evaluation was designed to capture a general understanding of projects and their outcomes and through this to better understand their suitability to the Bosnian context and for using any lessons identified to reflect on such efforts elsewhere. The team sought to take a comprehensive view of the...
contextual situation in BiH and the P2P projects designed to address reconciliation, and to contextualize this view within the theoretical and academic literature, as well as guidance and practice from beyond the limited field of USAID, that informs the practice of reconciliation more broadly. From the perspective of the evaluation team, this understanding is critical if one is to undertake an evaluation of the effectiveness of any reconciliation program.

There are a number of potential sources of bias (or distortions in the data that may lead to inaccuracy). These include researcher bias related to assumptions, values, and interpretation of significance of data; selection bias, wherein a non-representative set of documents or interview participants were identified; and response bias, wherein interviewees give socially acceptable responses or seek to provide information they believe the researchers or the grantees would prefer. All of these issues were mitigated, to the degree possible. To control for researcher bias, peer review and support occurred daily, as well as triangulation across methods and across sources, making sure that multiple data points converge. The primary tool for controlling against selection bias was to take a comprehensive approach, ensuring that data was collected from both insiders and outsiders, and that all documents available were reviewed and all grantees were contacted and interviewed, and people from all levels both inside and outside the grantee were met with. Unfortunately, due to time and resource constraints, the evaluation team was dependent upon grantees to arrange most data collection activities, and the size of the pool of interviewees was relatively small; however, the evaluation team does not believe grantees tried to influence the outcomes of the evaluation by selecting cheerleaders and planting positively inclined interviewees. Response bias was addressed, again, by ensuring that the views of outsiders were also collected and analyzed. It is important to note that these threats to validity cannot be entirely eliminated—and so there remains some risk that the findings in this report—and the conclusions and recommendations drawn from these—are not perfectly valid. However, overall the evaluation team is confident in their findings and feels that the conclusions and recommendations are valid and appropriate.

The primary weakness in this evaluation is the limitations imposed by time and resource constraints. The overall findings and conclusions could have been strengthened substantially—especially through a much more extensive series of data collection and verification activities, as well as a more rigorous (and thus time-consuming) thematic analysis of qualitative information from both documents and interview transcripts. The team arrived on December 2nd, and departed on December 15th. The first two days were spent on final evaluation planning and logistics and providing in-briefing to USAID, while the last two days in country were devoted to final analysis, production of the out-brief materials, and providing the out-brief to USAID. This meant that, given a six-day work week in-country, only seven days were available for data collection and analysis, and no time remained after the completion of the data collection to perform systematic data verification activities (such as member checking or participatory review of findings and conclusions). A proposed mini-survey to perform this function was not initiated due to the extensive time required to design, translate, conduct, and analyze such an instrument.

The projects themselves were considerably varied in terms of complexity, conceptual sophistication, targeted population and approach, numbers of beneficiaries, geographic location, and duration. As is noted in the project description section, two projects had ended before the evaluation—and thus the evaluation team could not complete the full set of evaluation activities on these—and four were ongoing. While each project was examined according to the evaluation questions, more information to inform the overall evaluation findings was inevitably available from some projects over others.

The evaluation team reviewed documents provided by CMM/Washington, prior to departure. These documents were a subset of the larger document review for CMM’s two-year Evaluative Learning Review project. It should here be noted that the team received all documents in the possession of CMM pertaining to BiH, but this data set likely represented only a portion (and an indeterminate portion, at that) of all project documents developed for the six projects; many of these documents which likely exist proved irretrievable. A further complication was that the team did not receive standardized
information for all projects—the data set was thus not only partial and incomplete, but it was also inconsistent and of widely varying technical quality. Consequently, the document review provided a background on the project activities of the six organizations, and aided in refining interview templates, but it provided less than ideal (or even anticipated) information on project outcomes and impacts. In an attempt to address this, the team also collected a variety of project design and reporting documents provided by grantees and USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the issue described above, while improved somewhat by documentation collected in the field, remains.

A total of five semi-structured interview templates were designed for the set of interviews conducted during the fieldwork. These: these included templates for Non-Grantee Expert Practitioners, Grantee Staff, Project Beneficiaries, Local Non-Grantee Observers (or Community Members), and Donor Representatives. Although the discussion during these interviews was left loosely structured to allow for any interesting themes to emerge organically during conversation, each interview progressed through discussion of all questions in the questionnaire. It became obvious during the course of interviews that some questions were poorly understood, and interviewees had little meaningful information to contribute. This was especially true when interviewing project participants or beneficiaries, and members of the wider community. This again constitutes a gap in the data.

During fieldwork, the team met with USAID personnel knowledgeable about the P2P grants, as well as US Embassy personnel from the Public Affairs Office. Interviews were conducted with staff members of CMM grantees; relevant local government officials; staff from local peacebuilding implementation organizations who have not received CMM funds; and beneficiaries and participants in CMM funded grant activities. The team also met with knowledgeable local practitioners with expertise in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes (see Annex C for complete list of interviewees and Annex D interview templates).

The evaluation team conducted almost all interviews as teams of at least two, with most attended by the entire five person team. This cross-team triangulation ensured a more wide-ranging and validated understanding of the findings as well as reality-checking of interpretation and generation of conclusions around each interview, through a systematic process of peer review and peer support. Most of these interviews were captured in typed transcripts at the time of discussion, and although this method is not ideal, the notes produced constitute a fairly comprehensive documentation of the discussions. Each team member also kept personal notes and observations. During the field work, the team regularly met to discuss, analyze, and interpret key findings and emerging themes as well as discuss data trends. In this way, the team had an ongoing opportunity to share observations, check facts, assess and reality-test subjective interpretations and impressions, and form together the evaluation findings and conclusions of this report together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Tools/Methods/Processes</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years, due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?</td>
<td>Document Review</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• Other donors staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
<td>• Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Senior staff of implementing grantees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Project documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. What have been the contextual</td>
<td>Document Review</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| factors—at local, entity, national, and regional levels—that have most influenced project strategy, design, and outcomes? | Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • Other donors staff  
• Implementing grantee staff  
• Project documents  
• Secondary sources |
|---|---|---|
| 2. Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping and adapting to changes in the context in recent years? | Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Policy makers/officials |
| a. Which underlying ToCs have been helpful in the Bosnian context? Which have been least helpful? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations  
• Senior Staff of implementing organization  
• Policy makers/officials (local political leaders)  
• Project documents  
• Secondary sources |
| b. What are effective strategies for APS projects:  
• (1) supporting sustained reconciliation between ethnic groups?  
• (2) supporting joint economic ventures for cooperation between ethnic groups?  
• (3) supporting facing the past and truth-seeking initiatives at the local and regional level?  
• (4) other strategies?  
*note: the team assigned priority to these, and rearranged them slightly, to respond to what is seen relevant in BiH, given the specific grant activities funded by CMM. "Transitional justice issues" was removed as not relevant. | Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Beneficiaries  
• Wider community stakeholders  
• Policy makers/officials |
| c. How have projects adapted/responded to emerging challenges and opportunities? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Project documents |
| d. Did APS-funded project find the ‘People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide’ guidelines useful? Why and why not? How can CMM make these guidelines more useful? | Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews  
Document Review | • USAID staff  
• Staff of implementing organizations  
• Project documents |
|---|---|---|
| 3. In contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Beneficiaries  
• Wider community stakeholders  
• Policy makers/officials  
• Project documents |
| a. Are APS projects appropriate responses to identified drivers of conflict in BiH? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Beneficiaries  
• Wider community stakeholders  
• Policy makers/officials  
• Project documents |
| b. What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Project documents |
| c. Are APS projects designed in response to a dynamic analysis of the conflict environment? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Project documents |
| d. Are project type vis-à-vis identified conflict drivers, and also adaptability, both significant determiners of impact? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Project documents |
| e. Do APS projects appropriately and sufficiently engage the main promoters and supporters of reconciliation? Are they able to engage spoilers? | Document Review  
Key Informant Interviews  
Small Group Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Beneficiaries |
## Evaluation Questions

The evaluation centered on the three primary evaluation questions, each with individual sub questions, presented below.

1. **How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?**
   a. What have been the contextual factors—at local, entity, national, and regional levels—that have most influenced project strategy, design, and outcomes?

2. **Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping and adapting to changes in the context in recent years?**
   a. Which underlying ToC have been helpful in the Bosnian context? Which have been least helpful?
   b. What are effective strategies for APS projects:
      i. supporting transitional justice issues?
      ii. supporting truth-seeking initiatives and other facing the past issues at the local and regional level?
      iii. supporting sustained reconciliation between ethnic groups?
      iv. supporting joint economic ventures for cooperation between ethnic groups?
      v. other strategies?
   c. How have projects adapted/responded to emerging challenges and opportunities?
   d. Did APS-funded project find the People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide guidelines useful? Why and why not? How can CMM make these guidelines more useful?

3. **In contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?**
   a. Are APS projects appropriate responses to identified drivers of conflict in BiH?
   b. Are APS projects designed in response to a dynamic analysis of the conflict

### Evaluation Questions Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| f. Is there effective synergy between different projects and/or funders—a cumulative effect (i.e., the RPP matrix, is there a good balance between activities that aimed at attitudinal change vs. institutions and key people vs. more people)? | Document Review, Key Informant Interviews, Small Group Interviews | • Wider community stakeholders  
• Non-grantee peacebuilding organizations  
• Project documents |
| g. How do projects measure effectiveness/impact? How has that evolved in response to context? | Document Review, Key informant Interviews | • USAID staff  
• Other donors staff  
• Staff of implementing organization  
• Project documents  

### Evaluation Questions:

1. **How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?**
   a. What have been the contextual factors—at local, entity, national, and regional levels—that have most influenced project strategy, design, and outcomes?

2. **Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping and adapting to changes in the context in recent years?**
   a. Which underlying ToC have been helpful in the Bosnian context? Which have been least helpful?
   b. What are effective strategies for APS projects:
      i. supporting transitional justice issues?
      ii. supporting truth-seeking initiatives and other facing the past issues at the local and regional level?
      iii. supporting sustained reconciliation between ethnic groups?
      iv. supporting joint economic ventures for cooperation between ethnic groups?
      v. other strategies?
   c. How have projects adapted/responded to emerging challenges and opportunities?
   d. Did APS-funded project find the People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide guidelines useful? Why and why not? How can CMM make these guidelines more useful?

3. **In contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?**
   a. Are APS projects appropriate responses to identified drivers of conflict in BiH?
   b. Are APS projects designed in response to a dynamic analysis of the conflict
Findings and Conclusions

Responsiveness of APS Projects to Changing Contexts

Findings

The overall context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH has not significantly changed in the past four years; however, certain trends continue and these have exposed new challenges and opportunities for peacebuilders.

Overall, national and state level structures and systems that ordinarily might be able to affect change can be considered stagnant. Despite hoped for political moderation after the good showing in the 2010 parliamentary elections of a specifically multi-ethnic party (the Social Democrats), national level political leaders and their respective sets of institutions have been described as intensifying a “mutually beneficial stalemate” that continues to constrict meaningful efforts at broader based reconciliation. In effect, the ethno-nationalism that was a driver of the war, and became institutionalized in the peace agreement, continues to be used by the political elite as a

environment?

c. Are project types vis-à-vis identified conflict drivers and also adaptability both significant determiners of impact?

d. Do APS projects appropriately and sufficiently engage the main promoters and supporters of reconciliation? Are they able to engage spoilers?

e. Is there effective synergy between different projects and/or funders—a cumulative effect?

f. How do projects measure effectiveness/impact? How has that evolved in response to context?

Detailed questionnaires were developed at the initial Team Planning Meeting (see Annex D).

Excerpts from Saferworld/NDC 2010 Youth Perception Survey

“Youth learn stories of war second hand. Their parents are passing down to them different narratives of recent history, which are further distorted by the media.”

“Young people are being manipulated by adults (politicians, media, parents, teachers), and I’m concerned that another cycle of conflict might occur in the next 20 years.”

~KII, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 12 May 2011, Sarajevo

“I have two friends, Bosnia-Herzegovinaks, from Kotorsko (about 10 km from Doboj) and we socialize. Their parents receive me well, as well as mine them. Youth should make more efforts to get rid of ethnic prejudices. There are much more prejudices among older people than [among] youth. For us, the most important [thing] is to socialise. Whether we are of this or another religion is not important to us.”

~FGD participant, female, 18, Bosnian Serb, high school student, Doboj
means of political and economic control. Increasing fear mongering by many politicians has specifically created a situation in 2012 where the ideas of state unity and a shared identity are farther from the average citizen’s imagination than even a few years ago. Further consolidation of nationalist patronage networks over the past several years has created a set of top-down political and social institutions that dominate most political, economic, and social spheres for the average citizen of BiH. Whether it is political parties, war victims’ or veterans’ associations, or religious and social institutions, most promote and sanction their members based on a particular version of nationalist and exclusionary narratives.

Dependence on such networks and the benefits they deliver drives most citizens to passively accept if not actively promote the various nationalist narratives. This dependency has only increased as the economic situation has shown few signs of improvement; remittances have slowed as a result of the global financial crisis and international financial assistance has slowed or dried up entirely.

Approximately one quarter of the population is considered youth. Depending on the source one uses, unemployment among youth is anywhere between approximately 53% and 79%—and this fact leaves a very large segment of the population potentially at risk of falling prey to ethno-narrative scapegoating and associated extremism. These trends are not new, but they are becoming more concerning as the first post-war generation reaches adulthood with few tangible employment prospects for the future.

Efforts to ensure more conciliatory school books and curriculums have resulted in some basic standards being met within schools. However, overall, education and community development experts describe a situation in which schools remain zones of nationalist narratives, often reinforced by families and other social or institutional structures (see textbook). For example, a large-scale survey of youth perceptions carried out by Saferworld and Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC) in 2010 found that “while the respondents felt that physical inter-ethnic violence was less pronounced they noted that verbal violence and ‘hate speech’ are prevalent in internet forums, blogs or social networks such as Facebook…especially in the field of ethnic and religious affiliation.”

Few alternative sources of information or influence are actively available or used by youth; for example, less than 10% of youth is engaged in any type of NGO work. Most 17 and 18 year olds in 2012 have

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146 USAID Youth Assessment, July 2010 “You(th), the People: Integrating Youth into BiH USAID Programming.”

147 Population statistics in Bosnia-Herzegovina are difficult to verify since the last census is from before the war in 1991, but World Bank estimates suggest that approximately 25% or 950,000 Bosnians are between the ages of 15-29. This group is also is estimated as having the highest unemployment rate at 57%. See: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/02/14/improving-opportunities-young-people-Bosnia-Herzegovina [Accessed April 2, 2013].

148 See both “Progress towards the Realization of the Millennium Development Goals” (‘’ UNDP, 2010); and “Voices of Youth: Survey on Youth in BiH” (UNDP, February 2012).

149 For example, history and religious textbooks have now been “sanitized” of extreme and chauvinistic language and descriptions.

150 “Leaving the Past Behind: The Perceptions of Youth in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Saferworld and Nansen Dialogue Center. 2010, Pg. 45).

151 “Voices of Youth: Survey on Youth in BiH” (‘’ UNDP, February 2012).
grown up in effectively mono-ethnic communities and segregated social spheres. While they might not hate the “other,” most have little knowledge of each other. Theirs is secondary trauma, but one that continues to define the world around them and which is recognized by USAID and others as a clear area of needed emphasis for future youth programming.\footnote{One of three areas of youth programming emphasized as being a priority is focused on peace and security and working with youth to advance reconciliation efforts. Please see the July 2010 USAID Bosnia-Herzegovina report entitled: “You(th), the People: Integrating Youth into BiH USAID Programming.”}

International efforts to counteract these overall trends have become more lackluster and disjointed in the past few years, particularly as the European Union (EU) has become immersed and distracted by its own problems. While the EU integration process has yielded some progress, in reality, state reform has progressed little (by many standards even regressed). Yet, international political will to impose sanctions, or to challenge the functioning and nationalistic fragmentation of the State, have become less common. The top-level political elite, consequently, have more space to pursue their nationalist agendas and consistently articulate nationalist discourses that reinforce disunity, segregation, and the status-quo.

Still, there appears to be open space at local political and institutional levels to influence actors and structures and to develop a counter-narrative and corresponding multi-ethnic functions. This is partly due to the fact that patronage networks are beginning to feel cracks at lower and mid-levels as resources to keep such networks in check have dwindled.

It also is likely due to the fact that overall apathy and anger with the national level stalemate is increasingly being matched with citizens now channeling participation within their local communities. Specifically for most Bosnian citizens, the municipal level (there are 143 municipalities in BiH) is the only direct vote/connection they possess that provides an entry into an otherwise overcrowded and too complex governance system. Recent local elections (October 2012) had significantly higher voter participation than general elections two years ago,\footnote{See \url{http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=18}.} and there is some evidence that local level leaders are also reaching out to civil society and championing other civic initiatives to address problems in ways that serve common interests.

There is also evidence of an increasing interest amongst citizens that trust building and reconciliation are necessary.\footnote{A 2012 survey on reconciliation and trust building in BiH suggests that over 88% of those surveyed saw such processes as important for their communities and country. Please see: \url{http://www.diskursi.com/uploads/2012/10/Edinburg%20EngWeb.pdf} [Accessed April 2, 2013].} This appears to be partly expressed in a strengthening of nascent civil society generated peacebuilding effort. Overall, Bosnian civil society continues to struggle to function in an era of decreasing donor support, too little strategic vision and coordination, and the continuing political stalemate. Yet despite this—or perhaps partly because of this—informants describe the growth of reconciliation efforts that have mostly been “off the radar” around the country. Many of these actors are not the “usual NGO suspects,” but rather a collection of concerned and engaged citizens attempting to help their communities.
Specifically, programs aimed at dealing with the past, helping trauma survivors, or building bridges across ethnic divides are often carried out by victims’ groups, local business people, enlightened religious officials, youth leaders, progressive media (both traditional and social), and often are just the result of groups of ordinary, concerned citizens seeking alternative ways to advance change. This is an important resource which needs further nourishment and support in order to produce meaningful results on the macro-level.

Conclusions

The primary negative trends have prompted more people to see the need for a different way of doing things; enough time has passed (and too much time has passed) for war-related traumas to continue to define people. There is a craving for normalcy, and this has created a fertile opening for peacebuilding interventions.

Space for moderate leaders and community actors is still difficult to find, but such figures are gaining exposure, particularly at the local community level. Examples of government and religious leaders who are known to be non-nationalists are discussed and cited as proof for others that change is possible in their own communities. Such change appears to be encouraged and supported, or at least tolerated, from multiple sides. The willingness of government, local business, and a variety of civil society associations to work together, often across the ethnic divide, is a sign of strengthened social trust at these levels and interest in improving local environments. This represents an important opening, which also can be potentially harnessed for more effective peacebuilding work.

For many, this means public interest in some types of or more intensive multi-ethnic engagement. It is unclear if this is similar everywhere around the country—particularly in the Republika Srpska (RS) and parts of Herzegovina in the Federation—but in many parts of the Federation there is openness towards engaging with and working with “others.” For some, this means acknowledging and openly engaging with trauma issues from the war. For others, it is more focused on how to encourage youth to be responsible citizens, and for still others it might mean coming together in frustration over common concerns. But it is the opinion of the evaluation team that the context is ripe for Bosnian-led reconciliation interventions if both timely and strategic.

Contextual Factors Most Influential on Project Strategy, Design, and Outcomes

Findings

Designers and implementers of peacebuilding projects in BiH have attempted to address reconciliation on a number of levels and through a number of mechanisms and in this way attempt to engage with the so-called propagators of nationalist narratives in BiH as they describe them. These include:

- Political institutions;
- Religious institutions;
- Schools;
- Media; and
• Families.

For some APS implementers, peacebuilding efforts are built around the idea of engaging with youth as a way to address larger reconciliation efforts and undermine many of the five enablers. This is partly due to the recognition that most youth—even those who live in towns with mixed populations—are growing up in mono-ethnic enclaves within Bosnia-Herzegovina, although in the absence of reliable census data, the exact extent of this is difficult to gauge. It is also partly due to the fact that youth are considered to be secondarily traumatized through hearing the war stories of their families and communities. Here there have been mainly two types of approaches: through the education sector and through community-based development type projects.

Efforts to encourage more tolerant and inclusive school environments as well as improve learning and educational outcomes have spurred both domestic civil society organizations and international organizations to focus attention on the education sector. For over 10 years, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other international and domestic actors have supported the development of inclusive curriculum and textbooks as well as progressive teaching methods and school management techniques. STC tapped into these efforts and expanded on them to work towards a more comprehensive understanding of inclusiveness, covering teaching methods as well as local school management with community involvement. These efforts have been based on the idea that educating and providing an educational environment that teaches tolerance and individual critical thinking skills will break the cycle of, as one interviewee described it, “raising the next generation of soldiers.”

These efforts have been slow partly due to ministries of education at the canton level (in the Federation) and RS entity-level lack of support for such reform processes as well as the continuing policies throughout the country of ethnically divided and segregated “two schools beneath one roof.” In such communities and others, many parents are reluctant to substantially change their “national” curriculum or create a more inclusive teaching environment as current national curriculums cater to perceived important elements of national culture transmission such as alphabet (Serbs require literacy in Cyrillic script, Croats use Latin script, and Bosnia-Herzegovina-


156 This assessment is shared in numerous documents provided by grantees or USAID. See the performance assessment of the CPT produced by promote, p. 4; and USAID BiH assessment report “You(th) the People” (“; July, 2010, p. 26).

Herzegovinaks use both) and identity-based conceptions of national history. Furthermore, lingering trauma from the war generates continuing fear and anxiety that justifies segregated educational spaces.

Outside of schools, other projects have targeted young adults who are just finishing or have finished their secondary schooling to encourage tolerance and peacebuilding. Many of these youth are considered “at risk” primarily due to the extreme difficulty for many (even with university degrees) in finding employment.\(^{158}\) Apathy and disillusionment are prevalent traits of many young adults in BiH. Two projects, Mozaik’s Youth Banks and YouthBuild, addressed this apathy while at least indirectly helping with future employment prospects. Broadly the projects focused on self-development as a way to engage with and do something concrete in their communities. Both projects have elements that encourage multi-ethnic and inclusive engagement and have focused on bringing together and integrating youth, business, and local governments to address immediate interests and build capacity for youth to find their places in their communities.

Both projects recognize that a key challenge for such programs is designing opportunities for youth beyond the specific project, particularly to combat negative influences to conform from others when they re-enter their social network. Youth Banks has annual meetings of their youth participants that include graduates as a way to foster a sense of shared community outlook and support. YouthBuild describes how former participants continue to volunteer with their programming in order to feel connected. Both projects see a need to further expand their support efforts as their programs develop and grow.

CRS has taken a more direct approach to reconciliation, as understood by the evaluation team, by engaging with those it has identified as most traumatized by the war, and, simultaneously, those articulating the most virulent discourses which justify the ethno-nationalist narratives permeating the current Bosnian context. Psycho-trauma counseling has been a feature of programming in BiH since 1996, but for the most part such programming was curtailed a few years after the conflict even though as the level of unresolved psycho-trauma within BiH still appears to be still be considerable.\(^{159}\) The CRS program provides services and support for trauma sufferers, seeking to support the healing effort of individual survivors, but through this also to help to heal their immediate families and social circle. One particular set of trauma sufferers that has been targeted is veterans and war victims such as camp survivors, a group that is arguably most severely traumatized. By assisting such groups with psycho-social services, as well as providing broader support, these individuals in turn can also become a powerful and unassailable set of voices advocating for reconciliation amongst the broader citizenry. Parts of this program accordingly focused on how to spread these messages. Veterans have traveled in collaborative

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\(^{158}\) This assessment is also shared in numerous documents: see p. 4 of the technical grant proposal submitted to CMM by YouthBuild; and p. 3 of the baseline study commissioned by Mozaik.

\(^{159}\) While there is little clear data on the level of psycho trauma in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 2012 study by the Ministry of Health, as referenced in the premier online news source for the region (Balkan Insight), suggests that over 60% of Sarajevo’s residents have PTSD. Please see: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/Bosnia-Herzegovina-still-living-with-consequences-of-warfield [Accessed April 3, 2013]. Field observations and feedback obtained over the course of this evaluation further suggest that high levels of trauma are present amongst almost all segments of the population.
speaking-out tours, where former enemies appeared and shared their personal stories, interacting respectfully and advocating for and demonstrating reconciliation. Some of these have been broadcast on television and disseminated through other media in order to expand and amplify the message.

Messages are also being directed at local and mid-level community leaders. This includes efforts to engage with religious leaders and community leaders to discuss and learn about how the various religions contain prescriptions for peace and preach tolerance. Here efforts focused both on how such leaders influence their communities as well as their institutional structures. For the most part, this effort has been modest and the APS project, Small Steps, was cut short. There is, however, opportunity to explore further engagement with such efforts.

The schism between people and their senior political leaders is a gulf that only a few have attempted to bridge in their reconciliation efforts. Uniting citizens around both immediate shared grievances and more long-standing frustrations has been one of the key ways that projects attempted to begin to bridge these divides. For example, shared grievances among camp survivors on the need to develop legislation recognizing their legal needs has been one way that projects have attempted to support and moderate the previous extreme positions of such groups. Another track has been engagement with civil society organizations on issues of shared concern such as the constitutionally focused reform efforts through PILPG. Efforts to build up civil society cohesion in specific issue areas, such as concerns surrounding the census format, and gender-focused areas for constitutional reform, have also focused on assisting civil society organizations to be more coordinated and jointly focused on their shared objectives.

**Conclusions**

The project approaches taken by diverse APS grantees demonstrate that there are a number of meaningful ways to engage in reconciliation efforts in BiH and, furthermore, confirm that there are openings for doing such reconciliation work now. However, overall reconciliation results from APS projects to date have been modest. Small glimmers of improved trust and engagement at the individual level and in limited pockets at the community level in the various projects are noted and commended—but these have only sometimes resulted in meaningful reconciliation even though there is ample evidence that suggests that reconciliation is indeed possible in this context. There is no substantive evidence was observed by the evaluation team that suggested could observe that these project efforts have had a higher-level impact on “Peace Writ Large” in Bosnia-BiH. These results suggest the need for far more serious attention to be given to design and implementation, with a more sophisticated approach to reconciliation, in order to ensure broader and more significant results.

The fact that there is a multitude of approaches that seem suitable to engage with as reconciliation activities has made it challenging for implementers (and USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina) to design any strategically targeted set of engagements. It is understandable, therefore, that projects attempted to address multiple levels and sought out potential openings; however, there was little sense from either within the Mission or the APS implementers of a coordinated set of actions and efforts that were consciously selected to lead to something more. Key actors clearly do not have a shared sense of what reconciliation looks like in BiH (at least not actively and explicitly), and this was most pointedly revealed by the request from the USAID Mission during the in-brief to provide a definition of what reconciliation actually looks like. This lack of clarity includes donors, civil society actors, and other key peacebuilding actors beyond the APS project implementers. It is telling, for example, that the peacebuilding network of civil society organizations within BiH (a byproduct of APS efforts) did not have a clear sense of the reconciliation objectives of the projects themselves.

This lack of a clear vision of what reconciliation is and what reconciliation projects are likely to look like has also affected the relative intentionality of reconciliation efforts within projects. When projects had intentional reconciliation components like working with trauma victims, the results appeared dramatic. When reconciliation was one of a number of possible benefits, or a “side-effect” associated with other
intended objectives, results were weaker. Youth projects that hoped for reconciliation as a byproduct did yield some evident results; how deep, meaningful, and ultimately sustainable such tolerance and opening experiences were for participants remains a question. It is worth noting here that intentional adjustments to include more reconciliation programming in the YouthBuild program in Brcko appeared to yield stronger reconciliation results in later youth cohorts, and this suggests that more intentional (if not explicit) youth focused reconciliation programming is possible.

Implementers have also not strategically seized the opportunities to multiply the effects of their reconciliation activities. While projects have attempted to expand on successes, these have not been numerous enough or strategic enough to have any significant impact beyond their immediate beneficiaries. Neither project evaluation documents nor interviews with implementers and beneficiaries could point convincingly to any significant impact beyond the immediate beneficiaries. The exception here is the CRS psycho-trauma work with war camp survivors. Here evidence suggests that intentional reconciliation programming combined with a systematic way of sharing these reconciliation messages outward to the larger community can yield dramatic results. This conclusion is amplified by the statements of participants of the speaking-out tour who recounted numerous emotional and powerful stories of their own personal transformation as well as numerous examples of powerful outcomes that occurred among audience members. The survivors' speaking-out tour mechanism is thus noted as a “power tool” for “chipping away” at the larger context and for reaching a broader set of the population, and such efforts need to be replicated and further amplified. Specifically, this means designing and implementing projects that from the outset build upon individual and small group reconciliation outcomes, and can be implemented in ways that support reaching out and influencing reconciliation possibilities in wider segments of society.

**Most Effective Strategies for Adapting to Changing Contexts**

**Findings**

While social conflict contexts and the dynamics driving them are known generally to evolve, a key finding from this study is that in the Bosnian context, the peacebuilding space has changed little since the inception of the APS grants in 2008. The immediate post-war period offered some fluidity, but 17 years after the DPA cemented “negative peace”160, the Bosnian context appears “fossilized” from a conflict resolution standpoint. Institutionalized ethno-nationalism that includes war and post-war grievances remains both a driver and source of the conflict—and a symptom. As the overall context has not changed, most adaptation performed by APS projects occurred on a tactical level, which highlights several strategic challenges. First, for the most part, the projects used an ad-hoc approach to reconciliation (with the exception of CRS), resulting in some positive although relatively weak outcomes. These results occurred mostly as a by-product of the activity and not as a chief objective of a carefully designed and implemented peacebuilding vis-à-vis reconciliation intervention. Projects’ designs were sophisticated and complex enough to include a broad set of activities that allowed for some emphasis shifting during implementation, which is laudable. For example, PILPG adapted to the reality of an impasse in constitutional reform and thus broke down its planned interventions into several different

160 Galtung, 1969
segments aimed at taking smaller bites of the larger political dynamic. Similarly, CRS recognized the value of including youth and added a program of peace camps to connect them with the war veterans who were the program’s primary beneficiaries. YouthBuild in later cohorts added educational sessions on tolerance and diversity.

Second, the chief challenge that most projects faced was a lack of technical expertise and required conceptual sophistication necessary to design interventions through a reconciliation lens. While technically sound in terms of general development goals aiming to better society or improve the lives of participating beneficiaries, the designers’ primary focus did not clearly emphasize the conflict resolution goals that CMM seeks to advance through P2P programming. With the exception of CRS, the projects improved the conditions of youth, encouraged youth personal development, established local networks to push for local development (YouthBuild, Youth Banks) or aimed to achieve institutional change or reform (STC and PILPG), assuming that these joint activities alone would somehow generate reconciliation outcomes. Most of these projects were explicitly standard development projects using the “contact hypothesis”\(^{161}\) to produce a vehicle for reconciliation. As peacebuilding goals were not carefully formulated, either intentionally or explicitly, the results in these projects show little progress towards genuine reconciliation and no contribution to “Peace Writ Large.” There was evidence of increased tolerance and appreciation of diversity, which in the divided society of BiH is significant and has some basis for further conflict transformation potential, but such results fall short of the needed transformation that is required to challenge and deconstruct the nationalist narratives and power structures that keep BiH petrified through fear, mistrust, and mutual antagonism.

Third, even the projects with a stated peacebuilding goal (Small Steps) appear to have produced very isolated, localized results, not adding up to anything significant on the macro level. Projects that aimed to advance youth interactions across ethnic divides placed emphasis on leadership development and community improvements with little strategic vision as to how newly developed youth could impact the stagnant top-level structures. Others, like PILPG and STC, aimed to reform institutions but appear to have produced the least significant results in terms of P2P reconciliation (although it must be noted that as the STC project had been closed for some time, data collection was extremely limited). The notable exception is CRS’ *Choosing Peace Together* that resulted in a creation of a *Peacebuilding Network*, which aims to develop a more coherent and strategic peacebuilding platform across the country.

Such tactical adaptations offer insights into possible directions of more effective programming in the future. For example, literally all interviewees emphasized that the youth has emerged as the primary stakeholder in peacebuilding. Connecting youth-focused projects with those involving war veterans speaking about their personal transformation could have a profound reconciliation impact on the larger society. Additionally, stitching active youth together, from across multiple projects and across ethnic divides, and unifying their activities towards a larger peacebuilding purpose, could have larger and far more significant effects.

The APS grantees’ management and staff appreciated USAID’s flexibility in terms of allowing for tactical adaptations and adjustments. During implementation, most grantees were in constant touch with the

\(^{161}\)Wright, 1997
Mission, seeking advice and making needed shifts. Almost all the grantees pointed out advantages of working with APS funding and USAID as compared to EU actors, whom they judged to be far less flexible. Repeatedly, we heard the need for better donor coordination on a strategic level—occasional meetings around an emerging political crisis (for example, constitutional changes) need to be supplemented with long-term and strategic joint visioning and synergistic action, especially around peacebuilding. Once such a vision is developed, the US Government (USG) and the wider international community will need to consistently apply a unified approach, merging financial and material development assistance with critically necessary political pressure on the topmost levels.

Most grantees spoke of limitations and constraints of the APS format in general—they felt heavily constrained by the orthodoxies of the system (especially as it relates to requirements for producing project proposals and reporting on project progress) and commented that they did not feel that the system allows for much adaptability within the short timeframe of these interventions. Consistently, the grantees’ management and staff, as well as beneficiaries, stressed that building peace requires time and it is very challenging to communicate complex (and often unintended) results in traditional donor formats.

Conclusions

As there were no major changes in the overall context, the APS projects did not exhibit much in the way of strategic adaptation to changing contextual factors. Some tactical shifts were made during project implementation, a few of which indirectly enhanced peacebuilding outcomes, but these were mostly ad-hoc and secondary sideeffects and show little evidence of careful design and implementation of structured and strategic reconciliation activities. Grantees appreciated the freedom they were given to be flexible and adaptable (to the degree that they were so) and appreciated coordination with and support from the Mission during implementation.

The Peacebuilding Network of CRS has promise and can serve as a clear resource for peacebuilders throughout BiH, particularly individual peacebuilder members and those not part of the most visible and developed NGOs. Yet it should also be recognized that the current network is mostly passive, and to become more effective, a more strategic and cohesive mission needs to be developed. Of course, building a more vibrant and focused network of peacebuilders takes time, a key set of respected individuals or leaders, and the flexibility to use such a network in potentially untraditional ways.

Most and Least Helpful Underlying Theories of Change in the Bosnian Context

Findings

For the most part, projects did not use CMM’s documents and guidelines in developing their ToCs in relation to reconciliation objectives. But perhaps more important than whether the projects adhered to a particular ToC framework—with the exception of CRS’s fairly developed set of theories—other projects lacked CMM’s intentional and strategic approach to integrating ToCs that could lead to reconciliation. YouthBuild utilized a well-explained ToC within the family of “healthy relationships,” which possibly led to their increased intentional approach to issues of inter-ethnic tolerance and cooperation across cohorts. Several projects (Small Steps, STC) were completed before the ToC document was disseminated. Others were either not familiar with CMM’s ToCs or did not apply them explicitly in design and implementation of their projects.

However, the evaluation team observed the implicit use of several ToCs in the Bosnian context, shown in the summary Table 2 below:
Table 2: Implicit Use of ToCs in Project Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ToC/Implementer</th>
<th>Healthy Relationships</th>
<th>Peace Inside Out</th>
<th>Dealing with the Past</th>
<th>Functioning Institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>YouthBuild</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Banks</td>
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<td>STC</td>
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</table>

Even though most grantees did not use CMM’s ToC as envisioned, during interviews with grantee management, staff, beneficiaries, and broader community stakeholders, all revealed that those four families of ToC were indeed quite relevant, helpful, and necessary in the Bosnian context.

Given the nature of P2P programming, most interventions fell within the “healthy relationships” family of ToCs, which were also those most often referenced in grant proposals and documents, as well as during our interviews. CMM documents recognize that bringing together people from different groups is in and of itself not enough; for actual reconciliation to occur a carefully designed and facilitated, well-structured engagement is required. Bosnian APS grant applications and reports (implicitly) recognized the value of ensuring such ongoing engagement, but due to the unintentional approach to reconciliation, overall peacebuilding effectiveness was diluted.

Again, it is important to stress the need for a more nuanced, systematic, and scientific understanding of reconciliation, both as a process and as a result. Additionally, when using ToCs to design short-term and small-scale P2P programs, it is critical to consider how their outputs and outcomes can be amplified, especially in a context in which divisions have been entrenched and institutionalized to the degree one sees in BiH. With the exception of PILPG’s project, and to a lesser degree CRS and Small Steps, all Bosnian APS grants employed a “more people” approach, hoping to generate broad based support for “Peace Writ Large” and promote the emergence of a critical mass to tip the balance in favor of political or societal level reconciliation. However, the social dynamics resulting from deeply flawed Dayton structures, the persistence of the use of divisive nationalist narratives to establish political legitimacy and mobilize grass-roots constituencies, and a lack of sustained international support are impervious to the far-flung, micro-scale, vastly under-resourced APS interventions when the model for social change rests on an approach seeking to reach “more people.”

As the Bosnian peacebuilding context remains unchanged, most interviewees underscored the importance of two other ToC families: “Reforming Elites” and “Functioning Institutions.” The lack of strategic engagement with “key people” is a significant impediment for systemic peacebuilding in BiH, but there was no pragmatic clarity found on how APS projects could engage or influence the top-most levels.
Conclusions

All CMM’s ToCs were helpful and, to one degree or another, were necessary and appropriate in the Bosnian context. However, without strategic amplification or multiplication of effects, it is difficult to see how APS grants and their micro-scale designs can achieve significant impact. The project outcomes demonstrate that they can improve local community trust and understanding, but even in these specific communities where reconciliation potential appears possible, reconciliation outcomes were elusive. The notable exception to this is the CRS project, which intentionally sought to amplify project effects by mobilizing recognized and noteworthy mid-level persons (war veterans and trauma survivors) to reach out to their larger communities.

In general, it appears that the principle strategic approach was “more people” based, and in the BiH context, these APS approaches are micro-scale and under-resourced to add up to a significant, macro-level reconciliation result, even with some clear evidence of (relatively weak) reconciliation results at individual and community levels. The limited scale and reach of these effects can be attributed primarily to a set of small, isolated interventions that do not have funding necessary to reach scale and begin to achieve “critical mass,” an absence of strategic vision for how micro-level results could be amplified beyond individual participants and isolated communities, and the lack of a mechanism for strategic synergy. The overall weakness of the effects observed—save for the work performed by CRS—is likely due to a lack of nuanced and sophisticated understanding of reconciliation activities, what they are, and how they work, (including naive interpretations of the “healthy relationships” ToC, which might lead to positive indicators such as changed attitudes, increased tolerance, better understanding of the “other”, more appreciation of diversity, etc., but which in the end fall short of the full potential of an effective reconciliation approach.)

Effective Strategies for APS Projects

Transitional Justice (TJ): Since the international community failed in its three attempts in the early 2000s to create a Bosnian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there has been little effort to advance national/local TJ initiatives. Out of six APS grantees, only CRS’s “Choosing Peace Together” contributed (albeit indirectly and unintentionally) to a TJ result, especially through the format of war-camp survivors doing joint speaking-out tours around the country which served to generate an alternative discourse to the nationalistic narratives and informally sought to establish a counter-narrative aimed at “truth and reconciliation.” The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has prepared a national TJ strategy which will be released shortly; its representatives credited the CRS project with creating an atmosphere in which “transitional justice is no longer a dirty word, and we can engage more people in critical discussions about the past, without being dependent on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.”

Trauma Healing: CRS and Small Steps created spaces for beneficiaries (war trauma survivors and religious leaders) to openly and honestly talk about war experiences. This approach showed significant reconciliation results on two levels: first, it helped to transform some hardline nationalists into vocal,

162 Sanely Periodic, UNDP Transitional Justice program manager, (group interview, 12/4/2012).
self-identified peacemakers and, second, it allowed them to publically and jointly communicate their experiences in a format that amplified the reconciliation impact outwards on a much larger scale. CRS used locally developed resource materials and workshop curricula, and local psycho-social healing experts, to build this effective intervention, showing evidence that the time is ripe for a more systemic reconciliation programming.

**Sustained Reconciliation:** Small Steps aimed to use their workshops’ participants to further sustain inter- and intra-community dialogue among religious leaders, but their programming was cut short due to the organizational challenges they faced with programming APS funding. Still, anecdotal evidence suggests that such programming can be powerful and continue to build beyond the conclusion of such a project. For example, Small Steps described a community leader from Visoko who had learned through the seminar series how to use her Islamic faith to spread peace. As described she had a “click moment” and since has started an NGO for other women community leaders to engage in interfaith dialogue and to be seen as examples in their communities. Such programming can also begin to aid those community leaders that envision change to have the tools and support to promote such efforts on community and mid-levels.

CRS’ “Choosing Peace Together” participants further testified to the importance of this approach as possibly the most relevant way to succeed in actual reconciliation programming, highlighting its relevance both as a process and as an end state.

As one participant stated, in an interview with CRS program beneficiaries (a group of war camp survivors):

> We have to keep meeting, keep working to humanize the other and talk about what happened to us. We have to put a face to it, explain what we did to us and others. It has to be an ongoing multi ethnic discussion as to what really happened…and only so will there be a possibility and space for a shared vision for the present—and also preventing this from happening in the future.  

**Youth Work:** Across interviews, the evaluation team repeatedly heard how important was engaging with youth—even managers/staff in projects that did not work with young people directly suggested that this approach is critical for peacebuilding in BiH. In those projects that were youth focused (YouthBuild and Youth Banks), there was evidence of positive indicators related to increased tolerance and appreciation for ethnic diversity in BiH. Given that this first post-war generation is mostly growing up in mono-ethnic communities, the fact that APS projects offered an opportunity to meet and interact with the “other” are quite significant. Most young people interviewed stated that prior to their participation in these projects, they had never met, let alone developed relationships with, young people from other ethnic groups. There were powerful statements of personal transformation and ongoing, sustained relationships, especially through Facebook.

The types of projects that engage youth can and likely should be focused on issues that youth consider important and which have been identified as youth programming priorities, and notably here having

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163 Drags Jakupovic, president of the Association of Serb Camp Survivors, (group interview, 12/14/2012).
better opportunities for employment and/or community engagement are areas that can be particularly good vehicles for programming. Regardless of the specific focus, however, the effects of youth work could be significantly improved by carefully making its reconciliation focus more explicit and more intentional. The focus on “prejudice and stereotype” trainings currently included in youth workshops resulted in visible impact that “softened” some youth’s hardcore nationalist narratives. Still, it was evident that such outcomes were mostly a by-product of other parts of the program design and not strictly related to a nuanced and carefully facilitated approach to reconciliation. The impact would likely be amplified by combining work with other approaches, especially with the “dealing with the past” pillar—possibly bringing war veterans in closer contact with participants in youth programs, as well as further amplifying effects through the use of traditional and social media.

Youth programming could also be enhanced by considering how to take some of these reconciliation messages mainstream through the media. As one informant noted, having a recent reality TV series end with a mixed ethnic couple did more to generate discussion and confront attitudes amongst a wide segment of youth viewers than any small, local NGO efforts could hope to. Importantly, this transition—in terms of design and implementation of youth work with a more intentional reconciliation goal and including media components to amplify the effects—does not appear to be a major challenge, as the managers, staff, and beneficiaries of youth programs met with sufficient possessed interest and enthusiasm—if not technical skills and capabilities—to accomplish this goal with minimal additional resources and structured capacity development. However, CMM and Mission staff should carefully note a warning emerging from the Saferworld youth perception survey which found that “ethnicity also strongly influences the way in which people in BiH consume media: most Bosnia-Herzegovinaks watch Sarajevo-based channels, most Bosnian Serbs watch RS- and Belgrade-based programmes, and most Bosnian Croats are dependent on and oriented towards programmes from Croatia.”164 Future APS will thus need to carefully consider how they will ensure that their efforts actually reach their intended audience.

**Joint Economic Ventures:** As one leading peacebuilder stated, “this conflict did not start due to economic challenges, and while important, such activities will never deal with underlying root causes.”165 Thus, a narrow focus on joint economic activity is not likely to create needed change; rather, integrating economic tools to reinforce intentional and sophisticated reconciliation work is a more appropriate approach. At the start, bringing people together for economic ventures can be a way to “get people into the room,” but this has to be complemented with more intentional and structured reconciliation process activities if powerful reconciliation results are to be achieved. And it should be noted that when there are local advocates of reconciliation and people can see the benefit, it may not be necessary to use economic incentives as lures to encourage participation.

164 Saferworld, Pg. 7.

165 Goran Bubalo, manager of CRS’ Choosing Peace Together project (interview, 12/6/2012).
Usefulness of CMM’s P2P Guidance

The timing of issuance of the P2P guide was a significant factor in the Bosnian context—two projects were completed before the document was available and, in the case of PILPG, the manager arrived after the grant was received and thus was not familiar with the guidelines at that time. For YouthBuild and Youth Banks, the grantee senior managers appeared familiar with the guidelines, and the review of their documents proves that these grantees have used the guidelines. During interviews, these managers also stated their appreciation for how user-friendly and practical the guidelines are. However, the implementation staff in charge of operationalizing guidelines into actual activities was neither familiar with the document nor versed in key concepts of P2P programming. This, in part, explains why those projects showed marginal reconciliation outcomes produced primarily as a by-product of other planned activities.

CRS managers and staff, including their M&E department, were quite familiar with the guidelines and appreciated the documents a great deal. They stated that its “plain” language makes the P2P programming achievable and especially noted its utility for designing results frameworks and other components of an integrated M&E system for the project. Also, as several people on their staff had substantive experience performing peacebuilding work, and possessed extensive prior familiarity with various theories of peace and reconciliation, as well as peacebuilding practice, they found the guide to be an excellent “framework document.” Thus, for such trained practitioners, the guidelines were of practical use in their own work and also as a tool to explain their work to others. It was evident that peace practitioners found the guidelines most useful. For those without theoretical/practical grounding in reconciliation work, guidelines were harder to fully understand, integrate, and make operational. Managers and staff in those projects without technical knowledge clearly appreciated the “spirit” of the guidelines, but it was not evident that they were able to make practical use of them in project design, implementation, or evaluation.

However, across the board, the grantees expressed facing challenges in combining user-friendly P2P guidelines with the APS grant forms and application process. Many commented on the gap between the clear, accessible format of the P2P guides, and the intimidating, incomprehensible, and burdensome format of the APS grant application itself. In addition to the burdensome format, the feedback suggested that the format at least indirectly focused applicants on projects that were likely to “be successful” over more experimental or unorthodox approaches. As one practitioner noted, there is somewhat of a disconnect between the P2P guide and the actual APS proposal format as the guide opens perspectives on doing such work and the proposal closes them: “You are forced to think what will work…not what we need, as the proposal cannot suggest that you might “fail.”

This is also problematic as it was evident that it excluded many potential implementers, especially smaller but highly skilled and effective practitioners who have established track records in achieving reconciliation results, but lack highly developed project management skill sets or organizational backing to generate complex project proposals. The case in point is Small Steps, a leading peacebuilding actor working with religious and community leaders with a specific focus on reconciliation, whose APS grant was cut short due to their organizational inability to meet APS accounting and reporting requirements.

Ability of Projects to Respond to Emerging Challenges and Opportunities

Findings

The context did not significantly change during the course of the projects, and accordingly projects did not require strategic reconfiguration to address changes in contextual factors. Still, implementers demonstrated an awareness of the contextual dynamics and did make tactical changes to their projects to either seize opportunities or reduce risks to project outcomes.
For example, the two youth projects experimented with ways to engage most effectively with local governments and business leaders. One project saw that they could have more impact with greater engagement by the Employers’ Association in Brcko beyond simply providing internships to include members of the Employers’ Association in direct classroom interaction with youth. This provided both youth and business people with a more personal space for understanding each other and apparently strengthened businesses interests in making the project succeed, including assisting youth to find that first opportunity for employment or professional, practical experience.

Regarding risk reduction, PILPG early on saw that its plan for taking on comprehensive constitutional reform was not appropriate to the context. Its focus on small parts of the constitutional reform process and ways to make these parts real for normal people—i.e., how one’s paycheck is affected by constitutional reform—allowed it to make some progress in organizing pressure groups around shared key issues, and even allowed for some minimal progress on specific efforts at constitutional reform.

**Conclusions**

The projects generally had enough space to make the necessary implementation adaptations and one APS project provided the general space to experiment with a side project on building a peacebuilding network. While no major strategic shifts were necessary given the static context, the implementers and the Mission appeared politically savvy enough to shift focus as opportunity and demand required.

**The Larger Impact of APS Projects**

**Findings**

APS projects are making minimal, if any, contributions at the societal level; no observations were made that support the conclusion that there has been any significant effect from APS projects at the top-level. This is not surprising given the severity of the current state of ethnic relations in post-war BiH and the level of trauma experienced by everyone living in the Bosnian context. Additionally, given the extremely limited scope and reach of most projects, and the minimal resources made available through the small grants of the APS mechanism, there simply is not enough input into the system to gain traction that could add up to a top-level result. There is evidence of some progress at the community level and quite extensive evidence of personal transformation at the individual level, both confirmed by interviews with beneficiaries and noted in a number of the midterm reports, but at this time, the individual level and community level results do not appear to add up to a meaningful result at higher levels. However, a caveat should be noted that the evaluation team does not mean to imply that the APS had no societal level impact overall, but rather that they did not find sufficient evidence of that impact. In other words, the APS may have contributed to a societal level change in attitudes towards reconciliation, but that this impact was minimal at best given other factors such as time and other donor activities.

There is still strong top-level obstruction and sabotage of reconciliation activities. Informants spoke of specific pressure in relation to project participation in which where inevitably a number of people “dropped out” due to pressure not to participate. They also described a general context in which many where many structures and systems in place divide people and make cross-communal activities a practical challenge. This also feeds into the perception amongst people that it is difficult—if not impossible—to break out of this type of context and to have more positive interaction. There is a lack of appropriate engagement from the international community and a conspicuous failure to deliver consistent, values-based pressure at the top political levels and to insist on BiH meeting modern and widely accepted standards of institutional and political structure and function (for example, a mandate for integrated, non-segregated educational institutions). The international community provides incentives and rewards that perpetuate the divided and dysfunctional political arrangements in BiH and enable the ethnic, hardline political elite to continue using nationalist discourses and justifications to maintain the status quo. Although there are many actors in civil society who recognize this dysfunctional dynamic and
take risks to address it—actively seeking to undermine the hardline nationalist political actors and the policies they pursue, they are not provided support from bi-laterals and multi-laterals engaged with political actors in BiH, which serves to entrench the ethnic divides built into the current system.

Although there is a wide cadre of trained and skilled facilitators in BiH, many of whom are working in obscurity and isolation from each other, most of these expert-practitioners of reconciliation arts lack the sorts of organizational structure and capacity which could lead to their ability to access donor funds. They struggle to produce proposals in English, lack high-capacity financial accounting and M&E reporting systems, and most of them reside outside of Sarajevo. They are effectively below the donor radar, in spite of the fact that they understand and can correctly implement contextually relevant reconciliation process activities.

Conclusions
The evident interest in the business and local government sectors in philanthropy and joint-mobilization to achieve a common good is heartening, as is the interest in and commitment to civic responsibility, volunteerism, and multi-ethnic engagement among youth, war trauma survivors, and religious leaders. The presence of a numerous and highly-skilled cadre of expert-practitioners constitutes a nascent network of peacebuilders, a “human infrastructure” for peace, and most of these valuable resource persons and change-agents are quietly working towards reconciliation outside the notice of donors. Substantial numbers of ordinary people recognize the need to move beyond the ethnicized divisions and constraints of the past and would be willing to work together to visualize and achieve a common future—if they had a clear set of activities that can be seen as leading them in this direction.

All of this leads the evaluation team to conclude that the context in BiH is ripe for strategic and large-scale reconciliation intervention. However, while there is broad-based recognition of the need to heal the trauma of the past and wide willingness to do so, it is also the case that people do not understand what dealing with trauma and grieving the wounds from the war entails and they lack clarity as to what such a process of healing and reconciliation looks like.

Do APS Projects Appropriately Respond to Identified Drivers of Conflict in BiH?
Findings
From the perspective of the evaluation team, there are three significant current drivers of conflict in BiH. It should be noted that these serve as both sources and symptoms. They have become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating and constitute a self-sustaining and overarching conflict dynamic that shows no signs weakening.

1. The structures of governance established with the DPA originally devised to “freeze” the balance of power on the ground and end the bloodshed, but have since calcified into a seemingly permanent set of ethnic dividers that trickle down into almost every element of social and institutional life in BiH. These structures have essentially served to further create new sets of ethnic-based grievances.

2. Effects of unresolved, war-related psycho-trauma from the war which has itself become a driver for further traumatization. Specifically, this affects those who lived through the war as primary victims and almost everyone else who enters the Bosnian context as secondary victims. This psycho-trauma severely affects youth born after the war (as well as international staff working for diplomatic and development organizations in BiH).

3. The nationalist discourses and narratives of victimization, justification, and rationalization that dehumanize and demonize the “other.” Again, this began as an effect or symptom of the war, but has become a tool of the political elite or a driver for keeping ethno-nationalism as a
dominant way of organizing power structures in BiH.

These drivers produce profound consequences that affect the quality of life and prospects for all Bosnian citizens. These effects include labyrinthine and dysfunctional political structures, economically unsustainable systems of patronage, and nationalistic and destructive mechanisms for political mobilization; divided social and political systems that perpetuate ethnic separation and segregation; and ongoing ethnically constituted animosities that prevent full recovery, both individual and social, from the consequences of war.

The APS projects conducted in BiH sought, to a greater or lesser degree, in whole or in part, to address each of these drivers and many of the consequences and as such were appropriate responses to these contextual factors. However, there appeared not to have been a careful conflict analysis/mapping on any scale that had carefully and strategically identified these drivers before the interventions. Yes, these projects addressed these drivers but not as intentionally as they might have, which diluted reconciliation results that were both possible in affecting individual drivers and in seeing how these operating together represented an overarching strategy for addressing the conflict drivers.

The overarching and conspicuous weakness of most of these interventions was a general lack of clarity about what sorts of process-related activities are required to achieve authentic reconciliation and a fairly consistent absence of an intentional approach to the design and implementation of the process-based reconciliation activities likely to produce powerful, deep, broad-based reconciliation results. Although there is ample evidence of weak, community-level “side effects of development” reconciliation indicators and broad but generally weak effects among most project participants (with the exception of CRS activities, which produced very strong reconciliation effects), the scale is too small and the approach too disjointed across multiple projects to be meaningful (although as previously discussed, this limited impact could likely be amplified, for example, through media products or much more intensive and wide-scale public participation in project activities).

Several of these projects were clearly development projects cloaked in the language of cross-ethnic collaboration and joint participation with some elements of diversity sensitization and tolerance-building grafted into them, and although laudable as multi-ethnic development, they fall far short of meaningful reconciliation. Of course, inter-ethnic exchanges and shared social space is necessary if reconciliation is to occur—but this alone is not sufficient to achieve a significant or sustainable reconciliation result and both donors and implementers need to be more sensitive to this. CMM’s P2P guidelines note that sometimes bringing people together in itself represents an achievement, but from the perspective of the evaluation team, this is a minimalist approach, which is perhaps a pre-condition to reconciliation but is not in itself reconciliation. In order to produce reconciliation outcomes, the process necessary to achieve this must be very carefully designed and integrated into intensive exchange activities, and the shared interactions must be intentionally designed if they are to produce resilient and transformational reconciliation outcomes at the individual level, which is the pre-condition to achieving sustainable and transformational results at community and political levels.

Conclusions

The work that aimed to address identified drivers of conflict, many of which resonate upwards at the political/institutional level, was based upon strategic analysis of issues of significance, and while admirable and clearly needed, the evidence suggests these were mostly unsuccessful at undermining these drivers in the current context. The political and social systems as currently constituted are impermeable and obstructive unless senior political level engagement by donors and diplomats occurs to reorient the incentive structures driving nationalist political elites. The one project that attempted to address this had difficulty. The other five programs were not strategically organized in a manner that could suggest a set of broad-based reconciliation activities and outcomes meant to challenge this entrenched political
power base. In other words, if only partially addressing the main drivers of conflict, then an APS-like mechanism for BiH would need to engage a far larger segment of the Bosnian population in a far more strategic way. The lesson learned here is that such calcified systems are impervious to the sorts of interventions the APS funded, both because of off-targeted, primarily development focused projects (with four out of six projects), and lack of sufficient scale and reach due to inadequate resources (with all projects). Either the APS objectives should accordingly become focused on more local reconciliation goals that can be amplified or strategically bolster other development efforts to address the other issues driving the conflict.

Are APS Projects Designed in Response to a Dynamic Analysis of the Conflict Environment?

Findings

If “dynamic analysis” means flexible, fluid, and adaptive, as previously discussed, the conflict context in BiH has not required this sort of rapidly adjusting approach. The conflict dynamics are reified and there has not been any major change across the life of the APS in Bosnia-Herzegovina (from 2008). Some of the projects did make tactical adjustments to respond to emerging issues, but this primarily occurred at the interface between project activities and micro-level contextual factors that affected project implementation. The PILPG project did reorient itself to tackle issues that were more manageable, in a sense going for the “low-hanging fruit” when the larger issue of constitutional reform became obviously a non-starter. YouthBuild introduced diversity and tolerance training when it became obvious youth would benefit from this, and Mozaik supported the formation of cross-ethnic Youth Boards when the youth expressed an interest in this.

There is clearly a high degree of political and social astuteness among grantees and their implementation partners (and the Bosnian public generally), especially at the local level, but this coupled with a lack of focus on how the various issues can be addressed leads to a lack of general responsiveness to the requirements for success within the Bosnian conflict environment. Grantees displayed clear ideas of how to scale out or up, for example, how to “cut and paste” YouthBuild to Mostar with a “bit more focus on conflict and prejudice,” but not necessarily how to take such steps and generate larger momentum country-wide.

Conclusions

With the exception of CRS and Small Steps, there was almost no explicit and intentional strategic approach to reconciliation, or even a well-defined and clear understanding of what reconciliation is, how it works, or how each project was making an active and strategic contribution to this. This raises questions about how responsive project designs were to a dynamic and sophisticated analysis of the conflict environment.

Are Project Types Significant Determinants of Impact?

In order to understand impact, it is first important to simply describe the layers of impact one expects to see in peacebuilding and reconciliation projects. The first layer is at the individual level and includes the changes that occur among the direct participants of the project. This level may also result in relational changes that carry outside of the individual to other individuals. The next level is community-level, sometimes also framed as within organizations or institutions. Again, transformations among individuals who constitute communities or make up organizations must occur prior to changes becoming evident at this level. The highest level is the societal, national, or macro-political level; it is not strictly necessary that individuals who reside at this level undergo personal transformation, as they may be pressured to adopt reconciliation if a significant number of people below them demand change, but change at this level is most likely to occur when senior leaders have also gone through personal processes of transformation and reconciliation. When discussing impact, it is important to recognize
that impact can occur at each level and not necessarily continue into other levels. For example, a project might produce strong impacts among individual project participants, but not at the community level. Likewise, a project might produce profound and significant impact at community level, but make no larger contribution at macro-levels. Finally, there could be powerful effects at the highest level that did not translate back down to communal or personal levels.

Impact is related to the concept of adaptability, as stated above, because of the assumption that conflict systems are dynamic and rapidly evolving. If this assumption is true, a static project design could be rapidly overtaken by events that could render it obsolete—and thus ineffective—if project activities do not adapt and respond to these dynamics. As has been previously discussed, given the static condition of the conflict in BiH, adaptability has not been a significant aspect of project implementation and thus has probably had very minimal effect on project impact, such as it is.

Given the previously described three key conflict drivers in BiH, the evaluation team does not believe project type is a significant determinant of impact. Any project could seek to address unresolved war-related trauma and undermine ethnic narratives, and each of the projects could conceivably be strategically structured in such a way as to at least begin to address the issues associated with post-Dayton nationalistic political structures. For example, YouthBuild and Youth Banks could have a far more structured set of activities designed to address war-related trauma, unpack and reconstruct ethnic narratives, and feed pressure upwards into the macro-level political system. The STC project could also have addressed these issues on a larger scale if a more intentional and strategic approach had been taken, as could PILPG have done. The CRS project did take such an approach, using a careful analysis of the conflict causes and a strategic approach to generating pressure against these. Youth projects, sports projects, small infrastructure, institutional development and curriculum design, any of these can be vehicles for intentional and strategic reconciliation and peacebuilding; project type is not significant. Project activities and operational approach, however, are significant, as is strategic engagement with the wider conflict context.

The key determinants of success and ultimate impact are intentionality and careful, appropriate design of reconciliation activities; skilled and sustained implementation of this process; participation/ownership of local actors; and strategic amplification of project effects beyond the limited pool of direct project participants and the local communities where these activities occur. As a caveat, it must be acknowledged here that if it is impact at societal and macro-political levels one ultimately seeks, these outcomes and impacts are extremely unlikely to become evident in the two to three year timeframe, and as a result of the very limited reach due to constrained resources, of the typical small grant project as funded by the APS.

**Do APS Projects Appropriately and Sufficiently Engage the Main Promoters, Supporters, and Spoilers of Reconciliation?**

**Findings**

APS projects are primarily focused on engaging with the potential promoters of reconciliation in BiH. This set of potential promoters of reconciliation are those that if reconciled themselves could and can have some of the biggest impact on peacebuilding, at least at local and mid-level contexts. Here APS projects engaged in three main ways.

Potential promoters were those that were beneficiaries of the programs, as in the case of psycho-trauma counseling and to some degree in the religious coexistence workshops, and educational reform efforts. Those that participated included many from mid-level decision-making positions or who were visible representatives and vocal proponents of nationalist discourses. Prominent “victims,” canton-level education ministries, and some prominent religious leaders were seen as being able to expand understanding and influence reconciliation efforts.
Second, youth projects had a component of their efforts dependent on engaging with a wider set of community actors. Both youth projects had specific strategies to include, invite, and involve potential peace promoters through formal cooperation with local government officials, formal cooperation with businesses, and consultation processes with community leaders on priorities for tangible community projects. Such strategies assisted in building up support for these initiatives while also diminishing chances of possible obstruction. For example, Youth Build noted how they invited all 31 district/city councilors in Brcko to the relevant events and consultations in order to keep the door open for cooperation at any time.

One APS project also attempted to engage with top-level political actors and institutions that are seen as the main spoilers blocking larger reconciliation efforts. The project, on constitutional reform, found that even with strategic and coordinated efforts, results were minimal. Some progress was made on modifying the census format for the 2013 census in BiH, for example, but overall top-level interest has been low.

Participants in this project noted that the lack of international diplomatic support for their efforts has been one factor contributing to the lack of success in this specific project—and more generally, in the lack of initiatives that would tackle/engage with top-level political spoilers. Other implementers acknowledged that they have made few attempt to tackle such levels now due to the fact that donors want success, do not necessarily see the mid-term necessity of such efforts, and even in the short-term tend to demonstrate inconsistent political support for such efforts.

Conclusions

The APS projects have demonstrated that it is necessary and indeed possible to build up a base for wider reconciliation efforts among potential promoters who are mid-level government officials (i.e., local mayors), members of “victims’ organizations,” and community leaders such as local business or religious leaders. While these actors might not initially be clear promoters of reconciliation programming, their engagement in the projects has resulted in their active promotion of reconciliation efforts. Such promoters have a clear sense of authority and legitimacy—perhaps most powerfully the war veterans—which other more traditional civil society organizations in BiH do not necessarily enjoy. This is not to suggest that such traditional civil society organizations should be discounted; they continue to play a valuable role and presumably can provide more support and energy towards reconciliation if somehow more focused (beyond the current level of passive peacebuilding networking). The Bosnian context requires a continued expansion of engagement with such potential promoters as low-level government officials, veterans, etc., in order to spread reconciliation results within communities and upward towards the larger sets of structures obstructing reconciliation efforts.

Operationally, this engagement can occur by directly engaging such promoters as beneficiaries, as well as by designing projects, which include and indeed require wider community participation for their success.

The APS projects also indirectly suggest that engaging with top-level political actors and spoilers requires a more coherent and coordinated international community approach. Certain local actors are willing and ready to tackle larger level spoiler issues, but they require consistent engagement and political support from the international community that will give them the legitimacy and cover, and acceptance of mid-term horizons required, for strategic engagement.

Is there Effective Synergy between Different Projects and/or Funders?

Findings

The evaluation team did not observe any evidence of effective synergies, either between the various APS projects or with similar projects funded by other donors. From the perspective of the evaluation team, these projects were designed and implemented not only in isolation from each other but also mostly in
isolation from the higher levels within the conflict context. There were some interesting collaborations and synergies at play: between projects and local governments or local business leaders; some coordination between other USAID projects, for example YouthBuild and Youth Banks, with other youth-related programming; and multi-donor funding of some implementers, like Youth Banks. But none of these were explicitly focused on leveraging results between projects or creating joint initiatives that might amplify project effects and generate stronger impacts in relation to intentional reconciliation objectives.

There was a general focus on engaging with key people, primarily at lower tiers of the mid-level, such as municipal government officials, community-level business leaders, religious leaders, youth leaders, war-trauma survivors, etc. But this was coupled with a general absence of a coherent strategy for how these key constituencies could be mobilized or synergized to apply pressure upwards into the institutional/societal/political power structures. To be fair, such a strategy is difficult to visualize, but the point here is that generally implementers, for whatever reason, appear not to have even considered this possibility. The leadership of Mozaik Foundation, is an exception, and demonstrated a clear talent for scaling up and “thinking big” (at least at their local level) in relation to using youth development efforts from this and other projects for higher level change, and if similar energies were focused on reconciliation, if correctly understood and strategically approached, it could be pursued if effectively implemented. The approach that CRS adopted, working with prominent war-trauma survivors to affect reconciliation at the individual level and then amplify the result with large-scale public outreach was the exception, and was substantially underfunded to produce a far wider effect.

Conclusions

Six small projects (none of them more than $1.3 million), with a total funded amount of approximately $5 million, across approximately seven years, without a clearly defined strategic programmatic focus or an agreed upon vision of reconciliation (both as process and result), are extremely unlikely to produce evident synergies. If this sort of cumulative and synergistic effect is desired, a much clearer and explicit emphasis on strategic focus, with specific leverage points and drivers of conflict identified, is required.

How do Projects Measure Effectiveness/Impact and has that Evolved in Response to Context?

Findings

CRS uses a very strong, sophisticated, and integrated M&E system to assist project management. This system contains outputs tracking indicators, but also focuses on measuring outcomes. The results frameworks and indicator tables used by CRS are contained in the background documents for this study and can be reviewed by the interested reader. Among other implementers, M&E is primarily output-based, although PILPG is monitoring emergent issues and context through rolling analysis. Primarily as a result of limited capacity, there is very minimal and informal rolling context assessment occurring among other actors in order to respond adaptively to contextual dynamism. Again, as context has changed only minimally, these processes have not significantly evolved and are not especially relevant in the Bosnian context.

Additionally, there was evidence that implementers learned by doing, and M&E information were fed back into the implementation process. YouthBuild, Mozaik, and CRS all demonstrated that they had been reflective and tried to incorporate lessons learned into an evolving implementation process (even if not specifically focusing their M&E on intentional and clearly defined reconciliation). YouthBuild and Youth Banks demonstrated quite developed M&E, but it is more focused on “self-development” impact rather than reconciliation. Youth Banks has a 2010 attitudinal survey which is to be repeated at the end of 2012. Both projects took on M&E to try to capture impact, but given that the project designs were
not intentionally reconciliation-focused, the M&E efforts also were not, although it is assumed they could be without major effort required to track these impacts more clearly.

**Conclusions**

It is important to note that given the extremely minimal formal M&E capacity among most likely skillful practitioners, many of the people most likely to produce powerful impact are also unlikely to have the skills and capacities to perform this function well and demonstrate success in the manner most donors expect. If the recommendation to work with skilled, non-affiliated, or micro-level practitioners is accepted, it is likely substantial investment in M&E capacity development will be required.

**Recommendations**

1. **Focus on developing primary and intentional process-based components, not relying on secondary by-products or side-effects from “simple contact.”**

The specific process activities that produce reconciliation outcomes are well-known, have been tested and verified to be effective in various conflicts, and are highly developed among expert-practitioners. There are a wide variety of specific micro-process tools available, but in general the effective approach will be structured as a participatory and experiential group process, with reinforcing and synergistic elements of training and skills building, inter-ethnic dialogue, and psycho-traumatic counseling or other trauma-healing methodologies, with ensured follow up and reinforcement such as mentoring, coaching, social media contacts, or other informal interactions. This process is not, correctly, a “training workshop,” although in many ways it superficially resembles this. There may be extensive amounts of individual preparation required (especially when dealing with severely traumatized war survivors), as well as preparatory mono-ethnic work before the combined, cross-ethnic group work can effectively proceed. The explicit and intentional objective of the activity is to allow people to grieve and free themselves from the worst side-effects of conflict and war-related trauma; to tell their personal stories and listen to others tell theirs, in the later stages doing so in cross-ethnic settings; to learn and acquire alternative narratives that allow people to make sense of their traumatic experiences and move forward with newly discovered resiliency and recovery from past experience; to re-humanize and develop empathy towards the “other”; and, finally, to establish networks of healed and reconciled people who can together begin working on establishing the human, social, and institutional infrastructure necessary to sustain peace, work collaboratively across ethnic divides, and prevent future outbreaks of conflict-related violence.

If this sort of explicit, intentional, and extremely technically demanding process activity does not occur—i.e., if it is assumed that through “simple contact” or as a side-effect of joint-activities reconciliation will organically emerge—it is almost impossible for deep, potent, and authentic reconciliation results to be achieved. This is especially true in conflict contexts such as BiH where large segments of the population are direct and primary survivors of war and are suffering from the lingering effects of violence related psycho-trauma.

2. **USAID Mission staff needs robust capacity development on reconciliation.**

Initiate capacity building on conflict transformation/reconciliation within the Mission to translate CMM guidance into both strategic and operational understanding. This capacity development or training delivery should cover, at a minimum, the following:

1. Introduction to conflict management and mitigation programming;

2. Reconciliation programming (process/techniques and result);
3. Conflict analysis for the country (identify drivers, strategic pressure points, etc.); and

4. Sessions on “how to” apply all 14 headings from the P2P guidance document to the actual Mission conflict context.

Furthermore, both CMM and Mission staff must recognize the relevance and impact of trauma when attempting such work—different types or levels of trauma, basic approaches to dealing with trauma, etc. It is also important to understand that USAID staff themselves, especially but not exclusively national staff, are exposed to and under the influence of war-trauma, and staff who have not yet resolved their traumatic experiences can face complications from exposure to reconciliation process activities, participants, and results, so additional care and training needs to be provided in this regard.

3. More careful and critical examination, from a Reconciliation lens, of proposed project (and internal capacities of grantees) is required—not mere proposal review.

CMM needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of conflict dynamics, post-conflict trauma, and reconciliation processes; apply a far more sophisticated lens in the design, implementation, and M&E of their reconciliation grants; and put this sophisticated understanding to use when reviewing and approving APS grant activities. Specifically, a detailed, current, and specific conflict analysis should be required to clearly identify underlying causes and conditions of (current) conflict, pinpoint specific dividers and connectors, and develop appropriate strategic interventions that are most likely to address these with limited time, personnel, and budget. Based upon this careful and relevant strategic analysis, CMM should ensure that Missions selected to receive APS funding provide a specific and explicit set of limited reconciliation goals and objectives which will enhance the “sharpness” of the peacebuilding outcomes.

Additionally, given the very intensive technical skill sets required to design and implement meaningful reconciliation activities, CMM should carefully review the organizational qualifications of offers applying for P2P grants. CMM should recognize that highly developed and capable implementers can generate proposals that contain all the requisite buzzwords (especially after carefully analyzing and digesting the CMM guidance documents,) but may nonetheless lack the specific and highly technical understanding necessary to correctly design and implement reconciliation activities. Importantly, such an analysis would distinguish reconciliation work from other interventions, including, for example, human rights, tolerance and diversity, democracy and governance, or other important pillars of post-conflict development. CMM should develop additional selection criteria that identify critical internal capabilities and technical expertise, including illustrative CVs of expert-practitioners, and share this additional guidance with USAID Mission staff in order to ensure the right partners are selected.

4. Support an approach that engages and empowers “outsiders” and non-traditional implementers.

CMM and its partner Missions should recognize the experiential nature of P2P program activities and create space for creativity and non-traditional activities most likely to produce reconciliation results (which CMM appropriately encourages in its guidelines), while retaining a clear focus on reconciliation objectives. This essential flexibility needs to be made operational in a way that allows non-traditional actors—many of whom are not working within well-established, highly developed, and high-capacity NGOs—to have access to the APS. CMM should examine if the current APS format is the most appropriate funding mechanism to support P2P goals and instead explore how to structure the process in a way that allows the so-called Tier II set of domestic partners—including both less developed organizations and individual reconciliation expert practitioners—more direct access to funds and capacity assistance. While such a mechanism might still require a more traditional Tier I domestic or international NGO umbrella structure, it would differentiate itself by having more direct involvement by CMM and USAID staff and a more flexible sub grant process. Through a focus on getting small grants to those that are doing the reconciliation work and providing them tools for amplifying their efforts, such a mechanism could become an effective way to support the energy and expertise of such non-traditional
partners. The selection process could also become less burdensome if grantees could provide concept papers in the first round rather than requiring the submission of full proposals. To comply with USAID Forward objectives of making greater use of local partners, the Mission can invite a broader range of partners and provide an orientation to applicants (such as a bidder’s conference) to make the application process less intimidating to non-traditional partners, which may actively dissuade extremely capable partners from seeking to access APS funds.

Additionally, CMM should translate both the P2P guide and ToC documents, and APS application forms, into local languages, as the documents and the application process itself are intimidating to many non-traditional implementers and may actively dissuade extremely capable partners from seeking to access APS funds. Finally, when updating the guidelines, insert more actual examples of how to turn the theoretical frameworks into practical, operational activities.

5. **Sustained engagement between CMM and Mission managers is required to provide necessary support to produce a focused conflict analysis and target programming opportunities within the manageable interest of the Mission.**

Make guidelines more accessible and facilitate operational integration through workshops, mentoring, or coaching—do not assume that Mission staff and grantees (both management and staff) will be able to make the guidelines operational simply by reading them. Peacebuilding generally, and reconciliation specifically, are areas of practice that are both subtle and complex, which typically require a tremendous amount of specialized training and/or extensive experience before they can be correctly understood. CMM should provide necessary technical expertise and assist Missions to develop an APS country annex with specific requirements for a sound conflict analysis and statement of specific, achievable reconciliation goals and objectives. Sustained engagement between CMM and Mission managers should ensure clarity for Mission managers and guarantee compliance with best practices and P2P guidance.

6. **At the political level, USG clarity and intention on peacebuilding modalities is required.**

Senior USG political engagement coordinated with and providing support for peacebuilders working at mid and top-levels is essential to success. The USAID Mission (and CMM) should understand the importance of a “whole of government” approach as well as the need for diplomatic and multi-donor coordination. This requires senior-level networking, lobbying, and advocacy with strategic counterparts/partners in other agencies and organizations. Creating a “unified front” is necessary to apply pressure at the top-level and influence senior political actors who propagate the nationalist narratives that perpetuate ethnic separation and forestall overall reconciliation and are primarily responsible for maintaining the divisive political structures currently affecting BiH.

**Concluding Remarks**

One of the key findings from this evaluation is not captured by the specific research questions this evaluation sought to address, and is an unintended outcome that CMM should recognize and appreciate. Namely, it is through the process of working with local partners under the auspices of the CMM APS
that USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina became aware of the need for—and the potential that existed within—
explicit and intentional reconciliation programming. As Dr. Krishna Kumar states in one definition of
reconciliation projects provided in the glossary: “[Reconciliation projects] differ from conventional
projects and programs in that their primary objective is to promote social reconciliation, and not to
provide services or advance economic, social, or political development.”166 The USAID/Bosnia-
Herzegovina Mission gives credit to CMM and the APS for drawing attention to this important issue.
Indeed, they now deem it important enough, and feel they have enough clarity of understanding of what
it might look like, that they will invest in it directly by producing their own variation of an APS fund.
Mission managers also noted that their foray into reconciliation programming would have not happened
at all had it not been for CMM pushing for it. This constitutes a major lesson for CMM in the minds of
the evaluation team: what CMM does, and of course how they do it, really does matter and pushes
USAID Missions to stride into uncharted territory.

In response to the lessons learned through experience with the APS, the USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina
Mission requested some focused analysis from the evaluation team that would assist them in designing
their own Mission version of a reconciliation project. Although this was beyond the scope of this
evaluation, the evaluation team felt that this was an important contribution to make and provided
additional recommendations that, upon reflection, the team feels constitutes a generic set of design
recommendations that CMM may wish to consider for future forays into APS country-level
programming.

Before describing these, however, the evaluation team also feels it is important to add some conceptual
clarity in this report that appeared to be lacking in much of the activity that CMM funded. As discussed
in the glossary, reconciliation is both a goal and a process for obtaining that goal. Reconciliation focuses
on the relational dimension to conflict but also must work within the subtle realm of social psychology
at the individual level. While it may manifest at social, institutional, and political levels, it is inherently
operative within individual human beings—it is, after all, only through aggregates of individual human
behavior that social systems, institutions, and bodies politic are constituted.

As a general principle, P2P reconciliation activities are effective at changing attitudes, reducing
stereotypes, restructuring ethno-nationalistic narratives of victimization and justification, and establishing
or strengthening peaceful cross-communal relationships.167 Skilled practitioners (and it is critically
important to recognize that facilitating these sorts of processes requires substantial expertise and
technical skillfulness) can generate—and objectively demonstrate—powerful and significant attitudinal
shifts among project participants. All who perform this work can relate consistent stories of observing


167 For an interesting discussion of the parameters under which contact can produce reconciliation results, see:
“The psychosocial need for intergroup contact: practical suggestions for reconciliation initiatives in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and beyond” (“ Freeman, Charlotte M. L. Intervention 2012, Volume 10, Number 1, Pages 17 – 29).
Lest this be seen as a vindication of the “contact hypothesis” the authors critique in this report, the reader is
cautions to pay careful attention to the four conditions required for “positive contact” to occur and the explicit
recognition of the need for skillful facilitation. The authors would also note that this list of necessary conditions,
from the perspective of transformative reconciliation processes, requires additional points.
personal transformations as individuals are converted from ideologues and extremists to peaceful persons who possess a newly humanized, non-antagonistic, and peaceful vision of the formerly demonized group of “others.” Participants who emerge from these sorts of processes consistently report multiple, compelling indicators that can be used to objectively verify the occurrence of reconciliation results. There is an extensive body of academic literature that describes and documents this effect in conflict contexts across the globe. It is important to restate that this transformative effect—and the means to achieve it—are not untested hypotheses. It should be accepted that the overall approach and various specific techniques for producing this result have been extensively confirmed: group processes aimed at individual-level reconciliation are effective when done well. Yet it is clearly the case that there often remains a gap when it comes to observing (or measuring) a more significant result, adding up a multiplicity of individual-level results to effect changes at macro-structural levels, thus making a significant contribution to so-called “Peace Writ Large.” There are a number of noted theorists who discuss, from within various conceptual frameworks, ways in which these higher-order results might be achieved. Two especially noteworthy examples are John Paul Lederach, who in his seminal work “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies” describes a “middle-out approach” in which the emphasis is on mid-level social and political leadership. The issue is also mapped extensively in the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) handbook produced by CDA. This document identifies two main approaches, “more people vs. key people,” and, like Lederach, describes the need for linkages, leverage, and ultimately structural/institutional changes that reinforce or entrench the individual level changes brought about by participation in P2P reconciliation activities.

There are a number of practical ways that this progression from individual-level to macro-level impact can theoretically be achieved. P2P can produce a “critical mass” of transformed citizens at the grassroots level (“more people”), a mobilized constituency for peace who produce a groundswell of pressure upwards into the political/institutional reaches of society, forcing transformation from below. P2P reconciliation can also occur among “key people” as well, engaging a significant number of mid-level leaders with power to influence top-level leaders as well as large constituencies at the grassroots level, or it can occur among only a few very influential senior leaders at topmost levels who demonstrate and validate a reconciliation approach. As the RPP notes, a synergistic focus at multiple levels is generally required.

The primary problem that presents when designing P2P interventions is one of scale and reach. Working at the grassroots is much easier because the space and openness to participate in the work is available, but this “more people” approach requires a very large and widespread intervention in order to reach enough people to begin to create pressure for change at the top. This sort of approach alone is likely to be beyond the scope of available resources in most situations. As an attempt to expand influence when

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168 In addition to the work of John Paul Lederach mentioned throughout this report, see, for example, the work of Dr. Eileen Borris, Hugo Van der Merwe, and Joseph Montville, among many others. And for a very extensive but succinct review of much of this work, see: “Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” published by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, (2003). http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.

operating through this “more people” approach, specifically when resources are typically constrained, it is often assumed that by identifying influential individuals within larger social frameworks (such as student leaders or local government officials), and building their capacity to conduct peacebuilding activities (such as through the ubiquitous Training-of-Trainers programs that occur in post-conflict settings); these individuals will return to their social setting and become “change agents,” diffusing peacebuilding results outwards or upwards and triggering transformational “ripple effects.” However, experience demonstrates that this diffusion frequently fails to occur, primarily because individuals are unprepared to address the pressures for social conformity they face after they re-enter their community or institution, and although they may possess a newfound passion and commitment to peacebuilding, they lack the resources or logistical skill to continue the work on their own.

Working at the top level is often much more difficult than grassroots or mid-levels because senior leaders have an interest in maintaining the conflict structure as it is, as this structure validates and legitimates their authority and their social position. They also often have obligations to their constituencies, which severely constrain their room to maneuver. Working at the mid-level is easier than the top because of wider space to participate and less visibility when questioning internal orthodoxies, but the ability of people at this level to influence both up the system and down into the grassroots may be limited. Most theorists agree it is likely necessary to work in parallel on each level, where space exists, to create synergistic feedbacks into the larger system that empower and sustain the intended result—but again, when working at multiple levels, resource constraints become problematic.

Two important caveats apply to the issue of limited resources that are worth careful consideration from the perspective of strategy. First, by understanding the process-based nature of individual-level trauma healing, reconciliation, and transformation, it is possible to produce widespread and far-reaching process activities that are relatively inexpensive when compared to more tangible development interventions. Process activities are relatively inexpensive when not conceptualized as sub-components of traditional, resource-heavy development activities. The primary costs associated with most peacebuilding interventions is not the facilitated process components; it is the “bricks-and-mortar” development project inputs that process activities are typically associated with. By viewing reconciliation activities as standalone process-based activities—rather than as adjuncts necessarily attached to traditional development projects—limited resources can be stretched much further and can reach a much wider pool of people.

Second, through the use of media and other strategic peace promotion activities, wider effects and influence can be produced that do ripple outward from beyond the individual or communal level. By identifying and magnifying demonstration projects, through producing media content and public outreach activities (such as the speaking out activities conducted by CRS) specifically aimed at addressing important structural factors in the conflict (such as deconstructing collective myths or re-narrating trauma-informed discourses of national victimization and justification), it is possible to generate wider secondary effects than possible solely via direct effects wrought through project participation.

So what exactly is meant by a “process-based approach” to reconciliation? As so many people mentioned during the course of evaluation activities in BiH, there are certain “untouchable issues” that can never be discussed, and time and again people mentioned “nationalist narratives,” which poison the minds of children and youth, justify divided social spaces and segregated and exclusionary institutions, and establish the legitimacy of nationalist ideologues among the political elites. Most people in BiH —and in any other situation of protracted social conflict, for that matter— are able to sit in a room together with people from different ethnic groups, to make polite small talk, share simple and superficial interactions, and even conduct intensive commercial or professional interactions. Bosnians are perfectly able to participate in this “simple contact” and then to go away and continue to remain embedded in the nationalist paradigms and discourses which dehumanize and demonize the other, justify whatever atrocities must be committed to ensure national defense and safeguard national survival, and which ultimately prevent meaningful reconciliation and peacebuilding from occurring. This is why the “contact
hypothesis” proves false. True and sustainable reconciliation cannot occur—unless these very deeply held and painful perceptions of the other are brought to the surface, examined, and abandoned; unless the traumas of living through a brutal ethnic war or growing up raised by people who lived through such a war are healed (and it is worth remembering that even if such a war did not occur in living memory, in most divided societies there are mythologized traumas continuously re-experienced through shared understandings of common history); and unless a person is transformed through structured dialogue focused on mutual understanding. In order for relationships to change, individuals must first change, and it is only through an intentional and intensive process of acknowledgement, dialogue, grieving and mutual healing that this change in individuals can occur. Perhaps most interestingly, from the perspective of theorists and practitioners, it is the people who have themselves gone through this process of transformation who are best suited to lead others through it, who can establish productive and collaborative relationships with members of their own and other groups, and who can begin to mobilize themselves to serve as visionary and active agents of social change.

The process of reconciliation and healing is not easy, and it is not fast. Reconciliation requires a fairly intensive set of activities that often require sustained engagement over months or years, and typically provoke very intense and unpleasant emotional reactions among participants before they show progress and begin to appear healed. A technically sound reconciliation process is specifically designed to allow these issues to surface in a way that is structured, respectful, and safe. The process involves allowing traumatic experiences to resurface, creating a space where they can be grieved and shared with others, often with representatives of the group that inflicted the trauma in the first place. It is through this opening and sharing that healing from trauma occurs, where nationalist discourses are honestly examined and can at last be abandoned, where common humanity emerges—and where people are transformed from ideologues and nationalists into peaceful persons who recognize a shared humanity transcendent of ethnic identity.

There are many methods and specific tools that can be used to produce this result, but all generally work on a variation of actively remembering and talking about traumatic events, and sharing these experiences with others. Often there is some sort of symbolic apology given or received and a conscious decision to forgive and an intentional approach to re-narrating the experience in a way which re-establishes the humanity of both victim and victimizer. Processes such as that described above have a profound power to liberate individuals from the consequences of trauma and to produce healed, transformed persons who are committed to and actively participate in societal level peacebuilding.

Because the skills required to design and implement these sorts of reconciliation processes are so technical and specialized, it is extremely rare that traditional development focused NGOs have the requisite sensitivity and technical capacity to properly implement powerful and authentic reconciliation activities. These “usual suspects” typically are aware of the process for accessing donor funding opportunities and are likely already linked to a USAID Mission (and thus are alerted to the presence of available funding), and they possess highly developed systems for producing strong proposals in English with detailed budgets and complex M&E frameworks, as they are already fluent in the donor culture of development. They are able to generate winning proposals with all the right buzzwords—even if these same proposals are conceptually weak and are not likely to generate powerful reconciliation effects. This is why the evaluation team has recommended a more hands on approach by CMM and USAID. In order to produce the strongest reconciliation outcomes, CMM needs to ensure the skilled expert practitioners and under-developed peacebuilding organizations—most of which are not, in fact, established NGOs—can access APS funds. USAID Missions interested in supporting P2P activities will likely need to engage in a far more proactive hunt for suitable practitioners and may need to engage in a relatively labor-intensive process of project development with peacebuilding actors who probably lack many of the systems and capacities one finds in more developed, formally constituted NGOs. But experience tells us that, almost without exception, in the conflict contexts where CMM P2P funding occurs, there is a nascent field of extremely capable, highly-skilled expert practitioners already
performing this work who would be able to dramatically expand their reach—and their contribution to “Peace Writ Large” —were they to gain access to APS funding.

John Paul Lederach uses an interesting concept he describes as “human infrastructure” for peace. Before this infrastructure can begin to be erected, individuals at all societal levels must go through some variation of the reconciliation process described above (of course, some remarkable individuals are able to achieve healing and reconciliation without going through the process as described, but these are very rare). Like any infrastructure project, it requires strategic thinking, advance planning, and patience before it is completed and begins to pay for itself. This is significant in that a long-term programmatic vision is required to achieve societal reconciliation and build peace at a national level. In the immediate term and the near-term, the only visible results are likely to be outputs and individual-level outcomes. These results, as they begin to add up, begin to show as higher-order results, such as community level cross-ethnic initiatives or activities which seem to be stove-piped into individual social sectors (such as media-driven peace initiatives, inter-religious dialogue activities, or educational institutional reform initiatives). These sorts of effects are likely to begin to occur only after several years into the process and may in fact not be evident within the typical three to five year timeline of the project life-cycle, and they are unlikely to occur at all if there have only been a series of small, isolated, and development-centric project activities—this is where constraining issues of scale and reach become extremely significant. The highest-order effects (the so-called contribution to “Peace Writ Large”), in which changes can be observed to be occurring at the top-levels of political and social institutions, are likely to occur only after a number of years and a large enough mass of people with transformed attitudes and perspectives have broken free from the constraints of the past and are working in concert for change (if not exactly in explicit and intentional collaboration with each other). Although it takes time and results are tenuous at first, this result is entirely achievable—if the process-based activities are strong and the resources are available to reach far and wide or are very strategically directed as to where scarce resources should be devoted within the complex social system of conflict.

Informed by the discussion above, the evaluation team feels the following program design recommendations, articulated as key determinants for success, are likely applicable generally wherever CMM sets out to produce a set of country-level P2P reconciliation activities.

**Key Determinant One:** Facilitated process approach with a focus on reconciled relationship building and personal transformation as the primary intentional emphasis, not a secondary by-product of development activities relying on “simple contact” to produce reconciliatory effects.

**Key Determinant Two:** Technical quality of the facilitated reconciliation process content, which likely contains elements of both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic dialogue, empathy building, psycho-traumatic healing and grief-work, and structured re-humanization of the “other.”

**Key Determinant Three:** Technical quality of the skilled facilitation delivered by expert practitioners; the practice of reconciliation is a science (and an art) and highly developed expertise is required. Subtlety may be required in some places, at first, to “get people into the room,” but being explicit works in

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others, especially when championed by members of the group who have already undergone
transformation and can testify to the power of the process.

**Key Determinant Four:** Sustained and more intensive engagement between process participants is
required. Reconciliation does not occur as a result of diversity sensitization nor will it occur beneath
surface levels through “simple contact” based exchange programs and collaborative, cross-communal
development activities.

**Key Determinant Five:** Joint, collaborative action and synergies to expand impacts beyond the individual
level with joint strategizing and mobilization for larger reach and focused effort to generate higher-level
effects. By joint strategizing we mean the process activities intentionally aim to generate transformed
individuals who will engage in follow-on and collaborative activities designed to broaden the effect and
transmit it outwards from the limited participants of the process itself. Funding to support these follow-
on activities should be assured.

**Key Determinant Six:** Amplification through wider community engagement and media activities.

**Key Determinant Seven:** Senior USG validation, promotion, and political level engagement to provide
cover, support, and political pressure to bolster the efforts of change agents working from within the
system. There is also a need to mobilize, motivate, and coordinate with other donors and diplomatic
actors.

**Cross-Cutting Determinant:** Again, to reiterate, reconciliation process activities are a science; *specialized
expertise is required at each stage and in every step.*
Annexes

Annex A. Methodology

The evaluation design selected for this evaluation is a non-experimental, multi-level, qualitative-dominant mixed methods design using document review, key informant interviews, and small group interviews.

To perform the document review, the evaluation team reviewed documents provided prior to departure by CMM/Washington as part of the larger document review for the overall P2P APS Developmental Evaluation. The team also collected a variety of project design and reporting documents provided by grantees and the USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina Mission and reviewed these as well.

The team met with USAID personnel responsible for or knowledgeable about the P2P grants, as well as US Embassy personnel from the Public Affairs Office. Interviews were conducted with staff members of CMM grantees, relevant local government officials, staff from local peacebuilding implementation organizations who have not received CMM funds, and beneficiaries and participants in CMM funded grant activities. The team also met with knowledgeable local practitioners with expertise in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. A complete list of interviewees is appended to this document as Annex C.

The following P2P grantees were visited for data collection activities:

- Save the Children: “Prevention of Violence involving children and promotion of respect for differences in B&H through the education system.”
- Small Steps: “Interfaith Dialogue and Diversity Training.”
- Catholic Relief Services: “Choosing Peace Together.”
- Mozaik Community Development Foundation: “Youth Banks: Peacing the Future Together.”
- Public International Law and Policy Group: “Constitutional Reform in BiH: Engaging Civil Society.”
- YouthBuild: “Youth Building Futures in the Brcko District.”

The evaluation matrix below (see next page) outlines specific methods and data sources that were targeted to answer specific research questions as laid out above.
## Evaluation Matrix

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Tools/Processes</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?</td>
<td>Document Review</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• Other donors staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
<td>• Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Senior staff of implementing grantees</td>
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<td>• Project documents</td>
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<td>• Secondary sources</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>a.</strong> What have been the contextual factors—at local, entity, national, and regional levels—that have most influenced project strategy, design, and outcomes?</td>
<td>Document Review</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
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<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• Other donors staff</td>
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<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
<td>• Implementing grantee staff</td>
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<td>• Project documents</td>
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<td>• Secondary sources</td>
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<td><strong>4.</strong> Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping and adapting to changes in the context in recent years?</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
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<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
<td>• Other donors staff</td>
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<td>• Staff of implementing organization</td>
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<td>• Policy makers/officials</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>a.</strong> Which underlying ToCs have been helpful in the Bosnian context? Which have been least helpful?</td>
<td>Document Review</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• Other donors staff</td>
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<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
<td>• Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations</td>
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<td>• Senior staff of implementing organization</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Policy makers/officials (local political leaders)</td>
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<td>• Project documents</td>
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<td>• Secondary sources</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>b.</strong> What are effective strategies for APS projects:</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• USAID staff</td>
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<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
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<td>• Beneficiaries</td>
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truth-seeking initiatives at the local and regional level?

iv. Other strategies?

*note: the team assigned priority to these, and rearranged them slightly, to respond to what is seen relevant in BiH given the specific grant activities funded by CMM. “Transitional justice issues” was removed as not relevant.

| c. How have projects adapted/responded to emerging challenges and opportunities? | Document Review | • USAID staff
| | Key Informant Interviews | • Other donors staff
| | Small Group Interviews | • Staff of implementing organization
| | | • Project documents

| d. Did APS-funded project find the People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide guidelines useful? Why and why not? How can CMM make these guidelines more useful? | Key Informant Interviews | • USAID staff
| | Small Group Interviews | • Staff of implementing organizations
| | Document Review | • Project documents

| 5. In contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? | Document Review | • USAID staff
| | Key Informant Interviews | • Other donors staff
| | Small Group Interviews | • Local academics or practitioners and non-grantee peacebuilding organizations
| | | • Staff of implementing organization
| | | • Beneficiaries
| | | • Wider community stakeholders
| | | • Policy makers/officials
| | | • Project documents

| a. Are APS projects appropriate responses to identified drivers of conflict in BiH? | Document Review | • USAID staff
| | Key Informant Interviews | • Other donors staff
| | Small Group Interviews | • Staff of implementing organization
| | | • Beneficiaries
| | | • Wider community stakeholders
| | | • Policy makers/officials
| | | • Project documents

| b. What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact? | Document Review | • USAID staff
| | Key Informant Interviews | • Other donors staff
| | Small Group Interviews | • Staff of implementing organization
| | | • Beneficiaries
| | | • Wider community stakeholders
| | | • Policy makers/officials
| | | • Project documents
c. Are APS projects designed in response to a dynamic analysis of the conflict environment?

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<td>• Project documents</td>
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d. Are project type vis-à-vis identified conflict drivers and also adaptability both significant determiners of impact?

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<td>Small Group Interviews</td>
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e. Do APS projects appropriately and sufficiently engage the main promoters and supporters of reconciliation? Are they able to engage spoilers?

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<td>• Non-grantee peacebuilding organizations</td>
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<td>• Project documents</td>
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f. Is there effective synergy between different projects and/or funders—a cumulative effect? [i.e., the RPP matrix – is there a good balance between activities that aimed at attitudinal change vs. institutions and key people vs. more people]

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<td>• Project documents</td>
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g. How do projects measure effectiveness/impact? How has that evolved in response to context?

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<tr>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>• Project documents</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex B. List of People Contacted

PEOPLE CONTACTED

Association of Serb Camp Survivors
Staff: Dragisa Jakupovic, President

Brčko District Government Officials
Staff: Marina Gorickic, Brčko District Association of Employers; Sejad Usanovic, coordinator for youth in the Brčko District Government; Miroslav Gavric, former mayor of the Brčko district

Bread of St. Anthony’s
Staff: Mirela Shuman, Director

CARE International
Staff: Zumka Buchan

Catholic Relief Services
Staff: Marc de Sila, country representative for BiH; Vahidin, regional technical adviser for evaluation; Valilda Dzuno, regional M&E manager; Karen Janes, international development fellow; Kevin Hardinag, new regional director; Goran Bubalo, Director

Beneficiaries: six prison camp survivors

Embassy of the United States Bosnia-Herzegovina & Herzegovina
Staff: Rahaela Dzidic and Ante Milisa

Millenium Challenge Corporation
Staff: ‘Natasha’, ‘Ruth’, ‘Matthew’

Mozaiak
Staff: Vesna Bajsanski-Agic, Executive Director; Zoran Puljic, Director; and two project managers, ‘Arnela’ and ‘Zeljkoa’

Beneficiaries: Ivo Petrovic, Antonela Armigic, Dijana Ivkic, Marijana Simic, Josipa Maticovic, Goran Cancar

Nansen Dialogue Center
Staff: Goran Shavija, Director

Open Society Foundation/Bosnia-Herzegovina & Herzegovina
Staff: Dzenana Trbic, Education Program Coordinator

Public International Law & Policy Group
Staff: Valery Perry, Chief of Party

Beneficiaries: Tija Memisevic, director of the European Research Center

Small Steps
Staff: Amra Pandzo, former Director

United Nations Development Programme
Staff: Sanela Paripovic, Manager

USAID/Bosnia-Herzegovina & Herzegovina
Staff: David Barth, Mission Director; Mirjana Popovic-Valjevac, Selma Sjercic, Agreement

Embassy of the United States Bosnia-Herzegovina & Herzegovina
Staff: Rahaela Dzidic and Ante Milisa

YouthBuild International
Staff: Edin Mujacic; and nine additional program staff
Beneficiaries: Amir Osmic, Red Cross Brčko District; Benjamin Tahro, works in Brčko; Dijana Radelja, works with physical recreation for women; Maja Rodic, youth club for kids; Adina Halilovic, student of journalism in Brčko; Jasima Salihovic, student; Sanja Maric, Brčko local; Haska Hamizic, student of social work from Brčko; Biljana Todic, Brčko, project consultant; Dea Tripnunovski, future lawyer; Irena Knezvic, a MS student of psychology helping with last group; Zoran Jovanovic, urban planner

Youth Information Center
Staff: Jan Zlatko Filipovic

Youth Initiative for Human Rights
Staff: Alma Masic

Miscellaneous Civil Society Actors
Bojan Bajic, head of an a new NGO to protect whistle blowers, former head of Nasa Stranka
Daniel Hopic, formerly of Save the Children

Sites Visited
YouthBuild project site in Brčko District
Mozaik Foundation project ceremony in Usora
Annex C. Research Instruments

CMM/Bosnia-Herzegovina Evaluation QUESTIONNAIRE

Wider Community

NOTE: As “reconciliation” and associated terms have been quite (ab)used in Bosnian over the last 18 years, I have tried to work around that specific term, but get to the same ideas behind our research questions.

1. How has context for peace building work Bosnia-Herzegovina changed in the past years (if need to be specific, we can say 2009 to today)?

2. What are effective strategies to increase inter-ethnic cooperation and build trust in your community:
   a. Sustained dialogue-communication between ethnic groups? In what form?
   b. Joint economic ventures for cooperation between ethnic groups?
   c. Facing the past and truth-seeking initiatives at the local and regional level?
   d. Other strategies?

3. In your community, some projects aim to bring such changes at the communal level;
   a. How can such projects have a larger impact beyond the individual persons who participate directly in their activities?
   b. How can other community members support efforts to enhance better understanding between members of different groups?
   c. How would you think we can measure/assess the impact of such projects on peace building in your community? What difference do such efforts make?

   [Note: Be prepared to mention grant projects by name and/or describe these for interviewees who may lack familiarity, as well as explain the question.]

4. If you are familiar with these projects, have they engaged the main proponents of cross-ethnic collaboration in your community? Are they able to engage spoilers?
Evaluation Questions: Grantees/Implementers

1. How has the context (if it has) for your work in people-to-people (P2P) peacebuilding changed in the past years? Or since you started the project efforts?
   a. What are the major reasons for this?

2. Which ways of understanding theories of change or how to make peace have been the most helpful in your design and implementation efforts?

3. Describe how you understand your project’s role in building peace processes? (can use conflict analysis type language if appropriate)

4. Describe for us the major modifications and changes that you made in the project or lessons learned as you have been attempting to implement the project.

5. Did you use any practitioner/academic tools to assist you in the proposal and program design efforts either from USAID or others? Are you familiar with the P2P guide put out by CMM?

6. Describe for us your evaluation process. How have you measured effectiveness? (Here to see how they both evaluate and whether they use this to feed in/modify follow-on programming)

7. How would you describe the project’s effects/impact on the larger community(ies) that you engaged with? (communal and societal levels, and any sustainability...)

8. To what extent have you been able to engage with the stakeholders you anticipated? How have you dealt with engaging with potential spoilers?

9. Are you aware and or do you cooperate/coordinate with the others working on similar efforts supported by USAID or others?

10. Beyond your project, when you look at the types of P2P efforts, which in your opinion have the most relevancy in the Bosnian context? Why?
    i. Supporting sustained reconciliation between ethnic groups?
    ii. Supporting joint economic ventures for cooperation?
    iii. Supporting facing the past and truth seeking at the local and regional level?
    iv. Other goals and objectives?
Evaluation Questions: USAID and Other Donors

1. How has the political and economic context changed in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed in the past few years, and how has this affected the context of people-to-people (P2P) and peacebuilding programs?
   a. What have been the contextual factors at each level (local, entity, national, and regional) that have most influenced project strategy, design, and outcomes?

2. Which strategies and Theories of Change followed by APS-funded projects have proven most effective for coping and adapting to recent contextual changes?
   a. Which have been the least helpful?
   b. Which might have been the most helpful?
   c. Which are effective strategies for APS projects for:
      i. Supporting sustained reconciliation between ethnic groups?
      ii. Supporting joint economic ventures for cooperation?
      iii. Supporting facing the past and truth seeking at the local and regional level?
      iv. Other goals and objectives?
   d. How have these projects adapted or responded to emerging challenges and opportunities?

3. In the contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level beyond the individual persons who directly participate in project activities?

4. Do you believe that the APS projects are appropriate responses to the identified drivers of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5. What are the features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?
   a. Are APS projects designed in response to a dynamic analysis of the conflict environment?
   b. Does the type of project, and the identified conflict drivers it seeks to address, significantly determine project impact?
      i. Does project adaptability significantly determine project impact?
   c. Do APS projects appropriately and sufficiently engage the main promoters and supporters of reconciliation?
      i. Are they able to engage spoilers?
      Is there effective synergy between different projects or funders, leading to a cumulative effect?
      Is there a good balance between activities aimed at attitudinal changes vs. institutions, and key people vs. more people?
CHAPTER 6: FIELD STUDY
USAID/BURUNDI PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT GRANTS

Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study of USAID/Burundi Annual Program Statement People-to-People Reconciliation Grants

January 2014

This publication was produced for USAID/CMM and USAID/Burundi under Contract No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00046. It was produced by Liz McClintock, Mathias Kjaer, Justine Nkurunziza, and Joseph Nindorera of Social Impact and Rebekah Krimmel of USAID/CMM. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development nor the United States Government.
Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study of USAID/Burundi Annual Program Statement People-to-People Reconciliation Grants

This document (Report No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00046) is available through the Development Experience Clearing House (http://dec.usaid.gov). Additional information can be obtained from:

Social Impact, Inc.
2300 Clarendon Boulevard, Suite 1000
Arlington, VA, 22201
Tel: (703) 465-1884
www.socialimpact.com

Photo: Peace Committee Network Chair, Committee Members, and Community Members, Gitega Province. CARE/MIPAREC “Sasagaza Amahoro” Project. July 17, 2013.

Source: Mathias Kjaer, SI Team Member.
Acknowledgements

This report would not have been possible without the contributions of many too numerous to fully name here. However, the team would like to express its sincere gratitude to the people below for their particularly valuable contributions to our evaluation effort. This report would not have been possible without their gracious contributions of time and intellect.

First and foremost, the team would like to recognize and thank the US Embassy Burundi staff who welcomed and supported our effort. We would especially like to thank our USAID/Burundi contact, Jean-Claude Niyongabo, Deputy Chief of Mission Samuel Watson and US Ambassador Dawn Liberi for their active engagement and thoughtful questions during both our in-brief and out-briefs. Their personal and professional interest in supporting reconciliation efforts in Burundi was obvious to our team.

Next, the team would like to thank all the implementing partners, donors, project beneficiaries, and non-APS implementers, observers, and community members who took time out of their busy schedules, including several who traveled hours to meet with the team, and provided thoughtful and articulate responses during our interviews. The insight gained during these interviews forms the heart of this report and we hope that our analysis reflects the views, thoughts, and observations expressed during these interviews.

Finally, the team wishes to acknowledge and convey our sincere gratitude to our local support staff. Our two French-Kirundi-English translators, Pierre-Claver Nsengiyumva and Marie-Rose Hantungimana, provided consistent, simultaneous translation during our interviews and also voluntarily joined our nightly debriefs to help ensure that any cultural subtleties were accurately understood by the team. The team also wishes to thank Florent Makarakiza for his work as a driver and ensuring that we arrived to our interviews safely and on-time. The team wishes to offer special thanks to our Logistical Coordinator, Leon Ndikuriyo. In addition to other administrative tasks—such as booking hotels, exchanging currency, procuring SIM cards, and printing various documents—Leon was tasked with acquiring lists of past beneficiaries from APS implementing partners and arranging the individual and group interviews. There is no doubt that without Leon’s consistent, professional, and organized support, the success of this evaluation would not have been possible.

Lastly, the team would like to recognize and thank Gabrielle Plotkin. In addition to handling many of the administrative and logistical arrangements, Gabrielle, whose written contributions can be found in the body of this report, helped research and summarize information from all 11 APS projects as well as provided a succinct summary of the country context.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Annual Program Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLTP</td>
<td>Burundi Leadership Training Program</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based Organization</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Collaborative for Development Action</td>
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<td>CENAP</td>
<td>Centre of Alert and Conflict Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICB</td>
<td>Conseil Inter-Confessionnel du Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNB</td>
<td>Conseil National de Bashingantahe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNTB</td>
<td>Commission Nationale des Terres et autres Biens</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Developmental Evaluation</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Democracy and Governance</td>
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<td>GR</td>
<td>Global Rights</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MIPAREC</td>
<td>Ministère Paix et Réconciliation sous la Croix</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OAP</td>
<td>Organisation pour l’Auto-Promotion</td>
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<td>P2P</td>
<td>People-to-People</td>
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<td>RPP</td>
<td>Reflecting on Peace Practice Project</td>
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<td>RfP</td>
<td>World Conference of Religions for Peace</td>
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<td>SCOPE</td>
<td>Supporting Communities for Peaceful Elections</td>
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<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Social Impact, Inc.</td>
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<td>SOW</td>
<td>Scope of Work</td>
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<td>THARS</td>
<td>Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services</td>
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<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>WWICS</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars</td>
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Glossary of Key Terms

**Annual Program Statement (APS):** When USAID intends to support a variety of creative approaches towards developing methodologies to assess and implement development objective activities, the Agency may use an APS to generate competition for these awards. When this mechanism is used, USAID will publish an APS at least once a year, either with an open-ended response time or a closing date of at least six months after issuance (USAID ADS 303.3.5.4).

**Bashingantahe (singular: umushingantahe):** A traditional Burundian conflict resolution institution, the origins of which date back to the 17th century, comprised of community elders (usually always men) charged with mediating, reconciling, and arbitrating community conflicts. “Formed from a combination of a root verb, gushinga (to plant, to bolt down), and the noun intahe (staff of justice), the word literally means ‘the one who bolts down the law’. These men are referred to in this way because of the staff of justice with which they hit the ground rhythmically and in turns to invoke the wisdom of the ancestors buried beneath and to highlight the power of the judgments they give when arbitrating on conflicts….To be selected, as research carried out countrywide has confirmed, a candidate must exemplify certain essential qualities such as experience and wisdom; a high regard and love for truth; a sense of honor and dignity; a love of work and the ability to provide for the needs of others; a highly developed sense of justice and fairness; a sense of the common good and social responsibility; and sobriety and balance in speech and action. Other moral and intellectual qualities are also needed, such as discretion, keen intelligence, self-respect and respect for others, temperance, courage and dedication.”

**Colline:** French for “hill,” this is the smallest administrative unit and is usually referred to by Burundians to describe their birthplace (and associated sense of identity). There are over 2,638 recognized collines throughout Burundi.

**Impact:** OECD-DAC defines impact as being a positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effect produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

**Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM):** USAID created CMM in 2002 within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) to expand and improve USAID’s capacity to address the causes and consequences of violent conflict. CMM is responsible for conflict assessment, field support, technical leadership training, and inter-agency/donor outreach on conflict and related topics. On behalf of USAID, CMM manages an Annual Program Statement for Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Programs and Activities.

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Non-Participant: A person who did not directly participate in the activity/project/program being reviewed.

Peace Writ Small: Adapted from Chloe Berwind-Dart’s definition of “peace writ little,” this term is “…conceived as a local or community level of sustainable peace…this concept emphasizes a limited scope of impact—in the sense that changes are constrained geographically. In order to influence Peace Writ Large, such local efforts would need to create effect at a higher level (sub-national, national, etc.).”

Peace Writ Large: Defined by Mary Anderson and Lara Olson as producing “changes at the broad level of society as a whole” through two programmatic goals—(1) stopping violence and destructive conflict and (2) building just and sustainable peace—and that “implicit or explicit in each of these [goals] is a strategy, or an assumption, that achieving [nearer term goals] is connected to the achievement of the Peace Writ Large goals.”

People-to-People (P2P) Programming: P2P programs are one approach among many to conflict mitigation. While P2P programs vary, most entail bringing together representatives of conflict-affected groups to interact purposefully in a safe space. P2P projects generally address patterns of prejudice and demonization that reinforce the perceived differences between groups and hinder the development of positive and productive relationships among parties to a conflict. The aim of P2P programs is to create opportunities for interactions between conflicting groups that promote mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.

Theory of Change (ToC): A Theory of Change explains why we think certain program activities will produce desired change in a given conflict context. A ToC is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, to clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing, state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be, fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict, and describe how our planned activities will produce the intended outcomes (see CMM’s new “Theories and Indicators of Change Briefing Paper,” available at http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/information-resources/development-experience-clearinghouse-dec).


Map of Site Visits
Executive Summary

Introduction

Since 2004, USAID/CMM has managed an annual Reconciliation Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The Reconciliation Fund is a Congressional appropriation to support local-level “People-to-People” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and has grown from an initial award pool of $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million specifically allocated for programs inside Israel/West Bank/Gaza. To date, the APS has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries.

As defined in CMM’s People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, P2P reconciliation programs operate based on the Theory of Change (ToC) that in “communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities…strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.” 174 APS projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political affiliations from areas of conflict. They provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, promote greater understanding and mutual trust, and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recently ended conflict.

Overview of Burundi APS Projects (2004-2010)

USAID/Burundi has overseen the implementation of 11 APS projects since 2004, representing $6,290,442 total funds invested in P2P reconciliation grants. The average size of projects was approximately $500,000 with projects ranging from a low of $386,449 (Global Rights [GR], October 2006-8) and as high as $750,000 (Search for Common Ground [SFCG], September 2004-5). SearSFCG has recently launched a new APS project, with FY2012 funding totaling $1,200,000; however, this project was too new to be considered as part of this evaluation. A brief summary of the USAID/Burundi APS projects is provided on the next page.

While the team struggled to find comprehensive and reliable data on total foreign donor assistance to Burundi during this period, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data indicates that Burundi’s official development assistance (ODA) grew steadily over this same period, growing from around $410 million in 2004 to nearly $600 million in 2011. This data also shows that the United States ranks fourth on the list of top ten donors to Burundi, with the top three donors (European Union, World Bank, and Belgium) providing over 5.5 times the amount of total foreign assistance ($272 million versus $48 million).

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Beginning in the fall of 2011, Social Impact, Inc. (SI) began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under CMM’s P2P APS. The objectives of this review are to learn about the effectiveness APS-funded programs and to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the “developmental evaluation” (DE) methodology (see Annex B for additional detail). The evaluation of the APS projects in Burundi is the third and final field evaluation of our Evaluative Learning Review. The first field evaluation took place in Israel/West Bank/Gaza in September 2012 and the second in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2012. The primary purpose for these field evaluations is to advance CMM and broader Agency learning about how to effectively design, implement, and manage APS-funded projects in the future. The primary audience for this evaluation report is CMM, and the target audience also includes USAID/Burundi.

This report is organized around three main evaluation questions:

- Was a P2P approach relevant for the Burundi context?
How effective have APS-Burundi projects been in producing attitudinal and behavioral change? and,

What are the links, if any, between APS-Burundi projects and “Peace Writ Large (PWL)”?

The nine-member team employed a non-experimental, qualitatively focused, mixed-method approach involving: (1) a desk review and simple content analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources; (2) key informant and focus group interviews with APS donors, implementers, and beneficiaries, as well as comparison groups with other donors, implementers, and other community members engaged in similar but non-APS projects where possible; and (3) additional interviews with community members and individuals in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Gitega province in order to test and validate information about program impacts received in the presence of expatriate evaluation team members. During most interviews, the team had a balance between Hutu and Tutsi and men and women. The team staggered its field visits to allow for the piloting of the evaluation instruments and additional triangulation of data. In line with the overarching DE approach of the larger Evaluative Learning Review, each team member was also asked to identify any underlying assumptions they had which might color their analysis, suggest any additional questions that should be included in the interviews, and to identify key stakeholders that might have been overlooked.

There are a few significant threats to validity/limitations of this study, including, limited institutional memory, limited time in country, difficulty in establishing causal linkages, loss of data fidelity due to translation, and the Hawthorne effect. These threats are inherent to any social science research involving similar levels of time, scope, and resources, and, as discussed in the body of this report, the team worked to mitigate these threats and limitations and is in the end satisfied with the integrity of the data collected.

Main Findings and Conclusions

Appropriateness and Relevance of P2P Approach to the Burundi Context

- **P2P interventions are appropriate, relevant, and necessary in Burundi.** There was a clear, logical, and plausible connection between the contributions of P2P programming and the goal of affecting reconciliation at different levels in society. Bringing groups together was seen as a critical and necessary element to move reconciliation forward. The physical proximity and intermixed nature of different ethnic, religious, and political groups—along with their shared, interrelated cultural similarities—binds communities together in a way that guarantees different groups must necessarily interact and participate in a shared future.

- **P2P approaches offer significant and unique programming advantages.** P2P approaches are well placed to identify, strengthen, and bolster existing informal and formal local approaches for conflict mitigation. These approaches contributed to improving trust between communities and in governance structures and built a foundation for peaceful interaction and cooperation amongst previously conflicting groups. P2P and personal interaction accessed and laid the groundwork for deeper, more meaningful reconciliation in a way that some governmental programs were not able to reach or foster. Yet, P2P engagement and programming alone is not sufficient to maximally affect future reconciliation and peace—a combination of approaches has added value.

- **The P2P approach is necessary, but not sufficient to sustain reconciliation or achieve PWL and there can be some considerable programming disadvantages when over-relying on this approach.** P2P projects in Burundi contributed strongly to reconciliation. At the same time, several interviewees expressed reservations about how P2P directly affects national level change. The focus on P2P in some cases could have detracted from efforts to implement a combination of approaches, structured to more comprehensively work together for augmented
impact. In addition, in resource-constrained environments, reconciliation gains made by P2P projects can be undermined by perverse economic incentives and political manipulation.

- **P2P approaches have contributed to building capacity of local informal and formal structures to support them in responding and adapting to salient and changing contextual factors.** P2P programming contributed to building the skills sets of community structures, increasing their access to tools to address and solve conflicts in their local societies. Imparting these skills and strengthening existing skills within these bodies supports sustainable approaches that can adapt and respond to contextual changes as they evolve.

### Effectiveness in Producing Attitudinal and Behavioral Change

- **Explicit links to other programming,** particularly if there are links between individual, community, and institutional change (even if a link to national level change does not exist) is critical to effective programs. These links contribute to sustainability in attitudinal and behavioral change, as well as to PWL.

- **Sustainable change is linked to programming that explicitly builds in ownership of reconciliation processes;** for example, empowering local community members to establish peace committees or in the case of the Ministry of Education taking the next step in integrating conflict resolution into the national civics curriculum or getting government buy-in for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

- **Advocacy and policy work,** particularly in Burundi during the period in which the projects being evaluated were active, was subject to a large and often powerful number of influences, requiring greater donor commitment over time. At the same time, evidence shows that this advocacy work is a necessary part of the other reconciliation efforts. Without it, implementers cannot guarantee sustained change even at community level.

### Success in Establishing Linkages to PWL

- **Overall, real strides have been made in reconciling individuals and groups at the community level, particularly in rural areas.** This cannot be exclusively attributed to the Burundi APS projects, as it is a result of a confluence of factors. However, there was substantial evidence that APS projects have made a real, mostly localized, contribution to peace. In order to further the reconciliation process, more effort needs to be made to work with, and restrain the disruptive potential of, national level politicians.

- **APS Burundi projects have achieved some qualified and significant successes** in changing attitudes, behavior, and legislation at the provincial and national levels, although these are fewer and less resilient than at the participant and community levels.

- **While the vast majority of Burundi APS projects did not adequately describe or explain the linkages between their activities and linkages to PWL,** all have mechanisms that would allow for higher level impact. The most enduring of these mechanisms is the support of existing or establishment of new local peace structures.

- **APS activities focused at the grassroots enjoyed greater success in achieving attitudinal and behavioral change in those not directly involved in the program** than those working on national level issues; however, their contributions to PWL are less immediate than those working at the national level. Also, although some APS projects have realized changes in attitudes and behavior, there is widespread concern that these changes are not resilient enough to resist negative political manipulation.
Greater strategic cohesion in the selection of Burundi APS projects could have increased overall effectiveness. Only two of 11 APS implementers were repeat grantees, there were few cross-program linkages or synergies between APS projects, and no project appears to have been selected based on its previous success.

Recommendations

Prioritized General Recommendations

1. USAID peacebuilding initiatives should look to integrate P2P programming at community level with both national and institutional level change initiatives. The combination of these programming approaches will provide mutually reinforcing synergies, more effectively enhancing the change that each individual approach could hope to sustainably affect. The combination of these types of programs can ensure that learning at the grassroots level informs national policy and that national policy has the buy-in and engagement of local communities. Together these types of approaches will likely improve the success of P2P engagement and increase APS programming contribution to PWL. However, USAID should remain cautious of any single implementer claiming to be capable of doing both successfully single-handedly. Instead, USAID should encourage APS partners with demonstrated successful programming at each level to partner and explicitly state how they expect to link and build on each other’s activities to leverage changes in PWL.

2. USAID should encourage and award complementary programs, acknowledging that one program cannot address conflict drivers at all levels. Often, when programming happens at only one level it can be incomplete, less effective, and in some cases exacerbate problems. For example, in Burundi, USAID might consider this integrated approach in relation to programming which addresses land conflict or the TRC.

3. USAID should support APS partners to increase their capacity to more systematically identify, track, measure, and most importantly disseminate information about their project activities. This could include requiring APS implementers to document their experience (through sound monitoring and evaluation [M&E]) and provide a dissemination plan of project results in their original project proposal. Significant follow-on benefit can be achieved from disseminating information on successful APS programs, grounded in sound evidence-based M&E data, as well as providing case studies where APS programming may not have achieved the expected level of success due to common contextual constraints.

4. USAID evaluation policy states that a percentage of program budgets should be dedicated to M&E. CMM should consider devoting more effort to improving M&E systems in APS projects to help better document successes, improve the learning cycle, and ensure the establishment of baselines and endlines. CMM should also consider hosting “learning events” to explain the utility of sound M&E for IPs’ own programmatic benefit in order to encourage partners to bring some of their own resources to track and successfully report on their achievements.

5. The timeframe for APS projects should be expanded to at least 3-5 years. While this may require more resources for a given award, reconciliation is a long-term process and to the extent possible project timelines need to reflect this reality.

Burundi-Specific Recommendations

1. The US Embassy should continue to capitalize on its convening authority and encourage donor coordination and follow-on funding for APS programs that have already demonstrated success. Given its limited allocation of democracy and governance funds, the Embassy should seek complementary, outside funding to sustain advances already made.
2. The US Embassy should consider hosting a public conference or “evidence summit” highlighting achievements of its APS programs, backed by sound data, in order to encourage partners to support these or similar efforts.

3. The US Embassy should consider re-engaging with local partners that have demonstrated success in implementing previous APS programs. Several local APS partners manifested a strong and sophisticated understanding of local conflict dynamics and how to address them. Coupled with their increasingly robust organizational capacities, these partners have the potential to effectively contribute to the design and development of the next APS and to lead the implementation of future programs. The US Embassy should consider encouraging these organizations to collaborate and/or partner on these future programs to ensure national coverage of any program activities.

4. Future APS funding should support, enhance, and/or further explore the opportunities to implement strategies that showed success. For example: Strengthen collaboration between Bashingantahe and locally-elected representatives nationally; support local peace committee structures in communities; actively encourage civil society organizations advocacy efforts on key national legislation such as land tenure and inheritance rights; work to strengthen ongoing community land conflict resolution processes by reinforcing the capacity of the National Commission on Land and other Assets (CNTB); and promote collaboration between the CNTB (and other national institutions) and locally-led conflict resolution activities.

5. Future APS funding should support strategies that would address identified gaps in current programming: projects should work to engage political leadership at all levels of government administration from the colline to the national level. Consider coupling income generating activities and life skills; working with national level structures that have the most potential to negatively affect community level resiliencies of P2P work; supporting dialogue between political party leaders; and more broadly engaging the youth wings of political parties in conflict resolution and dialogue processes.
Introduction

Since 2004, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) has managed an annual Reconciliation Fund small-grants competition through an “Annual Program Statement” (APS). The Reconciliation Fund is a Congressional appropriation to support local-level “people-to-people” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and has grown from an initial award pool of $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million specifically allocated for programs inside Israel/West Bank/Gaza. To date, the APS has supported over 135 peacebuilding projects in 35 countries.

APS projects generally bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political affiliations from areas of civil conflict and war; provide opportunities for adversaries to address issues, reconcile differences, and promote greater understanding and mutual trust; and work on common goals with regard to potential, ongoing, or recent conflict. The underlying ToC is that if opposing groups are given the opportunity to interact, they will better understand and appreciate one another, or, stated another way, as the health of the relationships between the groups improves, the likelihood of violence between them declines. A more nuanced discussion of the P2P approach is articulated in the CMM People-to-People Reconciliation: A Program Guide and in the research on contact theory. P2P approaches are operationalized through more specific ToCs at the program level, which explain how program actions will causally impact future peace and reconciliation.

The 11 projects funded in Burundi employed different approaches to P2P and worked through different project-level ToCs to address conflict dynamics. The team sought to understand if the P2P approaches employed were appropriate to Burundi’s conflict context; contributed to changes in attitudes, behaviors and institutional practices; and if and how they impacted Peace writ Small (PWS) and, ultimately, Peace writ Large (PWL).

Country Context

Burundi is a small country in the Great Lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa, nestled between Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The nation is among the poorest in the world, ranking 178 out of 184 in the United Nations Development Programme’s 2013 Human Development Index. After the country’s independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi suffered 40 years of military dictatorship. During that period, a cycle of exclusion and violence dominated the relationship between the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, ultimately resulting in civil war (1993–2003). Several waves of massive violence including massacres in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, and 1993 killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced almost one million Burundians—both internally and

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177 UNDP Human Development Index Report, 2013.
beyond its borders. In addition to physical traces of violence, the conflict and its aftermath exacerbated the problem of land scarcity and inflicted emotional trauma on many Burundian communities, creating a profound need for peacebuilding and reconciliation work.

In 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (commonly known as the Arusha Accords) was signed, initiating an end to Burundi’s decade-long civil war. The Arusha Accords created a power-sharing government that led to the adoption of a new constitution and paved the way for free and fair elections in 2005. Pierre Nkurunziza of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), formerly a rebel movement and now a political party, was elected as president. That same year, a high-level United Nations Mission, echoing Article 8 of the Arusha Accords, recommended the creation of a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Special Tribunal to help the country heal the wounds of its difficult past. (As of this writing, neither of these institutions have been established). The year 2005 also saw a movement towards decentralization, which shifted the emphasis on reconstruction work to local governing bodies.178

There are 17 provinces in Burundi subdivided into 129 communes and approximately 2,638 collines or hillsides—the smallest administrative unit. To date, much of the reconciliation work has occurred at the colline level. This is largely due to the fact that in addition to national level efforts being stalled, much of the violence that has plagued Burundi’s past has been perpetrated in these local communities—neighbor upon neighbor, family upon family.

Given the relatively peaceful transition and 2005 elections, the post-2005 era promised a new focus on development activity in Burundi. However, the challenges were enormous and included: the influx of over half a million returning refugees, the emergence of a Hutu-led political opposition, the growing pains of a government transitioning from autocracy to democracy, and, in particular, the rise of corruption and a crackdown on political liberties.179 Thus, as the country continued to stabilize between 2003 and 2010, it was ripe for conflict mitigation and peacebuilding interventions. The CMM-funded projects examined by this evaluation took place in this evolving context, which helps to explain that while the overarching objectives of the projects were complementary, the projects target different populations and activities, according to the specific time period in which they were developed.

**Key Conflict Drivers**

As identified by APS implementers, beneficiaries,180 and community members interviewed, one of the most common types of conflict in Burundi during the period in question and still today is land conflict: who owns it, who has a right to it, and/or who will inherit it. Conflict over land manifests itself in a number of ways including intra-familial disputes over inheritance, conflicting claims for the same plot by

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179 Between 2006-2009, the country welcomed back more than 500,000 former refugees. (Republic of Burundi. Strategic framework for growth and fight against poverty II, Bujumbura. January 2012. Pg. 45.)

180 In the context of this report, “beneficiary” is used to describe the target of the respective program’s activities.
multiple groups of repatriated refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and disagreement over the implementation and functioning of bodies governing land, such as the Commission Nationale des Terres et autres Biens (CNTB; National Commission on Land and other Assets) and the courts. Given the scarcity and finite nature of land, coupled with a high rate of population growth and the influx of returnees, land management remains a thorny and even deadly issue in Burundi. At the local level, communities are working to resolve land conflicts through structures such as local peace committees and at the national level the CNTB plays an active role. Many communities report progress in land dispute resolution locally; however, they complain that CNTB policy regarding land issues is unevenly applied and can either help or hinder work done at the community level (see Findings for additional detail).

Another frequently discussed type of conflict is the resettlement of IDPs and returning refugees. These conflict often manifest themselves through land claims, as well as through dissatisfaction and fear over how past inter-communal violence is and will continue to be addressed. The resettlement of IDPs and refugees also brings to the forefront some of the most challenging questions of reconciliation and peaceful cohabitation.

Uncertainty related to the process of truth-telling and justice—and fears about how justice will be served—is a source of consternation at the community level. Reconciliation, often described by interviewees as peaceful cohabitation, has happened or has progressed along many fronts at the local level, but nationally, the implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been stalled. There is a concern that a strong justice component in the TRC might undo or roll back some of the progress already made in communities on these issues. A Pastor in Gitega working with the Religions for Peace project commented that a national TRC process might undo the new relationships and trust neighbors have established. He commented that, “I continue to ask myself ‘Are people going to be asked to betray those with whom they have reconciled? Is this process going to ask neighbors to betray one another yet again? And if so, are they going to be able to live together again?’”181 Many interviewees echoed this sentiment and felt strongly that truth and reconciliation must be processes influenced and led by local communities, not dictated at the national level.

Tensions also manifest themselves in conflict and disagreement between locally-elected leaders and traditional leaders known as the Bashingantahe. Both of these groups contribute to the formal and informal governance structures in the community and collines and disagreement over their role in conflict resolution and decision-making can be a source of conflict itself.182

Finally, politically motivated conflict remains a challenge for communities, as it was during the APS programming period review (2004-2010), making the reintegration of ex-combatants difficult and increasing the risk of youth engaging in political violence. Political manipulation has been a problem during past elections, especially as young people have been mobilized as tools of violence and

181 Interview with RfP beneficiary, Gitega, July 19, 2013.
182 Interviews with CARE and MiPAREC staff, July 12 and July 18, 2013.
intimidation. Coupled with the persistence of impunity, this promotes a vicious circle of further violence that bodes ill for Burundi’s future. Many interviewees discussed the difficulty of resisting this kind of mobilization in resource-constrained areas and noted that this continues to threaten reconciliation and longer term peace.

**CMM Programming Response**

The range and breadth of types of P2P programming implemented by the 11 projects is noteworthy. Programming was directed at different levels of society and toward varied thematic issues to address multifaceted aspects of the major sources of conflict described above. The chart included as **Annex C** provides a snapshot of the types of programming. For example, six projects worked to resolve land conflict, six worked to contribute to healing and forgiveness at the local and national levels, four worked to support community groups like ex-combatants and peace committees, five worked on reinforcing informal and formal governance structures or legislation, and five connected to national institutions such as the Ministry of Education (MOE) and national Bashingantahe. Within these projects across different topical areas, four projects targeted key people and the other seven targeted more people—generally at the grassroots level. All 11 projects aimed to change individual attitudes and behaviors at the community level, and three projects specifically attempted to influence socio-political change.

Although accurate and comprehensive data on total foreign donor assistance to Burundi during the APS programming period reviewed (2004-2011) was difficult to obtain, the team attempted to get a sense of how the APS funding compared to other external aid coming into the country. **Figure 1** (below) provides an overview of the total OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) assistance between 1990 and 2011. As depicted in the chart, Burundi’s net Official Development Assistance (ODA) grew steadily over this period, starting at around $410 million in 2004 and growing to around $600 million in 2011. While the vast majority of funding was focused on health, the roughly $6.3 million received in APS funding to promote reconciliation pales in comparison to assistance received from non-United States Government (USG) donors over this period, making attribution of changes in attitude and behavior change due to APS programming difficult, if not impossible, to assess. The team thus looked to identify and measure any possible contributions to peace and reconciliation.

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Evaluation Purpose

Beginning in the fall of 2011, SI began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of targeted awards and activities under CMM’s Reconciliation APS. The objectives of this review are to learn about the effectiveness APS-funded programs and to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the “developmental evaluation” (DE) methodology (see Annex B for additional detail on our methodology).

The evaluation of the APS projects in Burundi is the third and final field evaluation of our Evaluative Learning Review. The first field evaluation took place in Israel/West Bank/Gaza in September 2012 and the second in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2012. The primary purpose for these field evaluations is to advance CMM and broader Agency learning about how to effectively design, implement, and manage APS-funded projects in the future. They are intended to analyze how program designs and implementation respond to significant contextual factors and conflict drivers in order to inform more responsive and relevant grant making in the future. The primary audiences for this report are CMM and the USG representatives in Burundi.

Research Methods

Responding to lessons learned during the previous two Evaluative Learning Review visits (Israel/West Bank/Gaza and Bosnia-Herzegovina), the team made significant adjustments to its methodology, such as staggering its field visits and having local team members conduct separate follow up interviews as described below, to better identify and test possible outcomes and impacts of APS programming. SI assembled a nine-member team, including our Team Leader and Subject Matter Expert, Elizabeth McClintock; CMM APS Manager, Rebekah Krimmel; Conflict and Evaluation Specialist, Mathias Kjaer;
two local conflict specialists, Justine Nkurunziza and Joseph Nindorera; two local translators; and one local logistician.

The team employed a non-experimental, qualitatively focused approach involving: (1) a desk review and simple content analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources; (2) key informant and focus group interviews with APS donors, implementers, and beneficiaries, as well as comparison groups with other donors, implementers, and other community members engaged in similar but non-APS projects; and (3) additional interviews with community members and individuals in camps for the IDP camps in Gitega province to test and validate information about program impacts received in the presence of expatriate team members. Both sets of Burundian team members (translators and evaluators) included both men and women, Hutu and Tutsi. In addition, the team strove to have interviewers and translators who ethnically mirrored key informants in every interview and focus group.\textsuperscript{184}

Field visits were staggered to allow for the piloting of the evaluation instruments and additional triangulation of data. The team developed its interview protocols during its remote desk review and piloted the instruments during both in-country and in DC-based interviews. The Team Leader traveled to Burundi one week in advance to orient the local team members, provide follow up training on interview techniques, refine and translate interview protocols, conduct initial interviews, finalize site selection, and line up the interview schedule for the following two weeks when the full team would be present.

The team interviewed a total of 140 individuals. The interviewees came from 23 organizations including USAID prime and sub-partner implementers, US Embassy and USAID staff, the CNTB, the Conseil National de Bashingantahе (CNB; National Council of Bashingantahe), one other donor, and three other organizations doing peace and reconciliation work in Burundi. The team also met with beneficiaries of seven CMM-funded projects and, in some cases, community members in project areas that were not engaged directly in programs. Together, these interviewees helped the team to better understand the relevance of P2P approaches.

Following each day of data collection, the full team (including translators) met for a semi-structured session to discuss what evidence they had gathered to answer the three primary evaluations questions, as well as to discuss any patterns, discrepancies, or surprises they had heard. Each evening, team members wrote up their notes from the interviews, sharing them with one another through a cloud-based shared drive. The data was collected according to project and year. Team members were asked to continue to reflect on emerging themes throughout the evaluation process. This rolling analysis was further strengthened by a half-day, mid-point check-in, when the team discussed its preliminary impressions, which were vetted and agreed upon by group consensus. In line with good evaluation practice, each team member was also asked to identify any underlying assumptions they held which might color their analysis, such as analyzing the APS projects through a “Reflecting Through Peace Practice” (RPP) lens; suggest any additional questions that should be included in the interviews, and to identify key stakeholders that might have been overlooked. On their last day of data collection in

\textsuperscript{184} Due to an illness and an unforeseen scheduling conflict, this was not possible to achieve in seven of the thirty meetings. In two of those seven meetings, women interviewed women and men interviewed men.
country, the team met for a final session to discuss the group’s overall impressions and to identify and discuss dissenting or divergent views. Once the US-based team returned home, the data was analyzed using the criteria developed at the beginning of the evaluation process (see Annex D) and the themes that emerged from the rolling analysis in-country. Based on this analysis, the team drew conclusions and developed recommendations, which were validated with the Burundi-based colleagues.

Limitations of Study, Threats to Validity, and Mitigation Strategies

Despite the team’s best efforts, the threats to validity and limitations of this study are numerous and significant, and most of these are inherent to any social science research involving similar levels of time, scope, and resources. However, the team can confidently say that they put forth their best effort to mitigate these threats and limitations and are in the end satisfied with the integrity of the data collected.

One of the most significant limitations was the limited institutional memory among APS implementers, beneficiaries, and USAID staff. All of the APS projects reviewed during the study had been closed out—some more than seven years prior to the evaluators’ visit. Several of the implementers interviewed had not been present during the design and early implementation of their programs and several beneficiaries had difficulty in distinguishing between projects, particularly where the same partners had implemented multiple APS (or other USAID-funded) projects. Likewise, USAID/Burundi’s APS point of contact only assumed his position a year-and-a-half ago and thus had limited familiarity with some of the APS projects in the portfolio that pre-dated his arrival. The team dealt with this limitation by using recall techniques during interviews (using key memory markers such as the 2010 elections, etc.) to facilitate interviewee recall of the timing of certain projects activities. The team also worked with implementer staff to track down previous staff, many of whom remained in/around Bujumbura, and conducted phone and Skype-based interviews with staff no longer in-country.

The limited time in country, while unavoidable, is another limiting factor that should be recognized. Although the team strove to meet with as diverse a group of stakeholders as possible, alternate viewpoints not currently presented in this report may likely have materialized with greater time in country and broader geographic reach. However, given the purpose and resources of this evaluation, the team is satisfied with the number and diversity of interviews they were able to complete.

Another critique, and one common in an Evaluative Learning Review, is that our interview selection may be biased towards those likely to give positive accounts of the APS activities. Considering the majority of the interviews conducted over the three weeks of fieldwork fall within two categories—APS implementers and beneficiaries—the answers provided may be over-representative of those likely to self-select or have a positive predisposition for these types of activities. In other words, there is a risk that we may have heard from too great a number of those “already converted.” In order to mitigate the impact of this bias, the team interviewed as many non-beneficiary community members and implementers as time and resources would allow. We also added a fourth week of fieldwork for our local team members so that they could speak with additional non-APS interviewees and return to communities in Gitega to test if what was shared in the presence of the expatriate evaluators was recounted by others in the same communities in the presence of only Burundian evaluators.

Yet another limitation resulted from a loss of data fidelity due to translation. Most interviews took place in either French or Kirundi, which meant that one or more of the expatriate team members needed simultaneous translation. This inevitably caused some disruptions and limited a more natural conversation style, thereby resulting in the loss of subtleties, which may have affected the team member’s overall understanding of the data being shared. Three mitigation strategies were used to manage this issue. First, the team trained the translators to augment their understanding of the topics to be covered and to stress the importance of direct, simultaneous translation. Second, the evaluators regularly asked clarification questions and restated issues to clarify their understanding. Finally, and most
importantly, the team always paired a local and an expatriate evaluator for interviews so that the understanding of the data gathered could be cross-checked.

A final limitation and threat to validity surround the *Hawthorne Effect* of qualitative data collection—the risk that the interviewee might alter what would otherwise be their response in order to “please the interviewer” or give an answer they think the interviewer wants to hear. The team sought to mitigate this threat in two ways: (1) interview teams would in all cases be comprised of at least one expatriate and one national team member and (2) following the departure of the expatriate team members, the two national team members revisited some of the communities to interview other stakeholders and see if the answers provided contradicted the information previously collected. Overall there was not a significant difference in the responses received.

### Findings and Conclusions

#### Relevance of P2P Approach to the Burundi Context

**DEFINING KEY THEMES AND TERMS**

P2P represents one of many possible approaches to conflict mitigation. It entails bringing together representatives of conflicting groups to interact purposefully in a “safe space.” CMM’s P2P program guide outlines best practices in P2P programming and describes it as a “type of work [that] addresses divisions within a community that may be rooted in group differences such as ethnicity or religion, or status as a returning ex-combatant, displaced person, or refugees [or others]. The aim is to create opportunities for a series of interactions between conflicting groups in the community to promote mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties. As the health of the relationships between the groups improve, the likelihood of violence between them declines.”\(^\text{185}\) The P2P guide and the extensive literature on the contact hypothesis describe the complex nature, parameters and theories behind how P2P approaches lead to reduced violent conflict and reconciliation. This evaluation acknowledges this complexity and will not extensively outline the parameters necessary for purposeful coming together of parties and will instead focus on how actual CMM-funded P2P programming contributed to reduced conflict in the Burundi context.

The team defined “appropriate” as suitable and proper for a particular context and compatible with addressing a change in conflict dynamics. “Appropriateness” was viewed as the least common denominator in understanding if bringing together conflicting groups in Burundi could add value and have the potential to improve and contribute to reconciliation. In other words, is there a logical and plausible connection between P2P approaches and a contribution to reconciliation in Burundi during the time period of CMM grant implementation? The appropriateness of approach does not necessarily equate to a conclusion that P2P is the most advantageous of approaches in all of the circumstances of conflict in Burundi.

\(^{185}\) USAID/CMM. “People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide.” January 2011.
To define “relevance,” the team looked to the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) working paper “Evaluating Relevance in Peacebuilding Programs,” which outlines six dimensions of relevance. Using this definition, a “relevant” program can be assessed by evaluating its: link to a conflict analysis, needs/goals appropriateness, timeliness, adaptability/responsiveness, stakeholder perceptions of relevance, and strategic and policy alignment. Given the time and resource limitations of this evaluation, the team chose to focus on two of these six dimensions—the adaptability and responsiveness of the program over time and the stakeholders’ perceptions of relevance—in this case, stakeholders include program implementers, program beneficiaries, donors, community members, and non-APS program staff. “Timeliness” is addressed in our discussion of “appropriateness.” The dimensions of “needs/goals appropriateness” and “whether or not the program design was based on a thorough conflict analysis” are addressed in the effectiveness section (see pg. 20). Finally, “policy alignment” was not identified as one of the main purposes of this evaluation and thus is not addressed here.

EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI AND APS PROJECTS

During the interviews, program staff and beneficiaries in all of the projects concluded that a P2P approach was appropriate given Burundi’s context. Indeed, they underscored that such an approach complements traditional ways of managing community conflict, such as the institution of the bashingantahe—local leaders invested by their respective communities with the power to investigate and resolve local conflicts. In addition, it was noted by all that P2P approaches are necessary, albeit not sufficient, for reconciliation—in fact, a P2P approach is often the necessary first step. Numerous implementing partners (IPs) underscored that the need to bring conflicting groups together was paramount. For example, staff from Religions for Peace and Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS), both of whom worked on trauma healing and trust building approaches, stated that healing could not take place in the absence of bringing people together. They insisted that people needed to face what had happened and to move forward together, whether that be through forgiveness, reparations, community healing processes, or other means, financial or symbolic.

The P2P approach was also described as appropriate and relevant given that these groups shared a history of conflict, and thus they must come together to build a shared future. Partners stressed that those who experienced violence in the community needed to lead the process of healing because it was at the community level the violence was perpetrated and at the community level that people need to cohabitate. For example, a Ministère Paix et Réconciliation sous la Croix (MIPAREC; Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation Under the Cross) project field facilitator in Gitega noted how important face-to-face interaction between victims and perpetrators is to

In some cases, community members (victims) at first refused to visit the perpetrators in jail, and when they did [encouraged by the program staff] and brought food, the perpetrator would refuse to eat it (thinking it was poisoned). However, over time, these groups learned to overcome their fears/suspicions and began to reconcile.

~ MIPAREC staff, Gitega


187 The concept of “sufficiency” is addressed in more detail throughout the Findings Section.
facilitate the establishment of a shared peaceful future: “Perpetrators need to have the chance to face victims, to take responsibility for what they did publically. And, [only after this] then move beyond.”

Organisation pour l’Auto-Promotion (OAP) staff expressed this same perspective.

In the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and OAP program, the project brought ex-combatants from opposing sides to work together on community projects and then brought those mixed, ex-combatant groups together with the communities that had previously feared them. Staff of OAP expressed the critical importance of constructing positive engagement and (re)creating productive relationships among ex-combatants themselves and between ex-combatants and the community. They felt that bringing these groups together to work on projects of shared interest and to engage one another helped start the process of restoring lost trust and reducing fear of the other.

An IRC manager echoed these sentiments by saying, “We thought people would have an opportunity to work together, and finally discover they have the same problem. And, need to find the same resolution.”

MIPAREC and other community projects supporting peace committees reiterated the need for communities and individuals to interact in positive and productive ways in order to begin the hard process of reconciliation through building trust. One interviewee stressed the efficacy of what she calls a “citizen-to-citizen” approach. She stated, “There is no better teacher than those living in the same condition,” and that “citizen-to-citizen” engagements must take place at the community level because people need to meet each other where they live to take the risk to forgive one another. Violence happened at the community level between citizens and thus healing must also take place there.

ACCORD, a South African organization that works on land conflict, shared this view that communities must own their reconciliation processes and work together for joint compromises. ACCORD called this a “whole of community” approach to solving conflicts and said it was the heart of their programming.

Another element raised by interviewees was the appropriateness of the timing and sequencing of activities in P2P approaches. For example, MIPAREC staff underscored the critical nature of timing—when to bring people together—when discussing both their trauma healing activities and their work to reintegrate IDPs. MIPAREC did this first by working separately with communities and IDPs to prepare them both for IDP reintegration. After working with the single identity groups, they worked with communities to gather local materials and labor to build houses for IDPs, to publically show their support for reintegration, and to demonstrate that they as communities stood ready to welcome the IDPs home. Thus, the P2P approach was critical to achieving the overall goals of their projects and their timing was a key part of the process. Project implementers commented that the “bringing together”

188 Interview with MIPAREC staff in Gitega Province, July 18, 2013.
189 Interview with OAP Project Team, July 16, 2013.
190 Interview with IRC Program Staff, July 16, 2013.
191 Interview with OAP Project Team, Executive Director, July 16, 2013.
192 Interview with ACCORD Project Director, July 17, 2013.
might well happen at different points in the project timeline and that preparation of one group to interact with another group should be considered as part of a longer term strategy.

More importantly, staff from all 11 projects, as well as other donors and beneficiaries, resoundingly concluded that bringing people of conflicting groups together was a critical and necessary ingredient for almost all projects aimed at impacting reconciliation in Burundi. For example, Religions for Peace program beneficiaries in Gitega commented, “[I]f there has been a conflict between two people [or groups], you must sit together and talk about what has happened to you, what has separated you. You might not forget but you need to know what and how you were separated to know how to live together [in the future].”193 The critical nature of bringing together conflicting groups, as well as providing a “safe space” for them to do so, was a common thread throughout the evaluation (see Annex H for additional APS implementers and beneficiary definitions and explanations of “reconciliation”). Thus, APS programming promoting a P2P approach both created opportunities that might not otherwise have happened and reinforced a Burundian tradition of bringing people in conflict together.

**Advantages Unique to a P2P Approach**

P2P work provided an entry point to allow local communities to define and lead reconciliation efforts in a manner that was appropriate for them and contributed to sustainable improvements in relationships. For example, MIPAREC worked to support and strengthen local structures that existed in the community and were responsible for resolving conflict, namely through traditional mechanisms such as the *Bashingantahe* and through locally-elected leaders. Programming in a way that built on the traditional role of *Bashingantahe*, as well as acknowledged the legitimate political role given to locally-elected leaders, proved to be culturally relevant and sustainable in the Burundi context. OAP, THARS, and Search for Common Ground (SFCG) supported existing bodies or helped to establish local peace committees that brought together parties in conflict and worked to solve conflict through community engagement. Members of the SFCG and MIPAREC peace committees reported they were able to resolve many local disputes between individuals without needing to elevate them to more formal community governance structures. They reported that the *Bashingantahe* and the locally-elected leaders appreciated their role and in many cases asked them to help address conflict between individuals before the cases were referred to community governance institutions.195

IRC, Interpeace/Centre of Alert and Conflict Prevention (CENAP), and others also mention that P2P

193 Interview with Religions for Peace program participants in Gitega, July 19, 2013.

194 All of the projects demonstrated degrees of success in purposefully bringing groups together in a safe place to better understand and appreciate one another. The evidence supporting the degree of changed understandings and perceptions of project beneficiaries and communities is further explored under the second evaluation question about attitudes and behaviors. The degree to which these changes resulted in higher level peace outcomes is discussed under the third evaluation question.

195 Interview with MIPAREC/CARE beneficiaries (Peace Committee Members), Makebuko Commune, July 20, 2013; Interview with SFCG women beneficiaries from Nyanza Lac, July 25, 2013.
work allowed them to work with groups plagued by distrust. The theoretical underpinning of the value of P2P is that meaningful, purposeful engagement helps expand understanding and builds or restores trust and collaboration across lines of division. In the Burundi context, evidence suggests that these programs contributed to increased levels of trust and fostered an environment ripe for more meaningful relationships. Many partners claimed that interpersonal interaction was the only way, although not always sufficient, to begin to build the new trust. In some instances, conflicting groups needed incentives to interact. In those cases, joint projects of common interest, including physical infrastructure jobs, served as a first step to encouraging conflicting groups to engage with one another. After joint projects were introduced, communities were trained on conflict resolution skills and peaceful ways to resolve disputes, all the while building relationships as they worked together. According to IRC staff, P2P projects also served to indirectly improve the trust of local governance by implementing public interest projects.

In a number of cases, P2P approaches were able to fill a void left by governmental or other programming that did not explicitly bring people together. For example, a program manager for MIPAREC in Gitega described a case in which a governmental approach to justice was insufficient to support reconciliation at the community level. He described how a jailed, ex-combatant refuted his wrongdoing throughout his imprisonment but once pardoned no longer refused to admit the wrong he committed. Upon returning home, it became clear that in order to live with the community, he needed to admit his wrongdoing so that he could move on and heal with his neighbors. Admitting wrongdoing and facing those wronged was more critical to living peacefully and reconciling than justice wrought through imprisonment.

**Challenges and Risks Unique to a P2P Approach**

There were also some challenges and risks to implementing P2P approaches, especially if this was done in lieu of other programming. Our evidence suggests that a sole focus on P2P reconciliation approaches can discourage the use of other relevant approaches and can undermine the impact that a combination of approaches might contribute towards reconciliation. The APS requirement of using P2P approaches could, in some circumstances, result in missed opportunities to contribute to national reconciliation and PWL.

Interviewees reported that, while local-level reconciliation efforts on issues such as land, trauma healing, truth telling, and trust moved forward in communities, as designed their P2P programs were unable to meaningfully impact these issues on a national scale. Interviewees reported concern that their gains would diminish if national policies are implemented in a destructive way. For example, if the TRC is implemented with a strong focus on justice, this could negatively impact relationships where scars have already begun to heal. In an interview, a Religions for Peace beneficiary commented on this dynamic by saying, “Is what we have built, [community trust and reconciliation], going to be in danger due to government programs? We are trying to calm people and come together to discuss what happened. So is the TRC going to question our approach [to truth telling and forgiveness] and put us at odds again?

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196 Interview with MIPAREC staff in Gitega Province, July 18, 2013.
What if a neighbor tells the truth [in the TRC process] and goes to jail after we’ve reconciled? Will the community be able to live together again or will our gains be destroyed?”

While project staff from all 11 of the projects mentioned that their P2P work was successful in contributing to community reconciliation, they all reported that work at the community level is not sufficient to ensure sustainable reconciliation. There was wide agreement that political structures at the top manipulate communities and if key issues are not addressed at that level, then progress will be vulnerable and reconciliation risks remaining incomplete at the local level.

Some partners structured their programs to fill this gap, focusing on a different level to complement community P2P programming. For example, two of the 11 projects—the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) and Global Rights (GR)—described P2P as secondary to their approach. These two programs defined their ToC as reaching key people to influence national structures to affect change from the top down. They recognized the need for change from the bottom up and felt that other programs could better address this dynamic. According to BLTP staff, the program was designed to foster leadership in Burundi by working with the MOE to implement a civic education curriculum in secondary school. Global Rights, in their second CMM project, wanted to influence national land tenure legislation—although their earlier work, which reflected a P2P approach, also influenced this project. Based on their espoused ToCs, both of these projects had potential to impact conflict dynamics in a sustainable way at the national level if fully implemented. Thus the projects appropriately matched needs with goals to assure that their respective approaches effectively responded to the context.

The team heard similar sentiments from program staff about the need to augment the community-based P2P approaches funded by CMM when confronting transitional justice issues and land conflicts. It is clear there is a critical need for P2P engagement; however, if national structures do not follow suit, catch up, and right-size their approaches in tandem with those at the local level, then national level systems can lessen the impact of, or potentially dismantle, the reconciliation processes occurring through community-based P2P efforts. For example, both Religions for Peace and SFCG had anticipated investing more effort in preparing their beneficiaries for the transitional justice process that would accompany the establishment of the TRC. Unfortunately, as the TRC has yet to be initiated, efforts to influence the transitional justice process at the national level went nowhere. On these issues, P2P will be more successful when explicitly paired with programming aimed at influencing national policy, such as land tenure legislation and/or TRC implementation processes. Simultaneously, as discussed above, it is critical for these national level engagements to link to grassroots initiatives and to respect local leadership when eliciting support in the implementation phase of national policy.

Finally, it can be more difficult to realize the power of P2P approaches in resource-constrained environments. Bringing people together to choose peace, to build stronger relationships, and resist calls to violence can provide a strong base for reconciliation at the community level. However, if the national systems do not support these local bases or worse yet, if they work against and exploit local relationships, P2P programs might lack the ability to contribute to long-term peace. For example, if political manipulation and calls to support political violence promise access to resources, including food

197 Interview with Religions for Peace beneficiary in Gitega, July 19, 2013.
and land, then for some they may be extremely difficult to resist. Program staff at IRC, OAP, CARE, MIPAREC, and THARS all insisted that P2P work should be coupled with other initiatives, such as income generating projects that provide alternatives to violence because beneficiaries will not be swayed by the short term promises of political parties or promises of access to resources and livelihoods in exchange for support.

**Flexibility to Adapt to Shifting Factors over Time**

With the exception of conflicts resulting from political manipulation (see section above), the P2P projects in Burundi demonstrated a substantial degree of flexibility to adapt to contextual factors over time—especially when geared toward building the capacities of local (formal or informal) dispute resolution mechanisms. For example, IRC/OAP, THARS, CARE/MIPAREC, and SFCG all worked to support existing and/or to create new local peace committees to respond to and resolve community conflict. The same adaptive nature of P2P programming was seen in projects that reinforced the relationship between the Bashingantahe and locally-elected leaders. Trained leaders now deal with a range of conflicts, not only those identified in the original project proposals. According to beneficiaries, these mechanisms served the goals of the project under which they were created and continue to contribute to conflict resolution in their communities because they have successfully adapted to the changing context.

In summary, P2P interventions address a broad range of conflict dynamics in Burundi. Programming was directed at different levels and toward varied thematic issues to appropriately and, in many cases, successfully address multifaceted aspects of the conflict. P2P programming reached a range of beneficiaries and aimed to affect change at multiple levels by targeting interventions at different groups. Some projects targeted key people, some targeted more people, and some targeted both. Some projects aimed to change individual attitudes and behaviors, while others worked through these to support change at organizational levels.

Additionally, all interviewees identified P2P approaches as appropriate, and relevant in the context in Burundi. The supporting evidence suggests that a P2P approach has such salience in Burundi because it is linked to the nature of the past conflicts and how the society is structured. For example, one of the most salient contextual aspects about Burundi is that it is a small, densely populated country made up of mostly intermixed ethnic communities who share the same culture, traditions, and language, even while their religion or political affiliation might differ. Different groups attend the same schools and places of worship, use the same health clinics, shop in the same markets and are governed by the same locally-elected representatives and traditional leaders. Many Burundians of different ethnicities also inter-marry and share in celebrations together. Because of this closeness, both in regard to physical proximity and shared culture, ethnically mixed groups must necessarily interact. Thus, programming that brings together conflicting groups is not only relevant, necessary, and historical cultural practice, but it is also virtually impossible to avoid.
Effectiveness in Producing Attitudinal and Behavioral Change

DEFINING KEY THEMES AND TERMS

A central tenet of USAID’s P2P approach is reconnecting people whose ties to one another have been severed by conflict in order to lay the groundwork for reconciliation. “People-to-People peacebuilding works to break down the barriers between groups by re-humanizing the other, fostering empathy and mutual understanding, building trust, and creating relationships.” Each of these goals requires that people re-imagine their relationships with one another and thus P2P programming “primarily function[s] at the attitudinal level.” All 11 APS-Burundi programs professed to changing both attitudes and behaviors of their beneficiaries in the context of their program activities.

In order to determine the effectiveness of these changes, the team first set out to define two key terms: “behavioral and attitudinal change” and “effectiveness.” The team used two different data sources to get at an understanding of “change.” First, during the document review and specifically when reviewing program proposals, they noted how the program implementers themselves described the change that they hoped to engender. Second, these definitions were compared to external program evaluation reports and documentation (where available) and responses during interviews with IPs and beneficiaries. Responses were triangulated to determine if self-reported change was confirmed by other community members and whether that change was perceived to be due to program activities.

Characterizing “effectiveness” was more challenging. The team agreed that in order to be “effective,” the change needed to have some measure of sustainability (meaning that the attitudes and behaviors of program beneficiaries continued to reflect the change sought by the program’s goals after the program had ended); the changed behaviors and attitudes should be linked to drivers of conflict (for example, if exclusion was identified as a driver of conflict by the project’s conflict analysis, the changed attitudes and behaviors should reflect a response to that such as inclusion and dialogue); and within the context of the program and its target beneficiaries, change would at least contribute to PWS. In other words, depending on how the target population described their own problems, effectiveness was determined by whether the activities undertaken engendered a change that then contributed to a more peaceful community, as evaluated by the community members themselves.

“The trainings have changed me; the way I behave has changed. Before I was proud and was a troublemaker but then I was trained [in conflict resolution techniques] and I have changed…when you train someone and he internalizes it, there is now an internal mechanism that keeps him from doing harm.”

~CARE/MIPAREC Peace Network Leader, Gitega Province.

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198 USAID P2P Guidelines, pg. 3.
199 Ibid. Pg. 8.
200 See the following section for a fuller discussion of the concept of Peace Writ Small.
ADDITIONAL METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

The team encountered two sets of challenges when measuring change in attitudes and behaviors. The first set is related to each program’s ToC: including (1) lack of a clearly articulated ToC and (2) lack of consistent indicators that could be used to measure change. In keeping with the requirements of the APS, all 11 projects focused on affecting behavioral and attitudinal change in their target beneficiaries. However, while every program design underscored the need to engender some kind of behavior or attitude change in order to achieve their specific program goals, most of the programs did not specify their ToC. This was largely due to the fact that an explicit ToC was not required of applicants until the 2009 APS, and only one project in Burundi included in the current evaluation was approved after that date (IRC’s SCOPE project, 2010-2011). Despite this, all program designs did include program hypotheses, which outlined program activities and their expected results. The team used this data to inform their assessment of program impact regarding attitudinal and behavioral change. However, due to the lack of consistency in how program hypotheses were expressed, the team was obligated to take their best guess at a ToC and then test that understanding during interviews with each implementing partner. Given the sometimes extremely long period of time that had elapsed between program design and this evaluation (nine years in two cases and between five and six years for seven other programs), our ability to verify the ToC for a program was limited.

CMM describes an effective ToC as referring “to the assumed connections between various actions and the result of reducing conflict or building peace.”\(^{201}\) The lack of an explicit ToC impacted this evaluation in two fundamental ways: first, without an articulated ToC, it was not always immediately clear to the team how the program activities were meant to build peace (or reduce conflict) and, second, without this explicit link, it was challenging to measure the change the projects hoped to engender. As stated in the ToC guidance paper, “theories of change are more useful to the extent that, having identified the changes we expect from an intervention, we can “know it when we see it”.\(^{202}\) Program conflict analyses, program evaluations, and interviews were compared to the team’s definition of effectiveness to overcome this challenge.

The second set of challenges was operational in nature and included the following:

- Distinguishing between changes in attitudes and changes in behavior;
- Balancing the relatively brief length of time accorded to project implementation against the time it takes to sustainably change attitudes and behaviors; and
- Competing tensions/factors within a community and/or at a national level and the impact those factors had on the ability and willingness of project beneficiaries to change and by extension, on the effectiveness of the project.

Distinguishing between Changes in Attitude and Changes in Behavior

\(^{201}\) ToC guidance paper, pg. 1.

\(^{202}\) Ibid.
In their description of “double-loop learning,” Argyris and Schön offer a helpful way to think about changes in attitude versus changes in behavior. Changes in behavior are often examples of “single-loop learning,” meaning that only the action has changed, rather than the underlying motivation for that action. An example in the Burundi context might be that neighbors who used to consider themselves as enemies and would cross the street in order not to encounter each other even under the most chance circumstances, now greet one another when they see each other. While this change in behavior is important, it does not necessarily demonstrate a change in attitude, which is generally a second and complementary goal of reconciliation programming. In other words, the community may be less tense because the two neighbors now greet each other on the street; however, their behavior may be due to community pressure to “cohabit,” and not necessarily due to a change in the perceptions each has of the other or an indication that they have “reconciled.” A true change in attitude requires what Argyris and Schön describe as “double-loop learning”—the variable driving the behavior change must be examined and modified to produce sustained individual or institutional transformation: In this case, the perceptions and attitudes that each neighbor holds of the other.

To manage this dilemma, the team sought examples of both behavioral and attitudinal change and triangulated interview data, speaking with IPs, program beneficiaries, and non-participant community members to get at both self-perceptions of change and verify that against community reports of change. In particular, the team looked at the sustained nature of a reported change in behavior and whether or not those changes had resulted in new and/or different outcomes in the community at both individual and institutional levels.

**Achieving Change over a Short Time Period**

To a person, each IP interviewed regretted not having enough time to assure and consolidate the changes in behavior and attitudes necessary for true reconciliation. “It is hard to [rate our success] because change does not happen so fast. So our definition of success did not change but our expectations about how soon change might happen were modified.” In some cases, such as the BLTP teacher-training program, the project was designed as a pilot and further funding was needed to roll out the project on a national scale to achieve the program’s larger goals in terms of behavioral change. In other cases, such as the IRC SCOPE project there was a delay in receipt of the funds, shortening the time frame for activities on the ground. However, all partners interviewed agreed that the kind of profound changes sought by these projects take time—at least as long as the conflict that produced the divisions. The team structured the interview protocols to get at both short and longer term changes,

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204 In our interviews with beneficiaries, this example was offered frequently to describe how an individual has changed.

205 Religions for Peace, program implementation staff interview, July 11, 2013.

206 Interview with IRC program implementation staff, July 10, 2013.

207 Comment offered by MIPAREC program staff during field visit to Gitega, July 11, 2013. Sentiment confirmed during interview with a non-APS implementer.
explored the link to PWS, and encouraged interviewees to explain how the APS-funded project in question was complemented by other activities—both those conducted by the same partner with different funding and those conducted by other organizations who were not currently CMM grant recipients—which might have extended the time frame over which more profound transformation could take place.

**Impact of External Factors**

A final operational challenge in assessing the effectiveness of the APS-funded programs was related to how the projects were influenced by external factors during the implementation phase. In a few cases, these factors had a salutary impact. In other cases, however, the external factors negatively impinged upon project activities—including those that addressed key drivers of conflict—making it challenging to evaluate the effectiveness of certain approaches.

The team again used the interview protocol as a tool to identify internal and external factors that might have impacted program implementation, as well as to identify unanticipated consequences of program activities. This allowed the team to then compare the answers to interview questions to program documents and responses to other, program-specific questions in order to parse out the effectiveness of program activities.

**EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI APS PROJECTS**

As stated in the preceding section, when evaluating the effectiveness of APS-funded programs, the team looked at program design, program activities, and their impact. The team then compared programs to determine if there were any trends (positive or negative) that seemed to be shared. Again, effectiveness was measured using the criteria of sustainability, linkage to drivers of conflict, and the success of program activities in achieving PWS, if not PWL.

**Program Design—What was the change the project hoped to engender?**

The team used the RPP matrix to sort the program implementers into four categories. The matrix is a useful rubric for both analyzing program targets and comparing program impacts. The matrix below includes each project’s ToC, to facilitate that analysis.

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208 The evaluation team uses USAID’s definition of ‘impact’. Please see the Glossary for this definition.

209 Anderson and Olson. *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioner*
<table>
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<th>MORE</th>
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| **INDIVIDUAL**                                                      | **BLTP: Building the Capacity of Burundi’s Future Leaders**  
| CARE-MIPAREC: Sasagaza Amahoro: From Grassroots to National Level-Spreading Peace  
ToC: Reinforcing the capacity of existing local CR mechanisms will enhance community stability & contribute to peace and reconciliation at community level. | ToC: Targeting youth in the context of education with a CR skill building program will prepare them to be future leaders.  
 | IRC-OAP: Supporting Communities for Peaceful Elections (SCOPE)  
ToC: Collectively chosen micro projects, when accompanied by CR training will improve socio-economic services in community and improve relationships between community actors. | Religions for Peace: Overcoming Barriers to Peace Building and Reconciliation through Multi-Religious Collaboration in Burundi  
ToC: A multi-religious approach to addressing key issues (GBV; TRC; and socio-economic reintegration) will contribute to more effective community reconciliation in target communities. |
| THARS: Conflict Transformation in Burundi  
ToC: Establishing locally owned peacebuilding programs, where community leaders are responsible for transferring skills, will prevent the recurrence of conflict. |  |
| SFCG: Supporting Burundi’s Transition to Peace by Facilitating Dialogue & Reconciliation  
ToC: Combining a range of conflict management activities to reach a broad spectrum of Burundians will contribute to peace and reconciliation. |  |
| SFCG: Supporting Reconciliation in Burundi  
ToC: Enable Burundians to coexist peacefully by reinforcing capacity at all levels of society to deal with conflict constructively. |  |
| SFCG: Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation and Collaborative Action in Burundi  
ToC: Promoting constructive exchange and dialogue among parliamentarians and between them and citizens, coupled with fostering dialogue between returnees and residents will promote inclusive, effective, and responsible participation in social transformation. |  |
| **SOCIO-POLITICAL**                                                | **GR: Strengthening Civil Society to Manage and Mitigate Land Conflict in Burundi**  
ToC: Raising awareness about land issues and reinforcing the capacity of CSOs to mitigate land conflict and to advocate solutions for the issue of land will positively contribute to the development and reform of a national land policy thus addressing key drivers of conflict.  
 | Interpeace/CENAP: Burundi Peacebuilding Program  
ToC: Broad based consensus on problems and their solutions will inspire more effective national solutions to key national problems. | GR: Laying the Groundwork for Future Post-Conflict Restorative Justice Mechanisms in Burundi  
ToC: Supporting civil society to raise awareness about and advocate for actions that contribute to the development of a national transitional justice policy will ensure a balanced and durable policy. |

Developmental Evaluative Learning Review: Synthesis Report  
Field Study of USAID/Burundi Annual Program Statement People-to-People Reconciliation Grants  
297
As the table above suggests, there are two distinguishing characteristics of the APS-funded projects. First, seven of the 11 projects focused on reaching more as opposed to key people within the defined target community. Second, only three of the projects targeted socio-political as opposed to individual-level change.

This distribution reveals a couple of important findings regarding USAID’s P2P approach in Burundi. First, because those projects addressing socio-political level change are often considered to be more ambitious because of their temporal reach, it was more difficult to measure change within the timeline of the grant. Second, these projects were more often affected by factors beyond the control of the program designers, making it challenging for the IPs to adjust and refocus program activities. For example, GR had anticipated encouraging and guiding civil society involvement in both the development of national legislation on women’s right to inheritance and on the implementation and monitoring of the TRC. However, the government’s retreat from their commitment to women’s rights and the fact that the TRC has yet to be established both limited GR’s ability to achieve their stated project goals. While they were able to successfully redouble their efforts to address land tenure issues, even here the results of their work became evident only after APS grant funding ended and through collaboration with other donors and organizations.

A similar challenge arose for those projects targeting key people. Of the projects evaluated, four had program activities that specifically targeted key actors as the catalysts for change:

- Religions for Peace identified specific religious leaders;
- BLTP focused on the MOE and teachers as conduits to youth; and
- Both GR programs targeted national NGO leaders and institutions that could have the most impact on the issues identified as being drivers of conflict, land tenure in particular.

Here again, external factors mitigated program effectiveness. For example, the Religions for Peace project was designed to use networks of religious leaders as the vehicle for preparing the ground at the grassroots level for the TRC—without a TRC, those programmatic resources had to be redirected. In addition, changes in the national level leadership of some of their partners made it difficult for Religions for Peace to connect the national work with key leaders to their grassroots work. Program beneficiaries at the grassroots level were largely unaware of program activities designed to link the grassroots with the planned dialogue on the TRC at the national level. Program staff acknowledged that factors beyond their control made their work challenging: “Changes in the national leadership of the various religious confessions [was an external factor that impacted our work]. That meant that we had to constantly renew the relationships at the national level.”

In the case of the BLTP, while collaboration with the MOE was quite close throughout the life of the project, it was not sufficient to influence the realignment of government priorities and thus the necessary funding for moving from a pilot project to nationwide implementation of the new civics curriculum never materialized.

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210 Interview with Religions for Peace staff, July 11, 2103.
As these examples attest, APS-funded projects that targeted key people and/or socio-political change seemed to suffer disproportionately from the impact of external factors. This finding is perhaps not surprising given that these projects often touched on aspects of key issues which were far more politically charged and were structured in such a way as to require significant political will on the part of government agencies to achieve change (such as the TRC or national education priorities) than those that targeted more people and/or individual change. This highlights the challenge of relying on short-term, unpredictable funding when trying to achieve long-term national policy reform.

**Program Design—Did a conflict analysis inform project design?**

Program implementation staff from all 11 APS-funded programs stated that their program design was based on some sort of conflict analysis. However, the team discovered that a conflict analysis was conducted specifically for an APS proposal in only two instances—the proposals submitted by IRC-OAP and CENAP. In three other cases, CARE-MIPAREC, SFCG and GR, the proposals were based on past or ongoing project work and the context analyses emerging from those concurrent program evaluations. The most effective projects seem to be those which specifically linked their program activities to the data revealed in the conflict analysis, and in particular, those which used geographic criteria generated by that analysis to bound their interventions.  

IRC-OAP commissioned a conflict analysis in mid-2009 that led them to identify the target population, program partners, and specific project activities. Theirs is one of three APS-projects whose “peace infrastructure”—peace committees—continues to function after program activities ended and which succeeded in achieving PWS within their two target communities (the other two programs whose “peace infrastructure” is still in place include CARE-MIPAREC and SFCG).

GR used the information gathered from their experience running land clinics in Ngozi province to inform their initial proposal to USAID in 2005. “We did a baseline assessment early in 2001-2002. [We also] did studies for certain issues or on issues where change was sought. We also took advantage of other studies. We refined our approach with learning from specific studies...We had worked on land conflicts for several years and that experience formed the basis of our program design process.” According to program implementation staff, this analysis changed their approach. Despite success with the land clinics, GR soon realized that without changes in the national land tenure system, no solution reached at the local level would be durable. Thus, they decided to invest in affecting change at the national level, in key institutions and

“Training helped us and we decided to then organize meetings and share the skills with others in our community. We trained others. We created a network of associations of peace that worked at the commune level. We acquired a culture of working together to solve problems. If a problem is brought to us we gather everyone on the committee together to work on it.”

~ CARE-MIPAREC Focus Group Participant, Gitega.

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211 In addition to IRC-OAP, CARE-MIPAREC, THARS, SFCG, and Religions for Peace all used their understanding of the conflict context to narrow their respective geographic zones of intervention.

212 APS-09-857 IRC Burundi Technical Application, pg. 2.

213 Interview with GR project implementation staff, July 11, 2013.
As will be elaborated below, this is an example of how program implementation staff adapted the interventions to fit the changing context over time.

**Program Activities and Effectiveness**

The APS-funded projects included a range of activities, which generally fell into the following categories in order of intensity of use:

- **Training** individuals and groups in negotiation, conflict management, mediation, and advocacy skills (eight of 11 projects);
- **Establishment of and support for existing** local mechanisms for conflict resolution and other “peace infrastructure” (eight of 11 projects);
- **Sensitization** of population (about issues such as non-violent conflict resolution, land tenure and inheritance rights, the need to cohabitate, rebuild trust, and changing perceptions of the other—eight of 11 projects);
- **Interactive theater** productions (four of 11 projects);
- **Media training** and programming (four of 11 projects);
- Design of **advocacy processes** that lobby **government** (through key leaders or CSOs) to more effectively deal with national issues such as land tenure or inheritance (four of 11 projects); and
- **Construction projects** that included messages of reconciliation (one project).

In general, all of these activities had important salutary effects on the target beneficiaries and contributed to reconciliation. For example, a behavioral change illustrated by the testimonies of beneficiaries in Gitega was that the training greatly improved participants’ communication skills. Two women leaders from Kabanga Zone, Giheta Commune, emphasized that because of the training they now feel comfortable to “speak our mind publicly.” This sentiment was echoed by women in Simba Zone, Makebuko Commune. In addition, participants recounted how they themselves had changed:

“I used to be a ‘king’ at home. I would criticize everyone and shout when something was not perfect. Since the training, I am more helpful now. I really respect my wife for all the work that she does. We are all more happy at home.”

“My family used to look at me like I was an animal when I arrived home. They feared me and did not want me around. Now, my children are happy when I come home and they welcome me [because I communicate better].”

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214 Interview with former GR project implementation staff, July 23, 2013.

215 Both quotes are from two focus groups participants in Simba Zone, Makebuko Commune, Gitega, July 20, 2013. Others in the focus group confirmed the changes that the two men self-reported.
However, what rendered a project most effective was the choice of activity and the implementers’ ability to explicitly link the chosen activity(ies) to the change they sought and to integrate the program beneficiaries and partners into this process. The following are some ways in which this link seemed to manifest itself most clearly:

- **Those program implementers that had a better foothold in the target communities and/or institutions were more effective. In other words, their past experience guided their programmatic choices. In the CARE-MIPAREC program, both beneficiaries and IPs identified CARE and MIPAREC’s previous experiences as key to their success, stating “the project built on good things”216;**

- **The explicit involvement of the community in designing the peacebuilding activities was also identified by participants as an important component because it allowed them to take an active part in the conceptualization of the change process. Thus, ownership over the program design process seemed to translate into ownership of the change process—change was not being done to the participants; rather they were driving their own change. This kind of participation took at least four forms:**

  1. **CENAP’s Participatory Action Research approach enabled Burundians from different parts of society to both define the problems and develop longer-term solutions together. According to interviews and program reports, 80% (9 of 11) of the recommendations that emerged from the project activities were implemented. As noted in its final evaluation report, “The endorsement of the First Vice-President of the recommendation for an additional “period of grace” for disarmament during the closing of the Second National Group meeting may be the most important indicator of impact that the programme is already having.”217**

  2. **One of SFCG’s most successful outreach activities integral to their P2P approach was the participatory theater.218 Designed to allow community members to interact with each other, as well as with the actors in a safe space and to offer solutions to the problems presented, the theater productions had a lasting impact on actors and audience members alike.**

     “After the plays, some people even reconcile by themselves. They see their mistakes. Each sees what they can contribute to process of resolving conflict. There are lots of volunteers who then share land or give it back. We play out the conflict exactly as we understood that it happened. Unfortunately, we’ve not presented sketches in a long while. I feel that these really contributed to making our minds peaceful…How the returnees felt really came through in the sketches. How they felt excluded and a bit cut off from their communities when they returned. This had a big impact on residents, who then reacted positively to the conflict resolution process.”

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216 Interview with project beneficiaries, Simba Zone, Makebuko Commune, Gitega, July 20, 2013.


218 This activity was also used in the CARE/MIPAREC project.
3. In the IRC-OAP project, community members defined the priorities and had a say in which construction projects would be undertaken. In one commune, this level of community ownership seemed to be especially successful with the projects that provided water. However, this approach is not without its challenges. As the IRC program staff noted, construction projects do not always mitigate the suspicion and distrust that exists between communities and local officials, despite their potentially mutually beneficial impacts. In particular, communities often worry about the corruption of local officials. “In Mutimbuzi, the community ownership over the infrastructure projects seemed to be weak, despite the fact that their priorities had been taken into consideration. This was largely due to a lack of communication by local authorities…[P]oorly informed about the choice of projects and the modalities of their implementation, the communities suspected the embezzlement of funds [on the part of the local officials]. As a result, the maintenance of these projects was compromised [threatening the project’s longer term impact].”

4. Four of the APS-funded IPs provided training and support to communities that resulted in the emergence of an organic “peace infrastructure.” Generally referred to as peace committees or peace clubs, these institutions have demonstrated remarkable durability. In interviews with program beneficiaries from IRC-OAP, CARE-MIPAREC, and SFCG, all underscored the utility and effectiveness of these local mechanisms. THARS also capitalized on existing community structures to implement peace clubs.

- “[There are three changes in our community. First,] CBOs [community based organizations], Bashingantahe, and newly elected leaders signed an accord/agreement to cooperate because they understand that they shared an objective to resolve conflict. [Second, for] CBOs that already existed, the project provided them with tools which meant that they are stronger and still going on. [And third,] new structures acted like referees [amongst the competing conflict resolution mechanisms…these] Peace Clubs [are] still active today.”

“Clubs of peace are really positive. [We] had not planned for those – they were organic…We did not expect that these peace committees would keep their neutrality for so long, but they have.”

~ CARE-MIPAREC Staff

219 Interview with SFCG women beneficiaries from Rumonge, July 24, 2013.


221 Email exchange with IRC Program Manager, September 5, 2013.

222 Interview with MIPAREC project team, July 18, 2013.
These local structures also facilitate the inclusion of people and groups that might have previously been excluded from a community. As described above, the CARE-MIPAREC program facilitated the return of IDPs to their collines. In the IRC-OAP SCOPE program, the focus was on the reintegration of ex-combatants. Both examples illustrate how P2P programming has tangibly changed attitudes and behaviors in the target communities.

In addition, non-beneficiary community members from areas touched by the CARE-MIPAREC project also reported on the effectiveness and durability of the peace committees, stating that they remembered that “active members of the peace committees [were recruited] within the displaced camps. They were then playing a role of a bridge between the two communities, and with other members, they started to propose to the IDPs to go back home in their respective properties…the Peace Committee also [continue to] sensitize the political parties leaders at the colline level and they are held accountable of anything which could happen and disturb the security and peace at the community levels.”

Interestingly, the idea of integrating the community in the design of project activities was also recognized as effective by program staff that had not followed this approach. In response to the question, “Would you have done anything differently?” Religions for Peace program staff replied, “We proposed the activities instead of letting the communities themselves choose what they wanted to focus on. We would change this going forward.”

- A final illustration of effectiveness of an APS-funded project was a program’s ability to both work effectively with the target institution—such as a government ministry, the Bashingantahe or the CNTB—and to reach beyond the specific institution and explicitly build relationships with other organizations and/or program activities.

  - The BLTP invested time and resources at the beginning of their program to build a close relationship with the MOE and specifically the Pedagogical Bureau in order to gather their input for the curriculum, include them in the training program, and to ensure their buy-in and support throughout the project. Perhaps more importantly, the BLTP decided to use MOE staff as trainers, although that had not been anticipated in the original program plan. The team built up the staff’s skills and integrated them into the Training-of-Trainers process. As a result, the MOE supported the expansion of the training for an additional 60 teachers, the Pedagogical Bureau staff is advocating for a further extension of the program, and the trained teachers continue to use the curriculum with support from the Pedagogical Bureau despite lacking the material resources for the classroom.

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223 Interview with OAP project team, July 16, 2013.
224 Interview with Mashitsi community members, Gitega, July 29, 2013.
225 Interview with RfP program staff, July 11, 2013.
As described above, the CARE-MIPAREC project worked closely with locally-elected leaders and the Bashingantahe in the formation of the peace committees. These committees continue their work today.

Activities where producing change was more challenging

Amongst the changes sought by program implementers, two types seemed to be the most challenging. First, policy work, such as that engaged in or attempted by GR, Religions for Peace, and SFCG on land reform and transitional justice, requires government agreement and participation. Where that engagement is lacking—whether due to changing government priorities, lack of capacity, or lack of desire—it is virtually impossible to move program activities beyond a certain stage. GR, for example, had planned to build on the incoming government’s public commitment to promulgate a law governing women’s inheritance rights. However, when the CNDD-FDD took power in 2005, it backed away from that commitment and little progress was initially made on one of its main program objectives. To address this challenge, GR and its partners, “held a workshop and a press conference, sponsored short radio programs, held three meetings with ministers, [and] met with the First Vice President of the Republic of Burundi” and succeeded in re-launching the inheritance reform process. Unfortunately, as of the end of the program in 2008, the government had not moved forward on the reform of the laws on women’s right to inherit. This example highlights the challenges of policy work of this kind, especially as it requires a sustained, long-term commitment of donors and organizations, which cannot always be guaranteed.

Second, regionally focused program design proved to be more challenging to implement than was anticipated in the APS and in the specific program documents. Two programs had a specific regional focus, SFCG’s “Supporting Key Actors to Mitigate Conflict in the Great Lakes” and THARS’ “Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation: Tubirengerte”. In particular, THARS reported challenges in their regional approach and noted they would not do a regional program again. In their assessment, the cross-country approach was too ambitious, requiring a knowledge of the communities and countries that THARS alone did not have and demanding extra resources to manage unexpected challenges in other countries (like recalcitrant administrators or lack of infrastructure). As one staff member stated, “we would have been able to achieve more had we just concentrated on one country”.

Program Activities–How did the program identify and adapt to changes in context?

A final measure of success for the APS funded programs was their ability to identify and adapt to any changes in their operating context. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, some of the IPs dealt with external factors that impinged upon their planned activities. In a few cases, those impacts were positive. For example, SFCG noted that the activities of the CNTB complemented the mediation work conducted by the SFCG trained facilitators, reinforcing SFCG’s emphasis on dialogue and mutually-agreed upon solutions to potentially explosive land conflicts.

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227 Interview with THARS staff, July 15, 2013.
However, in most cases where the changing context made a difference, the impact was negative, forcing a change in program focus or activities. As described above, GR was forced to rethink its programmatic approach and redirect resources originally allocated for influencing inheritance laws to advocating for land tenure legislation. GR also adopted a different approach to influencing national level officials on the issue of inheritance; choosing informal and off-the-record meetings to keep the conversation going, rather than risking a complete reversal of government engagement on the issue.228

In another example, one of Religions for Peace’s program objectives was advancing the goals of Burundi’s TRC through training, advocacy, community sensitization, and participation in the national consultative process on the establishment and monitoring of the TRC. Because the TRC was never established, the community-level training, advocacy, and sensitization activities were not linked to a larger process, creating confusion and even anxiety amongst program participants. “We did not get enough specifics about how the tribunal would work…[so I am concerned that] the TRC will perturb [reconciliation] programs; will force us to relive trauma without benefit.”229 Community members interviewed on collines (predominantly Hutu) and in IDP camps (predominantly Tutsi) expressed the same fears: that the justice component of the TRC might destroy the harmony they have jointly built.230 This challenge was exacerbated by the advent of the 2010 electoral process, which also delayed program activities because target beneficiaries were busy with election related issues. To respond to this situation, Religions for Peace requested a no-cost extension and redirected funds towards refresher training, community level sensitization, and the support of local initiatives.231

In general, several of the projects had success in changing behaviors and attitudes at the individual level and community level. In some cases, projects could link program success to national level change or influence. However, these connections to PWL were fewer and less resilient than the evidence of individual and community-level change.

**Success in Establishing Linkages to PWL**

**DEFINING KEY THEMES AND TERMS**

The team will use Mary Anderson and Lara Olson’s definition of PWL as articulated in their seminal work, *Confronting War*. Citing evidence from their “RPP work, Anderson and Olson define PWL as:

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229 Interview with Religions for Peace program beneficiary, Gitega. July 18, 2013. In their final report, the Religions for Peace staff noted “The delay in establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has contributed to the image that the government is incapable of spearheading reconciliation. This has created anxiety among the citizens who are fearful about the future of their country. It is feared that without timely and widely acceptable reforms, the country could again plunge into chaos.” *Overcoming Barriers to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation through Multi-religious Collaboration in Burundi*, Final Project Report. April 2011. Pg. 11.

230 Interview with IDPs and community members in Gitega, July 30, 2013.

Producing “changes at the broad level of society as a whole” through two programmatic goals—(1) stopping violence and destructive conflict and (2) building just and sustainable peace—and that “implicit or explicit in each of these [goals] is a strategy, or an assumption, that achieving [nearer term goals] is connected to the achievement of the PWL goals.”

Furthering the work of her CDA colleagues, Chloe Berwind-Dart, examines these presumed linkages between what she terms “peace writ little” and PWL. Berwind-Dart defines peace writ little (hereafter referred to as PWS) as:

“…conceived as a local or community level of sustainable peace…this concept emphasizes a limited scope of impact—in the sense that changes are constrained geographically. In order to influence Peace Writ Large, such local efforts would need to create effect at a higher level (sub-national, national).”

CMM GUIDANCE ON LINKING TO PWL

CMM's P2P Program Guide carefully cautions, “It is not realistic to expect USAID or its implementing partners to achieve the delivery of peace-writ-large from a singular peacebuilding program, let alone on a timeframe nicely aligned with fiscal cycles. The goal in most cases must be an incremental step on the path to larger impact. Indeed, P2P secures only one of the essential components of peacebuilding while contributing to other essential components.”

However, the guide also explains that “many programs together and overtime may add up to peace-writ-large, or widespread, deep, lasting, and positive peace which is more than the simple absence of violence.” and requires APS implementers to articulate a program hypothesis or ToC that is “logical and strategic, linking the goal of peace writ-small to the vision of peace writ-large.” As implicitly, and in some cases explicitly, stated in the guidance is the belief that P2P programs can and should link to PWL and that a critical mass of P2P programs can “add up” and attain PWL.

Testing this assumption, CDA undertook 16 case studies, including a case study in Burundi, through its “Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Peace Efforts” project. Interestingly, the project has found that,

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235 Ibid. Pg. 7.
236 As aforementioned, the APS did not require implementers to explicitly state their ToC until 2009, which affected only one APS project which submitted a proposal after 2009, although projects did articulate their program hypothesis. The terms are thus used interchangeably.
237 Ibid. Pg. 10.
“...although many people do, indeed, work at many levels, conducting good programs at each level, these programs do not automatically ‘add up’ to peace! ...Often, programs that had powerful impacts on participants’ attitudes and relationships did not lead to activity or changes that affect a broader constituency of people, and programs working at the elite or grassroots levels were often not linked. Good programs had impact on the local situation, only to see this undermined by national or regional developments.”238

Evidence suggests that USAID/Burundi APS programs have followed a similar pattern; however, the evaluators noted a few key characteristics that allow for cautious optimism. While it is true that all but a few of the programs failed to link activities at the grassroots and top political levels, there is evidence that changes in participants’ attitudes, behavior, and relationships influenced changes in the attitudes and behaviors of non-participants, particularly at community level, and also at the provincial and, in a few cases, the national level.

EVIDENCE FROM BURUNDI APS PROJECTS

Did program design consider linking PWS and PWL?

While a majority of project design documents described their activities as contributing to a larger, national level peace and reconciliation process, only two of the 11 projects, Religions for Peace and SFCG’s Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation, described a clear ToC for linking activities and outcomes at the local level to the provincial or national levels.

Although six other projects referenced activities and outcomes at higher levels, the linkage between local, provincial, and/or national activities was either unstated or poorly described. For example, projects such as CARE/MIPAREC’s “Sasagaza Amahoro” or SFCG’s “Supporting Reconciliation in Burundi” appear to have assumed a “scaling up” effect—the belief that by mobilizing a critical mass of supporters at the grassroots level, one will influence changes in attitudes, behavior, and even legislation at the provincial and national level. In the case of BLTP, while the project provided a clear mechanism for scaling up the activities in pilot schools through adaptation in the national curriculum, the project’s ToC did not explain how it would influence the attitudes and behaviors of MOE non-participants in the short-term and only vaguely demonstrated its linkage to PWL in the long-term by encouraging a change in mindset of Burundi’s future leaders.

Two of the APS programs operated on a highly localized level and therefore did not attempt to link their activities to a more macro level. IRC/OAP’s “SCOPE” project focused solely on implementing activities in Bujumbura Rural,239 while THARS worked with individual communities to “heal the wounds of trauma, strengthen community bonds and organize community leaders to prevent recurrence of violence on a local scale.”240 However, it should be noted that THARS purposefully selected

238 CDA, Reflecting on Peace Practice Program. “Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Peace Efforts.” Pg. 2.

239 This focus was driven by findings of IRC’s conflict assessment which identified Bujumbura Rural as seriously at risk of election related violence, as well as OAR’s ability to access key stakeholder groups given their previous work in the area.

240 THARS project proposal to USAID, February 2008.
communities in what it called “conflict corridors” in order to have the “greatest impact” but the sequence or mechanisms for doing so were not further fleshed out in the documents reviewed by the team.\textsuperscript{241}

Two projects did clearly articulate how their activities at the grassroots would be linked to larger provincial and national level impact. Religions for Peace’s design documents clearly articulated how the project would “encourage religious communities to align themselves around common issues such as peacebuilding and reconciliation so that they can harness their collective assets, leading to broader and deeper impact.”\textsuperscript{242} These documents also explained that “the activities implemented under this project will play an important role in linking the engagement of national religious leaders in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and other national advocacy efforts with the local peace and reconciliation efforts of the communities in the target province.”\textsuperscript{243} Likewise, SFCG’s Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation (2008-2010) design documents clearly describe how their “national-level strategy is linked with community-level activities in order to bridge specific conflicts between refugees and returnees. Through a multi-pronged approach, using radio programming and community outreach through exchanges, training and participatory theatre, the project aimed to effect change at both the local and national level.”\textsuperscript{244}

Overall, the designs for the vast majority of Burundi APS projects (9 of 11) did not provide clear and strong linkages between activities at the grassroots and larger provincial or national level impact. However, as explained in the following section, subsequent interviews with APS implementers and beneficiaries revealed that while perhaps not clearly or fully stated in their design documents or program hypotheses, many of these projects did in fact include mechanisms or activities that have resulted in (or at least have the potential to result in), higher level impact.

**Is there evidence that APS-funded organizations/projects have contributed to broad-scale changes in the conflict context or the attitudes and/or behaviors of non-participants?**

There was evidence of APS programs contributing to PWL in two important ways: (1) supporting local peace structures and (2) influencing national legislation.

**Supporting Local Peace Structures**

Activities focusing on the establishment of local peace structures were found in 4 of 11 projects.\textsuperscript{245} These activities took two forms: (1) strengthening the working relationship between the Bashingantahe

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{243} Ibid. Pg. 3.

\textsuperscript{244} Search for Common Ground, “Promoting Locally-Driven Conflict Transformation in Burundi,” January 2011. Pg. 3.

\textsuperscript{245} Including projects implemented by CARE/MIPAREC, IRC/OAP, THARS, and SFCG.
and locally-elected representatives and (2) the establishment of local “Comités de Paix” (Peace Committees) or “ Clubs de Paix” (Peace Clubs)\(^{246}\) (hereafter jointly called “Peace Committees”).

**Strengthening Existing Structures: Reconciling the Bashingantahe and Locally-elected Representatives**

Interviews with implementer staff, project beneficiaries, and community observers in Bujumbura Rurale, Gitega, Bururi, and Makamba provinces consistently revealed that there has been considerable tension, and in some cases direct conflict, between two key local conflict resolution institutions, the Bashingantahe and the locally-elected representatives, since the 2005 elections.\(^{247}\) The discord between the two groups has had significant implications for community-level conflict resolution as community members have had little confidence in the representativeness of either group or the legitimacy of their decisions.

While other projects worked on improving the relationship between the two groups more indirectly, the Sasagaza Amahoro project appears to have done so most clearly and successfully as evidence by the following accounts:

- In Gitega province, implementer staff, project beneficiaries, non-participant community members, and civil society representatives all credited the project as having significantly contributed to the improved working relationship between the Bashingantahe and locally-elected representatives. Two particularly striking accounts include:

  “With the project, we [the bashingantahe] now work with elected leaders without the ‘stick.’ Instead we agree together on how to approach problem. If we cannot solve it, we refer it to the head of the colline and he calls both elected leaders and Bashingantahe to help him decide how to deal with the case or problem.” ~ CARE/MIPAREC focus group participant.

  “For me, the clearest indicator of [Sasagaza Amahoro’s] impact is that I now see fewer people walking through my door to ask us to help resolve their conflicts [as the

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\(^{246}\) While the name alternated between communities, the Peace Committee or Peace Club served the same basic functions in all examples reviewed by the evaluation team.

\(^{247}\) While too nuanced to fully explain here, the root of this conflict is highly politicized and has larger implications. The evaluators heard during several interviews, corroborated by further research, that when the CNDD-FDD came to power, they set out to discredit the institution of the Bashingantahe, claiming—often correctly—that while it used to be an important part of Burundian communities, it had been co-opted during previous administrations by the single political party, UPRONA, to further the interests of the most powerful and to extend the power of the central state to the colline level. Indeed, the system was changed and Bashingantahe were no longer necessarily chosen by their communities and groomed for service but they could be appointed by the government. So to counter what they perceived as a corrupt institution, the CNDD-FDD tried to discredit the institution, putting forward locally-elected officials as the legitimate conflict resolvers in communities. Because they were elected, they were meant to be more neutral, respected by the community, etc. However, the institution of the Bashingantahe is too ingrained and instead of being displaced, this strategy simply succeeded in fomenting conflict at the community level. This continues to be an issue in the resolution of major conflicts in Burundi—who has the right to decide? What law or practice will be used to legitimize the decision?
Bashingantahe and locally-elected representatives in their community now work together to help solve these conflicts].” ~ Ligue Iteka (Burundi’s oldest Human Rights NGO) Provincial Representative

- The team also heard in two separate focus groups in Gitega that the Bashingantahe and elected representatives in their communities had actually signed a written agreement outlining the types of conflict that they had agreed they could resolve together and which types of conflict (i.e. those involving rape) they would need to refer to the local police.

More significantly for contributions to PWL, MIPAREC staff pointed to the national structure of the Bashingantahe as a key factor in helping to disseminate and replicate the success of their project to other provinces. The project’s quarterly reporting—wherein project reporting was passed from the communal to the provincial to the national level—raised awareness of the successful efforts in Gitega and resulted in Bashingantahe from different provinces sending representatives to witness the improved working relationships and bring back examples to replicate in their home provinces. By tapping into the pre-existing and organized structure of the Bashingantahe Council, the Sasagaza Amahoro project demonstrated an explicit and clear linkage between PWS efforts contributing to PWL.

**Building New Structures: Establishing Peace Committees**

An equally significant and more widespread activity across four Burundi APS implementers (CARE/MIPAREC, IRC/OAP, THARS, and SFCG) was the establishment of local Peace Committees. There was repeated evidence from Gitega, Bururi, Bujumbura Rurale, and Makamba provinces that many of the Peace Committees established during the lifetime of these projects continue to operate today and “act as referees,” with most meeting once a month (although some meeting weekly or bi-weekly) for a general assembly, complemented by ad hoc meetings as different community conflicts emerge. Some of these Peace Committees also serve as important entry points for other programs and implementers, such as the new CARE programs “PAMOJA” and “Nawe Nuze.” In Gitega province, the Peace Committees established under the CARE/MIPAREC project have even organized into a formal federation. Interviews provided the following evidence of their direct effect on community conflicts:

> “Something has changed today in our community, something very significant. People understand that misbehavior in the past was caused by bad leadership…the Hutu/Tutsi concept was manipulated…now we see people working together side-by-side for the development of our community.”
> ~CARE/MIPAREC Focus Group Participants, Gitega Province

> “I taught others on my colline after the training. Someone on our hill was jailed so with others, we decided to visit the victims to see if we could find another [non-punitive] solution. We all agreed that the person should be freed so we negotiated with the judiciary to let him go. He now lives peacefully among us. We attend each other’s ceremonies.”
> ~CARE/MIPAREC Focus Group Participants, Gitega Province

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248 Gitega focus group participant.

249 According to interviews with APS implementers and beneficiaries, the vast majority of Peace Committees established during their projects continue to operate and most reported that the number of Peace Committees has actually proliferated since the projects ended as neighboring communities are replicating them after seeing
Interviewees in Gitega province (both IPs and beneficiaries) attributed the disbandment of IDP camps in Tankoma and Matshitsi to the work of the Peace Committees, as they helped to mediate between and reconcile residents and returnees. The Peace Committees:

- Encouraged community members to attend conflict resolution training, leading to a change in community attitudes and a transference of skills taught, according to interviews (see textbox previous page);
- Encouraged and accompanied visits between residents and IDPs in the IDP camps;
- Worked with residents (predominantly Hutu) to rebuild houses destroyed during the 1993 conflict for the IDPs (predominantly Tutsi) to encourage their return;250 and
- Once returned, returnee representatives were encouraged to join the Peace Committees and help mediate future conflicts.

At least four commune leaders (three in Gitega province and one in Makamba province) were elected to positions in their local councils as a result of their experience serving on Peace Committees. These leaders ran on a peace and reconciliation platform, which distinguished them from the other candidates running on traditional, purely political platforms.

In Bururi province, Peace Committee members from SF CG’s and THARS’ projects served as mediators in land disputes between returnees and residents.251 Disputing parties were asked to present each of their cases to the Peace Committees who would then mediate a solution that was acceptable to both sides. Once in agreement, each party would sign a form provided by the CNTB and the Peace Committee members would sign off as witnesses. This form then served as official documentation of their resolution. Beneficiaries explained how this more informal process meant that although neither side might be completely satisfied with the end result, each felt that it was more balanced than a formal court verdict where there is a clear winner and clear loser. In their view, this kind of solution prevented future conflict as well because the dispute was resolved amicably. Beneficiaries explained that the CNTB, the formal adjudication body for land disputes, was generally perceived as biased (favoring returnees) in their communities and that Peace Committees represented a less biased mix of their peers.

"With this project, we were able to collect lots of “fruits,” i.e. an ex-combatant was elected head of colline. Now when there are arrests in the area and they inform us immediate and we are able to help many of them. Today ex-combatants are working together on profit-generating activity —animal husbandry, brick making— the problem is paying back the loans but this is due to poverty but now we have sensitized the need to pay back.”

~ OAP Implementers

their success in mediating community conflict. However, one notable exception appears to be with the THARS project in Bujumbura Rurale where only two of six Peace Committees continue to operate.

250 Community members would build the external structures of these houses by locally made clay bricks and add corrugated steel roofs and wooden door provided by the local/regional government.

251 THARS beneficiaries interviewed claimed that as many as 32 Peace Committees had been established in their province.
In Bujumbura Rurale, workshops and trainings provided by local Peace Committees played a critical role in improving the relationships between former combatants and political rivals from the CNDD-FDD and FNL. SCOPE beneficiaries explained that Peace Committees helped these former combatants understand that “they themselves were accountable for maintaining peace.” They explained that skills taught in the workshops “immediately reinforced the skills of leaders of at-risk groups who can play a critical role as community leaders, encouraging their peers to integrate into the community…Peace Committees also conducted awareness-raising activities that addressed the entire community, including at-risk groups, using the occasion to disseminate messages on the importance of social cohesions and of participation in community development…[lastly] the establishment of Peace Committees made a large contribution to SCOPE’s sustainability—and this, in fact was the reason why they were created.” According to OAP interviewees, the seven Peace Committees established under SCOPE provided over 53 “sensitization sessions” with 4,497 participants in the last six months of the program, and, most importantly, all seven Peace Committees continue to be active today.

Lastly, in Rumonge in Bururi province, the evaluators heard about an interesting variation on the Peace Committee model in the form of a participatory theatre troupe known as Playback Theatre. The team heard how these groups would visit neighboring communities where land conflicts were known to be intense. The groups would then spend one to two days researching the conflicts by interviewing the parties in conflict and other community members and would design a skit re-enacting the conflict. They would then act out the conflict but stop at key points to ask the audience how to proceed and explain alternate approaches that might lead to a more peaceful resolution. Interviewees explained that although the names of those represented in these skits would be altered, those in the audience usually knew exactly which conflict the skit would reference, given that conflict’s disruptive presence in the community.

Interviewees explained that these participatory theatre performances directly resulted in resolving 12 individual land conflicts with the conflicting parties agreeing to resolve their conflict in the presence of the community immediately after seeing their conflict re-enacted. Although the team was unable to independently verify the veracity of these statements, SFCG’s own final evaluation corroborates this account.

How to Encourage Political Buy-In

“If you want to work with people at the higher level, you need to advocate, negotiate regularly, and visit regular because they are too proud. But go and show them the evidence of your project working, then you can discuss.”

~ Burundi APS Implementer (OAP)

253 Given their limited time in-country, the evaluation team was only able to meet with three but did hear from these groups that the remaining groups were still active.
Influencing National Legislation on Land

GR’s strategy was focused on influencing national level legislation. It purposefully moved away from trying to resolve land conflict issues on a case-by-case basis and instead worked with national level policy makers and civil society to better monitor and resolve land conflict and transitional justice issues. GR became a sitting member of the inter-ministerial committee on national land policy, working with local CSOs to advocate on land tenure issues and helped shape new national land policy. Equally, if not more, significant, GR created a “land transaction tool” approved and accepted by governmental and territorial authorities as “the sole, mandatory tool for land purchases and sales in rural communities.”255 The tool provided a rapid and cost-efficient way for rural residents to officially measure and register their lands compared to getting a much more expensive and time-intensive deed. Although ultimately formalized after the close of the APS-funded project, the tool would not have come to fruition but for the work completed by GR during the life of its APS project.

The project also made significant strides in increasing the professionalization of local journalists and enhancing their ability to cover land conflict issues in Bururi, Makamba, Cankuzo, Rutana, and Muyinga provinces, helping to raise public awareness and augment the profile of land tenure issues in the national political debate. Lastly, responding to apparent governmental backtracking on previous commitments on women inheritance rights, GR quickly mobilized meetings, radio programs, a thematic workshop, and a national press conference to press the government to honor previous commitments. The government subsequently responded and dropped its proposed “pre-consultation” prerequisite, viewed by many observers as a ploy to delay further legislative action on this sensitive issue, and reasserted its commitment to pass an inheritance reform process. While this is a good example of adaptive implementation and flexibility in programming, it should be noted that such legislation has not yet been passed.

Similarly, though more limited in its success, Interpeace/CENAP’s “Burundi Peacebuilding Programme” was designed based on a Participatory Action Research approach to “reduce the vertical distance between [national] leaders and those at the grassroots.”256 During the first of three phases, the project held 78 focus groups with a representative sample of over 2,200 participants. Findings from these focus groups were then presented to a “National Group” made up of 200 people “representing the full diversity of Burundian society” who were asked to identify four priority issues and peacebuilding challenges (the group ended up choosing disarmament of civilians, poverty and unemployment, elections, and transitional justice).257 The program then moved into its second phase where it engaged in “broad based dialogue” and the design of “consensus solutions” through additional dialogue meetings in locations throughout the country, as well as research by four “Reflection Groups” comprised of experts in the four priority areas identified under Phase 1. During Phase II, the project held an additional 45 dialogue meetings including 1,077 people with the goal finding “solutions that were operational, adapted


256 Interview with CENAP staff.

257 “Interpeace-CENAP Burundi Peacebuilding Programme: Final Evaluation.” Pg. 5.
to the Burundian context, and acceptable by the majority of the people.”

According to CENAP interviewees and project documents, two important policy recommendations were followed during Phase III of the program. The project’s prioritized recommendation of a grace period for voluntary disarmament was endorsed by both the First Vice President of the Republic and the Vice President of the Commission of Disarmament and used by both parties to push for an official law granting this grace period. The project also worked to facilitate meetings between the ruling CNDD-FDD party and opposition ACD Ikibiri coalition after the disputed 2010 elections, ultimately resulting in the new law on the status of the opposition.

Factors Limiting Contributions to PWL

**Disruptive Power of Politics and Susceptibility to Political Manipulation**

A common thread throughout all the interviews—with beneficiaries, implementers, donors, and non-APS observers alike—was the disruptive force that politics plays in the reconciliation process in Burundi. There was a marked unease when interviewees were asked how the upcoming 2015 elections would impact any progress made to date (see textbox), with many citing the violence surrounding previous elections. APS and non-APS implementers (ACCORD and Ikibiri Coalition) described the disruptive influence of the 2010 elections, with some implementers having to delay implementation and others seeing tangible backsliding in the progress they fought so hard to achieve. Likewise, Peace Committee members expressed concern that community members might not be able to resist the monetary inducements offered by politicians to join local “youth wings” or otherwise engage in more destructive political behavior, including overt intimidation such as threats to physical safety or destruction of property. The majority of those interviewed lamented the ease with which self-serving political interest could uproot the progress and hard-won reconciliation gains at the grassroots level; a process unfortunately common in

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**Political Manipulation**

“When you mentioned the word ‘politics’—did you see my hair? My hair became like that of a lion. The main problems in Burundi are poverty and ‘mind poverty’—if [politicians] want to give us power, they will empower us. If they want to take power, they will minimize us. The people will follow those who have something to give.”

~ SFCG Beneficiary, Rumonge, Bururi Province

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**Supporting Evidence from Secondary Data**

“Burundian national politics are characterized by sharp competition among a few political parties associated with various elite groups. These struggles for power are, by and large, divorced from local level considerations...in the past, national level politics have proven quite influential on local level dynamics, as politicians have manipulated local people to attack people of different ethnic groups...While the work is effective at reducing violence and discontent at the local level, this appears to have very little influence at higher levels.”

~ CDA, “Understanding the Cumulative Impacts,” Burundi Case-Study

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258 Ibid.

259 Ibid. Pg. 6.

260 However, while the law has been passed, it should be noted that certain articles of that law (Articles 79 and 81) are being contested by the opposition political parties gathered in the ADC Ikibiri.
Both interviewees and APS documents also highlighted the ease with which rumors proliferate in Burundi, fueling anxiety and distrust, and causing what might be benign coincidence to spiral into potential frenzy and panic. One salient example from interviews was the lack of information surrounding the whereabouts and activities of representatives from three main opposition parties who boycotted the 2010 elections and fled Burundi. The mere lack of information on their activities outside the country’s borders has been enough for many to conclude that they are plotting a new rebellion.

Lack of Well-Defined DG Strategy focused on PWL

Another significant factor limiting the “scaling up” of small APS investments into tangible contributions to PWL is the haphazard nature of APS programming in Burundi. Burundi is defined as a “non-presence” country for USAID, with the Mission reduced to a few key positions co-located at the US Embassy. Traditionally, the Mission’s Democracy and Governance (DG) portfolio has consisted almost entirely of the APS projects and a few other election-related activities, despite clear CMM guidance that APS programming should complement, not constitute, a Mission’s broader DG strategy. As a direct consequence of limited DG funding, the Mission’s DG strategy is limited in both its ambition and reach, and as a result, APS programming in Burundi has had few opportunities to leverage or compliment current programming supported by USG funding. This, in part, helps explain the short timelines and rather isolated nature of APS programming in Burundi and demonstrates an inability to program towards the key intermediate results leading to higher level strategic DG objectives—and PWL in Burundi.

Lack of Resources for Capturing, Analyzing, and Reporting Results

Another obvious constraint for linking successes (and failures) in APS programming and contributions to PWL is the lack of documentations from both APS implementers and the USAID Mission capturing, tracking, or reporting on higher level outcomes and impacts. Although the majority of Burundi APS implementers have done an adequate job of tracking gender-disaggregated output indicators, as mandated in their grant agreements, few, with the exception of IRC, SFCG and CENAP, have documentation tracking higher level outcomes. None of the APS projects established any rigorous baselines, though it should be noted that IRC recognized this and established a midline during its own internal midterm evaluation. Likewise, evidence suggests that the USAID Mission has also not been tracking higher level outcome or portfolio level indicators for its APS projects. Once again, a valid explanation for this is the lack of financial resources—APS funding is strictly dedicated to programming and the Mission itself is expected to cover the costs of administering the grants, including the costs associated with M&E. Given the Mission’s limited DG budget, no form of rigorous M&E system has been established.

Lack of Wider Dissemination of Successes

A final limitation was one articulated by several APS beneficiaries themselves—the lack of systematic dissemination of individual project successes. Although SFCG’s theatre troupes traveled across Burundi and even to neighboring countries, and SFCG focused on disseminating its message through community radio, few projects were able to inspire other organizations or institutions to follow their lead. Interviewees from Sasagaza Amahoro recounted how neighboring Bashinganathe had been brought to Gitega on one or two occasions to witness the newly strengthened relationships between the local
Bashinganathe and elected representative but wished that additional efforts to share these successes had taken place. Likewise, donors, implementers, and beneficiaries lamented that few people in the capital Bujumbura were aware of the strides towards reconciliation in rural communities. The evaluators were told that this was a major reason for the pessimistic, and quite inaccurate, perception in the capital that Burundi was not yet “ripe” for reconciliation.

Overarching Conclusions

Appropriateness and Relevance of P2P Approach to the Burundi Context

- **P2P interventions are appropriate, relevant, and necessary in Burundi.** There was a clear, logical, and plausible connection between the contributions of P2P programming and the goal of affecting reconciliation at different levels in society. Bringing groups together was seen as a critical and necessary element to move reconciliation forward. The physical proximity and intermixed nature of different ethnic, religious, and political groups—along with their shared, interrelated cultural similarities—binds communities together in a way that guarantees different groups must necessarily interact and participate in a shared future.

- **P2P approaches offer significant and unique programming advantages.** P2P approaches are well placed to identify, strengthen, and bolster existing informal and formal local approaches for conflict mitigation. These approaches contributed to improving trust between communities and in governance structures and built a foundation for peaceful interaction and cooperation amongst previously conflicting groups. P2P and personal interaction accessed and laid the groundwork for deeper, more meaningful reconciliation in a way that some governmental programs were not able to reach or foster. Yet, P2P engagement and programming alone is not sufficient to maximally affect future reconciliation and peace—a combination of approaches has added value.

- **The P2P approach is necessary but not sufficient to sustain reconciliation or achieve PWL and there can be some considerable programming disadvantages when over-relying on this approach.** P2P projects in Burundi contributed strongly to reconciliation. At the same time, several interviewees expressed reservations about how P2P directly affects national level change. The focus on P2P in some cases could have detracted from efforts to implement a combination of approaches, structured to more comprehensively work together for augmented impact. In addition, in resource-constrained environments, reconciliation gains made by P2P projects can be undermined by perverse economic incentives and political manipulation.

- **P2P approaches have contributed to building capacity of local informal and formal structures to support them in responding and adapting to salient and changing contextual factors.** P2P programming contributed to building the skills sets of community structures, increasing their access to tools to address and solve conflicts in their local societies. Imparting these skills and strengthening existing skills within these bodies supports sustainable approaches that can adapt and respond to contextual changes as they evolve.

Effectiveness in Producing Attitudinal and Behavioral Change

- **Explicit links to other programming,** particularly if there are links between individual, community, and institutional change (even if a link to national level change does not exist) is critical to effective programs. These links contribute to sustainability in attitudinal and behavioral change, as well as to PWL.
• **Sustainable change is linked to programming that explicitly builds in ownership** of reconciliation processes; for example, empowering local community members to establish peace committees or in the case of the MOE, taking the next step in integrating conflict resolution into the national civics curriculum or getting government buy-in for the establishment of the TRC.

• **Advocacy and policy work**, particularly in Burundi during the period in which the projects being evaluated were active, was subject to a large and often powerful number of influences, requiring greater donor commitment over time. At the same time, evidence shows that this advocacy work is a necessary part of the other reconciliation efforts. Without it, implementers cannot guarantee sustained change even at community level.

### Success in Establishing Linkages to PWL

• **Overall, real strides have been made in reconciling individuals and groups at the community level, particularly in rural areas.** This cannot be exclusively attributed to the Burundi APS projects, as it is a result of a confluence of factors. However, there was substantial evidence that APS projects have made a real, mostly localized, contribution to peace. In order to further the reconciliation process, more effort needs to be made to work with, and restrain the disruptive potential of, national level politicians.

• **APS Burundi projects have achieved some qualified and significant successes** in changing attitudes, behavior, and legislation at the provincial and national levels, although these are fewer and less resilient than at the participant and community levels.

• **While the vast majority of Burundi APS projects did not adequately describe or explain the linkages between their activities and linkages to PWL, all have mechanisms that would allow for higher-level impact.** The most enduring of these mechanisms is the support of existing or establishment of new local peace structures.

• **APS activities focused at the grassroots enjoyed greater success in achieving attitudinal and behavioral change in those not directly involved in the program** than those working on national level issues; however, their contributions to PWL are less immediate than those working at the national level. Also, although some APS projects have realized changes in attitudes and behavior, there is widespread concern that these changes are not resilient enough to resist negative political manipulation.

• **Greater strategic cohesion in the selection of Burundi APS projects could have increased overall effectiveness.** Only two of 11 APS implementers were repeat grantees, there were few cross-program linkages or synergies between APS projects, and no project appears to have been selected based on its previous success.

### Recommendations

### Prioritized General Recommendations

1. **USAID peacebuilding initiatives should look to integrate P2P programming at community level with both national and institutional level change initiatives.** The combination of these programming approaches will provide mutually reinforcing synergies, more effectively enhancing the change that each individual approach could hope to sustainably affect. The combination of these types of programs can ensure that learning at the grassroots level informs national policy and that national policy has the buy-in and engagement of local communities. Together these types of approaches will likely improve the success of P2P engagement and increase APS programming contribution to PWL. However, USAID should remain cautious of any single
implementer claiming to be capable of doing both successfully single-handedly. Instead, USAID should encourage APS partners with demonstrated successful programming at each level to partner and explicitly state how they expect to link and build on each other’s activities to leverage changes in PWL.

2. **USAID should encourage and award complementary programs.** acknowledging that one program cannot address conflict drivers at all levels. Often, when programming happens at only one level it can be incomplete, less effective, and in some cases exacerbate problems. For example, in Burundi, USAID might consider this integrated approach in relation to programming which addresses land conflict or the TRC.

3. **USAID should support APS partners to increase their capacity to more systematically identify, track, measure, and most importantly disseminate information about their project activities.** This could include requiring APS implementers to document their experience (through sound M&E) and provide a dissemination plan of project results in their original project proposal. Significant follow-on benefit can be achieved from disseminating information on successful APS programs, grounded in sound evidence-based M&E data, as well as providing case studies where APS programming may not have achieved the expected level of success due to common contextual constraints.

4. **USAID evaluation policy states that a percentage of program budgets should be dedicated to M&E.** CMM should consider devoting more effort to improving M&E systems in APS projects to help better document successes, improve the learning cycle, and ensure the establishment of baselines and endlines. CMM should also consider hosting “learning events” to explain the utility of sound M&E for IPs’ own programmatic benefit in order to encourage partners to bring some of their own resources to track and successfully report on their achievements.

5. **The timeframe for APS projects should be expanded to at least three to five years.** While this may require more resources for a given award, reconciliation is a long-term process and to the extent possible project timelines need to reflect this reality.

**Burundi-Specific Recommendations**

1. **The US Embassy should continue to capitalize on its convening authority and encourage donor coordination and follow-on funding for APS programs that have already demonstrated success.** Given its limited allocation of DG funds, the Embassy should seek complementary, outside funding to sustain advances already made.

2. **The US Embassy should consider hosting a public conference or “evidence summit” highlighting achievements of its APS programs, backed by sound data, in order to encourage partners to support these or similar efforts.**

3. **The US Embassy should consider re-engaging with local partners that have demonstrated success in implementing previous APS programs.** Several local APS partners manifested a strong and sophisticated understanding of local conflict dynamics and how to address them. Coupled with their increasingly robust organizational capacities, these partners have the potential to effectively contribute to the design and development of the next APS and to lead the implementation of future programs. The US Embassy should consider encouraging these organizations to collaborate and/or partner on these future programs to ensure national coverage of any program activities.
4. **Future APS funding should support, enhance, and/or further explore the opportunities to implement strategies that showed success.** For example: Strengthen collaboration between Bashingantahe and locally-elected representatives nationally; support local peace committee structures in communities; actively encourage CSO advocacy efforts on key national legislation such as land tenure and inheritance rights; work to strengthen ongoing community land conflict resolution processes by reinforcing the capacity of the CNTB; and promote collaboration between the CNTB (and other national institutions) and locally-led conflict resolution activities.

5. **Future APS funding should support strategies that would address identified gaps in current programming: projects should work to engage political leadership at all levels of government administration from the colline to the national level.** Consider coupling income generating activities and life skills; working with national level structures that have the most potential to negatively affect community level resiliencies of P2P work; supporting dialogue between political party leaders; and more broadly engaging the youth wings of political parties in conflict resolution and dialogue processes.
Words used by USAID/Burundi APS implementers and beneficiaries to define “reconciliation.” For additional quotes, see “Annex H. Select Definitions of Reconciliation.”
Annexes

Annex A: Scope of Work

BACKGROUND:

USAID/CMM Office

The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) leads USAID’s efforts to identify, analyze, and address the sources of conflict, instability, and extremism, and to ensure development programs are sensitive to these same dynamics. CMM maintains an active Technical Leadership portfolio to advance analysis and research on the topics of conflict and development. CMM seeks to distill practical lessons from scholarship, evaluation, and experience to improve the quality of development programming and policymaking.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of the contract is to advance USAID’s technical leadership and learning with respect to conflict mitigation, reconciliation, and People-to-People peacebuilding programs through analysis and evaluation of targeted awards and activities under the Reconciliation Programs Fund.

The SI Team’s work is divided into three phases, which are not necessarily implemented in succession but rather with learning and action reflection steps integrated throughout. Specifically, the Burundi evaluation will be part of Phase II.

**Phase II:** Field Evaluation of Selected APS Programs. SI will conduct three field-based performance evaluations of the APS program in Israel/West Bank/Gaza; Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Burundi. The evaluations are intended to advance CMM and Agency learning with regards to the design of its APS and its adaptability to changing local environments; the content of its technical publications; and ways to further develop its conflict mitigation and management technical assistance to Missions.

The primary purpose for the evaluations in Phase II is to advance CMM and Agency learning. CMM desires evaluation reports with information to help the office improve (a) the design of its APS, (b) the content of its technical publications, and (c) the quality of its technical assistance to Missions. There is no pre-determined method of data collection or analysis, and CMM expects to consult with the evaluator and LG to select an appropriate methodology. It is likely the evaluators will be asked to incorporate at least some elements of a developmental evaluation into their approach. The final report should conform to the criteria outlined in Appendix I of USAID’s Evaluation Policy.

The primary audience for the evaluation reports will be CMM, but the target audience will also include the cognizant USAID Mission. SI will conduct fieldwork in Israel/West Bank/Gaza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Burundi, interviewing USAID and U.S. Embassy staff, project staff, project beneficiaries/participants, and other representatives of broader target communities.

**Burundi Specific Evaluation Questions**

1. **HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE APS-BURUNDI PROJECTS BEEN IN PRODUCING ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGE?**
   a. Program Design
      i. What was the change that the project hoped to engender?
         - From what to what?
         - At what level—individual, institutional, societal?
      ii. What were the project activities that were to lead to this change?
      iii. Did a conflict analysis inform project design? Was the analysis updated over the life of the project?
   b. Measuring Success in Program Implementation
i. How did project implementers define success?

ii. How did project participants define success?

iii. Did the definition of success change over time? Why?

iv. Did the organization/project identify any changes in its operating environment or the Burundian conflict context over time? If so, how did they identify these changes and in what ways did they adapt their implementation?

c. Cross-Program Comparison

i. Are there any commonalities between and across those organizations/projects:
   - In how they defined success?
   - In how effective organizations/projects defined and targeted “reconciliation” specifically?

ii. Are there any commonalities between those organizations/projects deemed to be most and least effective:
   - In terms of type/level of change sought?
   - In terms of target beneficiaries (Track I, II, or III level participants)?
   - In terms of project design, monitoring, and adaptive implementation?
   - In terms of the number, nature, or quality of “touch points”—defined as interactions between opposing parties to the conflict or project stakeholders from opposite sides of the conflict?

II. WHAT ARE THE LINKS, IF ANY, BETWEEN APS BURUNDI PROJECTS AND “PEACE WRIT LARGE”?

i. Did program design take into consideration the concept of ‘Peace writ Large’? How was the concept defined?

ii. Is there evidence that APS-funded organizations/projects have contributed to broad-scale changes in the conflict context or to attitudinal and/or behavior change in non-participants and/or institutions?

iii. Is there any evidence that APS-funded organizations/projects either complemented or detracted from other peacebuilding initiatives? Is there any evidence of unanticipated consequences

iv. How were any contributions to “Peace writ Large” identified by the specific project teams? How were they reported on?

v. Is there any disagreement between APS implementers, beneficiaries, managers (USAID staff), or other donors in the nature and quality of these contributions to “Peace writ Large”?

III. WAS A PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE APPROACH RELEVANT FOR THE BURUNDI CONTEXT?

i. Do people-to-people efforts appear to have been the appropriate responses to the conflicts they were intended to address?

ii. Did a people-to-people approach offer any significant advantages/disadvantages to other potential approaches identified by APS implementers, beneficiaries, managers (USAID staff), or other donors?

iii. Did a people-to-people approach offer sufficient flexibility to adapt to changes in salient contextual factors identified over time?
Annex B: Methodology and Work Plan

EVALUATION BACKGROUND

Beginning in the fall of 2011, Social Impact, Inc. (SI) began a two-year Evaluative Learning Review of the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation’s (CMM) small grant competition known as the “Annual Program Statement” (APS). In accordance with a Congressional appropriation, the APS is intended to provide support to local-level grassroots organizations implementing people-to-people (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs. As defined in CMM’s People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, P2P reconciliation programs operate based on the Theory of Change that in “...communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities...[building or rebuilding] strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence.” Thus, by creating a safe space where representatives from conflicting groups can interact, prejudices and perceived differences of “others” can be confronted, challenged, and hopefully ultimately replaced by “mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.”

Since 2004, CMM’s APS fund has grown from $8 million to $26 million annually, with $10 million reserved for Middle East programming and $16 million for global programs, supporting over 135 peace-building projects in 35 countries. Although CMM manages the overall APS, responsibility for the award and immediate oversight of the funded projects rests with USAID Missions abroad.

The objectives of this review are not only to learn about the APS programs themselves but also to build CMM’s technical leadership in evaluation of complex programs through a pilot application of the “developmental evaluation” methodology. The review is divided into three general phases:

Phase I: Knowledge Management and Study of the documentation associated with the Reconciliation APS.
Phase II: Three Field Evaluation of Selected APS Programs to provide a more in-depth understanding of key design and implementation issues.
Phase III: Reflective Learning, led by a pre-identified and respected group of peace and conflict scholars, focusing on structured learning on emerging lessons from the evaluation activity itself and current work in progress to deepen office learning and create institutional knowledge on the evaluation of peace programs.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

This field evaluation of the APS projects in Burundi is part of Phase II of our larger learning review. It is the third and final in the series of three field evaluations—the first took place in Israel/West Bank/Gaza in September 2012 and the second in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2012. The primary purpose for these field evaluations is to advance CMM and broader Agency learning about how to effectively design, implement, and manage APS-type projects in future. They are intended to analyze how program designs and implementation respond to significant contextual factors and conflict drivers in order to inform more responsive and relevant grant making in the future. The primary audience for this evaluation report is CMM, but the target audience also includes USAID/Burundi.

CMM APS managers seek to enhance the impact, relevance, and responsiveness of future conflict mitigation grant making through a developmental inquiry into:

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262 Ibid, p. 6.
1. The effectiveness of P2P peacebuilding initiatives in Burundi defined as producing changes in attitudes and behavior of participants and their community members;

2. Whether and how APS-funded projects might be contributing to broad scale and sustainable peace (“Peace writ Large”); and

3. If P2P efforts appear to have been relevant and appropriate responses to the conflicts they addressed, including their ability to adapt to conflict dynamics and drivers over time?

Enhancing CMM’s understanding of these three concerns promises to contribute to its overarching goal of more effective knowledge management and dissemination in the field of conflict management and mitigation. More specifically, an evaluation of the eleven projects undertaken in Burundi will inform CMM’s understanding of whether or not P2P efforts appear to be appropriate responses to the conflict dynamics they purport to address.

PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

Building from the Developmental Evaluation approach of the overall learning review, SI and CMM intends to modify its field evaluation approach to better identify and assess how reconciliation actually ‘happens’ at the individual level and the contributions of grassroots-level peacebuilders to macro-level reconciliation (“Peace writ Large”). We propose a slightly staggered and iterative approach to allow the team to undertake multiple layers of analysis, better identify changes in the country and conflict context, follow up on findings of interest from the first field trip, provide an opportunity to discuss preliminary findings and alter our data collection approach as needed, and provide a larger timeframe to meet with relevant stakeholders when they are available as well as allow for follow-up interviews.

Specifically, our Burundi team will undertake the evaluation in two, overlapping phases:

- **Phase I—July 10-27**: The Team Leader will travel to Burundi for 2.5 weeks in July 2013. The principal aim of the first five days of Phase I is to orient the Burundian team, map the grant recipients, their projects and their beneficiaries and finalize the evaluation interview instruments, translating them into Kirundi as necessary. This team will conduct initial interviews with a select group of officials from the IPs to test the interview questions. This team will also validate their understanding of the key themes gathered during the desk review process and test their relevance with the IPs. This testing period will take no more than two days. The Team Leader will structure the two evaluation sub-teams, allocating roles and responsibilities to each to ensure that they will be appropriately coordinated and the data collected will be consistent.

- **Phase II—July 15-August 2**: The sub-team Leader, accompanied by the CMM counterpart, will arrive in Bujumbura on July 15. During this phase, the two sub-teams will conduct interviews simultaneously, with one team most likely being responsible for the Bujumbura-based projects and the other for those projects conducted outside of Bujumbura. The teams will spend the first week in the field, reconvening on July 20 to share data and learning, revise questions and approaches as appropriate and set the schedule for the following week. The team will continue the interview process during first three days of the second week with the remaining grantees. The entire team will regroup at the end of that week to consolidate their findings and to provide USAID/Burundi with an initial overview of their learnings. Prior to the Team Leader’s departure on July 27, the Burundian evaluators will be tasked with a final set of interviews, making a limited number of site visits to interview project participants, as well as local leaders who were not participants, about peace building and project impacts. This data will then be shared via email with the Team Leader, who will incorporate it into the final report.

The phased structure allowing for a broad understanding of the intended aims and outcomes of the overall CMM initiative and of the CMM-funded projects more specifically, as well as offering the opportunity to investigate a discrete set of pertinent themes more deeply. Accordingly, the evaluation approach promises to increase the understanding of CMM, the USAID Field Mission, together with its partners, about how peace is built and how donors can positively impact peace-building processes.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS

CMM’s goals for the overall evaluation of APS-funded projects and for those located in Burundi in particular are laudable and ambitious. Given the logistical, financial, and time constraints that the team faces, it is important to highlight the following challenges:

1. It is our understanding that all of the APS-funded projects in Burundi have been concluded. This means that any evaluation data will be influenced by the passage of time and other exogenous factors. This will necessarily limit the team’s ability to attribute change to a specific project(s) or other APS-funded activity.

2. The large number of projects and the limited time available in the field will make it impossible to interview project participants from each project. Combined with the lack of consistent evaluation data from each project, this means it will be possible to only interview a discrete number of project participants and identify broad trends, rather than drawing firm conclusions as to the cumulative impact of APS-funded programs. At the same time, this constraint has spurred the team to design a more creative evaluation structure, which will allow us to focus on and probe a few key issues and trends and provide targeted and robust recommendations to CMM and the USAID Field Mission.

3. The team intends to explore the strengths and limitations of the underlying Theory of Change of CMM’s P2P approach. While the lack of uniformity across project-specific theories of change will make comparisons challenging, the team will nonetheless endeavor to provide recommendations to CMM for the design of future peacebuilding programming.
# Evaluation Data Source Matrix

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<tr>
<th>Evaluation Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Criteria/Indicator(s)</th>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Data Collection Instrument</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. How effective have APS-Burundi projects been in producing attitudinal and behavior change?</strong></td>
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<td>A. PROGRAM DESIGN</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. What was the change that the project hoped to engender?</td>
<td>Changes specified in the analysis are directly connected to the changes targeted by the program</td>
<td>– Project level</td>
<td>– Project docs (including work plans and quarterly reports)</td>
<td>– Document Review</td>
<td>– Comparison of implementer and manager response</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– From what to what?</td>
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<td>– Interviews with implementers and managers (USAID)</td>
<td>– KII</td>
<td>– Beneficiary stories/essays (case study)</td>
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<td>– At what level—individual, institutional, societal?</td>
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<td>– KII responses vs what is shown (or not shown) in documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. What were the project activities that were to lead to this change?</td>
<td>Multiple perspectives were reflected in analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Did a conflict analysis inform project design? Was the analysis updated over the life of the project?</td>
<td>Conflict analysis was validated by external experts and/or representatives of stakeholder groups</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. MEASURING SUCCESS IN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. How did project implementers define success?</td>
<td>Program is described as relevant (rooted in thorough conflict analysis; timely; appropriate to needs; adapted to changing context) by implementers, participants and non-participants</td>
<td>– As above</td>
<td>– Project docs</td>
<td>– As above</td>
<td>– Similarity in response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How did project participants define success?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Interviews with APS beneficiaries, implementers, managers (USAID)</td>
<td></td>
<td>– Project reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Did the definition of success change over time? Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Interviews with other key stakeholders (CSO, religious, women, youth group, etc. leaders) and other donors, as possible</td>
<td></td>
<td>– Internal/external evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Did the organization/project identify any changes in its operating environment or the Burundian conflict context over time? If so, how did they identify these changes and in what ways did they adapt their implementation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Comparison with other SI APS evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Changes in annual work plans</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– KII responses vs what is shown (or not shown) in documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C. CROSS PROGRAM COMPARISON

#### 1. Are there any commonalities between and across those organizations/projects:
- In how they defined success?
- In how effective organizations/projects defined and targeted "reconciliation" specifically?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Program definitions of success as reflected in initial program documents, reports and final evaluations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External reports on peacebuilding in Burundi cite commonalities and/or differences in reconciliation programming approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program/Portfolio level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As above</td>
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<td></td>
<td>As above</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison of beneficiary, implementer, and manager response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal/external evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison with findings of other SI APS evaluations and desk study report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Are there any commonalities between and across those organizations/projects deemed to be most and least effective:
- In terms of type/level of change sought?
- In terms of target beneficiaries (Track I, II, or III level participants)?
- In terms of project design, monitoring, and adaptive implementation?
- In terms of the number, nature, or quality of “touch points”?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type of change clearly identified in program documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiaries identified in program documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common design, implementation and monitoring strategies identified in program documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>As above</td>
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<td>As above</td>
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<td>As above</td>
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<td></td>
<td>As above</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### II. What are the links, if any, between APS-Burundi projects and “Peace writ Large”?

#### 1. Did program design take into consideration the concept of ‘Peace writ Large’? How was the concept defined?

| | ToC is clearly articulated in program proposal, reports and other documents |
| | Conflict analysis is explicitly linked to and reflected in program design documents |
| | Project level |
| | Project documents |
| | Interviews with program implementation staff and USAID |
| | Document review |
| | Interviews |
| | Compare program documents to interview responses and to independent conflict analyses |
| | External evaluations, |
### 2. Is there evidence that APS-funded projects have contributed to broad-scale changes in the conflict context or to attitudinal and/or behavior change in non-participants and/or institutions?

- Reform or creation of institution(s) to handle grievance(s) identified in conflict analysis and which program activities were designed to influence
- People (participants and non-participants) in communities in which projects were implemented continue to use skills, tools, strategies shared in program in non-program related activities
- Project is cited by community members (both participants and non-participants) as having contributed to the current social conflict dynamic in the community (positively or negatively)

#### Program/Portfolio level
- Project docs
- Interviews with APS beneficiaries, implementers, managers (USAID)
- Interviews with other donors (as feasible).
- Interviews with other key stakeholders (CSO, religious, women, youth group, etc. leaders).
- Review of national legislation relating to specific institutional change

#### National level
- As above

- Longitudinal surveys (if available)
- Perception surveys/Public Opinion polls (if available)
- Changes in donor development strategies
- Compare with KII responses

### 3. How were any contributions to “Peace writ Large” identified by the specific project team? How were contributions reported on?

- Reports explicitly reference contribution to ‘Peace writ Large’
- Decisions to make changes in program activities reference adapted conflict analysis and the placement of program activities

#### Program/Portfolio level
- Project docs
- Interviews with implementers, managers (USAID)
- Document Review
- KII and FGDs

- Comparison of implementer and manager responses
- Review of specific program documents and comparison with portfolio reports from USAID Mission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Is there any disagreement between APS implementers, beneficiaries, managers (USAID staff), or other donors in the nature and quality of these contributions to “Peace writ Large?”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program/Portfolio level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project docs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with APS beneficiaries, implementers, managers (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with other donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with other key stakeholders (CSO, religious, women, youth group, etc. leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with non-APS implementers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of findings from desk review and interview response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison to publicly available reports on conflict and peacebuilding activities in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison to reports of other donor activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. Was a P2P Approach Relevant for the Burundi Context?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do P2P efforts appear to have been the appropriate responses to the conflicts they were intended to address in Burundi?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the P2P approach is reflected in program documents, the program’s ToC, program activities, and by program staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ToC specifically links P2P approach to program activities and outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships between program participants in communities in which P2P approach was used have permitted those participants to more effectively respond, individually and collectively, to renewed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program/Portfolio level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with APS beneficiaries, implementers, managers (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with other donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with other key stakeholders (CSO, religious, women, youth group, etc. leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal/external evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIs and FGDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID and other donor guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with non-APS implementers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Did a P2P approach offer any significant advantages/disadvantages to other potential approaches identified by APS implementers, beneficiaries, managers (USAID staff), or other donors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Did a P2P approach offer sufficient flexibility to adapt to changes in salient contextual factors identified over time?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

The July 2013 field visit (Phase I) will commence the in-depth qualitative interviews with the eleven APS grant recipients and with the USAID Mission staff. Drawing on deliberations emerging from these discussions, and after reviewing the initial findings and methodology will be revised, as necessary. Phase II will begin with the arrival of the entire team, who will build on lessons learned, continuing the interview process with implementing partners, program participants and community members. The team will highlight significant themes, trends and concerns, as well as focus on the cumulative impacts, if any, of the APS-funded projects. This Phase will culminate in a meeting with program implementers and USAID Mission staff. In Phase III of the fieldwork, the Burundian team will complete interviews with community members in project activity sites, focusing on gathering data about attitudinal changes, if any, of program participants and their impacts on community reconciliation.

Interviews will be conducted with relevant IPs, project participants, community members and USAID Mission staff as relevant and community leaders who did not participate in the CMM-funded projects. The combined field data will then be analyzed by the team and presented with conclusions and recommendations to CMM in the final report.

Data Collection Methods

1. **Review of Published documents**: Data collection will begin with a review of CMM/USAID policy manuals and guidelines, relevant APS, RFPs, program reports, evaluations conducted by the implementing organization after implementation, relevant news and other reports.

2. **Interviews**: In the field, the team will conduct semi-structured, open-ended qualitative interviews with CMM/Mission Staff, Project Implementers; Project participants and, in areas where deeper investigation is undertaken with community leaders who were not project participants.

3. **Site Visits**: The team will visit offices and/or sites where project activities took place to interview program participants. The site visits will also incorporate broad interviews with local leaders about peace building.

Primary Locations of Data Collection

1. Bujumbura
2. Project implementation sites outside of Bujumbura, as possible (mainly during Phase II).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>TIMING (EST.)</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field I</td>
<td>July 10-14, 2013</td>
<td>Interviews, site visits (as possible),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field II</td>
<td>July 15-July 27, 2013</td>
<td>Interviews with organizations, project participants, and community leaders; site visits (as possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Brief Consultation</td>
<td>July 26, 2013</td>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings, facilitated discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field III</td>
<td>July 29-August 2, 2013</td>
<td>Interviews with community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Field Data</td>
<td>Initial analysis August 19-23, 2013</td>
<td>Comparative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>Sept 4-27, 2013</td>
<td>Consolidate data from trips, final report drafting, CMM review, final report submission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Possible Criteria for Data Collection, Organization and Analysis**

Using the results of the desk review and corroborated during the field visit, the APS grantee projects will be categorized according to a series of criteria relevant for analysis. The following is a preliminary list of six potential sets of criteria:

1. **CMM/APS Grant Record**: First-time grantee organizations or repeat grantees.
2. **Types of Work**: Dialogue; Education; Civil Society; Elections; Human Rights; Transitional Justice; Trauma/Healing; Religious reconciliation; Nonviolence, etc.
3. **Structure**: Urban/rural; elite/non-elite; specific focus on cross-conflict participation
4. **Participant populations**: Children; Youth (ages 18-30); Adults; civil society; dialogue professionals; educators; journalists; women, etc.
5. **Types/levels of change**: Cultural, Political, Relational, Structural; Institutional; Grassroots (Track III), civil society (Track II), official/political (Track I).
6. **RPP Categories**: More People vs. Key People at Individual Level; More People vs. Key People at Socio-Political level.

**Data Analysis**

1. All data collected will be coded thematically using the above criteria (and/or others that emerge during field research), the evaluation questions and the objectives identified in the statement of purpose.
2. All data collected will be systematically compared in the following ways:
   a. **Sources**—Multiple sources (project directors, staff, project participants, community leaders) will ideally be involved in providing data;
   b. **Themes and Trends**—Key themes, trends, issues and concerns that were identified in Phase I and probed in Phase II will be analyzed by comparing interview responses and contexts.
3. Comparative analysis will be used in order to enhance analytical perspective and to guard effectively against potential bias and/or threats to validity.

**Deliverables**

For the Burundi Field Evaluation, SI will deliver:

- A detailed evaluation plan outlining design, methods, data analysis plan, and calendar;
- A short concept note or desk review produced prior to the fieldwork, summarizing emerging themes and questions from the program background documents.
- A draft final evaluation report for review (in digital format) that conforms to USAID’s Evaluation Policy in format.
- A final evaluation report, integrating timely feedback from Social Impact and CMM.
Annex C: Overview of Burundi APS-Funded Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Rights – “Strengthening Civil Society to Manage and Mitigate Land Conflict in Burundi”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Dates/Location</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Goals and Stated Objectives** | *Strengthen civil society’s ability to monitor, inform, detect, and provide emergency responses to land conflicts;*  
*Foster a process of consultative, participatory, and inclusive policy dialogue around land issues; and*  
*Support and improve ongoing civil society initiatives to mitigate land conflicts.* |
| **Activity Type** | Training sessions, radio campaigns, workshops, one-on-one meetings with government and United Nations (UN) officials, joint actions with strategic partners, and facilitation of dialogues/forums |
| **Beneficiary Type** | Activities primarily targeted CSOs, but also women (one component involved convincing Burundian policy and decision makers to support women’s right to inheritance) |
| **Project Overview** | Global Rights received a one-year grant that aimed to strengthen civil society’s ability to monitor, inform, detect, and provide emergency responses to land conflicts; foster a process of consultative, participatory, and inclusive policy dialogue around land issues; and support and improve ongoing civil society initiatives to mitigate land conflicts. On the strategic level, the project facilitated advocacy activities and working meetings with key stakeholders, such as officials from ministries, the National Commission on Land, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), on solutions to the various problems at the heart of the conflicts. On the grassroots level, the program provided technical and financial support for actions addressing actual conflicts or that could strengthen responsiveness to actual conflicts, primarily through grants to legal service providers and journalists working on land issues. The project also worked with parliamentarians, ministers, NGO leaders, and journalists to secure women’s right to inheritance (WRI). |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Rights – “Laying the Groundwork for Future Post-Conflict Restorative Justice Mechanisms in Burundi”</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Dates/Location</strong></td>
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</table>
| **Goals and Stated Objectives** | *Increase Burundian stakeholders’ understanding of, collaboration with, and support of restorative justice mechanisms, including a truth and reconciliation process;*  
*Provide technical support to empower Burundian victims’ groups, as well as facilitate the contribution of witnesses and victims in the proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC);* |

Global Rights – “Strengthening Civil Society to Manage and Mitigate Land Conflict in Burundi”
| Activity Type | Training sessions, radio campaigns, workshops, one-on-one meetings with government and United Nations (UN) officials, joint actions with strategic partners, and facilitation of dialogues/forums |
| Beneficiary Type | Civil society actors, Burundians citizens at large |
| Project Overview | This project had four objectives: increase Burundian stakeholders’ understanding of, collaboration with, and support of restorative justice mechanisms, including a truth and reconciliation process; provide technical support to empower Burundian victims’ groups, as well as facilitate the contribution of witnesses and victims in the proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); increase understanding of and support for restorative justice mechanisms and transitional justice processes nationwide; and foster a civil society consultative process to promote a legal framework for establishing restorative justice mechanisms. The project started with a widely-publicized event commemorating the 1972 massacre. Global Right worked closely with local NGOs, particularly the NGO Network on Transitional Justice in Burundi to identify victim needs and coordinate roles in the upcoming transitional justice process. This included training of CSO leaders on the consultation processes leading to the creation of a restorative justice mechanism and lessons learned from Burundi’s own experience of truth and justice-seeking processes. The project also consulted communities directly and trained individuals on how to interact with such a transitional mechanism. |

### Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) – “Building the Capacity of Burundi’s Future Leaders”

| Amount | $594,243 |
| Project Dates/Location | December 2008-December 2010 |
| Goals and Stated Objectives | *Bring leaders together (build confidence and restore the relationship among them);  
*Strengthen the skills of leaders in communication, conflict management and negotiation;  
*Promote good leadership;  
*Build a new consensus on the rules of the game regarding the process of decision making. |
| Activity Type | 1) Program development meeting with 35 stakeholders (MOE staff, partners, teacher’s union, etc.)  
2) Development of the leadership training curriculum, including a teacher’s manual and a student guide  
3) Design and implementation of the training of trainers program with 20 teachers and four representatives of the government’s central education office. Sixty additional trainers were trained after revisions were made to the curriculum  
4) Testing and revision of curriculum— the curriculum was piloted in 20 schools; 1066 of participating students and teachers submitted feedback on the curriculum. Additional inputs from Ministry officials and partners were incorporated into the final design |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Beneficiary Type</strong></th>
<th>youth (with particular emphasis on secondary school students and teachers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Overview</strong></td>
<td>The Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) designed and implemented a two-year program targeted at youth to help institutionalize a culture of dialogue, non-violent conflict management, and the effective resolution of problems. The BLTP program, Building the Capacity of Burundi’s Future Leaders, focused on the development of innovative curriculum and facilitation methodologies and target secondary school teachers and students. In consultation with the MOE and its partners, the project developed trainings for students in leadership, conflict management, communication and negotiation skills that fit within the Ministry’s course on civic responsibility in which the schools deal with human rights, peace keeping, governance, and civic responsibility. The project developed the curriculum and facilitation approach, trained local trainers to deliver the lessons, pilot tested the modules, incorporated feedback, and finalized the curriculum. Throughout the life of the project, stakeholders within and outside of the Ministry were consulted and informed of progress in order to strengthen those working relationships.</td>
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**Interpeace/CENAP – “Burundi Peacebuilding Programme”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Amount</strong></th>
<th>$398,088</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Dates/Location</strong></td>
<td>July 2007-March 2010/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Goals and Stated Objectives** | Reinforce Burundian capacities to strengthen and consolidate lasting peace
1) First Phase [priority mapping]: map the threats to peace and stability using participatory approaches; and
2) Second Phase: conduct in-depth research and dialogue on the four priority issues [disarmament, unemployment, elections, and transitional justice] |
| **Activity Type** | Group discussions across ethnic lines and other lines of division in a collaborative effort to address challenges to peace.
Sharing of findings with government members, the MPs, the political parties, civil society organizations, embassies and international organizations |
| **Beneficiary Type** | Burundians at large (both within country and diaspora) |
| **Project Overview** | The overall goal of the Burundi Peacebuilding Programme is to reinforce Burundian capacities to strengthen and consolidate lasting peace. The project aimed to enable the people of Burundi to identify and find solutions to their own problems and open channels so that solutions could be heard and acted upon by Government and other key stakeholders. The objective of the First Phase was to map the threats to peace and stability through participatory approaches. Through a series of consultations with a large cross-section of the country’s population, the group identified major obstacles to lasting peace and presented the findings to a smaller, representative sample of Burundians. Based on conversations with this group, the project identified four priority areas for further research: disarmament, unemployment, elections, and transitional justice. Through surveys, dialogues, and participatory action research (PAR), the project identified solutions to these problems and tested if those solutions were operational, adapted to the Burundi context and acceptable by the majority of the people. |
Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS) – “The Conflict Transformation Project (Tubirengere)”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>$532,141</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Dates/Location</td>
<td>November 2008-November 2010/ Burundi-Bujumbura, Rumonge, Nyanza-Lac, Makamba, and Cibitoke; Rwanda-Gisenyi and Cyangugu; and the DRC- Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Stated Objectives</td>
<td>The project aimed to mitigate the root causes of conflict in Rwanda and the DRC by establishing peacebuilding processes that 1) heal wounds of trauma, 2) strengthen community bonds and 3) organize community leaders to prevent recurrence of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Type</td>
<td>Establishment of psychosocial trauma healing centers, training for staff to deliver this type of support. Activity strategies include awareness raising, community involvement, training of trainers, capacity building, and lobby and advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Type</td>
<td>Victims, returnees, communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Project Overview
The Conflict Transformation Project (Tubirengere) established local-owned peacebuilding processes in Burundi and its cross-bordering areas in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Building on previous work, the project expanded its reach to ten additional locally-owned sites in a corridor where violence frequently occurred in which a common language is spoken. Community leaders in the new sites received training and targeted technical assistance for establishing locally-owned, effective conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs that are networked with other like-minded groups in the region. The project delivered an initial training on the root causes of conflict and proven responses to them; participants developed peacebuilding plans for their communities based on these lessons. THARS assisted the participants in the implementation of these plans by providing additional training and technical assistance to each site throughout the life of the project.

Religions for Peace – “Overcoming Barriers to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Through Multi-Religious Collaboration in Burundi”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>$478,275</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Dates/Location</td>
<td>November 2008- February 2011/ Bujumbura City, Bujumbura Rural, Gitega, Ruyigi, Rumonge/Bururi and Makamba provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Stated Objectives</td>
<td>1) Advance the truth and reconciliation process; 2) Address the gender dimensions of the conflict; and 3) Support the socio-economic reintegration and recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Type</td>
<td>Training sessions, trauma healing, awareness-raising campaigns, advocacy. Activities were divided into four categories: skill development, mobilization, advocacy, and sharing of experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Type</td>
<td>Religious communities, women, youth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Project Overview
The project aimed to address the causes and consequences of instability and conflict by advancing the Truth and Reconciliation process; addressing the gender dimensions of the conflict; supporting socio-economic reintegration; and strengthening the capacity of national inter-religious structure. The project was implemented in six provinces that were greatly affected by violence and displacement: Bujumbura City, Bujumbura Rural, Gitega, Ruyigi, Rumonge/Bururi and Makamba. During the project, religious
Leaders from throughout Burundi worked through the Inter-religious Council of Burundi (IRCB) to reduce conflict through trainings, consultations, experience sharing, community dialogue, and mediation. The project created extensive networks among religious leaders, women and youth at national and provincial levels; encouraged religious leaders, including women and youth leaders to participate in trainings and monitoring sessions on the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission; worked with religious groups to identify and advocate against all forms of GBV; and brought together returning refugees who had lost land with those who had occupied vacant land through mediation sessions that promoted greater understanding and led to the identification of practical solutions to resolve community disputes.

**IRC/OAP – “Supporting Communities for Peaceful Elections (SCOPE)”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>$598,482</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Dates/Location</td>
<td>January 2010-July 2011/Kanyosha and Mutimbuzi Communes (in Bujumbura Province)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Goals and Stated Objectives | 1) Reduction of tensions within the local government due to effective multi-party collaboration to meet priority community needs.  
2) Repatriates, IDPs, and ex-combatants are peacefully reintegrated in their communities. |
| Activity Type   | Training in conflict resolution; collaborate work on 20 community micro infrastructure programs; dances, music, and performances demonstrating peaceful coexistence. |
| Beneficiary Type | Members of local government, political parties, marginalized groups such as ex-combatants and other community leaders |

**Project Overview**

In conjunction with the local partner Organisation d’Appui à l’Auto-Promotion (OAP), the IRC trained and brought together diverse community members and local authorities alike to actively engage in the community development micro-projects. The IRC provided 180,000 USD in sub-grants to two targeted Commune administrations, Kanyosha and Mutimbuzi in Bujumbura Province in order to complete 20 prioritized community development micro-projects. Implementing a people-to-people approach, the IRC used community development as a means not only to improve socioeconomic services beneficial to all community members, but also to bring together local officials of opposing political parties; build trust between communities and local authorities; and enable opportunities for social cohesion and reintegration. The IRC and OAP also conducted trainings in peaceful conflict mitigation and management, enabling beneficiaries to peacefully resolve conflicts at a local level before escalating. Local authorities were also trained in skills in governance and in the reintegration of repatriated refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and ex-combatants.

**CARE/ MIPAREC & TUBIYAGE – “Sasagaza Amahoro: From Grassroots to National Level-Spreading Peace”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>$389,867</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Dates/Location</td>
<td>March 2008-March 2010/Giheta, Gitega et Makebuko Communes in the Gitega province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Stated Objectives</td>
<td>promote conditions for sustainable peace by organizing interactions between key players including CBOs, Bashinggantahe, and local elected officials that lead to grassroots conflict resolution structures (result: communities have access to improved and sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Type</td>
<td>trainings, interactive theater, radio stories, direct exchanges between local structures (the communes of Giheta, Makebuko and Gitega in the province of Gitega).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Type</td>
<td>Local community members including residents, returnees, IDPs, B Bashingantahe, and locally elected representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Overview</td>
<td>This project used a three-pronged strategy to mobilize and increase the capacity of a network of grass-roots peace building actors to increase the efficiency of conflict mitigation services available to the population in target communes and infuse a sustainable and forward looking approach to increasing the role of the community and civil society in the national peace and reconciliation process. The project endeavored to facilitate a constructive dialogue between grass-roots conflict mitigation bodies and the justice system at the commune, province levels regarding their respective fields of competence and limits to their intervention. It also promoted the recognition of the importance of the role of grassroots structures in resolving conflicts and disputes within the modern legal system.</td>
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**Search for Common Ground – “Supporting Burundi’s Transition to Peace by Facilitating Reconciliation & Dialogue”**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>$750,000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Project Dates/Location</td>
<td>September 2004-September 2005 (*project received follow-on funding from SIDA). Radio programs played on four radio stations reaching “audiences across Burundi and into the refugee camps in Tanzania” Community outreach work targeted Bururi and Makamba provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Stated Objectives</td>
<td>The overall goal of the project was to <em>facilitate dialogue and reconciliation among Burundians</em> by (1) informing and educating the public on issues of national importance; (2) strengthening the capacity for inclusive participation in communities; and (3) strengthening the capacity of journalists and civic leaders to manage conflict constructively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Type</td>
<td>Media and community outreach work focusing on sensitization, dialogue and capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Type</td>
<td>Civil society actors, journalists, local elected leaders, key decision makers and community participants. Community outreach work targeted rural populations, including: ex-combatants (including former child soldiers), refugees and other war affected groups (returnees, Internally Displaced Persons – IDPs); as well as women and youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Overview</td>
<td>To achieve its overall goal and objectives, SFCG used an integrated three-pronged approach, combining sensitization, dialogue, and capacity building. Sensitization focused on the provision of information; dialogue fostered participation; and capacity building reinforced and expanded engagement. SFCG activities were divided between media and community work, a two-pronged strategy that has allowed SFCG both to effect change at the individual level, while reaching populations in every province and every commune of the country. On the media side, SFCG partnered with four radio stations in Burundi, reaching audiences across Burundi and into the refugee camps in Tanzania. The media work was complemented by community outreach activities targeting key conflict-prone areas.</td>
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</table>
### Search for Common Ground – “Supporting Reconciliation in Burundi”

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Project Dates/Location</strong></td>
<td>April 2007-April 2009/ three provinces for round tables and community activities; national coverage for radio broadcasts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Goals and Stated Objectives** | • Inform and educate the public on issues relating to truth, justice and reconciliation;  
• Strengthen local capacity—particularly of marginalized groups—for reconciliation and participation in community decision making; and  
• Create opportunities for all Burundians to participate in dialogue on truth, justice and reconciliation and prepare the ground for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). |
| **Activity Type** | Media and public outreach |
| **Beneficiary Type** | - Poor in rural areas  
- Ex-combatant groups  
- Refugees / IDPs of war and other war-affected persons, especially women and children |
| **Project Overview** | This project sought to promote broad public ownership of and participation in Burundi’s reconciliation process. Search for Common Ground partnered with radio stations in Burundi and one in Tanzania to educate the public on transitional justice issues to deliver radio-based soap operas, magazine programs, youth talk shows, and panel discussion broadcasts. Each of these programs featured community members addressing the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission both directly and indirectly. These media activities were complemented by outreach activities in key conflict-prone areas, including conflict resolutions trainings and community roundtables that discussed the National Land and Property Commission, transitional justice mechanisms, and planning for solidarity events. In addition, the project also designed and funded various community improvement projects that created space for different groups to come together around a common purpose. |

### Search for Common Ground - Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation and Collaborative Action in Burundi

<table>
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<th>Amount</th>
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<td><strong>Project Dates/Location</strong></td>
<td>September 2008-September 2010/Nationwide, with emphasis on sensitive areas, such as Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac</td>
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</table>
| **Goals and Stated Objectives** | • Promote constructive exchange and political dialogue between and among parliamentarians from different political parties and their local constituents about issues of local and national concern.  
• Foster dialogue and collaborative approaches to conflict between returnees and residents in the return zones. |
| **Activity Type** | Organization of exchanges, training sessions on conflict mitigation, panels, radio broadcasted shows, theatre performances |
| **Beneficiary Type** | General population, with particular emphasis on communities in sensitive areas |
| **Project Overview** | The overall goal of the Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation and Collaborative Action in Burundi project was to promote inclusive, effective and responsible participation in a process of social transformation toward a fair and equal society in Burundi. Through a multi-pronged approach, using radio programming and community outreach through exchanges, training and participatory theatre, the project aimed to effect change at both the local and national level. Most of these activities targeted land conflicts and other repatriation issues. SFCG produced a weekly political talk show, “Ijambo N'Irindi”, aimed at bringing parliamentarians from different parties together to discuss common issues, such as security, demobilization, transitional justice and repatriation. SFGC also produced an investigative journalism program titled “Icibare Cacu” that used a “Magazine” format, combining interviews, field reporting, man-on-the street interviews to explore a different case each week. These programs were complemented by organized dialogues at the community level, including listening club meetings, provincial community political exchanges, monthly panel discussions between government officials and activities, and participatory theater performances. Finally, the project delivered eight conflict mediation trainings for government officials to aid in the resolution of land conflicts at the local level. |
### Annex D: List of People Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Other Stakeholder</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Non-Beneficiary</th>
<th>Zone and Province</th>
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<td>Alexis HARERIMANA</td>
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<td>Alexis NIYIBIGIRA</td>
<td>Chef du programme</td>
<td>IRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alix Arquiliere</td>
<td>Program Coordinator</td>
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<td>Aloys NIBIGIRA</td>
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<td>MIPAREC</td>
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<td>Facilitateur au programme Pavage</td>
<td>Ikibiri Coalition</td>
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<td>Christian HAVYARIMANA</td>
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<td>Cynthia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dawn Liberi</td>
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Annex E: List of Documents Reviewed

PROJECT-SPECIFIC DOCUMENTATION

CARE – “Sasagaza Amahoro: From Grassroots to National Level-Spreading Peace”

Quarterly Reports Folder

- Quarterly Reports 2008 (3/4 quarterlies)
  - March-May 2008
  - June-Aug 2008
  - Sept – Nov 2008
  - No Jan, Feb (December included in 2009 Quarterlies)

- Quarterly Reports 2009 (4/4, one in French)
  - December 2008 – February 2009
  - March-May 2009 (Draft – JI edits)
  - June – Aug 2009 (French)
  - September- Nov 2009
  - No December 2009

Evaluation Reports Folder

- Project Evaluation Final Report, March 2010 (in French)
- Base Study Finale Report, September 2008 (French)

Log Frame & ME

- Results Framework – From Grass Roots to National – Spreading Peace
- Performance Indicators Excel doc (French)
- M&E Plan Sasagaza Amahoro Excel Doc
- Report on Indicators of Peace and Conflict, July- December 2009 (French)

Proposal Design

- Technical Narrative, Grant Application, Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation in Burundi

Studies and Learning

- Case Study (French) – Subject: Contributing actions to peacebuilding in the promotion of good leadership and governance in neighboring communities
- Study on the legal skill for community conflict management structures 1987-2005 (French)
- Lesson Learned in the Project (French)
- Lessons Learned w/CARE Burundi Peace Clubs Initiative
- Final Narrative Report of Peace Clubs Learning Initiative August 2010-January 2011

Global Rights - “Strengthening Civil Society to Manage and Mitigate Land Conflict in Burundi” and “Laying the Groundwork for Future Post-Conflict Restorative Justice Mechanisms in Burundi”

- Quarterly Reports 2007 (no Jan-Mar, Oct-Dec, covered in semi-annual)
  - April-June
  - July – September
- Semi-Annual Report, October 2006-March 2007
- Semi-Annual Report, April-September 2008
- 2007-I I Part I Semi Annual Report (PDF of email messages)
- 2007-II Part II Semi-Annual Report (PDF of an email)
- 2008-02 Semi-Annual Report Award n…0327-00 (PDF of an email)
- 2008-05 Semi-Annual Report Award n…0327-00 (PDF of an email)
- 2008-10 FY2008 PMP Award no. 623…0327-00 (PDF of an email)
- 2009-01 Final Report Award no. 623-…0327.00 (PDF of an email)
- GR Burundi CMM Financial July-Sep 2008
- GR CMM Semi-Annual Indicators Data April-September 2008
- Financial Status Report, SF269 Burundi-CMM Dec 07
- Financial Status Report, SF269 GR Burundi-CMM March 08

**Interpeace/CENAP - “Burundi Peacebuilding Program”**
- Quarterly Reports 2009 (2/4 quarterlies)
  - January-March 2009
  - April-June 2009
- 2010 Program Evaluation Final Report
- Performance Plan & Report FY 2010
- Performance Indicator Reference Sheet FY2008-2009

**IRC - “Supporting Communities for Peaceful Elections (SCOPE)”**

**Quarterly Reports Folder**
- Quarterly Reports 2010 (4/4)
  - January 20-April 20, 2010
  - April 21-July 20, 2010
  - July 21-October 20, 2010
  - October 21, 2010-January 20, 2011
- Quarterly Reports 2011 (2/4, project ended?)
  - January 21 – April 20, 2011
  - April 21-July 19, 2011
- Performance Progress Reports
  - Quarter 2, April-July 2010
  - Quarter 4, October-January 2010
  - Tear 2, Quarter 1 January-April 2011
- IRC DQA Revised, Performance Indicator Reference Sheet
- IRC FY2010 CCM PPR
- Final Evaluation Report of the SCOPE Project, August 2011
- SCOPE Project Final Report, August 2011 (contained in Submission Aug 30 Zip Folder)
- Submission Aug 30 Zip Folder
  - Annex H SnapShot Community Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
  - Annex I High Level Delegation Visit SCOPE
  - IRC Burundi Annex G Renouveau
  - IRC Burundi Annexes A-f & J
  - Performance Progress Report, Final, July 2011

**Proposal**
- 090603 Copy of Budget Excel Doc, Line Item Budget Sept 2009-March 2011
- APS 09-857 Burundi Technical Application

**Religions for Peace-“ Overcoming Barriers to Peace Building and Reconciliation through Multi- Religious Collaboration in Burundi”**
- Quarterly Reports 2009 (3/4 reports)
  - November 2008-February 2009
  - March-May 2009
Developmental Evaluative Learning Review: Synthesis Report
Field Study of USAID/Burundi Annual Program Statement People-to-People Reconciliation Grants

- Quarterly Reports 2010 (3/4 reports)
  - December 2009-February 2010
  - March-May 2010
  - June-August 2010
- 2010 Performance Indicator Reference Sheet
- Burundi M&E Plan
- Burundi Peacebuilding Project one-pager
- Matrix FY09 Annual Work Plan
- Technical APS-08-319 October 2008

SFCG - “Strengthening Burundi’s Transition to Peace by Facilitating Dialogue & Reconciliation,” “Supporting Reconciliation in Burundi, and “Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation and Collaborative Action in Burundi.”
- Burundi Reconciliation Initiative Interim Progress Report, October 2005-March 2006
- Supporting Reconciliation Final Report, July 31, 2009
- Evaluation of Program Impact (Supporting Reconciliation), September 2009 (French)
- SFGC USAID Eval 2004, Greater Horn of Africa Peacebuilding Project Draft Report, Eval USAID programs in Burundi (In Greater Horn of Africa Folder)

Promoting Locally Driven Conflict…in Burundi
- Annex 1 Final Eval (Final Eval October 2010 Project: Promoting Locally Driven & Collaborative Action in Burundi)
- Annex 2 Success Story
- Annex III Success Story, Youth, Music, Politics
- Annex IV Elections Update July 2010

THARS - “Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Programs and Activities (Conflict Transformation in Burundi)”
- Revised Project Proposal.
- Official Grant Agreement

WWICS - “Building the Capacity of Burundi’s Future Leaders”
- Quarterly Reports
  - January 2008 to the end of the first quarter FY08, March 31 2009, Submitted May 2009??
  - July 1-September 31, 2009, Submitted Nov 2009
  - October 1- December 2009, Submitted February 2010
- Burundi Leadership Project (BLTP) Final Evaluation Report (No noticeable date, maybe 2011, French)
- General Project Report, December 2008-December 2010 (French)
- Technical Submission APS 08-319, October 2008
## Annex F: Criteria for Data Analysis

1. Previous presence: has the grantee been a previous CMM recipient and/or does grantee have previous experience with target pop.

2. Types of Work: Dialogue; Education; Civil Society; Elections; Human Rights; Transitional Justice; Trauma/Healing; Religious reconciliation; Nonviolence, etc.

3. Participant populations/RPP category: Children; Youth (ages 18-30); Adults; civil society; dialogue professionals; educators; journalists; women, etc.

4. Types/levels of change: Cultural, Political, Relational, Structural; Institutional; Grassroots (Track III), civil society (Track II), official/political (Track I).

5. ToC/program hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Previous Presence</th>
<th>Type of work</th>
<th>Target Population + RPP category (more or key)</th>
<th>Typellevel of change sought</th>
<th>ToC/program hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Rights:</strong> Strengthening Civil Society to Manage and Mitigate Land Conflict in Burundi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Human Rights (specifically land access); Transitional Justice; Education about land issues</td>
<td>CSOs; National actors; Journalists; Key</td>
<td>Political and Institutional</td>
<td>Raising awareness about land issues and reinforcing the capacity of CSOs to engage the issue of land will positively contribute to the development and reform of a national land policy thus addressing a key drivers of BDI conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Rights:</strong> Laying the Groundwork for Future Post-Conflict Restorative Justice Mechanisms in Burundi</td>
<td>Repeat CMM grantee (Extension on previous application)</td>
<td>Human Rights (specifically land access); Transitional Justice; Education about land issues</td>
<td>CSOs; National actors; Journalists; Key</td>
<td>Political and Institutional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpeace/CENAP:</strong> Burundi Peacebuilding Program</td>
<td>Not as a partnership but CENAP has previous experience in peacebuilding</td>
<td>Dialogue, reconciliation, conflict management through broad community consensus</td>
<td>Grassroots, civil society and national level actors; More</td>
<td>Political and institutional on specifically identified issues</td>
<td>Broad based consensus on problems and their solutions will inspire more effective national solutions to key national problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRC/OAP:</strong> Supporting Communities for Peaceful Elections (SCOPE)</td>
<td>Peaceful conflict management and mitigation in advance of elections; micro project grants</td>
<td>People in specific communities – including members of opposing political parties; ex-combatants; local authorities; Key</td>
<td>Individual, relational, grassroots, institutional at the level of local government</td>
<td>Collectively chosen micro projects, when accompanied by CR training will improve socio-economic services in community and improve relationships between community actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THARS:</strong> Conflict Transformation in Burundi</td>
<td>Trauma/healing; conflict resolution;</td>
<td>Specific communities in three countries; more rather than key</td>
<td>Individual; relational, grassroots</td>
<td>Establishing locally owned peacebuilding programs will prevent the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WWICS-BLTP</strong>: Building the Capacity of Burundi’s Future Leaders</td>
<td>First time CMM grantee; previous experience at key leader level</td>
<td>Education; Conflict management</td>
<td>Youth; teachers, Ministry of Education staff; Key</td>
<td>Individual, cultural and institutional as it related to school environment</td>
<td>Targeting youth in the context of education with a CR skill building prog will prepare them to be future leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RfP</strong>: Overcoming Barriers to Peace Building and Reconciliation through Multi-Religious Collaboration in Burundi</td>
<td>Conflict resolution, transitional justice, GBV</td>
<td>Religious leaders and their local communities Key</td>
<td>Individual change; culture change as it related to managing conflict to mono-religious communities</td>
<td>A multi-religious approach to addressing key issues (GBV; TRC; and socio-economic reintegration) will contribute to more effective community reconciliation in target communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARE/MIPAREC</strong>: Sasagaza Amahoro: From Grassroots to National Level-Spreading Peace</td>
<td>Repeat USAID grantee; deep experience in communities that were targeted</td>
<td>Conflict resolution; mediation; dialogue;</td>
<td>Bashingantahe; locally elected leaders; local CBO leaders; Key (at community level)</td>
<td>Socio-political in terms of how the institutions functioned; individual in terms of community</td>
<td>Reinforcing the capacity of existing local CR mechanisms will enhance community stability &amp; contribute to peace and reconciliation at community level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SFCG</strong>: Supporting Burundi’s Transition to Peace by Facilitating Dialogue &amp; Reconciliation</td>
<td>Repeat USAID grantee; extensive experience in Burundi working on these issues</td>
<td>Facilitate dialogue and reconciliation among Burundians; media programming; capacity building of CSOs and journalists; Trauma/healing</td>
<td>Journalists; CSOs; all Burundians (through media programming); help victims of torture; More people</td>
<td>Individual change; cultural change vis-a-vis Burundian attitudes towards each other</td>
<td>Combining a range of activities to reach a broad spectrum of Burundians will contribute to peace and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SFCG</strong>: Supporting Reconciliation in Burundi</td>
<td>TRC; TJ; facilitate dialogue; strengthen CR skills; media programming</td>
<td>All Burundians via media programming and outreach activities on key issues (Land, TJ, TRC, CR); More</td>
<td>Individual change; culture change</td>
<td>Enable Burundians to coexist peacefully by reinforcing capacity at all levels of society to deal with conflict constructively</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SFCG</strong>: Promoting Locally Driven Conflict Transformation and Collaborative Action in Burundi</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Developmental Evaluative Learning Review: Synthesis Report
Field Study of USAID/Burundi Annual Program Statement People-to-People Reconciliation Grants 354
Annex G: Research Instruments

Questions for Implementers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Interview:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization/Project:</td>
<td>Time Start: Time End:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewer(s):</td>
<td>Interviewee Name, Title:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction:
Bonjour et merci d’avoir consacré le temps de parler avec nous aujourd’hui. Comme nous avons expliqué lors de notre demande de rendez-vous, nous travaillons actuellement avec USAID CMM (Bureau de Gestion et mitigation des conflits) à Washington D.C. sur un programme d’évaluation de 2 ans. L’évaluation focalise sur les programmes de réconciliation « Personne-à-Personne » (P2P), autrement dit, le « APS » ou Annual Program Statement.

Nous avons déjà mené un programme de recherche dans 2 autres pays (Israel/West Bank/Gaza, et Bosnia-Herzegovina) où nous avons parlé directement avec les bailleurs, les partenaires d’exécution, et les bénéficiaires des programmes APS de CMM. L’objectif principal des évaluations sur terrain est d’avancer l’apprentissage au sein de CMM et de USAID en général en rapport avec le dessin, la mise en œuvre, et la gestion de ce genre des projets dans l’avenir. Les responsables CMM veulent mieux comprendre comment le dessin et la mise en œuvre des différents projets répondent au contexte et aux facteurs principaux du conflit pour mieux informer le processus de financement de CMM dans l’avenir. L’auditoire principal des ces évaluations est CMM et l’agence USAID Burundi.

Nous souhaitons parler avec vous aujourd’hui pour écouter votre expérience, dans vos propres mots, pour nous aider à mieux comprendre comment ces projets se réalisent « sur terrain » en réalité. En particulière, les gestionnaires CMM APS cherchent à comprendre l’impact, pertinence, et réponse des futurs dons dans la domaine de la mitigation des conflits à travers une enquête sur trois questions :

- L’efficacité des initiatives de la construction de la paix dans le cadre « personne-à-personne », définies comme les initiatives qui produisent un changement d’attitude et de comportement des bénéficiaires et leurs communautés ;
- Si et comment ces initiatives contribuent à la paix globale (« Peace Writ Large ») ; et
- Si les projets P2P ont été les réponses pertinents aux conflits ils ont adressés, y compris leur capacité de s’adapter aux dynamiques et facteurs de conflits pendant la durée du projet.

Confidentiality Protocol

- We will collect information on individuals’ names, organizations, and positions. A list of key informants will be made available as an annex to the final evaluation report, but those names and positions will not be associated to any particular findings or statements in the report.
- We may include quotes from respondents in the evaluation report, but will not link individual names, organizations, or personally identifiable information to those quotes, unless express written consent is granted by the respondent. Should the team desire to use a particular quote, photograph, or identifiable information in the report, the evaluators will contact the respondent(s) for permission to do so.
- All data gathered will be used for the sole purposes of this evaluation, and will not be shared with other audiences or used for any other purpose.

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Do you have any questions for us before we get started?

General:

1. Before we begin, can you tell us a bit about your association with the project?
   a. When did you first start with project? How long have were you with it?
   b. What were your major roles and responsibilities?
   c. Who were the others associated with the project?
   d. What were their roles and responsibilities?
   e. If they are no longer with the organization, do you happen to have their contact information?

Peace writ Small:

Design:

2. In your words, how would you describe the Theory of Change (ToC) behind this project?
a. What were the overall objectives of the project? In other words, what kind of change did you hope to inspire – from what to what? And how do you know when enough is enough in a project that is trying to change behaviors and attitudes?

b. Did you conduct a conflict analysis to inform your project objectives?

c. Did you have a defined group of beneficiaries? If so, who were they? What level was the project intended to target: Individual? Community? Institutional? Societal?
   Probe: Who do you work with, How do you work with them?

d. Can you describe most common activities?
   Probe on touch points – frequency, intensity, and inclusiveness)

e. Where did they take place? (coverage)

f. Why did you make that choice of target community?

g. If the project was going to be a success, how would you know?

**Implementation:**

3. In your own words, how would you define “reconciliation”?
   a. Do you think the project activities were well suited to encourage this type of reconciliation? Would you have done anything differently?

4. Did you alter your ToC or project activities at any point during project implementation? If so, why?

5. How did you track your progress? (Probe: were they required to? Where systems imposed? Where these system helpful/detrimental? Suggestions for improvement).

6. Did the definition of the project’s success change over the life of the project? From what to what?

7. Would you describe the project as a success? (Possible follow on: Did you build on existing mechanisms or projects?)
   Rating (ask respondent to choose from the following: (1) very successful; (2) Somewhat success; (3) A Little Successful; (4) Not Successful.

**Peace writ Large:**

8. Do you think the project contributed in any way to changing the context? How? What might be needed to expand success to the next level?
   a. At participant level?
   b. At community/institutional level?
   c. At national level?

9. Did any outside factors contribute to/influence/detract from your success?
   a. Internal Factors (e.g. existing conflict resolution mechanisms)
   b. External Factors
      i. Country/conflict context
      ii. Other Donor Programs
      iii. Other factors?

10. Do you think the project had any unobserved or unanticipated consequences (good or bad)?

**People-to-People Context:**

11. Knowing what you know today, if you were asked to create a project to encourage reconciliation in Burundi, what would it look like?
   a. What primary issues would it address?
   b. What groups/people would you involve/work with?
   c. What would the main project activities be?

12. Have you implemented similar projects outside of Burundi? If so, where and with what donor? Or with a different donor inside Burundi?
   a. Did these projects differ from the one(s) in Burundi? If so, how? What makes Burundi unique?

13. What do you understand the expression a “people-to-people approach” to mean?

14. Do you think a people-to-people approach offers any unique advantages or disadvantages over other approaches?
Rating: Please tell us how you would answer the following: “A P2P approach is __
Options: (1) Very useful; (2) Somewhat Useful; (3) A Little Useful; (4) Not Useful.
for encouraging reconciliation at the:
Participant level ____________
Community level ____________
National level ____________”

Follow-on:
15. Did you successfully apply for additional funding from USAID/CMM or other donors to extend this project? From whom?
16. If yes, did the project(s) have similar or different objectives? What were they?
17. Did you continue to use the same the same kind of approach?

QUESTIONS FOR DONORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Interview:</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project:</td>
<td>Time Start: Time End:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewer(s):</td>
<td>Interviewee Name, Title:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category of Interviewee: Donor Agency:

| No. of Interviewees | M  | F  | Ethnic Group: |

Introduction: Good morning/afternoon and thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. As mentioned during our interview request, we are currently working with USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in Washington, D.C on a two-year evaluation of their People-to-People reconciliation grants programs, commonly known as the “Annual Program Statement” or “APS.”

As part of our larger project, we have conducted research in three countries (Israel/West Bank/Gaza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Burundi) to speak directly with the funders, implementers, and beneficiaries of CMM’s APS programs. We would like to speak with you today to hear about your experience, in your own words, in order to help us better understand how these projects look and function “on the ground.”

Confidentiality Protocol

- We will collect information on individuals’ names, organizations, and positions. A list of key informants will be made available as an annex to the final evaluation report, but those names and positions will not be associated to any particular findings or statements in the report.
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- All data gathered will be used for the sole purposes of this evaluation, and will not be shared with other audiences or used for any other purpose.

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Do you have any questions for us before we get started?

General:

1. Before we begin, can you tell us a bit about your portfolio? What types of programs do you oversee?
2. Our evaluation is looking at reconciliation programs.
   a. How would you define “reconciliation”? 
   b. How would you define “success”?
3. Are you familiar with USAID/Burundi people-to-people reconciliation programming?
   a. Are there any projects that stand out (successful or unsuccessful)?
   b. Does USAID’s type of programming differ from yours?
      i. Size, duration, touch points?
      ii. Target groups or locations?
      iii. Types of activities?
4. Have you seen a change in the conflict context in Burundi over the last 10 years?
   a. If so, what do you think contributed to this change?
      i. Organic process (returnees, etc.)?
      ii. Donor-supported?
   b. Do you think it’s possible to disaggregate impact of donor-specific programs? If so, what do you think has been the impact of the USAID/Burundi APS?
   c. Have there been any unobserved/unintended consequence of donor projects (good or bad)?

People-to-People Context:
5. Have you implemented similar projects outside of Burundi? If so, where and with what donor?
   a. Did these projects differ from the one(s) in Burundi? If so, why? What makes Burundi unique?
6. Do you think a people-to-people approach offers any unique advantages or disadvantages?
   a. Is it sufficiently flexible to allow for changes over time?

Rating: Please tell us how you would answer the following: “A people-to-people approach is _________ for encourage reconciliation at the”

Options: (1) Very useful; (2) Somewhat Useful; (3) Not Useful; (4) Harmful
   Participant level ______________
   Community level ______________
   National level ______________

QUESTIONS FOR BENEFICIARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Interview:</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project:</td>
<td>Time Start: Time End:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewer(s):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category of Interviewee: Approximate Age:

| No. of Interviewees | M | F | Ethnic Group: |

- Mieux comprendre:
  o L’efficacité des initiatives de la construction de la paix, définies comme les initiatives qui produisent un changement d’attitude et de comportement des bénéficiaires et leurs communautés ;
  o Si et comment ces initiatives contribuent à la paix globale au Burundi; et
  o Si les projets ont été une réponse pertinente aux conflits ils ont adressés, y compris leur capacité de s’adapter aux dynamiques et facteurs de conflits pendant la durée du projet.

Notre souhait est d’apprendre de vous quels ont été les meilleures pratiques/approches et quelles sont les leçons à tirer pour améliorer les projets futurs.

Confidentiality Protocol

- The team will collect information on individuals’ names, organizations, and positions. A list of key informants will be made available as an annex to the final evaluation report, but those names and positions will not be associated to any particular findings or statements in the report.
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- All data gathered will be used for the sole purposes of this evaluation, and will not be shared with other audiences or used for any other purpose.
Do you have any questions for us before we get started?

General:

1. **Before we begin, can you tell me about how you heard about the XXX project?**
   - **Probes**: Program included the following activities [...] and partners [...] and was organized with the following people [...]. Do you remember this program? Did somebody ask you to join it? Did you hear about it on the radio? How was the program described to you?

2. **In a few words, can you tell me how you were involved with the XXX project?**
   - **Probes**: Why do you think you were chosen to participate? dates of involvement; frequency of involvement; changes in participation over time; who did you interact with during the project? What types of activities were you involved in? Did you have a role in determining those activities?

Peace writ Small:

3. When you first started with the project, what do you believe was the purpose of the project? Did this change over time?
4. In your own words, how would you define “reconciliation”? Do you think the project activities were well suited to encourage reconciliation? Would you have done anything differently?
5. Do you feel that you have changed in any important ways from your participation? Are you different today than you were when you first started the project? How? In what ways have you changed? Would others say you have changed?
   - **5b**: (Following answer above, ask respondent to pick from one of the following choices) Would you say that you have changed?
     1. Significantly;
     2. Somewhat
     3. Very little
     4. Not at all
     5. Don’t know

Have you contributed to changing others, their attitudes, behaviors? How?

6. Would you participate in this project again? Would you recommend it to a friend ____; a neighbor____; someone from a different ethnic or political party or socio-economic group____? Why?

Peace writ Large:

7. How would you describe the context in your community before the start of the project? Is this different now? How about the country context? Is it different now?
8. If yes, what do you think explains this change? Do you think the project contributed in any way?
   - **9b**: If yes, how would you describe this? Did the project have:
     1. A lot
     2. Some
     3. Very little
     4. No change at all
     5. Don’t know

9. Do you think the project helped anyone not directly involved in the project? If yes, how so; If not, why?
10. Do you know of any other similar projects? If yes, do you think they were more or less successful?

People-to-People Context:

11. If you were asked to create a project to encourage reconciliation in Burundi, what would it look like? What activities would you suggest?
12. Are there any other groups/people you would involve?
13. What do you think are the biggest worries/troubles/issues facing Burundi today? Is anyone working on these issues?
### Annex H: Select Definitions of “Reconciliation”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementer</th>
<th>Quote</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THARS</td>
<td>&quot;Reconciliation means people build relationships, true relationships, regardless of the past. For us it is all about positive relationships. There is also the theme of forgiveness—we wanted to create our own Burundian reconciliation where we focus on “positive relationships”—how do they overcome what divides them, addressing the root causes of violence. We also wanted to focus on how these people dealt with structural and cultural dimensions of conflict in Burundi. Reconciliation is the end of a process of managing the structural and cultural dimensions of violence.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAP</td>
<td>&quot;The word has many meanings— for us, it means sharing what you have, and also searching together. Reconciliation means working together for common cause and for common interests. This requires change—not just change in riches but also in change of mentality. This includes everyone’s dignity. Thanks to this mental change you reconcile with yourself, with the other, with the environment, and also with God (for those who believe).&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD-Non-APS</td>
<td>&quot;Use a very basic understanding so that community members understand the dynamics. Reconciliation is to assist members of a given society to give them an opportunity of overpassing challenges that brought misunderstanding, negative competition, violence, so that they can overcome these challenges, start a new life, and heal wounds that have been healed. Sometime needs to be done through punishment and/or compensation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPAREC</td>
<td>&quot;Reconciliation depends upon the context. There are people who you might consider as victims and on the other hand there are perpetrators. During the crisis there are people who burnt other peoples’ houses, stole their assets, or killed. Now these people are still living in the community—in 2005, some of the offenders were released from captivity and both groups needed to meet. Reconciliation is a process where offender told the truth to the victim—for us this is where reconciliation starts—where the victim and perpetrator... Another definition of reconciliation—cohabitation—you live there and I live here. I see the person—I don’t say hello and he doesn’t say hello but we don’t bother each other. Our position is that the perpetrator and the victim should be able to meet and sit together and speak about the truth and the perpetrator should acknowledge what they have done and the victim’s suffering.”</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiaries/Project</th>
<th>Quote</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIPAREC - Gitega</td>
<td>&quot;Reconciliation is the process when people are in conflict and someone from the outside comes to them and tells them how to behave. Overtime their conflict and bad ideas disappear and people begin to reconcile.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPAREC - Gitega, 2nd group</td>
<td>&quot;Reconciliation is finding a solution to a problem that faces two or more groups. The solution must come from within these groups...an outside mediation may help but the solution needs to be theirs.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;People must feel love. If there is love, it will ensure there will be no return [of conflict].&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Reconciliation happens between people opposed in conflict, when people decide to ask for forgiveness. If they ask openly, you show that you are ready, that you are sincere, and then people will also forgive you. If you reconcile, your life returns to normal. If the person speaks the truth, if he is honest, then he deserves forgiveness.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iteka (non-beneficiary)</td>
<td>&quot;Putting together two protagonists or two conflict parties arguing about any particular issue, putting them together in order to come to a common agreement and mutual interest.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAP</td>
<td>&quot;For me reconciliation means encouraging people to make their issues public. We have seen...&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Quote</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>“Reconciliation is when two people who are opposed to one another and then an external person comes and put people together, listens to one side and listen to the other and then works towards an end state of reconciliation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Reconciliation means a lot of things—it means exchanging ideas, sharing work, the absence of discrimination, the absence of contempt.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“When two sides are in conflict, in order to reconcile, each needs to concede something…they need to go beyond what divides them, coming to similar views, accepting to sit down and agree…this is what will lead you to reconciliation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions for Peace</td>
<td>“In order to reconcile, there are things you give and thing you receive. This is true in all relationships.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THARS</td>
<td>“When two people are in conflict, one cedes something so they can come together without considering what they have given up. The goal is to accept and share -- accepting to change fixed ideas, to change, and to come to a consensus without the use of physical force.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7: POTENTIAL INNOVATIONS IN THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT

This chapter reviews the APS’ efforts to support conflict mitigation and reconciliation activities around the world, considers these in light of the guidance on P2P reconciliation, and offers alternate scenarios of potential future developments for consideration by program managers, implementers, and partners.

By synthesizing the results of the three field evaluations, the desk review of all available APS documentation, and the meta-evaluation and meta-analysis of sampled evaluations, we have gained insights on the $115 million the APS has invested in supporting reconciliation over the eight-year period reviewed. Together, these sources paint a picture of a program that has supported reconciliation among individuals in diverse conflict contexts. While this critical examination concludes that the APS has directly contributed to individual transformation of attitudes and behaviors among the project participants, the APS has not been as successful in contributing to PWL, and all the systemic societal shifts that PWL entails. The APS could develop according to several different scenarios, each of which would allow the APS to contribute to more societal-level transformation, even though significant challenges must be overcome to effect changes in social and political institutions.

This chapter is divided into three primary sections. As Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) Collaborative Learning Projects’ “Reflecting on Peace Practice” (RPP) program serves as a key reference throughout this chapter, the chapter first begins with an introduction to key RPP terms and concepts relevant to our review. It then examines the APS’ main strengths and weaknesses based on conclusions drawn from each component of our evaluative learning review and reference the RPP concepts previously identified. It then concludes with some suggestions for CMM to improve the APS going forward.

Key Terms and Concepts from CDA’s RPP

RPP is one of the seminal works guiding CMM’s management of the APS and its work more generally. Launched in 1999, RPP is “an experienced-based learning process” focused on both the reflection of and practice of effective peacebuilding.263 During its initial three-year phase (1999–2003), RPP conducted 26 case studies and held consultations with over 1,000 peace and conflict practitioners, scholars, and

263 Please see CDA’s Reflecting on Peace Practice website for additional background, http://www.cdacollaborative.org/programs/reflecting-on-peace-practice/.
experts from over 200 donors, implementers, local partners, and community groups. The main findings and lessons learned from this phase were published in CDA’s *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. During its second and ongoing “utilization phase,” RPP has been testing and refining the lessons from its first phase as well as identifying additional lessons in four priority areas: (1) conflict analysis and program strategies; (2) the “adding up” or cumulative impacts of peace efforts; (3) the linkages between micro- and macro-level effects on peace, referred to as *Peace writ Little* (hereafter referred to as PWS and PWL; and (4) how to monitor and evaluate the impact of individual programs on PWL.

As defined in *Confronting War*, PWL refers to changes at the macro level. It involves producing “changes at the broad level of society as a whole” with the dual goals of (1) stopping violence and destructive conflict and (2) building just and sustainable peace. PWS refers to the more immediate, micro-level changes in individual attitudes and behaviors. CDA’s Chloe Berwind-Dart explains that PWS is “conceived as a local or community level of sustainable peace,” and further clarifies that “this concept emphasizes a limited scope of impact—in the sense that changes are constrained geographically...in order to influence Peace Writ Large, such local efforts would need to create effect at a higher level (sub-national, national).”

One of the central findings of *Confronting War* and the first phase of RPP argues that peace programs should actively look to link their specific program goals to contributions to PWL. “Peace programs that are not consciously and directly linked to the large and long-term goal of peace will very often miss the mark. They may do some good for some people, but they will make very little real contribution to the realization of Peace Writ Large.” To help explain how to develop and strengthen these linkages between PWS and PWL, RPP developed a four-cell matrix (see diagram below) outlining the two types of approaches most commonly used by peacebuilding programs and the two basic types of change they generally hope to engender. RPP found that all the activities reviewed in their study could be located within one of these cells, with some programs engaged in more than one cell or working in between cells.

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The arrows in the diagram above represent the linkages RPP found to be particularly significant for programs to have an impact on PWL. “First, RPP found that programming that focuses on change at the Individual/Personal level, but that never links or translates into action at the sociopolitical level has no discernible effect on peace [emphasis original].”266 Regarding the shift from the sociopolitical to the Individual/Personal level (see dashed arrows above), RPP found the linkage to be weaker, stating their “evidence suggests that sometimes, but not always, work is necessary at the Individual/Personal level to ensure that sociopolitical changes are sustained and internalized in the behavior of individuals.”267 Second, RPP found that approaches that only worked in one quadrant at the sociopolitical change level and failed to link with the other (e.g., concentrating only on “more people” and failing to also link “key people” or vice versa), “do not ‘add up’ to effective peace work.”268 Importantly, RPP is careful to recognize that “most programs do not and cannot do everything at once. In many cases, programs can remain in one cell and develop opportunities for cooperation and/or coordination of efforts with other agencies working in different areas in order to magnify impacts.”269

While RPP stresses the importance of linking activities and contributions to PWL, it also recognizes the difficulty of actually assessing these contributions and evaluating the effectiveness of these programs. “Most peacebuilding programs are discrete efforts aimed at affecting one (often small) piece of the puzzle, and no one project can do everything. Outcomes are also difficult to assess. Attribution of social impacts to particular peace activities is even more difficult.”270 To help alleviate this difficulty, RPP suggests that effectiveness be assessed along two dimensions: (1) program effectiveness—whether an activity is achieving its intended goals on its “own terms” and in an effective manner; and (2) impact of

267 Ibid., p. 12.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid., p. 13.
PWL—assessing changes in the overall environment that may or may not result from the activity—in other words, looking for contributions versus specific attributions to PWL.

Having outlined some of the key terms and concepts that informed our assessment, we now turn to our assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the current APS design.

**Strengths of the Current APS Design**

First, we acknowledge the significant strengths of the overall APS program in effecting individual and local community change. The field evaluations in IWBG, BiH, and Burundi indicate that the APS programs directly contributed to reconciliation among participants. IWBG APS grantees “achieved notable successes—responding effectively to contextual challenges, achieving consistently positive results with direct participants and local communities, and establishing promising foundations for broader social-structural impact over time.” In BiH, APS projects show “quite extensive evidence of personal transformation at the individual level.” In Burundi, “real strides have been made in reconciling individuals and groups at the community level, particularly in rural areas.”

All evidence supports the conclusion that APS programs have made strong contributions to PWS in the form of reconciling individuals and local communities directly involved in APS programs. Together, the field evaluations present evidence that the APS programs certainly do contribute to individual and local community reconciliation, or PWS. The meta-evaluation supports this, as individual-level “behavioral and attitudinal changes were credibly claimed by a majority of the evaluations.” The desk review adds the qualification that those APS programs that include ideal or adequate “touch points”—direct contact between individuals—produce ideal or adequate contributions to PWS. Individual and local community reconciliation is a clear strength of the current APS design.

**Weaknesses of the Current APS Design**

Across the board, the learning review pieces, taken alongside the APS goals, together point to one overall weakness in the current APS design. While the APS goals include some impact on PWL, the proven impact of the current design is limited to PWS. The programs as a whole,

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**Examples of APS Contributions to PWL**

- For example, see the establishment of local peace structures and changes in national legislation from the Burundi field evaluation.
- In IWBG, APS-funded projects facilitated strategic partnerships on environmental issues between Israeli and Palestinian individuals, municipalities and communities, establishing programs to engage youth from both sides and the wider region in environmental action. These environmental initiatives have resulted in regional partnerships developing alternative energy sources, in joint wastewater disposal and pollution reduction systems, and in concrete policy changes.
- According to documents reviewed during the desk review, in Sri Lanka, PILPG was able to achieve senior-level government buy-in to direct “others within government to formulate a legitimate constitutional proposal to resolve the grievances of the Tamil population—any program will have a hard time achieving its goal—devising a sustainable political solution that met the demands of both parties and secured a lasting peace in Sri Lanka.” Likewise, in the Central Asian Republics, an evaluation of IREX’s Youth Theatre for Peace found that “the target community members reported having significantly fewer conflicts between one another…All in all, the evaluation findings show that YTP has a certain effect not only on direct program participants but on wider community members as well through events organized by program participants (i.e. Forum Theater plays)."

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Despite all the significant evidence of individual and local community change, can generally credibly claim only that they have paved the way for eventual broader social-structural impact over time, though the APS projects are generally much shorter than the timeframe that would be required for full realization of such PWL shifts. In other words, in contrast to the strong evidence of individual and local community change, the APS projects reviewed do not present compelling evidence of direct impact on PWL, beyond a few limited and isolated examples (see inset box). Rather, the successful programs that clearly contribute to PWS also describe challenges that prevent clear evidence of direct contributions to PWL. These challenges, as identified in our Evaluative Learning Review, include:

- APS projects are relatively small, not reaching critical mass to bring systems-level change in their overall conflict system.
- Separate APS projects are selected without consideration as to how they will complement each other and add up to more than the sum of the parts.
- APS projects are generally limited to working within one country at a time, although conflict dynamics often spill across international borders.
- APS projects are funded at most for three years and there was little evidence of strategic follow-on funding, but PWL shifts require longer-term engagement.
- Tracing the indirect contributions of specific individual and community shifts to the overall social-structural impact is difficult in complex and rapidly changing contexts where many initiatives interact. This challenge is compounded by our finding that APS programs generally have weak/insufficient M&E systems for tracking these contributions and that USAID Missions generally do not track contributions to PWL at the portfolio level.
- Gains achieved in part through people-to-people reconciliation approaches can be reversed by economic or political developments.
- P2P programming—no matter how large its scale, how coordinated it is for maximum impact, how able it is to engage relevant conflict dynamics outside the one country of focus, how long-term it is, or how well its indirect contributions can be traced—is necessary but not sufficient to bring about PWL shifts.

Rather than seeing this as a weakness of the program, it may be more useful to reframe this finding. A weakness implies that we must try harder, strengthen, and succeed in developing the ability to consistently make direct contributions social and political institutional and structural shifts for PWL. But, taken as a whole, the learning review suggests something entirely different: P2P reconciliation programming should not be expected to make direct contributions to PWL at the individual activity level. APS managers, implementers, and partners should be encouraged to better demonstrate linkages and/or gaps in achieving clear contributions to PWL. P2P reconciliation is often most salient at the level of individual and local community change, as well as in supporting and/or creating conditions in which PWL might be achieved, as part of a multifaceted peace process in which many other kinds of initiatives engage the social and political institutions and key people that are part of PWL shifts. In other words, CMM should direct APS designers and implementers to more explicitly state in their conflict analyses and activity design documents how their activity fits into the larger conflict system and explicitly state where it sees links to more sustainable peace.

“In short, it is not realistic to expect USAID or its implementing partners to achieve the delivery of peace writ-large from a singular peacebuilding program, let alone on a timeframe nicely aligned with fiscal cycles. The goal in most cases must be an incremental step on the path to larger impact. Indeed, P2P secures only one of the essential component of peacebuilding while contributing to other essential components.”

~P2P program guide. Pg. 25.
ENGAGING WITH “PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PEACEBUILDING: A PROGRAM GUIDE”

In January 2011, following a series of consultations with scholars and practitioners, CMM published its “People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide.” The document provides APS program designers and evaluators with a set of 14 guidelines to ensure “high-quality people-to-people programs” that measure “impact, capture learning, and advance a ‘Do No Harm’ Approach.” It carefully explains that “peacebuilding requires sustained and long-term efforts” and underscores that the APS is intended to support a broad range of conflict programs and serve as a natural test-bed for innovation.

Interestingly, while the guide is too recent to have significantly influenced the APS projects reviewed in our Evaluative Learning Review (2004–2012), it echoes many of the same findings that emerged from our study. For example, similar to our finding that APS programs are much more successful at contributing to individual- and community-level attitudinal and behavioral change than larger societal-level change, the guide readily admits that “P2P programming primarily works to create attitudinal change among large groups of people or key people. It seeks to transform attitudes and perceptions and to build relationships and trust across conflict lines.” While the guide does go on to stress that “the impact for broader peace is more significant if these personal transformations are translated into actions at the structural and institutional levels,” it does not provide any detail on how this would actually take place.

The guide also recognizes several other limitations identified by our review, such as:

- **The relative small size of APS projects in overall conflict system**—“The duration of the [APS] program is bound to be shorter than the entire conflict transformation process, which can occur over decades. When using P2P programming, USAID staff and implementing partners perpetually confront the dilemma of having to produce ‘long-term results with short-term resources.’”

- **PWL requires longer-term investment**—“Rarely if ever would a single program operate along the full spectrum in both [attitudinal and institutional] dimensions. Due to the

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practical constraints of management, project goals are necessarily more limited. However, many programs together and over time may add up to Peace Writ Large…”278

- **Difficulty of measuring and tracking results**—“One of the challenges in measuring the impact of peacebuilding generally and P2P programming specifically arises from the extremely fluid nature of most conflicts…another challenge in measuring impact is that P2P interventions focus on behavioral and attitudinal change. These changes are largely intangible [emphasis original]…[lastly] the timing of the monitoring and evaluation do not necessarily adhere to the process of [conflict] transformation. Changes in perceptions and behavior are not likely to occur linearly.”279

- **Gains from P2P activities can be reversed by economic and political developments**—“USAID staff and implementing partners need to monitor the government representatives’ shifting incentives and understand the impact and consequences of their relationships with these officials.”280

While the guide’s recognition of these limitations suggests that many of the findings from our learning review are not new to CMM, we hope that our findings will be taken as objective supporting evidence that the current APS design needs to be modified in either form or function. CMM should look to modify the way the APS awards are made and their project results reported. As suggested by our learning review, the APS does not currently have the mechanisms in place to effectively contribute to PWL. With the exception of IWBG which has a pool of $10 million reserved annually, APS awards are made through a global competition that provides relatively small amount of money to support P2P reconciliation activities across a broad range of countries. Our Evaluative Learning Review found little evidence of strategic or complementary funding in the award of APS grants. Further, the APS does not feature a central M&E system or way of aggregating individual project outputs and outcomes into higher-level outcomes and impacts, making it difficult for APS managers to build on previous successes and scale-up instances of successful innovation. Instead, our review found that the APS awards appear to be relatively scattered and short-term, with little to no strategic or regional programming.

**Scenarios for Innovation with the APS**

As mentioned throughout our learning review, reconciliation projects are only one part of the multifaceted peace processes that lead to political agreements and conflict-sensitive laws, judiciaries, economies, and educational, religious, and social institutions. Thus, the APS should be seen as offering a unique and limited contribution in conflict areas. The APS should be further developed so that the unique and limited contributions of P2P reconciliation are most efficiently applied to those areas where they can make the most positive difference.

278 p. 7.
279 p. 22.
When we understand the limited role of APS programming, with its emphasis on individual change and local community shifts, we see that not all conflict areas are equally poised to respond to P2P reconciliation approaches.

This analysis suggests that the APS should be revised to offer more strategic use of P2P reconciliation approaches, so that the efforts are not wasted on contexts or times when returns on the APS investment will likely be marginal. Below we suggest possible innovative scenarios or opportunities to revise the APS to be more strategic in deploying the P2P reconciliation approach. These suggestions are offered as ways to build on the significant strengths of the APS while openly acknowledging the limitations of what it can achieve, particularly in isolation. Allowing the APS to develop a more focused mission, appropriate to the capabilities of P2P reconciliation, will allow the APS to be more effective.

**GREATER CONCENTRATION OF APS RESOURCES**

Rather than spread APS projects each year across 15 different countries with about $1 million in programming in each country, the APS could invest in a small number of focus counties (i.e., four or five) with $4 million to $5 million in programming in each country, similar to its investment in IWBG. So rather than fund one project in a country, the APS would fund 7 to 15 projects. With so many projects receiving support, the APS would be in a position to require coordination among grantees to encourage complementarity and overall impact. The one or two areas designated to receive APS programs would be carefully chosen with consideration of the dynamics that would allow APS programs to have effects beyond a small group of participants. Instead of a wide global competition for projects in numerous countries, the APS program would first manage a process of identifying one or two areas where necessary contextual factors were in place to make the most of P2P programming. However, one important caveat to note is that a higher concentration of funds and thereby an increase in the number of grants within each of the focus countries will result in an increased management burden for the individual USAID Missions. CMM should thus consider setting aside APS core funding to respond to the additional grants management functions and possible need for additional staff.

**MORE SYSTEMATIC ENGAGEMENT**

Relatedly, rather than seeking out places that already offer ideal environments for P2P reconciliation to have maximum impact, instead the APS could help to create such contexts. For example, focused uni-national/uni-ethnic work, engaging with one community in an inter-communal conflict, is widely recognized as an important approach in overall peace processes. In addition, fair political and economic systems that offer opportunities to all, regardless of identity, are required for P2P to have an impact on broader attitudes beyond direct participants. In order for P2P to be successful, it may need to be paired with uni-national/uni-ethnic work that engages only one side of a conflict in a preparatory step for two-sided engagement, and also with democratization, human rights, and economic opportunity work.

Coordination with other donors can be a part of more systemic engagement as well. The selection process for awarding APS grants could involve consultation with other donors, exploration of what they plan to support and how an APS project would be part of a broader system intervention. In other words, acknowledging other donor-supported efforts as part of the system more explicitly could allow the strategic choices that would support more systemic engagement.

Under this scenario the APS becomes centrally focused not on doing P2P, but on doing highly successful P2P. In order to do successful P2P, the APS could encourage and award complementary programs, acknowledging that one program cannot address conflict drivers at all levels. Often, when programming happens at only one level it can be incomplete and less effective; in some cases it can exacerbate problems. This more integrated approach to programming would engage with multiple activities that add up to the implementation of highly successful P2P. Instead of seeking proposals exclusively for P2P activities, the APS would seek proposals for successful P2P initiatives that include both P2P activities and their necessary related activities that make a conducive context for P2P to be highly successful.
Consider the following medical analogy: Rather than focusing exclusively on reducing a patient’s weight, a doctor may be more successful by introducing a program that includes increasing exercise levels, decreasing calorie intake, decreasing body fat, increasing muscle strength, and improving nutrition. The overall impact on a patient’s weight in the long term will be stronger if the focus is not exclusively on weight, but instead includes related considerations that support long-term multifaceted and systemic shifts.

**REGIONAL APPROACH**

Within the many details of the overall Evaluative Learning Review, there is a stark absence of regional approaches. The APS is currently structured largely to engage with conflicts that lie within one state’s borders, with only a small number of exceptions. But because many conflicts today spill across international borders, shifting an overall conflict system requires engaging with that full system. The learning review was structured such that the field evaluations focused on discrete areas of impact, and even the field evaluations did not venture beyond those borders. What lessons could have been drawn from the IWBG evaluation if it had ventured into the broader region? Imagine an APS that allows activities that engage people in several interrelated countries. We know that diaspora groups are often more extreme in their views than their compatriots at home, and that diasporas may be more influential in shaping the policies of their home country than are the people who remain at home. However, diasporas are often excluded from APS participation by the exclusive focus on people within particular state borders. If the APS were restructured to allow greater flexibility for regional approaches, more effective P2P reconciliation would be possible.

**LONGER TERM PROJECTS**

The APS could develop such that a particular project is funded for three years, renewed for another three years, and then renewed for another three years. After nine years of activity, the results would be much more significant than those that shorter programs can offer. The first few years of the project would allow for implementers to work out the wrinkles in the program, and then ongoing years would allow more and more effective implementation. Periodical renewal mechanisms would provide appropriate oversight. A common thread throughout our field evaluations was that APS implementers felt that they need more time to have more impact. Imagine a scenario in which the APS gives each project more time and gets more impact as a result.

**ENGAGE MORE KEY PEOPLE**

APS projects have strongly emphasized engaging “more people.” However, as argued by both CDA’s RPP and CMM’s own P2P guide, effective peacebuilding projects need to also involve “key people” to support reconciliation. The P2P guide makes explicit reference to the need to “identify and involve those who can most directly and positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts” and that “approaches that concentrate on ‘more people’ but do nothing to link to or affect ‘key people,’ or vice versa, do not

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281 It should be noted that the FY2012 and FY2013 IWBG APS solicitations did include allowances for regional programming; however, these years were outside of the period of projects reviewed (2004–2011).
lead to effective peace work.” APS managers should be encouraged to develop more programs focused on “key people” and linking them with programs focused on “more people” by convening them around their shared interests.

MORE FLEXIBLE PROGRAMMING

The APS could develop mechanisms that encourage project implementers to seriously assess the local context periodically and then to adjust their plans accordingly. While the learning review, particularly the BiH field evaluation and desk review, showed evidence of some project activities poorly matched to the needs of the local context, there were also examples of several projects that did make adjustments when the local context changed. As described in the desk review, this adaptive implementation increased program efficacy. Rather than simply allowing adjustments in isolated projects, the APS could explicitly encourage refined and updated analysis, leading to refined and updated project plans.

LOCAL PARTNER INITIATIVES

Like many USAID procurement mechanisms, the APS structures today generally favor large international organizations as the primary implementers of APS projects. However, the Evaluative Learning Review pointed to a lack of sustainability of the programs, as large short-term initiatives were later not re-funded for longer-term implementation. While recent APS solicitations have had separate thresholds for local partnerships, and recognizing that many of the APS grantees in IWBG are local grantees, CMM could do more to encourage local partners to lead local P2P programs within the APS. Such initiatives would be more sustainable and would be well aligned with USAID Forward and other procurement reforms emphasizing Paris Declaration principles such as host-country ownership.

By revising its current procurement mechanisms in favor of more flexible, locally focused options, CMM could achieve multiple objectives. It would be able to continue to carry out its current activities while simultaneously building local capacity. It would increase the sustainability of its projects because later, when USAID no longer funds a particular program, the local implementers would be well positioned to work with other international donor partners to continue program implementation. Further, remembering that the introduction to the P2P guide calls the APS a “test bed for innovation,” deviating from the current procurement mechanism which rely heavily on traditional international APS partners, CMM could provide local organizations with more direct access to funds and capacity assistance, providing them with tools and resources to amplify their efforts. One idea to consider is that the selection process could also become less burdensome if grantees could provide concept papers in the first round rather than requiring the submission of full proposals. To comply with USAID Forward objectives of making greater use of local partners, the Mission could also invite a broader range of partners and provide an orientation to applicants (such as a bidder’s conference) to make the application process less intimidating to non-traditional partners, which may actively dissuade extremely capable partners from seeking to access APS funds. Additionally, CMM should translate the P2P guide, Theories and Indicators of Change” (THINC) documents, and APS application forms into local languages, as the documents and the application process itself are intimidating to many nontraditional implementers and may actively dissuade extremely capable partners from seeking to access APS funds. Finally, when

282 Ibid., p. 15.
updating the P2P guide, CMM should insert more examples of how to turn the theoretical frameworks into practical, operational activities.

**PROVIDE FUNDING DEDICATED TO M&E, LEARNING, AND DISSEMINATING RESULTS**

CMM’s P2P guide explains that projects can “expand the scope of the P2P programming impact by ‘advertising’ their successes, demonstrating the potential impact of their work to other communities.”\(^{283}\) Further, it explicitly instructs APS managers that program learnings should be “disseminated widely so as to contribute to the upstream policy development thinking and program design, and help address challenges in the field by validating program hypotheses and theories of change.”\(^{284}\) However, the APS provides no central funding for USAID Missions or APS implementers to conduct and strengthen their M&E.

CMM could set aside specific APS funding dedicated to M&E. This funding could, for example, be provided to USAID Missions to host “learning events” that explain the utility of sound M&E for implementing partners’ own programmatic benefit. This may even result in partners deciding to contribute some of their own resources to track and successfully report on their achievements, thereby effectively leveraging limited APS funds. CMM could also consider reserving a dedicated pool of funds to manage a central, APS-wide M&E system, which would allow CMM to aggregate individual project outputs and outcomes and try to discern large trends and influences on a national or even regional level.

**WAYS TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE INNOVATIONS**

Each of the possible innovations presented above could be dismissed as impossible based on current practices, current constraints, current regulations, or current priorities. Each innovation goes against current practice. Each could easily be labeled unrealistic. But according to discussion among evaluation experts at the Learning Summit (described in Chapter 8), a contribution of this learning review is to “stir the pot” or “shake things up a bit.” By questioning the goals of the APS—e.g., *Is it useful for P2P programs to attempt to make Peace Writ Large impacts in isolation of other related activities?*—this learning review encourages the development of the APS.

The innovations section presented here will only be useful to the extent that it is engaged to spark creativity. These scenarios are presented as imaginary “what if” explorations, inspired by a rigorous critical examination of the APS. It would take much creativity and hard work by people with authority in all areas of the APS to make any one of these shifts. So rather than look first at all the challenges to any changes in the APS, the opportunity presented here is to look first for any possibilities. Are there any parts of these shifts that could be possible? What (Herculean) efforts would be required?

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CHAPTER 8: VALUES AND ALTERNATE SCENARIOS FOR EVALUATING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION PROGRAMMING

This and the previous chapters document a two-year effort by SI to help CMM evaluate the P2P reconciliation APS, with an emphasis on exploring ways to improve both the design and implementation of APS programs as well as how to evaluate them effectively. Given the process-focused, nonlinear nature of APS programs and their outcomes, this Evaluative Learning Review drew inspiration from Michael Quinn Patton’s DE methodology. The authors wish to underscore that the process that unfolded during the two years of our review deviated, at times quite significantly, from Patton’s methodology; this Evaluative Learning Review should not be considered a true DE. However, despite certain design elements outside of the control of the evaluation team, which will be explored in detail below, the team actively sought to incorporate elements and the intent of the developmental approach in a way that was unique for a government agency such as USAID. This chapter considers the conceptualization and early plans for the Evaluative Learning Review, the ways the methodology developed over time, how the evaluation was actually implemented, and what we can learn about adapting developmental approaches to evaluating such large-scale global programs. Finally, we identify challenges in evaluating P2P reconciliation programming and offer scenarios that help balance the many considerations inherent in such efforts.

The chapter draws extensively on team notes taken during the two-year project. In particular, the explanation of the early conceptualization of the evaluation, considered in the following section, draws on conversations with team members who participated in the early stages of the project. The latter sections draw on notes from Learning Group (LG) meetings, team meetings, the December 6th, 2013 Learning Summit, and conversations with the LG, field evaluation team members, and other team members throughout the project.

Conceptualizing the Evaluation

First, we consider the context that set the stage for this Evaluative Learning Review and its early conceptualization. The idea for a developmental approach to evaluating the APS emerged in the context of commitments within USAID as a whole and CMM in particular to improve the efficacy of development programming in complex contexts. CMM programming takes place in dynamic
environments involving shifting actors, targets, and windows of opportunity. Furthermore, APS programs focus on process-focused outcomes, such as changes in perceptions and attitudes, which are difficult to attribute to single activities and are likely to evolve in a nonlinear fashion. These factors make evaluating APS programs particularly challenging. CMM recognized that more “traditional” evaluation approaches involving assumptions of complete baselines, linear ToCs, and static targets and indicators were not responsive to the nature and context of its APS programs.

Under its THINC project, CMM had already engaged a group of leading conflict scholars and practitioners to summarize the ToCs implicit and explicit in conflict resolution program design.\textsuperscript{285} That project continued to explore and make more explicit the implicit assumptions that often drive the design and desired change sought in its conflict prevention and mitigation activities, and developed guidance for program implementers to usefully consider their ToCs.\textsuperscript{286} In addition to clarifying how and why an activity will address underlying conflict drivers and reach its intended outcomes, CMM was interested in exploring and clarifying conflict-related ToCs to “provide a basis for assessing relevance, effectiveness, and impact in M&E, and therefore to help identify reasons for success or failure.”\textsuperscript{287}

During the course of this work, CMM’s then Technical Lead Tjip Walker, having previously read Michael Quinn Patton’s Developmental Evaluation, met and discussed the challenges of evaluating conflict-related programs with Dr. Patton at a workshop held in conjunction with the annual American Evaluation Association conference. These discussions in turn influenced the THINC work, resulting in the group recommending that a worthy next step would include embedding a DE team into a new CMM project for the full life cycle of the project. The objectives would be twofold: to evaluate a project throughout its full life cycle, and to pilot the use of DE as a support to a specific intervention in a conflict area. CMM’s APS seemed to present a logical and appropriate opportunity for such an evaluation given that the programs were relatively small and short-term. Thus, acting on the recommendations of the THINC group, CMM began to develop a call for proposals to pilot DE within the context of one or two specific APS projects.

\textbf{SETTING PLANS IN A SCOPE OF WORK}

However, during the subsequent development of the scope of work (SOW) for the evaluation, staff transitions within CMM resulted in shifting responsibilities for finalizing the SOW, and additional ideas for the use of the evaluation emerged. Consequently, the evaluation purpose gradually shifted and reporting to Congress on the utility of the P2P reconciliation programs became an additional rationale for the evaluation. While the hopes of learning from the evaluation remained part of the evaluation purpose, providing a performance evaluation of the overall global program took on increased importance. The call for proposals did not request a plan for embedding a DE team within one or two new projects and working with those projects throughout the life cycle of each specific project. Instead

\textsuperscript{285} The project report is available here: \url{http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{286} CMM published three rounds of guidance, the most recent of which can be found here: \url{http://www.cdacollaborative.org/media/89747/THINC-Briefing-Paper.pdf}.

of a process focus, the products (evaluation reports) took on more significance. Thus, the SOW suggested a more traditional summative performance evaluation, which was further solidified in the subsequent “Amendment #1: Answers to Questions” (see excerpts below).

**Request for Proposals, Pg. 7-8:**

“The primary purpose for the evaluations in Phase II is to advance CMM and Agency learning. CMM desires evaluation reports with information to help the office improve (a) the design of its APS, (b) the content of its technical publications, and (c) the quality of its technical assistance to Missions. There is no pre-determined method of data collection or analysis, and CMM expects to consult with the evaluator and Learning Group to select an appropriate methodology. It is likely the evaluators will be asked to incorporate at least some elements of a developmental evaluation into their approach.…The primary audience for the evaluation reports will be CMM, but the target audience will also include the cognizant USAID Mission. A final list of evaluation questions will be developed in the course of Phase I in consultation with these constituencies, and said questions will be provided to the evaluators prior to their deployment.”

**Amendment #1, Pg. 1:**

“Offerors should note that the task order is not to evaluate each individual award/project, but to apply evaluative thinking or an approach like developmental evaluation (Patton 2011) to examine aggregate or cumulative performance of all APS awards at the country level.”

The excerpts above highlight the multiple purposes and interests that motivated CMM to seek the evaluation. One purpose was learning. Another was trying aspects of a DE approach. Other interests were in receiving specific products: evaluation reports that would present findings on specific areas of interest to CMM. One of these products was to be performance assessments at the country level for selected countries where the APS had operated. The products desired were aligned neither with the process interests in considering DE nor in being open to learning that would arise through that process. As the project moved into contracting, the process interests in learning and experiencing DE took on less of a place in the contract, which called for specific products that assessed performance of the global APS.

As the project team moved into implementation, CMM guidance straddled both the performance assessment product-oriented contract and a continued interest in learning about DE. Focused on the assessment products, CMM and USAID were to be the primary audience for the evaluation report. The list of evaluation questions would be developed by the evaluation team, CMM, and USAID Missions, without the explicitly stated involvement of the APS implementers; the evaluation questions were required to be finalized before an evaluation team would visit the field, where the focus was on data collection to examine cumulative performance in all projects in the country. Finally, the award of a fixed price contract restricted the team from innovating in the methods of implementing the evaluation—particular activities were promised as part of the fixed price contract, and significant adjustments would be difficult. It should be noted that a request to add the third field evaluation to the contract came after initial award; therefore, a contract modification was extended including additional funds to complete the evaluation. However, a budget was required to be developed for the evaluation and approved before any contract modification, thus making any on-the-go or developmental-like innovation difficult once the budget was set.

On the other hand, the CMM project management team remained highly engaged in the evaluation throughout the full two years of implementation, sought out input from Michael Quinn Patton on ways
Implementation of the Evaluative Learning Review

As is hoped during long-term evaluation projects, particularly those with a developmental component, the details of the actual design of the evaluation developed during implementation, as the team learned while doing the evaluation. The desk review provided input to shape the meta-evaluation. The three field evaluations were conducted sequentially, with each one providing useful background to shape the next field evaluation. By the time of the third field evaluation, the time in the field had significantly extended (without any budget increase), as the team staggered their time in the field. The various components of the evaluation, described in turn below, each focused on a different evaluation use. Together, these pieces of the evaluation all add up to the product presented here: an assessment of P2P reconciliation program, an assessment of the existing evaluation processes for the P2P reconciliation program, and suggestions for innovations within both the overall program and the evaluation of the program.

DESK REVIEW

The desk review was guided by a list of questions identified in close consultation with CMM and the project’s LG. The purpose of these consultations was to determine the specific objectives of the three interrelated evaluative learning activities to be conducted by SI: the desk review, the meta-evaluation, and the field evaluations. Implicit in each of these activities was the larger question of how well APS projects conform to and integrate guidance into project design, implementation, and M&E processes. In order to produce useful and potentially significant findings, the analysis focused on assessing alignment in project implementation rather than project design. Particular emphasis was placed on determining the extent to which each project responded to contextual challenges.

This desk study used a standard document review approach. It employed qualitative methods to review and analyze content to understand the strength and adaptability of the project design and reported implementation; the quality of the projects’ reporting; challenges faced by the projects; and the larger impact on or contribution to peace and reconciliation as reported by the implementers themselves.

The SI team, in collaboration with CMM, developed a desk review protocol that included questions on project design, implementation, and monitoring. Each question in the protocol was reviewed with CMM to determine the utility of possible findings for USAID. Questions were keyed to USAID best practices and guidelines for APS projects and were accompanied by definitions for each of the key terms.

Key considerations guiding the analysis of the sampled grants included the timeframe of each project and the changes in the APS solicitation over time—for example, the desk reviewers were careful not to be overly critical of projects prior to 2009 lacking a clearly defined ToC as this requirement was not introduced until the 2009 APS. Similar fluctuations related to grant size, duration, APS-eligible countries, focus on cross-border versus uni-national programs, and adherence to the P2P approach occurred over the life of the APS.

META-EVALUATION AND META-ANALYSIS

The meta-evaluation and a meta-analysis were led by a member of the LG with the intention of providing a richer understanding for the SI team and CMM about what evaluations had been conducted on APS activities to date, the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluations as seen through USAID’s evaluation standards, any findings related to outcomes of the programming, and to gain insights into
better options for future evaluative efforts and opportunities of APS activities for skill-building among CMM’s partners.

The assessment was driven by two sets of questions:

1. The meta-evaluation: What methodologies have been used? Using evaluation standards, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation methodologies and products.

2. The meta-synthesis: What can we learn about how to implement an effective P2P program? What can we learn about how well P2P programs are delivering results?

A sample of 10 out of 31 P2P evaluation reports comprised the data set for this Assessment. The team reviewed the quality of the reports against USAID’s Summary Checklist for Assessing USAID Evaluation Reports, as well as emergent standards from the field of peacebuilding and accuracy criteria from USAID’s Program Evaluations Meta-Evaluation Checklist. The team also mined the evaluation reports for crosscutting lessons learned and information on P2P programming results.

ISRAEL/WEST BANK/GAZA

The IWBG field evaluation was the first of three separate regional evaluations designed to inform the Evaluative Learning Review. The evaluation centered on three primary evaluation questions developed in collaboration with SI, CMM, and USAID/West Bank Gaza:

1. How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in IWBG changed in recent years due to Israeli/Palestinian and regional political developments?

2. How have APS-funded projects sought to analyze, adapt programming, assess impact, and remain relevant as the conflict context has evolved in recent years?

3. In contemporary context, are APS projects producing effects at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?

The six-person evaluation team, including two CMM staff members, employed multiple methods of data collection, including interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and an online survey. The online survey examined themes that emerged in data analysis of interviews and FGDs and was used to help validate preliminary findings and conclusions.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The evaluation of the APS projects in BiH was the second in the series of the three field evaluations. The evaluation centered on three primary evaluation questions developed in collaboration with SI, CMM, and USAID/BiH:

1. How has the context of P2P peacebuilding in BiH changed in recent years due to developments (political, economic, etc.) in BiH and the region?

2. Which of the strategies adopted by APS-funded projects were most effective for coping with and adapting to changes in the context in recent years?

3. In the contemporary context, are APS projects contributing to changes at the communal or societal level (beyond the individual persons who participate directly in project activities)? What are features of the contemporary context that enhance or limit wider impact?

The five-person evaluation team, led by SI’s then Deputy Director for the Evaluative Learning Review and consisting of local evaluators and a CMM staff member, employed a non-experimental, multi-level, qualitative-dominant mixed-methods design using document review, key informant interviews, and small group interviews. Through these methods, the evaluation was designed to capture a general understanding of projects and their outcomes and through this better understand their suitability to the
Bosnian context and to use any lessons identified to reflect on such efforts elsewhere. The team sought to take a comprehensive view of the contextual situation in BiH and the P2P projects designed to address reconciliation, and to contextualize this view within relevant literature, including guidance that informs the practice of reconciliation beyond USAID reconciliation programs.

**BURUNDI**

The final field evaluation in Burundi was organized around three main evaluation questions developed in collaboration with SI, CMM, and USAID/Burundi:

1. Was a P2P approach relevant for the Burundi context?
2. How effective have APS-Burundi projects been in producing attitudinal and behavioral change?
3. What are the links, if any, between APS-Burundi projects and “PWL”?

The nine-member team employed a non-experimental, qualitatively focused, mixed-methods approach involving: (1) a desk review and simple content analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources; (2) key informant and focus group interviews with APS donors, implementers, and beneficiaries, as well as comparison groups with other donors, implementers, and other community members engaged in similar but non-APS projects where possible; and (3) additional interviews with community members and individuals in camps for the internally displaced camps in Gitega province in order to test and validate information about program impacts received in the presence of expatriate evaluation team members.

The team staggered its field visits to allow for the piloting of the evaluation instruments and additional triangulation of data. Inspired by the DE approach, each team member was also asked to identify any underlying assumptions they were making which might color their analysis, suggest any additional questions that should be included in the interviews, and to identify key stakeholders that might have been overlooked.

**LEARNING PROCESS**

Finally, in addition to each of the above parts of the Evaluative Learning Review, each of which is further described in the relevant chapters in this volume, the learning process represents a core component of the Evaluative Learning Review. The learning process involved several activities. An LG was convened to engage with the Evaluative Learning Review most intensively during its formative stages, providing advice that CMM considered as it steered the project planning, and then as needed throughout the process. Individuals from the LG provided feedback on the overall learning review design and the field evaluation processes and products, and led the meta-evaluation team. In addition, others joined the shared learning as team leaders for each of the field evaluations. CMM’s managers of the APS and of the Evaluative Learning Review joined with the SI team leaders in periodic (usually monthly) leadership meetings. The leadership meetings had a dual purpose: fine-tuning the implementation of the Evaluative Learning Review and reflecting together on what we were learning about the process and substantive findings of the overall project. Finally, the learning process was greatly enriched by a Learning Summit that gathered evaluation experts together to help us make sense of the overall Evaluative Learning Review, and particularly the scenarios for future development of evaluation of P2P reconciliation programs.

The final sections of this chapter draw on the insights generated collaboratively during the learning process. As part of the work of the LG, members discussed evaluation methodology and ways to improve evaluation, and the team took notes on these discussions. Field evaluation teams engaged with questions on methodology as a daily part of their work together, and field evaluation team leaders later wrote structured reflections on the evaluation methodology and learnings from those field evaluation discussions as input into the overall findings presented here. The December 6th, 2013 Learning Summit discussion among evaluation experts included a specific focus on evaluation methodology and ways to improve evaluation of P2P reconciliation. The discussions below do not attempt to attribute comments directly to any individual, as the shared learning dynamics made it difficult to assign individual credit for
specific ideas that emerged in the learning process. The insights that emerged during the learning process are presented below, beginning with ways in which DE approaches can be adapted to evaluate large-scale global programs. We then turn to values, principles, and scenarios that may inspire further development of evaluation of P2P reconciliation programs.

Adapting Developmental Approaches to Evaluating Large-Scale Global Programs

DE works in partnership with program decision-makers to support innovations in social change efforts. Evaluative input can be useful when program managers engage in ongoing program development, adapt programs to new local contexts, pilot or adopt innovative approaches in a program, and adapt programs flexibly in response to shifts in the program context. As described by Patton, DE is used to support developments in a social change intervention by working directly with the leaders of that social change initiative. Typically, DE works at the project implementation level, helping those decision-makers who work closely with a target population.

How might DE motivations support evaluative work in partnership with program managers who are themselves removed from direct engagement with the target population? This Evaluative Learning Review innovated by trying to work not with people who are directly doing reconciliation work with conflict parties, but rather with people who are managing a global program that selects others to do reconciliation projects with conflict parties. In other words, this evaluation is one step removed from the direct project implementers, although it should be noted that implementers from over 37 projects were consulted during the field evaluations. These consultations sought input from the implementers, but the learning was aimed at managers of the global program, not the particular implementer. (Despite this focus, learning did take place among program implementers, too, as described further in the section on improving evaluation.)

There was a major shift in the unit of analysis between the early vision of the project and the final scope of work that ultimately guided the evaluation. Originally, the unit of analysis would have been one project because the THINC project suggested that a pilot program should utilize a DE approach within one P2P reconciliation project for the full life cycle of that project. Here, a project refers to one grant to one specific implementer for one set of activities in one country over a period of approximately one or two years. For example, a DE team might have supported the project manager at Search for Common Ground in implementing the $530,948 grant for “Supporting Reconciliation in Burundi,” April 2007–April 2009. This DE team would have worked with the project implementation team to infuse evaluative thinking into the project work and to bring evaluation insights to inform project decisions. With feedback early on during the project, shifts in project design could have been considered and, after discussion with USAID, implemented according to new approaches suggested by the evaluation insights.

288 Patton, 2011.

289 Ibid.
The evaluation would have lasted the full two years of the project and might have had an opportunity to inform significant changes in the project as the Burundi context changed.

However, the final scope of work called for a different unit of analysis. The requested focus was on the global APS managed by CMM in USAID’s Washington office. Rather than look at one specific project within the global program, and suggest appropriate shifts in that particular project, the evaluation was to look at the whole global set of many projects and to consider the country-wide program impact in a sample of countries. Because the primary direct client was now the larger program management team in Washington, the kinds of shifts that evaluation could support, and the time frame within which such shifts could be implemented, thus changed. The activities of the Washington program management team do not include interference in the project implementation managed by local USAID Missions in the relevant countries where grantee projects are implemented. Instead, Washington’s activities include envisioning future years’ solicitations of applications, managing the selection process for grantees, and then referring winning grants to USAID Missions for contracting and management. Because USAID’s procurement procedures can constrain the ease with which project implementation can be changed, the only kinds of innovations CMM can consider are long-term. As the Evaluative Learning Review concludes, it offers CMM several scenarios for potential innovation at the global program scale, affecting ways that CMM solicits applications, manages the grants competition, and manages the contracting and grant management. Any changes CMM chooses to make in the APS will be ones that will require years to implement, as contracting procedures must be approved in advance of issuing the program call for proposals, and, once set, the parameters of application review and selection cannot be shifted.

If an evaluation were to suggest innovations based on an empirical review of the program and its complex contexts, then allow time for the implementation of some of these suggestions, follow the impact of these innovations, and, finally, settle on which innovations to keep and which to reject, it would take much longer than the two years of this Evaluative Learning Review.

However, by including some aspects of a DE approach, this Evaluative Learning Review suggests some innovations for CMM to consider. The programming innovations are presented in Chapter 7. Below, we offer potential scenarios of evaluation innovation—alongside acknowledgement of the challenges that such evaluations must engage—as well as principles and values that can guide evaluation innovation.

**Improving Evaluation of People-to-People Reconciliation Programming through Ongoing Learning**

The motivation to improve the evaluation of P2P reconciliation programs is clear: to improve program efficacy. The desk review, presented in Chapter 2, concludes that adaptive implementation increases program efficacy, and that poor M, E, R hinders adaptive implementation. Thus, to support adaptive implementation, and thereby program efficacy, we need strong M, E, R.

The Evaluative Learning Review suggests scenarios for innovative evaluation that emphasize the value of ongoing learning. All of the potential scenarios are based on the idea that evaluation can support adaptive implementation, enhancing the effectiveness of reconciliation programs. The evaluation of P2P reconciliation programs can track and support the development of programs that are co-created by stakeholders operating within complex dynamic systems that often characterize reconciliation contexts. Not only this, when core stakeholders engage in tracking and supporting the development of their reconciliation program, that engagement itself supports reconciliation. Thus, evaluation becomes part of the intervention. When participants in a reconciliation program, informed by evaluative insights, bridge the conflict divide to further develop that reconciliation program, they work together towards a shared
goal; working towards a shared goal is itself a reconciliation process. Furthermore, evaluation can change the way people work together. Rather than seeking one “right way” and sticking to it, groups can improve gradually, through trial and error, constant feedback, and continuous learning.

This attitude towards evaluation as process-oriented, an integral part of P2P reconciliation emerged as a key theme in leadership meetings between the Evaluative Learning Review’s managers at CMM, relevant managers at SI, and periodically with LG members. At the conclusion of most of those meetings, a few minutes were dedicated to reflection on the project’s development, allowing space for new insights or approaches to emerge (see inset box). These insights informed the development of the Evaluative Learning Review, and the flexible space for creative reflection became a regular practice. Through regular use, these evaluative practices became integral to our way of working.

Through clarifying these questions, creative approaches emerged for further development of the project. For example, the structure of the Burundi field evaluation team’s time in the field was adjusted so that not all of the international team members were present in Burundi for the same period of time. Rather, staggered field visits allowed for a balance between involving all team members in as many interviews as possible, and allowing time on the ground for the evaluation questions to develop organically through engagement with the relevant stakeholders in Burundi.

By engaging with CMM program managers as active partners in the Evaluative Learning Review, including through leadership meetings that involved these active partners in all decision-making components of the project, the Evaluative Learning Review served to “stir the pot” at CMM. In other words, the process raised more questions than answers, and brought to the surface challenging areas for ongoing consideration. Rather than come to any set of conclusions regarding the definitive “best practice” or the best way to do something, the project led to scenarios for potential development of the P2P reconciliation program. CMM program managers reported that the project, through the process of leadership team meetings, greatly increased their awareness of the difficult balancing acts required in evaluating the P2P reconciliation program.

Similarly, the field evaluation teams found that their presence in the field served as a catalyst for learning among the stakeholders with whom they worked. Rather than treat stakeholder interactions as data collection, the interactions took on importance as part of the overall learning process in the Evaluative Learning Review.

In BiH, the field evaluation team met with the USAID Mission soon after arriving in the area, and learned that the BiH USAID Mission wanted an additional question explored in the evaluation: What is reconciliation in the Bosnian context? CMM’s Deputy Director joined the BiH field evaluation team, and found the subsequent explorations of the meaning of reconciliation in BiH useful for his own developing understanding of the nuances of reconciliation in practice. This learning occurred in unplanned ways during the field evaluation. For example, in one meeting with local partners, the evaluation questions regarding CMM guidance documents quickly became irrelevant. (As sub-grantees, the local partners had not worked with the CMM guidance documents.) However, the local partners turned the conversation towards the topic most pertinent for them: their experience of reconciliation. Later, in a separate meeting, another USAID Mission member questioned if reconciliation was ever possible in BiH. In response one of the evaluation team members, Mr. Vahidin Omanovic, an expert-practitioner of reconciliation process activities, shared his personal journey of reconciliation and some of his ongoing work towards broader social reconciliation. He described his wartime experience as a concentration...
camp prisoner, and told a number of anecdotes about people with whom he had worked. He also described, in evidently reconciled terms, how he currently viewed people from the other ethnic group that had been responsible for his traumatic experience. This personal testimony contributed significantly to group learning in ways that would be difficult to fully convey in the field evaluation report.

For the Burundi field evaluation team, the learning process was highly inclusive, and again and again the evaluation led to learning in unexpected places. For example, in meeting with a community council leader in a remote region, the evaluation team raised a question about the ways that the local council could influence the national council. The local council leader took the question quite seriously, open to approaches he had not previously considered, and left the discussion with some potential actions he and his council colleagues might take. When the evaluation team driver began to sit in on some focus groups, he was impressed with the discussions and shared that he learned much about reconciliation in the various regions they visited. The learning often generated more questions. In the team discussions regarding the potential for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to serve as an effective reconciliation tool for Burundi, many more questions were raised than answers offered.

The IWBG field evaluation team, by structuring their evaluation outbrief session to include substantial discussion, served to facilitate multiple stakeholders communicating with each other about big questions regarding USAID policies and procedures. Many of these questions arose from misunderstandings. A Palestinian grantee thought that it was only Palestinian vendors and participants who had to go through the vetting process, but USAID Mission staff explained that the same vetting procedures apply to all Israeli vendors and participants, too. Similarly, evaluation discussions allowed a grantee to ask about required indicators and gave a USAID Mission staff member a chance to explain that, beyond the “changing perceptions” indicator, all other indicators can be developed and tailored specifically for each unique project. For the two hours of the evaluation outbrief, the evaluation team established a forum for open-ended, problem-solving communication between grantees and Mission staff, which allowed these differences to be revealed and resolved.

Taken together, these field evaluation examples of unexpected learning point towards the values, principles, and scenarios of constructive evaluation of P2P reconciliation programs, discussed below.

VALUES, PRINCIPLES, AND SCENARIOS FOR EVALUATING PEOPLE-TO-PeOPLE RECONCILIATION PROGRAMMING

The Evaluative Learning Review revealed challenges that require balanced approaches that acknowledge the sensitivity and multiple purposes of evaluating P2P reconciliation programming. For example, both critical thinking and creative thinking are essential to useful evaluation, yet balancing these two approaches can be a challenge. Probing these challenges further, we see additional challenges emerge in situations where multiple values or principles might pull in different directions. The challenges, values, and principles are considered below, and, where the learning process discussions considered potential scenarios for engaging these challenges constructively, these scenarios are presented.

WORK WITHIN AN APPROPRIATE TIME SCALE

This experiment in bringing some developmental aspects to a short-term engagement with a long-term program suggests that DE approaches and tools can be useful for large-scale global programs, but that the utility will be seen over longer periods of time, depending on the speed with which global program managers are able to try out innovations and incorporate new approaches into policy. What is the potential of a truly long-term DE? Could evaluation continue over a decade with periodic support to innovations on a global scale?

The timing of innovation implementation is a related challenge. As learning takes place, the time frame for implementing new plans informed by that learning varies. The more significant the learning and thus, the more radical the shift in plans, the more important it may be to act quickly. However, such major
changes may also create more contracting concerns that require many levels of careful review. This
timing issue was seen even during the Evaluative Learning Review. During the process of the overall
evaluation project, CMM realized that there would have been substantial benefits to working at a
different level of analysis in beginning a pilot of DE. The potential utility of piloting DE with one project
by embedding an evaluation team as a support to a project management team throughout the lifecycle of
the project became clear as the work continued supporting CMM with its headquarters roles in the
reconciliation program. But, while some of the CMM managers may have wanted to explore such a
course of action further, it was clear that contracting had already set an overall course and that shifting
the overall project goal would have been difficult, if not impossible.

A principle for effective evaluation, then, is to work within an appropriate time scale. Consider the
metaphor of steering a ship. When evaluation leads to new information and a desire to make a “course
correction,” the impact of that course correction will only be seen when the appropriate time has
passed. A small sailboat may respond instantly and come about on a different tack, and that new tack can
be adjusted again quickly. A large cruise ship may take many minutes to make a turn, and again many
more minutes may be necessary to fine-tune the direction of the large ship. To the extent that projects
are like ships, evaluation within an appropriate time scale will allow time for course corrections to be
observed.

ENGAGE MULTIPLE LEVELS OF THE SYSTEM

In addition, this experiment raises an interesting question about where the “real” work of P2P
reconciliation happens. Is it in the dialogue between 20 people participating actively in a three-day
discussion that helps shape their shared community? Or is it in the planning of the national project
through which facilitators and project managers arranged two years’ worth of such dialogues? Or is it in
the work of the global program managers who select projects and guide local USAID Missions in
managing project contracts? By looking at the global level of the project, this evaluation has illuminated
ways the often invisible work done at headquarters that form an important part of the reconciliation
work, too. Washington is where policy is set and large-scale financing decisions are made; what happens
here shapes what project proposals are written and what projects are awarded funding. The project
designs shape what reconciliation activities are implemented. At the same time, however, participants
form the heart of reconciliation—by bringing their voices to conversations they shape the dialogue to be
most meaningful and effective for them. The work of reconciliation happens at all of these various levels.

Thus, it seems developmental approaches can be useful at any one of these levels of analysis, or with any
one of these stakeholders or participants in reconciliation processes. As demonstrated in the field
evaluations and the unexpected learning that occurred when headquarters USAID staff met with
implementers and participants in the field, there is much benefit to engaging multiple levels of the
reconciliation system, from headquarters to field project managers to participants. Useful evaluation will
recognize the interconnections between different parts of the system, from micro-local communities to
regional, national, and global levels. However, as described above, the time frame for shifting strategies
and implementing project innovations will be different, depending on the bureaucratic or culture context
in which the unit of analysis is situated.

How, then, can DE approaches be most useful in supporting decision-makers located at the
headquarters funding level, several steps removed from the direct participants in reconciliation
processes? What suggestions can we offer for future use of developmental approaches in this and similar
program contexts?

- Adopt an appropriate time frame, based on the time required for steering policy shifts at the
global level of a program.
- Focus evaluative thinking on ways in which global program policy influences project impact, but
  remain open to unexpected learning beyond this focus.
• Complement the global-level focus with additional evaluative efforts at the national and local levels.

• Engage multiple levels of the reconciliation system.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: PROJECT LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL EVALUATION IN THE FIELD

An alternative scenario for CMM to consider is the implementation of a DE in a new P2P project throughout the full life cycle of that project. Such an evaluation would strongly complement the present Evaluative Learning Review by taking seriously the local experience of one specific reconciliation project, providing evaluative feedback as the project develops, and observing how the project tries new approaches in response to that evaluative feedback. If CMM could work with a USAID Mission to embed a DE team to support project decision-makers in a new P2P project as it is launched, throughout its implementation, and as next steps are planned, this would allow evaluative input to support the project managers in shaping social change innovation to best respond to the context in which they are working. In other words, the original idea that spurred this current evaluation should be implemented. While this current evaluation has contributed evaluative input to the global overall program, much could be gained by providing a similar service focused specifically at the project level.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: LOCAL COORDINATORS BALANCING ADAPTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Another challenging area that the project has revealed is the tricky navigation of two core values: the value of responsibility, as demonstrated in sound and well established government contracting procedures, and the value of adaptability in implementing P2P reconciliation projects to those dynamic environments where reconciliation is needed most. What innovative management approaches would serve both of these values well? One potential scenario for innovative management is a local coordinating body composed of a diverse group of stakeholders. Responsibility would be preserved, with the local coordinating body holding responsibility for sound implementation of the project. The local coordinating body would engage ongoing monitoring and evaluation to support its guidance of the project. At the same time, ongoing learning and adaptability during implementation would be built into the management structure, such that the group would have the authority to consider project innovations and to adjust the project work plan as needed. The very functioning of the local coordinating body, with its members representing the diversity of stakeholders, would be a reconciliation activity by itself—people planning together how to reconcile their communities—beyond the locally relevant plans that would be emerge from such a body.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: PROCESS-FOCUSED CONTRACTING FOR EVALUATION

Another manifestation of the tension between the values of responsibility and adaptability can be seen in the concerns surrounding contracting for evaluation. Specifically, problems arise when evaluation contracts focus overwhelmingly on the products of the evaluation, in the form of specific written reports. In such cases, the focus of the evaluation may be skewed heavily towards those products. As a result, the processes involved may receive less attention, and the learning that occurs during the process of evaluation may be overlooked because parts of the evaluation process are not specifically reflected in the conclusions presented in a typical evaluation report. Thus, learning takes place during evaluative inquiry, but not all the learning is captured in a focused evaluation report.

To mitigate these obstacles, it could be useful for evaluation procurement to include some acknowledgement of the evaluation process, although, of course, products may also continue to be of interest as part of an evaluation process. For example, while some evaluations are appropriately product-oriented, ongoing learning could be supported by evaluation processes that include engagement
with multiple stakeholders learning together. USAID has experience contracting for services that are not specifically product-oriented. USAID could choose to contract for an evaluative process in which the products are not specified at the start of the evaluation. Rather, the contract would call for evaluation services, perhaps full-time consulting for a period of time, and the evaluator would work with the USAID project managers to plan and implement various kinds of evaluation and provide ongoing training and mentorship in evaluation. Such an approach that emphasizes working with USAID project managers in planning and implementing evaluations would not only produce useful evaluations of the specific projects evaluated, it would also serve to strengthen USAID capacity for future evaluation needs.

Some parts of this current Evaluative Learning Review were more amenable to process-focused learning. Consider the three areas of learning that focused this Evaluative Learning Review:

- Learning that informs better reconciliation programming;
- Learning that provides accountability to USG funders, demonstrating an awareness of challenges and successes in reconciliation processes; and
- Learning that informs evaluation of reconciliation programming and ongoing learning.

The first two areas of learning were much more structured, while the third area included much open space, dialogue with interested experts, and reflections by the evaluation teams. This third area, process learning, may be the most important over the long term. As CMM further develops skills, abilities, and institutional processes that support ongoing learning, the reconciliation program will continue to develop as needed in the future. Other CMM programs will also benefit from the support of evaluative input to their development.

**CONTEXTUALIZE “WHAT WE KNOW” WITHIN A CULTURE OF ONGOING LEARNING**

Another challenge that the Evaluative Learning Review process uncovered is how evaluation can both tell us what we know about what works and encourage ongoing adaptability over time. There is, on the one hand, a widespread yearning for finding out “what works” so we can simply do that. But, on the other hand, there is also an awareness that context matters, and, particularly in conflict contexts that call for reconciliation, the context sometimes changes dramatically as the conflicts develop. There really can be no one approach that fits all reconciliation projects. Instead of finding success stories and mimicking those approaches, reconciliation program managers need to be guided by appropriate values and principles and adopt modes of learning that encourage discovering what works in their particular context. With this approach, ongoing evaluation can support ongoing learning and ongoing development. This challenge calls for balancing the doing of a project with regular reflection on it and allowing the space for projects to develop over time. Evaluation must encourage adaptability over time.

**VALUE ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION**

There may be utility in using DE approaches to support innovation at the field level of project implementation. Having focused here on evaluating the global level of the program, possible scenarios for innovation have emerged that could support the increased efficacy of the overall program, and possible scenarios that could be expected to decrease efficacy have also been identified. For example, the Evaluative Learning Review clarifies that context knowledge shapes effective programs. Thus, close management of specific reconciliation projects from Washington would not be expected to allow room for guidance based on local context knowledge. Rather, a “light touch” from Washington that encourages adaptive implementation would be a promising area to explore in further developing program management procedures. In addition, adaptive implementation might be further encouraged by actively requiring new plans to be developed periodically, rather than simply allowing new plans when necessary. If, in the course of an entire year of a project, the implementer finds no way to possibly
improve it, then evaluation is likely not being used effectively to support adaptive implementation in that situation.

Imagine a scenario in which adaptation of a plan would be the expected normal course of action as a project proceeds, rather being an exception that requires extra review. Such a scenario might systematize periodic renewed analysis of the situation and the role of the project in that situational analysis. Projects would be adapted based on updated analysis and evaluation of the project up to that point.

While one of the scenarios offered here is a focused DE engaging in one discrete project with direct project implementers, a related scenario would involve a DE that is in conversation with both the field and the headquarters stakeholders. In the course of the Evaluative Learning Review, the opportunities for learning between field and headquarters components of reconciliation work were striking. Implementers in the field came to see their work as part of a larger whole, and saw their efforts adding up over time as other reconciliation projects also changed society. Headquarters project managers developed more nuanced understandings of specific projects and their unique approaches.

An evaluation culture infused with reconciliation programming evaluation practices could encourage sharing and even celebrating the learning that comes from mistakes or missteps. In encouraging adaptive implementation, innovation is encouraged. Of course, innovation involves experimentation, and true experiments can lead to dead ends. If our evaluation culture embraces adaptation as a useful result, then even dead ends can be helpful steps along the way to adaptation. Adaptation can be a measurable value in an evaluation culture that encourages people to recognize failures and move forward. Being accountable to a complex system that shifts over time requires adaptability.

In other words, “success is failure waiting to happen.” If a project finds a “successful” model and follows it over and over without change, even as the context changes, it will eventually be entirely ineffective.

The value of adaptive implementation may also present opportunities for balancing the competition that emerges when the values of responsibility and fairness shape contracting procedures that create a context of resource scarcity for project implementers. As project implementers are in some ways in competition with each other for financial support for their efforts, there are some structural disincentives that discourage sharing knowledge, and even methods of ongoing learning, with each other. However, a focus on adaptive implementation requires engaging all potential sources of feedback, including other implementers operating in the same conflict system.

**Focus on Values**

An additional element of evaluation culture that could be combined with one of these scenarios is a focus on values. What are the values that draw people to engage in reconciliation work in contexts where it is not popular—or even suspect—in their home societies? Sometimes, success may mean simply sticking with the process, rather than achieving any immediately visible outcome. What values keep people engaged in such processes? How are these values sustained?

Evaluations may focus more on values by asking to what extent people are being true to their values, rather than asking about results. In complex systems, the language of models and best practices can be counterproductive. Instead, discussion on principles or values can give direction, helping clarify the fundamental aims of an effort without constraining a project into set formulas.
Conclusion

The findings offered above are shaping the final stages of this Evaluative Learning Review as we capture on paper our current understandings in the form of values, principles, and alternative scenarios. Our contributions to the ongoing development of evaluation approaches can be summarized thus: Ongoing learning, through process-oriented and complexity-oriented evaluation methods such as DE, will allow continued improvement and adaptation in both the evaluation of and the practice of P2P reconciliation. This calls for balancing the implementation of a project with regular reflection on it, and allowing space for projects to develop and evolve over time. In addition, this type of DE can itself serve as an intervention, because it facilitates people working towards a shared goal—itself a reconciliation process. Evaluation can also change the way people work together. Rather than seeking one “right way” and sticking to it, groups can improve gradually, through trial and error, constant feedback, and continuous learning. Ultimately, these findings indicate that evaluation supports adaptive implementation, and, as we have found, reconciliation programs are more effective when they are adaptively implemented.

In RPP terms, we propose the following “building blocks” or criteria for engaging effective and manageable learning and evaluation for adaptive implementation based on our findings related to current APS implementation and evaluation practice as well as reflections on our own team’s process of adapting a developmental approach.

These are useful for P2P reconciliation, and other programs operating in similar, often complex, contexts:

- Work within an appropriate time scale;
- Engage multiple levels of the system;
- Consider project-level DE in the field;
- Consider local coordinators balancing adaptability and responsibility;
- Consider process-focused contracting for evaluation;
- Contextualize “what we know” within a culture of ongoing learning;
- Value adaptive implementation; and
- Focus on values.

These findings are consistent with the present conclusions related to ways to improve P2P reconciliation programs. While it is clear that the current P2P reconciliation APS contributes significantly towards promoting local change at the community level, there are opportunities to increase the synergies between P2P programming and other approaches that together can add up to larger or higher-level changes. Scenarios for future development of the P2P reconciliation APS include:

- Greater concentration of APS resources;
- More systematic engagement;
- Regional approach;
- Longer-term projects;
- Engage more key people;
- More flexible programming;
- Local partner initiatives; and
• Support M&E, learning, and disseminating results.

In sum, ongoing learning is important for both the development of P2P reconciliation programming and for the development of evaluation methodologies appropriate for these programs. In the spirit of ongoing learning, we offer this synthesis of our two-year learning process as a contribution to dialogue with evaluators and those engaged in reconciliation efforts, as we continue finding our way together.