PEACEBUILDING DESIGN, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION:
A Training Package for participants and trainers at intermediate to advanced levels

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Developed by Anita Ernstorfer and Kiely Barnard-Webster
of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

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the Carnegie Corporation of New York
Acknowledgements

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The authors thank Jessica Baumgardner-Zuzik from the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) for accompanying the production of this training package by co-facilitating the pilot training to test the draft training materials in Washington D.C. in September 2018 and coordinating the review of external experts. A particular thanks to those colleagues who have volunteered to review the draft training package: Marsha Base at The Carter Centre, Jenny Vaughn at Mercy Corps, Jessica Baumgardner-Zuzik at the AfP, Jack Farrell at Search for Common Ground, and Rebecca Herrington at Social Impact.

We want to extend a particular thanks to the participants of the pilot training to test the draft training package. The pilot training took place in Washington D.C. in September 2018 and included mid-to Senior level representatives from implementing agencies, donors, multi-lateral agencies, and private foundations: Kaitlin Conklin and Alicia Clifton at Search for Common Ground; Ana Caridad and Ben Spears at The Carter Center; Takawira Kapikinyu at Catholic Relief Services; Stephen Wicken at Humanity United; Sarah McLaughlin at the US State Department; Martha Kimmel at the Mennonite Central Committee; Yun Jae Chun at the UN Peacebuilding Fund; Sarah Gates at FHI 360; and Leslie Wingender, Carrie O’Neill, Lauren Shaugnessey, Alliou Traore, and Benjamin Medam at Mercy Corps. Thank you for your patience and openness to test a draft training package and for your excellent inputs to make it stronger!

Finally, we want to express our gratitude and appreciation to our CDA colleagues Isabella Jean and Grace Boone for working with us through every step of the process to get this training package drafted, refined, improved, and into its current layout. We hope it is user-friendly for both trainers and participants.

This training package builds on many existing resources in the area of design, monitoring and evaluation and peacebuilding initiatives from a variety of different organizations. Many of those are highlighted in the The Online Field Guide to Peacebuilding Evaluation and DM&E for Peace and specific resources are highlighted in each training module. The training package also integrates and brings together a variety of CDA tools developed in the areas of peacebuilding effectiveness/Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and conflict-sensitivity/Do No Harm (DNH) over the past 20 years.

Picture: CDA, September 2018. Participants in pilot training workshop to test the draft training package.
The Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (PEC)

The Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (PEC) is a project of Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) in partnership with CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Mercy Corps and Search for Common Ground (SFCG). The project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY) and is field-wide effort to address the unique challenges to measuring and learning from peacebuilding programs. The PEC convenes donors, scholars, policymakers, local and international practitioners, and evaluation experts in an unprecedented open dialogue, exchange, and joint learning. It seeks to address the root causes of weak evaluation practices and disincentives for better learning by fostering field-wide change through three strategic and reinforcing initiatives: 1) Developing Methodological Rigor; 2) Improving the Culture of Evaluation and Shared Learning; and 3) Fostering the Use of Evidence to Inform Peacebuilding Policy.

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

CDA (www.cdacollaborative.org) is a US based non-profit organization committed to improving the effectiveness of those who work internationally to provide humanitarian assistance, engage in peace practice, support sustainable development, and conduct corporate operations in a socially responsible manner. Our donors and partners support CDA because we combine rigorous analysis with pragmatic field-level work and deliver practical tools to field staff and policymakers alike. CDA is known as a leader in peacebuilding effectiveness work. We help peace practitioners, and organizations improve the relevance and accountability of programming through better tools for conflict analysis, program strategy, design, and monitoring and evaluation. CDA has also contributed to influential policy guidance, such as the OECD/DAC guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.
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This training package includes 7 Training Modules and a set of Annexes (Annexes A-O). The Training Modules build on each other and should ideally be used in a sequenced way in a training setting. However, for groups with specific training needs around particular areas, modules can also be used individually, but need to be tailored by the trainers and facilitators to meet the needs of specific audiences. The annexes provide worksheets and hand-outs that can be used as resources during the training for specific modules and exercises.

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[to be used in Module 3, and possibly Module 7 especially if program design/review and/or evaluative clinics are being conducted]

Annex I: **What’s the Problem Exercise**
[to be used in Module 3 and possibly Module 7 especially if program design/review and/or evaluative clinics are being conducted]

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Module 1: Introduction and General Orientation

Purpose of This Module

To introduce the overall organization, intent and resources that constitute this Peacebuilding DM&E training library. To provide a contextual frame for the design and context of the training and suggest approaches to delivering the training.

A. Overview

This training manual was produced by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA), as part of the Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (PEC). The PEC represents a whole-of-community effort to advance the field of peacebuilding evaluation and to address the unique challenges to measuring and learning from peacebuilding programs. Over the past 20 years, individual PEC members and the PEC as a consortium have put forward a range of materials relevant for the design, monitoring and evaluation (DM&E) of and learning from peacebuilding initiatives. They have collected a wealth of practical experiences in this area supporting programs in their own organizations and advising others to design and implement more effective peacebuilding programs – and learn from it. This training manual builds on those materials and rich experience. It puts forward a condensed package of critical elements and steps to take in peacebuilding DM&E and learning. It is aligned with the PEC Guiding Steps for Peacebuilding, Design, Monitoring and Evaluation. It aims for an intermediate level of knowledge and experience with these issues.

B. Who Is This Manual for And How to Use It?

This manual is designed to support learning led by seasoned trainers with subject matter expertise in peacebuilding program design, conflict analysis, conflict-sensitivity, and monitoring and evaluation.

The impetus for developing this manual will likely come as no surprise to such professionals. Though myriad resources and tools exist to improve the quality of peacebuilding DM&E, as a field, peacebuilders still struggle to incorporate many basic monitoring and evaluative processes into programs, if at all. Though this guide incorporates many of the most widely recognized peacebuilding DM&E guidance materials from the past decade, it has also been intentionally, and explicitly, tailored to support peacebuilding practitioners to improve the quality of their DM&E decision-making, in particular.
“Peacebuilding evaluation, regardless of the level one seeks to assess – outcomes, strategy or PWL – faces numerous challenges. These challenges can be broken down into methodological problems and issues at the heart of evaluative practice. This discussion focuses on the latter as they often underpin the former, methodological challenges. Furthermore, the issues at the heart of the evaluative practice are directly connected to the [recognized] “quality gap” in peacebuilding evaluation.”

This guidance is only one step of many, necessary for instilling quality DM&E processes across peacebuilding organizations and programs. Change is complex and it is slow, often requiring multiple, interconnected, interventions before results are even initially catalyzed. It is therefore the responsibility of those using this guide to apply this guidance to their own organizations and peacebuilding programs.

Our Theory of Change | If lessons are applied consistently, and quality processes are encouraged by diverse peacebuilding organizations and donors, then - with some ongoing external accompaniment support provided to such professionals - over time a ‘culture of evaluative thinking’ could start to permeate this field.

As of this writing, much work still needs to be done.

The target audience for the training supported by this manual is:
- **Practitioners** with some prior experience with peacebuilding program design, conflict analysis, conflict-sensitivity, monitoring, and evaluation.
- **Program and M&E staff** from peacebuilding organizations who want to enhance their specific peacebuilding DM&E skills.

The training is not designed for absolute beginners. Each training session, based on the content of this manual, needs to be adapted and tailored to the target audience emphasizing specific elements based on the needs of the group. Some modules provide different options for engagement for the facilitators — depending on the participants’ prior level of experience.

This manual is neither a ‘participant’ manual alone nor a full-fledged ‘facilitator’ manual with very detailed facilitation guidance, but rather a core resource manual that also provides some facilitation guidance. **Trainers** will need to be experienced with peacebuilding, DM&E, training and group facilitation, as well as related participatory approaches and learning techniques. It is highly recommended that trainers have a clear purpose in advance of their workshop (e.g., to introduce senior managers to new concepts like complexity-aware monitoring, to hold a 1-day “drill down” session on one topic for program and M&E staff, a broad M&E overview to orient new M&E staff on good practice, and resources for future M&E development). Depending on the different purpose(s), the design of each training session or workshop will look quite different.

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2 Beginner resources on peacebuilding DM&E are available on [DM&E for Peace website](http://www.dmeforpeace.org)
This resource manual is meant to allow facilitators the opportunity to ‘choose their own adventure’ for their workshop, based on a variety of resources, tips and exercises included throughout. The manual presents an array of options for an informative, utility-focused M&E workshop; many different M&E workshops could be fashioned from this packet. There is no prescriptive guidance for one best approach to teaching M&E.

This manual is intended to be helpful for peacebuilding initiatives at various levels:

- **Macro-level**: Country strategy and portfolio level planning
- **Mezzo-level**: Program level that includes various pillars of activities
- **Micro-level**: Project level DM&E

Depending on the needs of the training participants, different modules can and should be prioritized, and some modules, like **Module 2** (conflict analysis) and **Module 3** (program design), provide different options for groups to choose from. Other modules might be dropped all together while additional elements, not reflected in this manual, may be introduced. Each training needs to be tailored to the needs and levels of experience of each group.

This training manual has seven modules:

- **Module 1**: Introduction and Orientation
- **Module 2**: Conflict Analysis
- **Module 3**: Peacebuilding Program Design
- **Module 4**: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan
- **Module 5**: Baseline and Indicator Development
- **Module 6**: Monitoring for Intended and Unintended Impacts and Adaptive Management
- **Module 7**: Evaluation and Other Evaluative Processes

These modules are supported by a set of annexes that provide additional resources, suggested handouts, and other instructional support materials.

A ‘standard’ 3-day training would cover the above elements to some extent. Tailored trainings will put emphasis on some modules more than others, and/or drop some modules all together – or introduce additional content not reflected in this manual.

**What Does This Manual NOT Provide?**

This training manual does not provide a general introduction to DM&E, peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity, or conflict analysis. Participants are expected to bring a basic foundation of these concepts and associated frameworks to this training. The training is also not a ‘training of trainers or facilitators’ guide and will not focus on facilitation and/or training skills specifically, even though various hints and practical recommendations for trainers and facilitators are provided. The manual does not provide step-by-step guidance on how to design and implement evaluations. Instead it offers an overview of how to plan for evaluations and other evaluative options.
What Is the Evidence Base and Existing Guidance That This Manual Is Based On?

The humanitarian sector and some development sub-sectors have universally agreed upon standards to define ‘good practice’. These include, for example, the SPHERE standards for the humanitarian sector or the INEE (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies) minimum standards for education in emergencies. Likewise, the evaluation community operates with clear standards and principles, such as the American Evaluation Association Guiding Principles for Evaluators.

The peacebuilding field has struggled to agree whether universal ‘standards’ are desirable and who would set them due to perceived dominance of donor countries versus societies in which programming happens. Definitions of what constitutes relevant and effective peacebuilding vary greatly across organizations. At the same time, pressure to demonstrate ‘what works and what does not’ in peacebuilding is greater than ever in light of the changing donor landscape and funding priorities for peacebuilding.

The field of peacebuilding evaluation has significantly matured over the past decade. Donors have increased their pressure to show concrete results, which has pushed the peacebuilding community to invest in more robust DM&E approaches. This push has had some perverse effects of overpromising high-level impacts for small-scale projects or disincentivizing an acknowledgement of ‘failure’ and learning from important programming that did not work, including unintended negative impacts. A range of guidelines, frameworks, and toolkits have been developed by peacebuilding and evaluation organizations and practitioners. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on the evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities (OECD/DAC 2012) are now a key set of standards in the field, which heavily draw on lessons and findings from CDA’s Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) as well as the Do No Harm (DNH) collaborative learning programs.

There is a range of general M&E tools available which are also applicable to peacebuilding. In addition, resources and experiences in the peacebuilding DM&E area have grown and developed significantly over the past 5-10 years, particularly with the emergence of DM&E for Peace, more internal DM&E guidance in many peacebuilding organizations, the development of the OECD/DAC evaluation guidance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding programs, and the work of the PEC. Hence, this manual provides general orientation and guidance on foundational considerations in peacebuilding DM&E, but also reflects the latest ‘cutting edge’ thinking and practice. Links to other materials and resources will be provided to ensure that users of this manual are well equipped to tap into a wide range of available materials.

Facilitation Note

For in-person training, ask the group which criteria for effective peacebuilding DM&E and related guidance they already use. Write the answers on a flip-chart or ask them

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3 The PEC developed an Online Field Guide for Peacebuilding Evaluation housed on DM&E for Peace platform. The field guide is a curated resource with a compilation of available evaluation resources that have been tested by organizations working in peacebuilding or related fields.
to write on cards or post-its. Then, pin the flip chart, cards, and/or post-its on a wall and keep adding to this list throughout the training.

C. Sample Agenda

The table below represents a sample agenda for a three-day training course using content in this manual. It is strongly recommended to tailor trainings to specific audiences, which might include dropping certain modules/sessions, emphasizing some content over others, adding additional elements, etc. Independent of the focus of the course, it is highly recommended to use experiences and programming examples from participants and their organizations as much as possible during the practical exercises. This will increase the learning experience and give participants concrete ‘take aways’ of their own work that they can use with their teams after the training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day/Time</th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morning Session 1</td>
<td>Introduction and General Orientation</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Plans - I</td>
<td>Monitoring for Intended and Unintended Impacts + Adaptive Management - I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning Session 2</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis (Intro session is expected to be shorter, so there is more time for conflict analysis)</td>
<td>MEL Plans - II</td>
<td>Monitoring for Intended and Unintended Impacts + Adaptive Management - II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afternoon Session 1</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Program Design - I</td>
<td>Baseline and Indicator Development - I</td>
<td>Planning an Evaluation or Other Evaluative Processes – Overview of available options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afternoon Session 2</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Program Design - II</td>
<td>Baseline and Indicator Development - II</td>
<td>Planning an Evaluation or Other Evaluative Processes – What do I need? (practical exercise)</td>
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D. Resources Required

*Trainers* and *facilitators* for this training need to be experienced both in the fields of peacebuilding, as well as design, monitoring, evaluation and learning. They need a strong understanding of the particular challenges of peacebuilding DM&E as well as qualitative and quantitative DM&E approaches to peacebuilding. Strong training, and facilitation skills are required, as well as managing inter-cultural groups and participants with varying levels of experience. An ideal team set-up could be a combination of a peacebuilding expert with solid DM&E understanding and expertise, combined with a DM&E expert who has strong experience.
working with peacebuilding programs. In any case, facilitators need to bring sufficient practical experiences to highlight examples from the field and be flexible enough to adapt the agenda to various audiences.

Materials required for this training include:

- Power Point presentation opportunity, Laptop
- Flip charts, flip chart paper and markers
- Large and small post-it notes
- Paper in varying size and color
- Scissors and tape
- Additional materials the facilitation team might want to use for exercises, such as pipe cleaners, play-doh etc.

**Workshop Preparations**

Before the workshop, trainers/workshop facilitators should send out background reading and ask workshop participants to obtain project and program examples. Ideally, real life cases can be used as part of the exercise in the workshop as well as for practical application.

The following inputs will be required from participants ahead of time:

- **Summary of one conflict analysis of a context where one or several participants work.** This should be around 5 pages and provide an overall context description, as well as an overview of the main dynamics related to peace and conflict, both negative and positive. This will be used in Module 2 (conflict analysis) and Module 3 (program design) particularly. Geographic or systems maps will be appreciated! The DOMINIA case study (see Annex A) can serve as an example of what this could look like. Alternatively, the DOMINIA case can be used for exercise purposes, but a real-life conflict context example will work much better. Facilitation will work best with one scenario.

- **2-3-page summaries of projects and programs that one or several participants are familiar with or currently working on,** see example description in Annex F. This will be used in Module 3 (program design). The number of project examples will depend on the group size. There should be enough examples and related resource people (workshop participants who work on the respective projects and programs) to allow for small group discussion of not more than approximately 5 people.

- **Program scenarios with an imminent need for evaluation or another evaluative process** can be used in Module 7. There should be enough examples and related resource people (workshop participants who work on the respective projects and programs) to allow for small group discussion of not more than approximately 5 people.

- **Participation in a pre-workshop survey.** Given this manual provides a broad and diverse array of resources, it would be in the best interest of both facilitator and participant to tailor the material appropriately, depending on needs and interests of those in the room. There is too much material in this manual to include in a three-day training. Strategic decisions will almost
certainly be required by facilitators in advance of any workshop about which material to include. Refer to Annex N for suggested pre-survey questions.

Facilitation Note
For the pilot training led by CDA, facilitators tailored the content of each Module session based on the needs and experience of participants. Some additional material was added (e.g., detailed content on quantitative data collection tools). Also, to adhere to good M&E practice, the facilitators used all data collected in the pre-survey. Mainly, demographic data gathered was presented as an ice-breaker in the introductory session to the workshop by facilitators in a session called: “Who’s in the room?”. This worked well and also queued up a major theme for the workshop: choosing M&E that is useful, and informs decision-making, rather than a tick the box exercise.

E. Key Readings

Facilitation Note
The below provides a list of key readings for the training overall. In addition, each module provides additional literature and references for the specific topics. It is important to send these readings to participants ahead of the workshop. A basic foundation and some practical experience with peacebuilding, and DM&E is expected from participants. However, it should also be pointed out to them that it is their responsibility to read up on areas where they might have gaps.


Peacebuilding Evaluation Online Field Guide: A compilation of foundational material relevant to peacebuilding contexts on the design and conduct of evaluation (including manuals, guidelines, tools, etc.), hosted by DM&E for Peace.
Module 2: Conflict Analysis

“Analysis is not optional; it is essential and obligatory for peace work.”

CDA consultation participant

Purpose of This Module

This module will focus on exploring the importance of conflict analysis and how to use conflict analysis for effective DM&E. This section is not a ‘how to guide’ on how to conduct conflict analysis. There is a wealth of resources on this topic – a selection of which is highlighted in this module. Hence, it is essential for participants to have a background in conflict analysis, as the basics of conflict analysis will not be covered in this course.

Facilitation Note: Required Resources

a) A summary of a conflict analysis of a context where one or several participants work. This should be around 5 pages, provide an overall context description, and an overview of the main dynamics related to peace and conflict – negative and positive ones. This will be used in this module and Module 3 (program design) particularly. Geographic or systems maps are appreciated! The Dominia case study (Annex A) can serve as an example of what this could look like. Alternatively, the Dominia case can be used for exercise purposes, but a real-life conflict context example will work much better. Facilitation will work best with one scenario.

OR

b) A conflict systems analysis with a short narrative by one of the participants. This is only recommended for an advanced audience who is familiar with conflict systems analysis already. Note: having 1 or 2 participants in the room familiar with systems analysis will not be sufficient.

A. Why Is Conflict Analysis Important for Effective Peacebuilding?

Facilitation Note

Do a quick brainstorm in plenary on this big question before diving into this session. Capture key points on cards, flip charts, etc.
The key criteria for understanding whether an initiative is relevant from a peacebuilding perspective is if it addresses one or several of the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis. In other words, without a conflict analysis and a detailed understanding of the specific conflict drivers in a given context, it is not possible to determine whether a peacebuilding initiative actually makes a difference. Without understanding the key drivers of conflict, the program goal, theory of change, and overall program design will not be relevant, or effective, in addressing the most important drivers of conflict.

Relevance assesses the extent to which the objectives and activities of the intervention(s) respond to the needs of the peacebuilding process, i.e. whether they address the key driving factors of conflict revealed through a conflict analysis. Relevance links the outcomes of the conflict analysis with the intervention’s objectives, although the relevance of the intervention might change over time as circumstances change. Understanding relevance may also involve an assessment of the extent to which an intervention ties in with overall strategies and policy frameworks of the country or external partners. Different conflict groups or actors may have different perspectives on the relevance of an intervention and its results. (OECD/DAC, 2012, 56)

B. Conflict Analysis for Good DM&E: Key Issues to Consider

The following are key questions that are important to consider in relation to conflict analysis for solid peacebuilding DM&E:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Conflict Analysis Questions</th>
<th>Common Gaps/Weaknesses or Cautions Concerning Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The analysis identifies key driving factors and key actors for conflict/peace</td>
<td>• Analysis is too comprehensive. There are too many factors with no priorities identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analyzes entire context but does not focus on conflict determinants; everything is seen as relevant to peacebuilding.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Factors/issues are identified, but priorities or dynamics among them are not.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analysis is implicit, and thus not shared among team and program partners.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The analysis considers what needs to be stopped (and who will resist) and what forces promote peace in this context.</td>
<td>• Analysis focuses on positive factors that might be strengthened but does not consider countervailing negative forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analysis does not analyze what factors connect people or promote peace in this context.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4 Key driving factors are elements/dynamics without which the conflict would not exist or would be significantly different. Key actors are people or groups that can significantly influence the conflict dynamics.

5 This is adapted from Thinking Evaluatively in Peacebuilding Design, Implementation and Monitoring: Three Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and Do No Harm (DNH)-infused options to strengthen the effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies and programs, Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium, 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Conflict Analysis Questions</th>
<th>Common Gaps/Weaknesses or Cautions Concerning Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The analysis is updated and tested regularly/periodically.</td>
<td>• Analysis is performed once at the beginning of the program but is not updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program strategy builds on the analysis: identifies peacebuilding needs or points of leverage for change.</td>
<td>• Conclusions about drivers and dynamics of conflict are not utilized to strengthen program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The scope of the analysis is appropriate (not too broad or narrow); and mitigates bias towards agency’s expertise or general beliefs about conflict.</td>
<td>• Program goals and design do not address factors identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis does not enable program designers to identify what to do to change conflict dynamic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The M&amp;E system builds on the analysis: ongoing context monitoring and how drivers of conflict shift and evolve over time</td>
<td>• Analysis is performed to justify favored program approach (methodology, focus, constituency).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis is based on beliefs about how to bring about peace generally (and not contextualized).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis has omitted or excluded significant perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis exists at one level, but does not consider other levels (e.g., at local level, missing wider dynamics; national/regional analysis without local particularities; national analysis without international/regional dimensions, sector specific analysis only without understanding the broader context).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• M&amp;E systems are completely disconnected from the conflict analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• M&amp;E systems narrowly monitor project progress, but do not provide ongoing monitoring of changes in the context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• M&amp;E system does not foresee or allow for program adaptation or for response to changes in context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• M&amp;E systems does not assess unintended impacts (see Module 6, Unintended Impacts and Adaptive Management).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The analysis process has been conflict sensitive - considered what potential harm it might cause</td>
<td>• Team composition exposes team members, partners, and/or interviewees to danger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• With the team composition, behavior is perceived as biased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis process deepens polarization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Causes of conflict are contested among key parties—analysis process is fraught.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Group Exercise: Reviewing A Conflict Analysis: Is It Fit for Purpose?**

Facilitators, please refer to the facilitation note at the beginning of this section for required resources. Whether the participants have brought their own example of a conflict or context analysis or they have chosen to use the fictitious case study, Dominia (Annex A), they should have read it before the first day of training. For more advance groups, already familiar with conflict analysis, this could include a conflict systems analysis provided by one of the participants – or alternatively using the South Sudan training example of a conflict systems analysis provided in this manual (Annex B).

Questions for group work:

- Is the purpose of the analysis clear?
- Do we have sufficient information on key drivers of conflict, factors for peace, and key actors? Do we have a good understanding of critical conflict dynamics and possible scenarios of how the situation might evolve in the near to medium-term future?
- Given the context information we have, do we have a good sense of which negative, violence enforcing dynamics should be stopped?
- Do we have information on how the analysis has been produced (conflict-sensitivity considerations), whether and how it is shared amongst program teams and local partners, and how it is being updated on a regular basis and used as part of project implementation (not only at the beginning of the program)?
- Do we have information on what has been tried before by our organization or others, and what has worked and what hasn’t from a peacebuilding perspective? How is that information being made available and used?
- Is the scope of the analysis appropriate for the type of engagement we are planning (strategy, portfolio, program, project)? Are we missing key pieces of information (e.g. national/sub-national specifics, sector specific information)?
- How is the conflict analysis being used and/or how could it be used (depending on whether a real life example is chosen or whether a fictitious case is being used)?

**Facilitation Note: Reflections for The Group Exercise**

If possible, try to encourage participants to bring a context or conflict analysis from their own experience. Often, the level of engagement and learning experience with fictitious cases is not comparable with actual contexts that participants work on. However, when people are asked to immediately analyze contexts and programs in which they have a personal stake, the focus might shift defending on their programmatic choices or their ‘version of reality’ and a more neutral workshop example might help for training purposes.

Therefore, if a real case is chosen, remind the group that the purpose of this exercise is not to ‘get the analysis of that particular context right’ – but to focus on understanding critical elements of the analysis and their importance for monitoring and evaluation, based on an understanding of the purpose of the conflict analysis. Participants who volunteer to provide ‘their context’ should be given an opportunity to present their context briefly (in addition to the written hand-
out), but this session should not turn into a lengthy discussion of the country or context – that is not the purpose.

If Dominia is chosen: The Dominia case study is based on several real case studies conducted in Africa and Asia but is fictionalized. The case was developed by CDA and has been used in other workshops and has been frequently mistaken by workshop participants as being based on their own context. Clearly, dynamics described in the Dominia case are not unique!

C. Practicing Conflict Analysis for Good DM&E

Facilitation Note

After groups discuss these questions, summarize and highlight key points that are emerging. Which additional elements of the analysis are missing in order to have a solid conflict analysis foundation from a DM&E perspective?

Optional:

Available as an alternative exercise, and/or in addition to the above:

If it is a group with more limited experience with conflict analysis than expected (which should not be the case as it should be an entry requirement to take the workshop, but it could happen), a quick and dirty force field conflict analysis exercise might help to get the point across about how crucial it is to identify and prioritize key drivers of conflict in the area of analysis. In such a case, the following process could be done, based on either Dominia or the participant case:

- Identify and list:
  - Factors supporting conflict
  - Factors supporting peace

Key actors: Their behavior, motivations, interests, and constituencies of influence

Note: In a regular conflict analysis process, groups would first list all the factors that seem relevant from a conflict perspective. In this abbreviated version for workshop purposes, participants will be asked to focus on the most important factors for conflict right away. A key driving factor for conflict is a factor without which the conflict would not exist or be significantly different.

Process Note: Conducting A Three-Box Analysis

1. First, determine the level of analysis you are doing (local community, larger city/town, province, whole country, region, etc.). This should be informed by the purpose of the analysis and why you are doing it.
2. Clarify who is providing the information and what it is based on. This issue will depend on who your participants are—local partners, international staff, representatives of multiple organizations, people from the affected communities themselves, etc.

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3. Explain, briefly, the three boxes and the kinds of information you are asking for in each.
4. Before you start working as a group, nominate a facilitator first.
5. List all the factors for conflict, for peace and the key actors and stakeholders.

While listing the factors and actors, consider the guidelines for identifying factors for peace, against peace and actors below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors for Peace</th>
<th>Key Factors for Conflict</th>
<th>Key Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the forces in the situation that exist now that can be built upon to promote movement towards peace?</td>
<td>What are the most important factors that are working against peace or for conflict?</td>
<td>Which individuals or groups in the situation are in a position to strongly influence the conflict negatively? Who can decide against peace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What currently connects people across conflict lines? How do people cooperate?</td>
<td>What factors, issues or elements are causing conflict and/or dividing people, and how?</td>
<td>Which individuals or groups in the situation are in a position to strongly influence the conflict positively? Who can decide for peace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who exercises leadership for peace and how?</td>
<td>Note: these are not things you want to exist or that you would like to see— they must be true now.</td>
<td>Note: these are not necessarily people who may be program targets / participants, such as women, youth, or religious leaders. We may be interested in engaging with those groups, but they are not always “key” in the situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tip! What if ‘peace’ isn’t the goal?

In some instances, the context is not seen as one of “war,” “conflict,” or “peace.” For instance, in post-accord or post-election situations, people may think that the country is at peace, relatively speaking. In those situations, it may be necessary to reframe the discussion. One possibility is to start the analysis process by developing a **vision for the kind of society people want**, in as specific terms as possible, and do a three-box analysis of factors that are moving toward the vision and others that are holding it back. In one instance, we used the concept of “**consolidating the peace**,” asking what it would take to ensure a lasting peace, and in another the challenge was defined as “**unity and reconciliation.**” The three-box analysis was then performed in relation to that vision.

**Facilitation Note**

The Dominia case has a teaching note which pulls out these factors (for/against peace) and actors. This might come in handy if this (optional) exercise is done, and if Dominia is used for that purpose.
This three-box exercise is time consuming, so it is recommended to only do it in case participants really struggle with the concept of understanding key drivers of conflict.

Link between conflict analysis and other forms of analyses and assessments: choosing the right tool and approach depends on the purpose of your analysis

Conflict analysis or any other form of analysis can be done for very different purposes and hence there are different ways of using conflict analysis. In practice, some of these purposes may overlap. Some of the main purposes and ways of using a conflict analysis are listed below:

- Offering a general understanding and assessment of the conflict context, conflict issues and main actors engaged in a context and conflict situation;
- Preparing a third-party intervention (e.g. a reconciliation or dialogue program) by making explicit common and different understandings and perceptions of conflict dynamics and issues;
- Presenting an analytical basis for scenario-building exercises or risk assessments\(^7\);
- Offering a basis for identifying and prioritizing peacebuilding needs;
- Providing a general understanding about a given conflict and analytical base for awareness-raising and advocacy campaigns on a selected conflict factor such as ‘human rights violations against minorities’;
- Assessing the potential and actual impact of a project or program on the peace by understanding macro-level conflict dynamics;
- Offering a source of information for “zooming in” on particular analytical questions of the conflict such as the actors, dynamics, needs, and interests;
- Helping to create a common understanding of the main conflict factors and dynamics before developing a joint, multi-donor or “one-government” approach in peacebuilding.

Depending on the purpose and the prime focus of a conflict analysis, different (participatory) tools of conflict analysis can be used. An overview of some of the most common tools can be found in Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Basics. A Resource Manual. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2016.

More recently there has also been increased attention on understanding the sources of radicalization and violent extremism as a particular form of violence. Different guides have been produced to understand structural and personal drivers of radicalization and extremist ideologies (see key readings for select literature references).

**D. Optional: What Is the Benefit of a Conflict Systems Analysis from A DM&E Perspective?**

For More Advanced Groups: Systems Thinking in Peacebuilding

There is an increased awareness about the need to apply a systems perspective in peacebuilding and be more strategic on how to intervene - at the portfolio and program level, and also for

\(^7\) Scenario-building exercises and risk assessments are often based on a comprehensive conflict analysis.
country-level strategic planning across a variety of stakeholders. This reflects the realization that conflict prone environments can only be understood as complex systems of interconnected relationships between actors, institutions, a variety of different conflict factors, and power relations. A systems approach to understanding conflict dynamics helps to prioritize and focus on the most important dynamics that fuel tensions in a given context. It can also be easily updated to provide a macro-level conflict baseline of the overall context to assess larger peacebuilding impacts and or macro-level conflict-sensitivity issues at e.g. country strategy or portfolio levels.\(^8\)

Like other conflict analysis processes systems analyses can be used to analyze national or sub-national dynamics, or sector specific dynamics.

Depending on the level of advancement of the group:

- Show a systems map as an example (e.g. Syria systems analysis)
- For an audience that is already familiar with conflict system analysis and would like to focus on a systems approach, the annex also provides an example of a systems analysis and systems map of South Sudan, which can be used alternatively to DOMINIA as an exercise case. Even better would be a scenario in which participants bring their own conflict systems analysis to have this discussion, but this is only recommended for advanced audiences.

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**Updating Your Systems Analysis Using M&E Data: One Example**

**DRC – Lubumbashi Anti-Corruption Program**

*Kuleta Haki* was an experimental anti-corruption project implemented from 2015-2017 in Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of Congo. Kuleta Haki was designed based on a classic ‘strength in numbers’ idea. The central theory of change was: *If people from within the criminal justice sector (CJS) who act with integrity can establish strong relationships with each other, then they will feel more protected and empowered to act against corruption more openly and often because they will have support (e.g. emotional, hierarchical, tactical) from those inside the system.* The Network grew to between 80-100 members, including lawyers, magistrates, police, clerks, judges, and civil society members.

Mid-way through the project, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects - in the role of learning partner to the group - led an internal mid-term review. The formative evaluation uncovered that Network members, internal to the CJS especially, explained that they had started to recognize the collective harm caused by corruption. Forty percent of the interviewees identified a “prise de conscience” – or an “awakening” – to corruption in their professional lives. This was a particularly important finding because systems thinking posits that a shift in a ‘mental model’ (values, assumptions and beliefs that shape a system) have significant potential to change the greater system.

The corruption systems map developed by the Network at the beginning of the project, mapping the dynamics that come into play during corruption transactions in the CJS, identified one mental model

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among justice actors as “corruption is normal” (see figure below). Comparing the mid-term evaluative findings against the initial systems analysis of corruption dynamics in Lubumbashi, the program team felt there was very early evidence of a shift in this ‘mental model’ where corruption was seen as less normal and more as potentially harmful amongst those in contact with the project.

You Have Done Your Analysis – Now What?

Module 3 will focus on how to use conflict analysis findings for strong program design and the design of solid theories of change.

E. Key Readings


**Understanding Drivers of Radicalization and Extremist Ideologies**


**Systems Analysis Resources**

For an example of a conflict systems analysis on Syria, see *ARK GROUP: The Syrian conflict: A systems conflict analysis*. ARK, 2016.

Module 3: Peacebuilding Program Design

“Design is not just what it looks like and feels like. Design is how it works.”
Steve Jobs

Purpose of This Module
Review the essential elements of peacebuilding program design based on findings from conflict analysis. The focus will be on the most important design steps that result in strong programming and M&E. This session is not a detailed introduction to peacebuilding program design, such as design of theories of change, or how to formulate strong program goals. Participants in need of such introductory training should catch up on such content before attending this training. The focus of this session is to introduce a simple but powerful program strategy design and review tool, the Reflecting on Peace Practice Matrix.

Facilitation Note:
At the end of this module on Program Design, you will also find a “Program Design Troubleshooting” exercise option – see Annex H for the Troubleshooting Tool. This can be used for more advanced groups who are already familiar with applying basic program design steps in practice, who work with their own teams and others on program design and ‘fixing’ related program design issues or would like to practice advisory roles. Different scenarios are given to explore what different teams might be suffering from, which can be used to discuss various approaches to strengthen program design. This option will work best when applied to concrete projects and programs of specific individuals/teams participating in the workshop. A short project description (Annex F) should be shared with the other participants ahead of time/before the workshop so they can get familiar with the context and project. The person(s) working on this project will then become resource people during this session.

A. What Is Strategic Programming Based on Conflict Analysis?
Good M&E can only happen if there is strong program design. In other words, if an initiative has not been designed based on findings from conflict analysis and based on strong peacebuilding design criteria, your M&E system will not be able to make up for a weak design.

Group Exercise: What Is Strategic Programming?
Ask participants to work in small groups at their tables: You have done your conflict analysis – now what? Before figuring out roles and mandates of specific organizations, it is important to ask the ‘bigger picture’ questions based on the findings of the conflict analysis.
Go back to the conflict analysis scenario (participant example, DOMINIA case study or systems analysis example), and discuss the following questions:

- Where might positive change be possible in the conflict system?
- Where is positive change already happening – how and why?
- Who are the key national and local ‘champions’ for positive change?
- Who are the stakeholders who benefit from continued violence or might see the proposed program as a threat to them?
- What kind of support (from international, regional, and national organizations) is currently being provided in relation to which conflict drivers? How is that going?
- What are lessons available from past efforts and past ‘failures’?
- What type(s) of conflict-sensitivity and Do No Harm considerations result from the conflict analysis in relation to programming?

Debrief in plenary

B. How to Avoid the Analysis-Programming Gap

Facilitation Note: Quick Temperature Check in The Room

- What are people’s experiences with translating (conflict or other types of) analysis into action, strategy, and programming?
- Which approaches are useful, where are the key challenges?

Translating the findings from conflict analysis into strong program design is one of the most challenging steps in peacebuilding program design. Many organizations invest time and resources into conducting extensive analyses but then do not know how to translate the findings from analysis into action.

This can have many reasons, or a combination of items on the list below:

- The purpose of the conflict analysis was not clarified from the start, leading to a fuzzy scope of the analysis.
- The analysis is either too broad (too macro-level) or too narrow (e.g. too sector specific or only covering a specific sub-region).
- It is unclear whose analysis it is, in other words: the process by which the conflict analysis was designed was not participatory or transparent.
- The format and way the conflict analysis has been produced is not user-friendly. It is difficult to use a 70-page narrative conflict analysis report without a clear sense of what the priority conflict drivers really are that should be addressed (see Module 2 on conflict analysis, one reason why conflict systems analysis can be so helpful).

The key determining factor whether a peacebuilding program is ‘relevant’ is to determine whether it addresses at least one of the key driving factors of conflict identified in the conflict analysis.
Group Exercise: Designing Relevant Peacebuilding Programming

Go back to the Dominia case study or the country context you are using in your group:

- What are some of the key drivers of conflict that your programming should address in order to be relevant in this context?
- What are some of the factors for peace you should consider in relation to the specific key drivers of conflict you have identified?
- Which actors and stakeholders are key to involve? Which ones are “easy to involve” and which ones are “hard to reach” but necessary to engage for positive and sustainable outcomes?

Note to facilitators: Factors for peace/conflict and key actors are highlighted in the facilitator section of the Dominia case study.

Facilitation Note

In the debriefing, watch for priority setting. It is easy to “find everything relevant” (not prioritizing conflict factors) and/or to resort to ‘programming as usual’ – lean towards entry points and approaches that are familiar and ‘feel comfortable’ rather than addressing the specific conflict drivers in a given setting.

C. Important Steps and Elements for Peacebuilding Program Design

Facilitation Note

Ask participants what peacebuilding program design steps they currently undertake. Do they feel that the processes they have are conducive for strong DM&E? What might be missing?

Participants should be familiar with these design elements:

- **Articulating your long-term vision** (5-10 years – or longer): What are you intending to contribute to at the Peace-Writ-Large level/long-term socio-political change? What are big picture strategy reflections on how to get there? What can your own organization contribute, in which areas are others already engaging or well placed to engage?

- **Developing theories of change (TOC)** at the appropriate level. What tools do people use in their organizations, theories of change, pathways to change, logical frameworks etc.? Refer to additional resources on theories of change listed at the end of this module.
• **Articulating robust program goals of YOUR initiative** that express the specific change it will contribute to within the timeframe you currently have for funding (e.g. 2 years). The *Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) building blocks for peace/criteria of effectiveness* can be used as macro-level principles to ‘test’ program goals for peacebuilding relevance (see [Annex C](#) for a more detailed description, provide as a hand-out in the training). The 5 criteria of effectiveness are:

  o The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict.
  o The effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis.
  o The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.
  o The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security.
  o The effort results in meaningful improvement in inter-group relations.

**Group Exercise**

*Using the Building Blocks for Peace/Criteria of Effectiveness ([Annex C](#)) to test robust program goals:* Ask workshop participants to use the hand-out to discuss whether the goals of the program they are examining (fictitious project example or one of the participants’ programs/projects) are aligned with one or several of the Building Blocks for Peace/Criteria of Effectiveness. Ask them how they think their projects/programs will contribute to this and if they see any gaps that could be further addressed.

**Facilitation Note: Optional**

Some groups might need a refresher on particular aspects of the above, or on the theories of change. If a refresher on theories of change seems useful, the following examples can be used to talk about articulation of theories of change at different levels (project/sector/portfolio) and involving different levels of change (individual/socio-political).
A Theory of Change is an explanation of how and why an action is believed to bring about its planned objectives, i.e. the changes it hopes to create through its activities, thereby revealing underlying assumptions. A clear theory of change helps to articulate the logical flow from the starting point (analysis) to the goal of the initiative to the broader change the organization plans to achieve.

A practical formula for articulating a theory of change is the following:

\[
\text{If } x \text{ [activity]}, \\
\text{then } y \text{ [expected change]}, \\
\text{because } z \text{ [rationale - why do you think this change will happen?]} 
\]

**Examples of Theories of Change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project level (individual level change)</th>
<th>Portfolio/Sector level (socio-political level change)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If [activity] children in this school are given individual treatment for trauma recovery,</td>
<td>If [activity] we strengthen the capacities of select local and national level government institutions in violence prevention and coexistence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>then [change] they will develop increased ability to control their emotions and not act out against others, especially those who are different from them;</td>
<td>then [change] interactions within the government and between state and civil society will be more constructive and inclusive,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because [rationale] the activities will have helped them begin to heal from the psychological wounds of war and reduce their overall fear and sense of vulnerability at school.</td>
<td>because [rationale] local and national government institutions will be better equipped to deal with tensions more constructively and engage in forward looking, preventive approaches within government and in state-society relations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we wanted to move this engagement to potentially show results towards socio-political change:

[Note: under these conditions, if we introduce inter-group skills (negotiation, mediation, problem-solving) to children of different religious groups together, then they will be able to learn them and use them to resolve disputes at school, including those that may arise between religious groups.]

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10 For more background on the different levels at which theories of change can be useful (activity, project, program, portfolio/sector, country level etc.) please see Peter Woodrow and Nick Oatley. *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programs*, CCVRI and DFID, 2013.


12 Ibid.
Group Exercise

Project a theory of change on a slide in the room – can be one of the above, the example below, the theory of change from the fictitious Kyrgyzstan project example in Annex F, or from a brave workshop participant who wants to test his/her theory of change ad hoc (but would need to have this ready before the workshop as part of the project description):

Example:

If people from within the criminal justice sector who act with integrity can establish strong relationships with each other across institutional departments and levels,

then they will feel more empowered to act against corruption more openly and often

because they will feel more protected and receive support (e.g. emotional, hierarchical, tactical) from those inside the system.

Ask:

• Is this a good TOC? At what level does it try to achieve change?
• Is the change statement ‘then’ feasible and realistic?
• How will you get to the ‘if’?
• What assumptions are built into this TOC?
• What would you suggest making this TOC stronger? [Recognizing that this is a fictitious exercise as we do not have the full context of this program]

Many organizations struggle to understand how to get from the ‘if’ to the ‘then’ – and how to achieve ‘if’ in the first place! The next section introduces the Reflecting on Peace Practice Matrix (RPP) as a simple tool to design and test program strategies to see whether program activities are designed in a way so they will ‘add up’ to the program goal, and ideally contribute to PWL.

How Do We Know What Works in Peacebuilding?

This section outlines principles to design more impactful and strategic peacebuilding initiatives. These principles focus on the ‘how’ of effective engagement: what level of change is intended/realistic (individual-personal versus socio-political?), and what are the strategies for engagement (working with more and key people). This will be explained further in the below.

In addition, the peacebuilding field has conducted an increasing number of meta-evaluations, sub-sector reviews of specific thematic areas, and other evaluative learning reviews to understand how peacebuilding approaches in specific sectors and areas are effective.13 These studies and reports should be consulted by teams working in those specific areas to capitalize on the learnings and assessments of those sectors.

Examples of such reviews include the following:

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13 See forthcoming PEC sub-sector reviews of reconciliation programming and on violence reduction.
• The upcoming sub-sector review of reconciliation programming conducted by the Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (to be published in early 2019)
• Meta-review of inter-religious peacebuilding program evaluations conducted by the Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium
• Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM’s People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS)

Facilitation Note: Language Matters!

Many organizations use different kinds of language to describe long-term impact, project/program results, or project/program goals and objectives. For purposes of this training, it does not matter so much what language and terminology will be used, but it is important that participants share the same understanding of what they mean when they use certain terms.

If training participants are all from the same organization, it will be good to use the terminology that is used by this organization. But please do re-confirm at the beginning of the workshop that all participants, even if from one organization, share the same understanding of terminology.

For mixed groups of participants, establish common language and terminology at the beginning of the workshop.

In this training package, ‘vision’ is used to describe the long-term aspiration of positive change in a specific context, not tied to the intervention or programs of one specific actor. Program goal is used to describe the objectives of one specific actor/organization during a specific period of time e.g. 2-3 years).

For exercises and discussions both related to theories of change and the RPP Matrix (below) it is important to point out that both can be used at different levels:

• **Strategic Level:** What is the change logic that informs the choice of priority areas within a country strategy (formal or informal)—and why were other options not chosen?

• **Portfolio/Sector/Program Level:** What are the two or three dominant theories of change embedded in the programming within the sector/portfolio? How will the combined efforts of the range of funded projects achieve desired changes (results) within a priority area?

• **Project Level:** What is the core theory of change informing the project approach? How will reaching the project goal/objective contribute to the larger goals/objectives at the sector/program level?

• **Activity Level:** How will the activity (training, dialogue…) produce the intended microlevel change(s) and, ultimately, lead to the project objectives/goals?\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) See Woodrow, Peter, with Nick Oatley. “Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes. Part I: What they are, different types, how to develop and use them.” A Conflict, Crime, and Violence Results Initiative (CCVRI) product. London, UK: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and DFID, 2013, p. 4.
D. The RPP Matrix

The RPP Matrix is a simple but powerful tool for strategy and program design and review. The focus of program design exercises in this module will be on applying this tool to explore important distinctions and linkages between different levels of change (individual/socio-political) and types of people who are engaged (more people/Key people).

For peacebuilding programs to be effective, they must **link change at the individual/personal level to change at the socio-political level**. The individual/personal level includes attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, skills and interpersonal relations. The socio-political level includes relations among social groups, public opinion, social norms, societal institutions, and deeper elements embedded in social and economic structures and culture.

| Individual/Personal Change | Healing/recovery  
|                           | Perceptions  
|                           | Attitudes  
|                           | Skills  
|                           | Knowledge  
|                           | Behavior  
|                           | Individual relationships  
| Socio-Political Change    | Group behavior/relationships  
|                           | Public opinion  
|                           | Social norms  
|                           | Institutional change  
|                           | Structural + cultural change  

RPP found that programming which focuses on change at the individual/personal level but never translates this into action or results at the socio-political level has no discernible effect on peace. In many cases, it is also important to link change at the socio-political level (e.g. development of a new policy) back to individual/personal level change—especially if the changes are to be meaningful and sustainable.

While the desired changes do not necessarily need to be observable at the national level, programs/projects should, at the level at which they are operating, affect the creation of institutions (formal or informal), result in locally-driven peace agendas and action, or lead to collective attitudes and behaviors that reflect improvements in the key driving factors of conflict.

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15 For a more detailed introduction into lessons and approaches, please see the CDA’s [Reflecting on Peace Practice resource manual](https://www.cda.int/publications/analytical/reflecting-on-peace-practice-resource-manual).

or peace at that level (e.g., increased security or perceptions of security, improved group attitudes or relations, resistance to violence, etc.).

“More People” Must Engage “Key People” And Vice Versa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More People</th>
<th>Key People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace needs support and participation of the general population.</td>
<td>Peace cannot be achieved without involvement of certain people with major influence on the situation.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Effective programs link work with “more people”—i.e., people at many levels of society and in many sectors—to “key people,” people or groups that have the power or influence. Work that influences “more people” or “key people” but does not connect or link to efforts to affect the other has limited impact.

Annex D contains the RPP Matrix that can be used as a hand-out for training purposes. The RPP Matrix can be used at different levels: to design and/or examine individual project strategies, entire programs or portfolios, as well as country level strategies. It can also be used to ‘map’ different activities of various organizations, for example to see if/how different organizations reach different levels of change and/or more and key people.

**Example from Practice**

For example, after the inter-ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, many more international and national organizations started doing peacebuilding work in the country – at both sub-national and national levels. In an exercise with different organizations involved in peacebuilding, the RPP Matrix was used to ‘plot’ the mine areas of activities (from a higher, macro-level perspective, not project activity by project activity) and thus map out the various areas of engagement. As a consequence, organizations saw where there were areas of overlap and gaps as well as areas in which no one was engaged. Hence, the RPP Matrix can be used to support and facilitate macro-level coordination at country strategy levels.

**E. Examining Program Strategies**

**Group Exercise**

*This exercise can be done in different ways, depending on the level of experience of the group. Some of these options lend themselves well to be done ‘clinic’ style in which one or several colleagues are resource people and bring a particular programming challenge to the group and are then being advised in peer settings:*

**Option 1:** Design programming options for Dominia. The identities of organizations trying to engage and intervene in Dominia and sample program goals outlined in Annex E can be used to develop program strategies and activities. This exercise focuses on developing new programming options, building on the sample goals, based on a fictitious scenario and considered from various perspectives of those affected by the situation.

**Option 2:** Design new programming options for the context(s) that one or several workshop participants will bring, using the RPP Matrix. For this option, the respective participant(s) and workshop facilitators will need to develop identities of specific organizations (e.g. development, humanitarian, corporate, national or local institutions etc.) and program goals before the session. Using this option, facilitators will need to navigate the challenge of not all participants being familiar with the particular context while being asked to develop ‘new’ programming options; therefore, this exercise might feel a bit artificial to those who do not know the context – something to be considered as some participants will be more comfortable with a fictitious training set-up than others.

**Option 3:** Review (an) existing program(s) that participants bring to the workshop – ideally in the context that was used for conflict analysis exercise purposes. However, another project from another context can be used. If this option is chosen, it is essential that trainers work with
the relevant participants ahead of time to put together two-pagers summarizing the main project elements (very brief summary of main drivers of conflict, program goal, theory(ies) of change, key program elements, key challenges in design and/or implementation). An example for this is provided in Annex F.

**Option 4:** Along the lines of option 3 but for more advanced teams who are already familiar with applying the basic program design steps in practice (Note: if people have heard of program goals and/or theories of change it does not necessarily mean they know how to apply them in practice!): Use the “Program Design Trouble Shooting Tool” in Annex H to examine an existing participant’s program to find creative ways of strengthening program design. It is essential to have key resource people in the room who are familiar with the project/program to be examined, and that a 2-page summary has been shared with workshop participants ahead of time.

**Option 5:** For advanced teams like Option 4. Conduct the ‘What’s the Problem Exercise” outlined in Annex I. This is a new scenario and does not require preparation by participants or prior reading.

**Instructions and 4-Steps for Group Work:**

There are many steps to take during a program design or program design review exercise. The four steps below focus on some key steps that could be taken during a program design or program design review exercise:

- Identify program activities, intended changes and theories of change
- Using the RPP Matrix to examine program strategies
- Analyzing the program’s theories of change and program logic
- Assessing conflict-sensitive design

Each of these steps comes with a few guiding questions that can be asked during the process.

**Step 1: Identifying program activities, intended changes and theories of change**

Use the program planning chart in Annex G showing activities, expected changes, theory of change, and other assumptions.

- In the top row of the chart, enter the goal/objective of the program/project that is already identified.
- Discuss the associated overall theory of change at this level.
- Identify 3-4 activities in your project/program. Enter them in the first column of the program planning chart.
• In the other columns, identify the actual or expected change from each individual activity.

  → Are you building on the factors for peace identified in your conflict analysis? Are you considering factors to stop and/or change negative dynamics as well as building on and possibly reinforcing positive dynamics?

Step 2: Using the RPP Matrix to examine program strategy

• Start with locating the goal on the RPP matrix. Is it at the Individual/Personal level of change, or the Socio-Political level? Is it more in the realm of ‘More People’ or ‘Key People’?
• Plot the program activities and their intended changes onto the matrix. Use different visual identifications for ‘activities’ and ‘changes’. (Note: for a program already being implemented, completed activities and actual results can be plotted, as well as further planned activities and expected results depending on availability of time.)

Step 3: Analyzing the program’s theories of change and program logic

Analyzing the program theory of change and overall program strategy will help to see how the conflict analysis is connected to the program goal, and ultimately, to Peace Writ Large. It will also help the team, partners, and donors see whether the initiative is contributing to Peace Writ Large beyond the life of program, and whether there are any assumptions made that would need to be addressed in the program strategy.

• Are the theories of change appropriate and realistic in the context? Will change come about in the ways envisioned as a result of the planned activities?
• How would successful achievement of the program goal make a significant contribution to the realization of Peace Writ Large?
• Examine the logic between the activities and the goal. Would achievement of the activities lead to the goal? Is anything missing? Is the goal realistic?
• Are there unexamined assumptions underlying the links between the different activities, such as willingness, availability, external events, etc.?
• Are “hope lines” revealed on the Matrix or in the logic presented in the Four-Column Chart? (“Hope lines” are leaps in logic or gaps between activities and desired results—depicted on the Matrix by dotted lines.) How might hope lines be converted to desired changes?

If the program is already being implemented:

• Is the program on track to achieve its goal/objective? Have new gaps in program logic or other obstacles appeared during implementation, requiring adjustments in the future planned activities or a new approach?
• Have the activities completed so far resulted in the expected changes? Are there any unexpected positive or negative outcomes? Are the theories of change proving viable in the context—or is rethinking indicated?

Step 4: Assessing conflict-sensitive design

• Is the initiative aware of the actual or potential unintended negative impacts it might cause? What are those potential unintended negative impacts?
• How has the program design examined common causes of unintended negative effects, such as the choice of program partners, contractors, suppliers, location of the engagement, distribution of benefits, and timing of the programming?
• How does the initiative consider conflict-sensitivity considerations (mainly possible unintended negative impacts) in its M&E system?
• Do staff and partners have skills in conflict-sensitive program implementation and/or been trained in Do No Harm approaches? If not, how could those skills be acquired?

The Peacebuilding and Conflict-Sensitivity Clarification:

Often, there is an assumption that all peacebuilding programming that focuses on addressing key drivers of conflict directly is automatically conflict sensitive. This is not the case. In any type of programming, be it development, humanitarian, or peacebuilding, the details of an intervention matter from a conflict sensitivity perspective. The actions and behaviors within programs, as well as programs themselves, can have significant unintended negative consequences and impacts on the conflict context. It is important to consider critical program details such as choice of partners, location, timing, or choices within procurement and human resources.

Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding:
A Spectrum for Engaging in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts

Avoid Negative Effects
Implement basic conflict sensitivity with the aim of reducing negative impacts of programming

Build on Positive Effects
Reinforce positive factors in society; reduce divisions; seek to enhance positive impacts of operations on the overall situation

Contribute to Peace
Address and engage key drivers of conflict at local and/or macro levels

Peacebuilding

Spectrum of engagement with conflict contexts. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2015.
### Comparison of Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Sensitivity</th>
<th>Peacebuilding</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong>¹⁹: Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to:</td>
<td><strong>Definition</strong>²⁰: Peacebuilding refers to measures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of handling conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• understand the context in which it is operating, particularly intergroup relations,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• act upon the understanding of these interactions, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Aim</strong>: Work <strong>IN</strong> the context of conflict to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming (on conflict, but also on other factors).</td>
<td><strong>Main Aim</strong>: Work <strong>ON</strong> conflict, seeking to reduce key drivers of violent conflict and to contribute to Peace Writ Large (the broader societal-level peace).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applied to Whom/What Programming</strong>: All programs, of all types, in all sectors, at all stages of conflict (latent, hot, post-war) must be conflict sensitive, including peacebuilding efforts themselves.</td>
<td><strong>Applied to Whom/What Programming</strong>: Peacebuilding programmers or those that articulate goals or objectives aimed at securing peace. Such goals/objectives can be integrated into other programming modes (development, relief) and sectors – or peacebuilding can be a standalone effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Required Analysis</strong>: Requires an adequate understanding of the conflict (e.g., dividers and connectors analysis) to avoid worsening dividers or weakening connectors; to reduce dividers and support existing connectors.</td>
<td><strong>Required Analysis</strong>: Requires a deeper understanding of the key drivers of conflict and dynamics among factors and key actors, in order to ensure program relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard/Measure of Effectiveness</strong>: At a minimum, the program/project does not make the conflict worse-and usually also makes a positive contribution.</td>
<td><strong>Standard/Measure of Effectiveness</strong>: Program/project reduces the power of key driving factors of conflict, contributing to Peace Writ Large.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


²⁰ Ibid.
Group Exercise: Debriefing in Plenary

- What are implications for these program strategy reflections for program implementation and M&E?
- How can the program design reflections be integrated into the M&E process?

Annexes related to peacebuilding program design/Module 3:
- Annex C: RPP Criteria of Effectiveness/Building Blocks for Peace
- Annex D: Reflecting on Peace Practice Matrix for Strategic Programming
- Annex E: Organizational identities – Dominia case study
- Annex F: Example program description
- Annex G: Program planning chart
- Annex H: Program Design Troubleshooting Tool
- Annex I: “What’s the Problem” Exercise

F. Key Readings


Church, Cheyanne, and Rogers, Mark M. *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Search for Common Ground, 2006. Read pages: 14-40 (Ch 2: Understanding Change and Ch.3 Program Design)


Module 4: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan

“Monitoring and evaluation are different sides of the same coin, which is but one of the coins in the currency of learning.”

Designing for Results, 2006

Purpose of This Module
To provide an overview of important elements to consider when planning for monitoring, evaluation, and learning for a project, program, or portfolio. Although there are practical examples of suggested tools and processes, this module serves primarily as an instructional guide for facilitators, with reference to existing resources that might supplement further learning in specific areas of focus (e.g., developing a monitoring plan).

Monitoring | “A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an intervention with information regarding the use of allocated funds, the extent of progress, the likely achievement of objectives and the obstacles that stand in the way of improved performance” (OECD, 2002).

Evaluation | “Evaluation refers to the process of determining merit, worth or value of an activity, policy or programme. It consists of the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors” (Scriven, 1991; OECD, 2002).

A. What’s the Right Monitoring Method and Approach for You?

“There is no single blueprint methodology for [monitoring or] evaluating donor engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Rather, the golden rule is to apply the right tools and methods to the right questions. Methods should be chosen according to the [monitoring or] evaluation purpose and key objectives.”

In most cases, a mixed methods approach will be the most appropriate monitoring (or evaluation) process for peacebuilding programs, as well as more innovative approaches that consider the high level of flexibility and constant adaptation required in highly complex settings. For a full overview of different monitoring options, please consult the resources listed in this

21 OECD/DAC, 2012, p. 49
section, and at the end of Module 7. The following approaches are highlighted as particularly relevant from a peacebuilding perspective. However, this is not an exclusive list.

**Complexity Aware Monitoring**

Some organizations are experimenting with Complexity Aware Monitoring, which complements other forms of monitoring when used for complex and volatile aspects of projects and strategies. On this topic, [USAID’s Learning Lab Discussion Paper](https://www.usaid.gov/learning-lab) discusses five particular approaches to complexity aware monitoring:

- **Sentinel Indicators** (see Module 5)
- **Stakeholder Feedback**
  
  Recipient feedback loops are designed to collect non-sensitive data (feedback), and sensitive data (complaints) so project staff can hear and respond to different types of information coming from communities in which they work. For one resource on how to design effective feedback loops, see CDA’s collaborative work with ALNAP: [Closing the Loop: Effective Feedback in Humanitarian Contexts, Practitioner Guidance](https://www.cda.org/resources/closing-the-loop-effective-feedback-humanitarian-contexts).

- **Process Monitoring of Impacts**
  
  This approach accepts that, for projects/programs in complex contexts, impacts cannot be fully determined in advance, rather they are shaped by context, the people/networks involved, their access to resources, power, etc. Immediate impacts are monitored, “which are directly connected to the use of outputs.” See the foundational PMI resource [here](https://pmi.org/resources/evaluation/guides), and current iterations, such as [Causal Loop Mapping](https://pmi.org/resources/evaluation/guides).

- **Most Significant Change Approach**
  
  The Most Significant Change (MSC) monitoring approach involves generating and analyzing personal accounts of change and deciding which of these accounts is the most significant – and why. MSC is about collecting and reporting stories but also about having processes to learn from these stories – in particular, to learn about the similarities and differences in what different groups and individuals’ value. MSC is an example of a “goal free” process that does not start from the program/intervention but explores what people in the situation view as significant change and then traces back to a plausible explanation of how the initiative contributed to the observed changes. It provides some information about impact and unintended impact. The stories themselves reveal how a variety of stakeholders are experiencing and perceiving change. To that end, the different values of stakeholders are the foundation to determine what is most important. It is also used as an evaluation approach. Though, by itself, it is not sufficient for impact evaluation as it does not provide information about the usual experience but about the extremes. See the entire short description on [Better Evaluation](https://www.betterevaluation.org), and foundational guidance by Rick Davies.

- **Outcome Harvesting**
  
  Many peacebuilding organizations have experimented and/or regularly use Outcome Harvesting. Outcome Harvesting collects (“harvests”) evidence of what has changed
(“outcomes”) and, then, working backwards, determines whether and how an intervention has contributed to these changes. Outcome Harvesting has proven to be especially useful in complex situations when it is not possible to define concretely most of what an intervention aims to achieve, or even, what specific actions will be taken over a multi-year period. Outcome Harvesting is a method that enables evaluators, grant makers, and managers to identify, formulate, verify, and make sense of outcomes. The method was inspired by the definition of outcome as a change in the behavior, relationships, actions, activities, policies, or practices of an individual, group, community, organization, or institution. These outcomes can be positive or negative, intended or unintended, but the connection between the initiative and the outcomes should be verifiable. Saferworld has been a pioneer in using and documenting the application of Outcome Harvesting and Outcome Mapping in its peacebuilding work. Find more on Better Evaluation, and from peacebuilding practitioners applying this approach to monitoring (such as Saferworld’s Learning Paper, Doing Things Differently: Rethinking Monitoring and Evaluation to Understand Change).

Programs that are based on conflict systems analysis and systems thinking might particularly benefit from these approaches (see Modules 2 and 3 for further references on systems approaches).

Additionally, there are methods and approaches commonly used for evaluation that are also applicable when developing creative, fit-for-purpose approaches to monitoring. Though monitoring and evaluation serve different functions (monitoring is an ongoing process and often informs decisions that are practical, detailed, and frequently meet an immediate pressing need or question; evaluation is a snapshot in time focused on bigger picture or more complex issues such as why something happened) there is often overlap in approaches to data collection, analysis and learning. Find one such example below.

**Developmental Evaluation**

When an intervention is innovated by developing a new approach, or introducing an old approach in a new, complex setting, traditional evaluation (or monitoring) methodologies may not be appropriate. **Developmental Evaluation** is an approach that allows for continuous adaptive learning over time that draws on systems concepts and relatively intense stakeholder engagement practices. Where structured monitoring or evaluation frameworks may not be capable of anticipating the range of potential outcomes from an innovative intervention, developmental evaluation presents a set of practices and strategies for creating a learning framework to facilitate the identification and prioritization of key issues and things to learn.

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Applying Developmental Evaluation Principles

As part of an internal M&E team working on media and civil society development projects in the MENA region, we incorporated some components of the developmental evaluation approach into our program. We embedded designated M&E officers into the delivery teams, provided access to ongoing context research and analysis, and built both formal and informal reflection processes into the delivery schedule.

As we kept results at the center of discussions about strategy and created opportunities to rapidly and informally provide feedback from the populations targeted by the intervention, the project benefitted. This was especially useful because some project components were delivered remotely, and it was not possible for the program team to interact directly with beneficiaries.

One challenge we encountered when drawing on the principles of developmental evaluation was the struggle to balance the time required to engage with the project team around learning and the time required to collect and process data rigorous enough to satisfy donor reporting requirements. Greater communication with the donor around our approach and enhanced documentation of the improvements that we identified and adopted could have helped to mitigate this challenge.


B. MEL Plans: Accountability and Learning

Certain approaches and methods for monitoring in complex contexts (such as those mentioned above) are often most useful for providing ongoing information to program and field teams about a project’s progress towards results. However, monitoring the context, and the progress of implementation, is also necessary to ensure decisions about programmatic adaptation are fully informed, and ongoing accountability and learning is taking place. MEL plans help program teams manage these different types of information – e.g., to track and verify that data is being collected from, and directed to, the right places, at the right times, etc.

Purpose of a MEL plan

A MEL Plan serves as a **management tool** for all M&E activities. It indicates when critical decisions are necessary and outlines the information needed to make these decisions and how it will be collected.\(^{24}\) Decisions in this sense are “practical and detailed, and often meet an immediate pressing need or question.”\(^ {25} \)

For example, critical decisions might include determining:

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\(^{24}\) DM&E for Peace and SFCG: Foundations of M&E, MEL Plans.

• Are activities feeding into the objectives, or do they need to be altered?
• Is the project targeting the right population or do different participants need to be targeted?
• Is the implementation team still following the same workplan, or is communication needed to get everyone on the same page?

A good MEL plan, especially for projects in complex environments, is updated regularly based on new information. MEL plans are a discrete set of documents included as part of a project’s materials. They should stand alone, rather than be housed within another project document like the logical or results framework.

**Group Exercise: Ice Breaker Exercise (optional)**

**Mental Model Drawings**

*Supplies: Flipchart paper, tape, printer paper, markers / crayons / colored pencils*

To get a quick read on how participants are viewing MEL plans, provide everyone with a paper and writing instrument. Ask participants to take 3 minutes to draw a picture of how they “see” monitoring, or MEL plans. Participants can share drawings in pairs, small groups, or a large group. Tape pictures up on flipchart at the front of the room or on a wall. A brief (10-15 minutes) plenary discussion can focus on similarities and differences of participants’ perceptions, and what this could imply for the workshop. (Adapted from “Facilitating Intentional Group Learning” from FSG.)

**When Do You Develop the MEL Plan?**

Developing the MEL plan is part of the program design process (refer to Module 3), which takes place after a conflict analysis (refer to Module 2). A project’s theory of change, goal, objectives, and activities based on a thorough conflict analysis should already be in place before the MEL plan is created. If not, the MEL plan will not be a useful tool to help decision-makers get the right types of information at the right intervals over the course of the project.

**What Does A MEL Plan Track?**

A MEL plan should track several ‘levels’ of progress. Put simply, once a project starts, it interacts with different parts of the context. Thus, there are many activities taking place that need to be routinely monitored, both regarding the context and the project implementation. Some activities already taking place in the context itself may be important because they could be affecting the progress of the project. On the other hand, a project’s activities might be having intended or unintended effects on the context (refer to Module 6).

Central to this is understanding how local context (or the conflict system) responds to our programs and interventions. If the monitoring system is designed to collect context monitoring indicators along with program monitoring indicators, both can be used to inform the evolving conflict analysis and real-time program adaptation.
Broadly speaking, the following types of indicators are important (for more details on indicators, see Module 5):

**Context indicators** | look at changes in the surrounding environment, and track changes in relation to key elements in the conflict analysis. They can be used to update conflict analysis.

**Interaction indicators** | monitor the interactions between the intervention and the conflict context (and vice versa) to understand if an intervention is promoting stability and peace or exacerbating tensions in the area.

Levels of progress to monitor:

- **Progress towards results** – Are you achieving what you intended? (track to learn about your intended effects)
- **Progress of implementation** – Are you doing what you planned? (track for lessons about the project’s contribution to results, and to maintain accountability in the context)
- **Changes in context** – Are things changing that might derail your progress? Are you missing big windows of opportunity? What is the impact of your engagement on the context? Is your project making the context worse? (track for learning and adaptation, particularly if monitoring reveals unintended negative effects on the context, see Module 6: Monitoring for intended and unintended impacts and adaptive management.)

Facilitation Note: “Advanced Concept” – Purposes of M&E for Peacebuilding Advocacy & Policy

*Activities*: MEL plans in the peacebuilding sector are meant to enable learning and accountability in rapidly changing and complex contexts. However, this often focuses on peacebuilding programming. M&E of peacebuilding activities meant to influence policy can include embedded support functions that actually *improve* these influencing activities. M&E plans for policy-related activities might serve additional purposes such as...
as increasing knowledge, developing capacity, trust and collective efforts and alliances. See ODI’s Working Paper “Monitoring and Evaluation of Policy Influence and Advocacy.”

**Group Exercise: True or False?**

*After introducing the concept of a MEL plan, and explaining its purpose, the facilitator can offer a “pop quiz” to see what information was retained:*

Two possible processes:

1. **Write the statements below on large post-its (obviously, without the FALSE or TRUE answers).** Arrange two flip charts, one with ‘true’ at the top and one with ‘false’. Ask the participants to plug the post-its onto the flip-charts.

2. **If the group is more introspective, the facilitator can split everyone into 2-3 small groups, and ask them to take the quiz in small groups at their tables then share the answers together in plenary (discuss together, if useful).**

**Statements:**

- **The MEL plan is found in the logical or results framework (FALSE, the MEL plan is part of a discrete set of M&E documents that belong with all project materials. MEL plans are designed to inform decision-making around accountability and learning whereas logical or results frameworks help Program Managers track the overall project).**

- **Developing a MEL plan is part of the project/program design process (TRUE)**

- **A MEL plan cannot be created until the baseline data is available (FALSE – baseline data does not have any effect on the MEL plan)**

- **One does monitoring in order to have data to inform programmatic decisions, and to also be used for donor reporting (TRUE)**

- **A MEL plan tracks only the progress of a project to inform decisions (FALSE – track context too)**

Unfortunately, a MEL Plan will not always include a detailed description of each of the following key elements (although if it does, it is more likely of higher quality). In general, here are some different ways of thinking about each of the key elements in a MEL plan:

1. **How do we measure? Qualitative and quantitative Indicators** (see Module 5 on indicator and baseline development)

2. **Baselines** (see Module 5 on indicator and baseline development)

3. **Preliminary list of data collection tools**

**C. Data Collection and Accountability**

As mentioned, a MEL plan for a peacebuilding program tracks progress in three domains (changes in context, progress of implementation, progress towards results).

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Facilitation Note:

Discuss in plenary or at small tables, depending on group dynamics at that point in the workshop.

Assess from participants:
- What tools are used to collect quantitative and qualitative data for their projects?
- What tools are used to store or manage data after it has been collected?
- How data is used within the organization, with local partners and program participants?

Below are some different ideas for formal and informal data collection tools within each of these domains.

- **Context:** The purpose of data collection is to look for contextual red flags (that a driver of conflict is getting worse, that inter-group tensions are rising, that your project may be having unintended negative effects...etc.). Tools to monitor these elements within the context include:
  - Search for Common Ground Conflict Scans [Methodology](#) and [Examples](#)
  - CDA Do No Harm Framework and [Practical Guidance](#)
  - Conversations based on informal or formal feedback to listen to concerns of community members living in programmatic areas of focus (informal or formal feedback mechanisms: making note of conversations in journals or group notes, satisfaction surveys, formal suggestion boxes, etc.).

- **Implementation:** The purposes of collecting data on implementation are to ensure the project is being managed well and activities/milestones are being achieved. Tools to monitor these elements can be quite simple, and include:
  - Organizing the project log frame/results framework into a track-able Excel sheet
  - Use project management software of your choice

- **Progress toward results:** The purpose of collecting data is to understand what changes might be taking place (the evaluation will help us understand why these are occurring). Often, this element of monitoring relies on indicators, though there are other and more informal ways to measure change or results. Many different quantitative and qualitative tools exist, for a mixed methods approach. See a few suggested tools for programs in complex contexts here:
  - Approaches focused on behavior or relationship change in rapidly changing contexts (see [Saferworld’s approach](#) drawing on Outcome Mapping (OM) and Outcome Harvesting (OH) schools of thought). Many peacebuilding programs will address some element of behavior or relationship change, therefore these types of monitoring approaches may be useful. Also, if relying on OM and OH schools of thought, joint-discussion and joint-analysis are mandatory, prompting much-needed learning that can both catalyze and inform program adaptation.
  - With a strong methodology and quality data collection training, third party monitoring can fill evidence gaps in volatile or complex contexts. This approach relies on third party (non-program) participants to collect monitoring information and send
to a remote database (see some examples of how it can be used in PVE/CVE programs). Though there is value in this approach, there is also an important ethical debate about its benefits and risks (see World Bank Group’s work on this, and contribution to the discussion on ethics). There are other ways to collect information in dangerous contexts, through proxy indicators (see Module 5).

- Basic questionnaire or survey, implemented by program staff or remotely if using third party monitoring (for online surveys, see SurveyMonkey, Kobo Toolbox, or QuickTap Survey)28
- Key informant interviews conducted by program staff, or program participants for a more participatory approach (Tips for conducting Key Informant Interviews)29
- Focus groups (See Interagency Emergency Child Protection Assessment Toolkit)
- Regular joint meetings with project staff, HQ staff, and MEL teams. Some teams working in fast-paced, complex contexts worry about ‘silos’ forming around MEL and programmatic staff. Rapid joint-analysis of key monitoring data during regular meetings may help bridge possible silos and provide needed information for adaptive management and course corrections in program design and implementation processes.
- Informal conversations with program participants, that are both ethical and honest, to assess perceptions of program relevance, changes and results (see CDA’s Listening Methodology, p. 75, found in DNH Trainers Manual)

The responsibility for data collection must not be siloed with the MEL team or Coordinator. Roles for each member of a project team must be clear (including specific tasks and time frames), as all members are responsible for collecting and reporting data.

Finally, storing MEL information in a central location and managing this so all members of a project team know where to file and retrieve relevant information and reports is critical for good M&E and project management. A knowledge management tool30 may be called a M&E Information Map and serves as “a visual representation of the gathering, processing, and feedback of data within the project.”31 At the same time, it is also critical to be aware of sensitivities in relation to sensitive data and how to ensure that information and data do not get into the wrong hands, which might put program partners and beneficiaries at risk.

**Accountability**

A core Do No Harm concept is that once an intervention enters a context, it becomes a part of that context. This idea similarly applies to any outsider tracking the effects of a peacebuilding

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28 For more in-depth reading on this topic, see Corlazzoli, V. ICTs for Monitoring & Evaluation of Peacebuilding Programmes. DFID: Department for International Development, 2014, p. 1-36
30 USAID Learning Lab, 2015, What you need to know about knowledge management.
31 DM&E for Peace and SFCG: Foundations of M&E, MEL Plans
program. Not only is learning an important intended outcome for monitoring efforts, so too is the accountability of program and M&E teams leading these processes.

In areas where program participants are asked to provide input for monitoring, or participate and lead monitoring activities, formally or informally checking how transparent, fair and accountable these processes feel to participants should be almost a natural component of this work. For example: Do program and M&E teams know what levels of accountability might be necessary? Meaning, can they answer: “Who needs to know which types of information in order to feel that this process is transparent?” Or, have teams thought to ask participants about their perceptions and experiences with monitoring? (E.g., teams might ask: “How are participants engaged in monitoring activities versus how they may WANT to be engaged?” or “What role would participants like to play in decision-making after monitoring data has been collected?”).

**Close the loop!** Collecting data or feedback from communities is only part of the process for tracking and understanding how communities are experiencing service delivery or peacebuilding programs. After listening to these experiences, program and M&E teams will need to (either formally or informally) ensure communication about decisions or changes made is delivered back to communities.32

It is also highly recommended, depending on how accountability is defined at different levels, to think about how ‘informed consent’ is understood and communicated. Related to this, an organization-wide plan (that both programmatic and M&E staff use) for protecting and using data should be in place and communicated to those providing this data.

**Facilitation Note: Data Protection and Responsible Data**

The issue of data protection and responsible data use is of particular concern in many programs implemented in countries in transitions and conflict-affected contexts. This is particularly the case for initiatives that have implicit or explicit theories of change in relation to the ‘prevention’ and/or ‘counteracting’ of violent extremism.33 Many program partners and ‘beneficiaries’ are concerned about being associated with or pulled into a securitized agenda that is related to counter-terrorism efforts. Some partners also have experiences with some donors openly asking for program data to be shared with other parts of government, such as security and intelligence agencies. Particular context awareness and conflict sensitivity is required in such cases to avoid, at all cost, that partners and beneficiaries are put at risk.34

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**Group Exercise: Putting Together A Simple MEL Plan**

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34 Additional useful resources here might include: [Responsible Data website](#) and David Leege, Emily Tomkys, Nina Getachew, Linda Faftree. *Tools, tips and templates for making Responsible Data a reality*, MERL Tech, 2017.
In small groups (2-3 people) using the Speculandia case study, found in Annex M, create a list of information a project team would need to gather (information that enhances learning and accountability of the project), and explain why this information is important for decision-making (i.e., Why is that decision important for adaptive, or more effective, programming?). From the list, put together a simple MEL plan using the lessons learned in this module. Refer to Annex J for a simple MEL template, or refer to Annex O for the key elements of a MEL plan and design your own.

A note to facilitators:
MEL plans should move beyond simple indicators. They should emphasize collecting information to feed indicators, to be sure, but also data that enables adaptive decision-making and decision-making processes.

D. Proposed Timetable for All M&E Activities
This includes baseline development, monitoring, evaluation, internal reviews and/or other evaluative options.

Group Exercise
Ask participants what timetables they use for M&E activities, and have several participants share this out in group discussion. This will give the facilitator a sense of how strong of a grasp some participants already have on M&E, if that is needed. The facilitator may select one particularly apt answer and ask the participant if this timetable is often what actually occurs in practice – and, if not, why (to prompt a discussion about operational challenges to M&E particularly in politically sensitive environments, about institutional challenges in relation to M&E, etc.). A particular point to highlight here is that M&E is often an afterthought and is being discussed only once the analysis and program design is done, and budgets have been allocated. This leads to poor M&E processes, and often to underfunded M&E activities and related internal resources if no sufficient budgets have been allocated.

In the M&E timetable and related budgets, it is important to make sure every M&E activity is accounted for. These activities include:

- **Baseline development**: first M&E activity, refining indicators as needed immediately after data collection.
- **Monitoring**: ongoing throughout the project, although it must not be so frequent that it “fatigues” participants or other key stakeholders to the project. Ensure there is time to both collect AND then use the data! Timing must take into consideration who will analyze data, how, and how often.
- **Internal review, reflection, or other evaluative options**: an internal review serves many different purposes, such as reviewing the project’s theory of change, design, or early progress towards results. Timing is reliant upon purpose (for other evaluative options, see Module 7).
- **Evaluation**: a mid-term or formative evaluation takes place after enough time has elapsed for some early changes to be catalyzed – for example, after 1 year of implementation – whereas a final or summative evaluation takes place after the project (for other evaluation options, such as developmental evaluations, see Module 7).

### E. Summary of Program Objectives, Theories of Change and Activities

**Cartoonist and Evaluation: Mark Rogers (2010)**

As a management tool, most MEL plans go far beyond a rubric to organize data collection and analysis. A useful MEL plan will also contain a short **narrative** – a summary of **program objectives, theories of change and activities** (see Module 3, program design).

The narrative effectively “sets the stage” for the MEL plan, because it paints a clearer picture of the types of changes intended over the course of implementation and how these changes will be catalyzed by the project. The development of the MEL plan is often an opportune moment during the design stage to finalize conversations with the project team and donor about realistic changes to expect in a given context.\(^{35}\) The summary may also indicate the level to which different changes are to be expected. For example, perhaps the project is an innovative pilot aimed at reducing levels of violence using a new approach. The summary might indicate which objectives, activities and anticipated changes are linked to the newer approach, so that the MEL plan is framed as a tool particularly focused on tracking learning in these nascent areas.

A clear articulation of the theory of change is particularly important in a MEL plan as this statement, based on research and analysis, outlines the overall expectation for change in a project or program. Finally, a narrative provides a snapshot of the project and the theory of change at the outset, however in complex contexts some or all of these elements could inevitably change over time. What might have been assumed at the beginning about change or what catalyzes change could be adapted over the course of implementation. In this case, the summary in a MEL plan acts as the ‘baseline’ documentation of the design team’s implicit and explicit **assumptions** about context and project. Keeping this qualitative documentation intact could inform learning and accountability over time.

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\(^{35}\) **DM&E for Peace and SFCG: Foundations of M&E, MEL Plans.**
Types of Assumptions:

**Causal Assumptions** | based on evidence/experience/theory/values/beliefs that explain how the world should be. These types of assumptions are often used to explain links between elements in the theory of change. They are very individual and rooted in people’s personal cultural experiences.

**Contextual Assumptions** | something taken as given, what is assumed to continue in order for an intervention to proceed. For example, a certain level of political stability, the engagement of external actors, or a certain type of regional dynamics that influences a particular context.

**Facilitation Note**
Ask in plenary: What types of assumptions do you make in relation to your programs? Elicit a few concrete examples.

**F. A Learning Strategy for The Program**

**Facilitation Note: Possible Exercise/Energizer Around Learning**

Lead this group discussion to engage participants:

1. **Introduction**: Individual’s varying learning styles reflect the different ways in which organizations learn and adapt – and struggle with it. So, let’s learn more about your individual learning styles!
2. **Ask people individually what their learning strategies are and do a graphic or physical illustration of it** (e.g. using pipe cleaners, play-doh, grabbing a note book or another workshop participant (learning from each other!)) etc.
3. **Quick debrief in plenary about different learning styles.**

In complex contexts, planning and adaptation are paramount. M&E data must be *useful* for achieving these ends. Monitoring and evaluation provides information and data, however translating this into *lessons learned* require analysis and sense-making (arguably, it also requires an organizational culture receptive to learning conversations – something many see as lacking among peacebuilding organizations still today[36]). There is no such thing as an M&E team that enjoys collecting reams of data and information but then never using any of it! Many systems are available to help coordinate this transformation of data into knowledge and, ultimately, action. For example, [USAID Learning Lab’s resource](https://www.usaid.gov/learning-lab).

> “Monitoring and evaluation can only play a significant role in the accountability process if measures to enhance learning are put in place. Through regular exchange of information, reporting, knowledge products, learning sessions and the evaluation management

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response system, information from monitoring and evaluation can be fed back into the learning process and planning.”

Recall that the function of a MEL plan is to serve as a management tool. Often, the ‘L’ component of the plan, how learning is managed, is forgotten entirely or is implicit (e.g., only buried in the “who analyzes” element of a MEL plan) which obscures exactly how learning is meant to take place. Making learning an intentional and explicit component of a MEL plan is advisable. There are several ways to do this, each with varying levels of emphasis on learning:

- The most basic way of adding a learning element is to build it into the pre-existing MEL plan. This includes some additional articulation of when data will be analyzed, how that will be done, and the intended uses of the analysis – by who, how and when. A deliberate process of discussing with the team on how the findings and data collected through the MEL plan will be discussed in the team and used for program management and adaption is critical in this regard.

- Another way is to create a specific learning agenda for the program, which intentionally highlights all elements of a program that may require additional learning to become more effective (the programmatic theory of change, certain technical aspects or processes such as facilitating a dialogue activity, etc.). An accompanying learning plan adds value in that it may collate other relevant sources of information for improving programming, not just data resulting from M&E activities. For example, citing lessons pulled from portfolio reviews, findings of research, evaluations from other projects, analyses conducted by donors or third parties, knowledge gained from experience, etc. might be used to enhance program planning and adaptation.

Because learning activities and processes are frequently missed, and there is not yet a ‘culture of learning’ embedded within most programs or organizations, M&E managers should create learning agendas. In an ideal world, an additional ‘learning agenda’ would not be necessary, as the MEL plan itself will be robust and manage learning appropriately for the context.

Examples of learning processes and activities:

- Different activities to catalyze learning: After Action Reviews, Brown Bag meetings, joint-consultations to identify patterns in case study data (see FSG guide for facilitating intentional learning).
- Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) inspired strategy and program reflection exercises, facilitated either internally or externally. This is a useful process at pretty much any stage of the program cycle.
- Commission a case study review: A case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. It relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to

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37 UNDP p. 182.
38 USAID Learning Labs, Collaboration, Learning and Adaptation.
39 For guidance on how to do this, see Ernstorfer, Anita, Isabella Jean, and Peter Woodrow, with Diana Chigas. Thinking Evaluatively in Peacebuilding Design, Implementation and Monitoring: Three Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and Do No Harm (DNH)-infused options to strengthen the effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies and programs. Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium, 2016
converge in a triangulating fashion. It results in a report that contains a rich narrative of the phenomenon detailing how it came about.\(^\text{40}\) They are as such necessarily brief, reflective snapshots of complex and dynamic situations.

**G. Budget Requirements for MEL Plan and Indicator Development**

There are many options for developing a project’s MEL budget – however a common mistake for peacebuilding practitioners is to under-budget (or not budget at all!) for MEL activities. It is best to have a budget exclusively for MEL activities. The following elements may need to be considered when making budget decisions:

- The type of data collection instruments you are using (e.g. some survey equipment is quite expensive and requires time to learn to use, purchasing collection equipment like cell phones and phone credit, etc.).
- How many people are on the MEL team and/or have design, monitoring and evaluation functions (even without a formal MEL role in their titles), and need time covered. Also, whether an evaluation is internal (the MEL team) or external (hiring additional consultants and budgeting for their associated evaluation costs).
- How frequently the MEL team is traveling to far-away locations to collect data or to convene M&E activities (e.g. feedback workshops to jointly-analyze data). This will have transportation cost implications among others.
- How much your donor expects to be engaged in M&E activities (implications for MEL and project team’s time and travel costs).
- How many additional ‘evaluative options’ you are building into your program (see Module 7).

**H. Key Readings**


USAID. *Discussion Note: Complexity-Aware Monitoring*, Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. 2016.


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\(^{40}\) Robert Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) Edition, 2003
Module 5: Indicator and Baseline Development

“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.”

Albert Einstein (attributed)

Purpose of This Module

To demonstrate the importance of baselines and indicators for solid peacebuilding M&E and provide guidance on how to develop them. This module’s focus is on what is specific about baselines and indicators from a peacebuilding programming perspective, including e.g. relationships between baselines and conflict analysis. Guidance from this module is intended to support decision-making for peacebuilders across myriad peacebuilding sectors.

Baseline | an analysis describing the situation prior to a development intervention, against which progress can be assessed or comparisons made.\(^{41}\)

Indicator | quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor\(^{42} \ 43\)

A. Baseline Development

What Is A Baseline and What Purpose Does It Have?

A baseline “provides a starting point from which a comparison can be made.”\(^{44}\) This is a critical step for any project and takes place after the design stage but before an intervention begins, so the data collected reflects the situation before a project (or any activity) has had any effect.

A baseline is a discrete activity prior to implementation, yet it serves several different purposes. Most importantly, a baseline serves to:

1. Take a snapshot in time of elements in the context, so future comparisons can be made;
2. Assist with planning (refine targeting); \(^{45}\)

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\(^{41}\) OECD DAC, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, 2002, p. 18.


\(^{43}\) OECD DAC, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, 2002, p. 25.


3. Help test and refine indicators, ensuring future accuracy of measurement.46

A baseline is fundamental both for project management, and monitoring, but also important for evaluation. The existence of a baseline is one critical element of the “availability of information” criteria, one of three areas that are assessed in Evaluability Assessments, meant to determine if a project can be evaluated or if it is too poor of quality for an evaluation.47

Relationship (And Differences) Between Conflict Analysis and Baseline

“For instance, your analysis might identify local corruption as a cause of conflict. Your baseline then might find that 60% of community members feel local government is very corrupt, with rates among young, Christian women being the highest at 95%.”48

In peacebuilding programs, it is not uncommon to assume a conflict analysis and baseline are interchangeable. A conflict analysis can be ‘a snapshot in time and assist with planning’ just as a baseline might. Both also occur at the beginning of the program cycle before an intervention begins. However, they are distinctly different tools and should be used according to the function they serve.

Conflict analysis serves to explore and explain a problem (e.g., what drives conflict), while a baseline serves to document the status of elements the intervention hopes to change in the conflict context.49

A peacebuilding intervention should also be designed based on the findings from a thorough conflict analysis and strategic planning conversations about potential leverage points for changing a conflict, whereas a baseline serves no purpose in project design. A baseline must be designed only after there is an understanding about what types of changes are needed to alter the conflict.

Group Exercise

Pick one of the drivers of conflict identified in the case study (Dominia, Annex A), e.g. corruption (which is also a driver of conflict in many contexts). If corruption is identified as a driver of conflict, what type of information would the baseline ask for?

In the debriefing, probe for people’s perceptions on corruption, quantify those views and analyze them qualitatively, including disaggregation of data along e.g. agenda, gender, ethnicity, faith, location, etc.

Steps for Peacebuilding Baseline Development

1. Identify goals of the baseline

Determining the focus of the baseline is an essential first step: what is it you need to capture? Knowing some of the purposes a baseline serves, the following priority areas for data collection will come as no surprise. No matter what, a baseline must focus on change.

Baselines could do this by highlighting the intended changes (outcomes), unintended changes (e.g. inter-group relations in the local community, or capacity), and assumptions that you may want to monitor over the course of a project.

Once goals have been identified, a baseline plan can be developed; this plan is very similar to the Basic MEL Plan illustrated in Module 4. For another example of a baseline plan, refer to Designing for Results, pages 71-76.

For possible high-level inspiration on the types of changes goals could seek to achieve, please refer back to the RPP Building Blocks/Criteria for Effectiveness in peacebuilding outlined in Module 3.

2. Determining comparison, or control groups, data source and targets, for the baseline

Most M&E practitioners (in any field), will, at some point over the course of their work, need to explain how organizational M&E systems are designed to interpret ‘attribution’ versus ‘contribution’ of programs to results. For peacebuilders, this conversation is slightly more challenging than for most. “Attribution is the ascribing of a causal link from a specific intervention to observed (or expected) changes. While attribution poses a problem in all areas of development work, attributing results to any particular policy or single intervention in conflict contexts is even more difficult.”

This is due to many factors in conflict environments, including the rapidly changing and unpredictable nature of these contexts, it is hard to develop a ‘counterfactual’ with any a high degree of certainty.

**Comparison or control groups for the baseline:** Using comparison or control groups is the most common counterfactual for determining impact (at macro/goal level). For resources on designing counterfactuals (comparison or control groups, particularly) in peacebuilding evaluation refer to evaluations or grey literature discussing experimental, quasi-experimental or Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) to assess impact of peacebuilding programs.

However, “there is much debate about whether it is even possible to construct a good counterfactual in many peacebuilding interventions – given the complexity of fragile and conflict-affected contexts and the nature of the interventions, including policy interventions or

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51 “the situation or condition which hypothetically may prevail for individuals, organizations, or groups were there no intervention.” OECD DAC (2012) Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility—Improving Learning for Results, p 11.
52 Chigas, Diana, Madeline Church, Vanessa Corlazzoli, Evaluating Impacts of Peacebuilding Interventions, DFID, CDA, Saferworld, Search for Common Ground, May 2014, p. 23
interventions focused on macro-level effects.” Developing a robust counterfactual may not be effective or feasible in conflict contexts and – what is more - may even cause unintended, negative outcomes. In addition, it may be difficult to actually ‘control’ the key elements of a control group. This can undermine the effectiveness of the approach. In these cases, OECD guidance states: “Where causality cannot be reliably determined using rigorous methods, evaluators may present plausible explanations for their conclusions regarding impact, though limitations should be made explicit.”

In the event attribution is not deemed necessary from a M&E standpoint (a decision perhaps made based on a variety of factors, like does not meet needs of the project, too expensive, not enough staff available, etc.), the ‘contribution’ of a peacebuilding project to change may be sufficient and a ‘good enough’ approach for informing decision-making. Assessing a project’s contribution to a peacebuilding goal or outcome does not imply reducing the level of methodological rigor of baselines or other MEL systems and activities, but rather applying a different approach to serve the needs of the program. Data sources and targets can be carefully selected during the baseline stage (and subsequent monitoring and evaluation activities), so biases are intentionally avoided, data is still triangulated, and holds up to external standards (for example, the American Evaluation Association Program Evaluation Standards).

**Data source & Targets for the baseline:** “The data source and target refer to where the data will be accessed and how many data sources will be utilized. For instance, a data source and target might be 80% of the participants in training.” Determining the data source and target for your baseline depends on the indicators you need to measure.

3. **Draft questions for data collection**

The “questions” for data collection are the indicators. The baseline team will need to take the indicators developed as part of the design and use these in the baseline plan. However, if the baseline is also going to focus on unintended changes and assumptions, which is often wise given the variability of conflict contexts and need to quickly adapt programming based on multiple types of information, then additional questions (or “indicators”) relating to this focus will need to be added. (See section B on Indicators, below).

4. **Conduct baseline data collection and analysis**

The means of verification (data collection methods) for a baseline are often the same as those used for ongoing monitoring and evaluations (refer to Module 4 for sample data collection methods). The team designated to collect baseline data might choose several different instruments for each baseline focus.

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Who Should Conduct Baselines? How and When?

Ideally, the team or person tasked with evaluation of the project should carry out the baseline, as this allows for continuity in project measurement. If this is not possible (as it is the case most often!), other team members can be tasked to do this, or an external expert can be hired (see sample ToR [here](#)). The baseline must be planned to take place a few weeks before implementation starts, although this may not always be possible given a rapidly changing context. In this case, a baseline can be conducted in parallel to the first months of project activities. In highly fluid and complex settings, this might also make for a more realistic baseline process.

How Do Evaluators Use Baseline Data?

An evaluator will rely on baseline data to make definitive statements about change. If the evaluator does not know the starting point for an expected change, then it becomes extremely challenging (at times, impossible) to determine if change has occurred as a result of the project.

Facilitation Note: A Quick Group Exercise in Plenary

- What if we have a short window between receiving funding and project implementation? When do we conduct the baseline?
  *Answer:* Then conduct baseline simultaneously with early project implementation.

- Can we continue refining our indicators throughout the project, so our indicators are as accurate as possible?
  *Answer:* Ideally no – indicators should be refined after the baseline and then left alone. Otherwise, the baseline data could be rendered useless. If context changes are extreme, when it is time to evaluate the project, indicators may then require adaptation. Some organizations also add new indicators after baseline development depending on program logic.

- Is baseline data collection an opportunity to determine potential conflict sensitivity concerns?
  *Answer:* Yes.

Responses adapted from Designing for Results, 2006.
B. Indicator Development

The Purpose of Indicators

For peacebuilders, questions of measurement are often complex simply because anticipated changes are often achieved non-linearly and in difficult environments (where it can be challenging to measure incremental changes and to collect data).

An indicator “refers to a measure used to demonstrate change in a situation, or the progress in, or results of, an activity, project, or program.” Though indicators are meant to signal change (such as the treetops indicating the wind blows), they are not designed to tell you why this change is occurring.

As peacebuilders, it is often wise to determine a select number of indicators (e.g. 2-3) for each element you are hoping to measure. Often, taking a mixed methods approach to measurement when thinking about indicator development (later used in baselines where they can be refined, in monitoring activities, or evaluations) depending on the change you need to measure is best because this can provide a more rounded picture of the type of change you are seeking.

At the broadest level, there is debate about the value of universal versus contextual indicators in areas of conflict and fragility. It is good to know this debate exists. However, there are universal quality criteria to consider when developing indicators, and commonly agreed-upon processes.

Basic Components of an Indicator

The basic components of any indicator vary; however, all indicators must demonstrate some type of change or progress of an activity. An indicator that does not demonstrate change, for example at socio-political level (e.g. change in an institutional process or a policy) or at individual-personal level (e.g. a change in group behavior), might be an indicator that is unclear, irrelevant, or something you cannot measure.

Source: Conflict Sensitivity: Indicators for local community development programming in Myanmar, UNDP, 2017.

An important clarifying concept | Module 4 discusses the importance of monitoring the context. Understanding what is going on in a context is a different process from measuring change or progress that results from your project interacting with that context. This module exclusively provides facilitation.

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57 RBM (Results-based management) in UNDP: Selecting Indicators, Signposts for Development, UNDP 2002
exercises designed to help peacebuilding M&E practitioners design high quality outcome/goal indicators (or those that measure the change that results from a project). This is intentional, as decisions needed to be made about what to prioritize in this manual for peacebuilding M&E decision-making, and outcome/goal indicators can often be much harder to get right than proxy, context, output or input indicators. This module nevertheless provides guidance for designing all different types of indicators. Facilitators may simply need to provide their own exercises to help participants design proxy, context, output or input indicators. (Also, refer to Annex L for an ‘indicator matching’ exercise if participants feel they need practice with understanding other types of indicators).

All indicators should be:

- **Directly relevant** to what type of change is being measured (e.g. an attitude change)
- **Clear** enough that different people will know what is being measured and have the same interpretation of that indicator
- **Practical** in that data collected for the indicator can be used to assess change
- **Doable** – meaning data can be collected for the indicator.  

**Group Exercise: Assessing Change Using the RPP Building Blocks/Criteria for Effectiveness**

*Using a relevant program or project, apply the RPP Building Blocks together in small groups. Write the discussion question on a flipchart at the front of the room and circulate amongst the small groups to facilitate and guide discussion. Discussion question:*

What are some macro level indicators you might use to measure the intermediate steps toward Peace Writ Large in this project?

*Write a reminder on flipchart paper or show on a PPT slide during group work: An indicator “refers to a measure used to demonstrate change in a situation, or the progress in, or results of, an activity, project, or program.” They are meant to signal change, not tell you why this change is occurring!*

*Ask a member of each small group to take notes. Share some macro indicators as a group in plenary and discuss.*

**Group Exercise: “Pop Quiz”**

Which of these is a good indicator measuring change (outcome/goal indicators) that results from a project? Why or why not?

*Given that indicators should be relevant, clear, practical and doable, which of these is a good outcome/goal indicator? The purpose of the exercise is to show that quite a bit of nuance and thinking goes into creating a good indicator. It may be good to refer to the universal vs. contextual indicators debate. Universal indicators are often critiqued because they are copied and pasted from context to context. But, a universal indicator could be good, if used the right way – meaning, it adheres to this set of quality criteria in a given context. To keep things simple, it is important to note that the indicators here *in theory* should all be indicators that measure change resulting from a project (not indicators tracking the context, or inputs/outputs of an*

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activity or project). Facilitators can make this an oral “quiz” where they write each potential outcome/goal indicator on a flip chart and ask the group to reply, then analyze together, OR a written quiz that is collected and discussed in plenary. The focus is on outcome/goal indicators because these are often harder to get right than input/output indicators.

1. 45% decrease in violence in village A in 6 months

   [OUTCOME INDICATOR, BUT OF MEDIocre QUALITY – Seems relevant for a peacebuilding program but could be clearer about what kinds of “violence” are being measured. It is practical for assessing change or progress possibly resulting from the peacebuilding project, however, unsure how doable it is until “violence” is defined.]

2. 20% increase in community leaders who believe male ex-combatants deserve a chance at reintegration by end of project

   [OUTCOME INDICATOR OF GOOD QUALITY – The indicator is relevant to peacebuilding programming, clear, practical and doable.]

3. # of incidents of violence

   [OUTCOME INDICATOR OF POOR QUALITY – This may help understand the context but does not indicate if change has occurred. Not clear what violence means, not practical to assess change, unclear if data can be collected or not. Could be relevant to peacebuilding programs.]

4. % membership in community-based organizations within 2 years

   [OUTCOME INDICATOR OF POOR QUALITY – Unclear what CBO means, not practical for assessing change, may be doable but unclear. Would need context to know how this is relevant to a peacebuilding program.]

5. # of youth-led community activities

   [OUTCOME INDICATOR OF POOR QUALITY – Good to understand context, but what change has occurred? Not practical to assess change.]

References: “Conflict Sensitivity: Indicators for local and community development programming in Myanmar” (UNDP, 2017); Designing for Results: Indicators (SFCG, 2005).

The most common acronym used as an aid-memoire for indicator development is S.M.A.R.T. Originally crafted in the early 1980’s, S.M.A.R.T. indicators are still used today as a quality criterion for indicators. As explained in Search for Common Ground’s Indicator Module:

- **Specific:** measures as closely as possible the result it is intended to measure; disaggregated data (where appropriate). Clear to any person gathering data what is being measured.

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• **Measurable:** some indication of the size of the change being measured (“size, magnitude or dimension of the desired change”\(^{61}\)), detail about the target population to be measured, quantitative (where possible) or qualitative measurement.

• **Achievable/Attainable:** technically possible to gather data, and at a reasonable cost.

• **Result-oriented:** reliable; general agreement over interpretation of the results.

• **Time-bound:** measuring change within a realistic range of time (e.g. % change in attitude between *April 2015* – *April 2016*). This also ensures that data can be collected frequently enough to inform progress and feed programmatic decisions.

### Examples of other sets of quality criteria:

**CREAM** (Clear, Relevant, Economic, Adequate, Monitorable)\(^{62}\)

**SPICED** (Subjective or based on key informants’ insights, Participatory or inclusive of key stakeholders to the project, Interpreted and Communicable, Cross-Checked and Compared, Empowering or allowing time for self-reflection and adaptation during the process, Diverse and Disaggregated)\(^{63}\)

### Two Main Types of Indicators

Indicators can either be qualitative or quantitative types of measurement. The data that is collected can be very different, depending on which type of measurement is selected.

> “Often quantitative indicators are preferred over qualitative indicators as their numerical precision may make interpretation of results data easier and more concrete. They tell us what happened and how much. However, qualitative indicators can supplement quantitative indicators by revealing more meaningful, deeper information on how something is working or not working and why this happens. Therefore, a combined usage of the two types of indicators is always recommended in program design, monitoring and evaluation.”\(^{64}\)

Quantitative indicators measure changes in numbers (numerical values, ratios, percentages, etc.) whereas qualitative indicators provide information on “changes in knowledge, attitudes, perceptions, behavior or capacities of individuals, groups and organizations, and changes in the standard and quality of things such as services, utilities or infrastructure.”\(^{65}\) Qualitative indicators often require open-ended questions and get at nuance and subtleties, whereas quantitative indicators often use closed-ended questions and give exact answers.

### Examples of quantitative indicators:

- A 50% increase over the baseline in the number of people who enroll their children in ethnically mixed schools by the end of the project
- 500 disputes resolved by trained mediators over 18 months

\(^{61}\) Church, Cheyanne, and Rogers, Mark M. *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Search for Common Ground, 2006, p. 43-60


\(^{65}\) UNDP, 2017. “Conflict Sensitivity: Indicators for local and community development programming in Myanmar”
c. 100 new soap opera episodes produced and aired on local conflict issues

Examples of qualitative indicators:

a. 25% of the population is confident people can safely move around in all areas in their community by end of project.

b. 10% of community members fear violence in village D in 6 months.

Levels of Indicators: Input, Output, and Outcome/Impact Indicators

Reminder: an indicator refers to a measure used to demonstrate change in a situation, or the progress in, or results of, an activity, project, or program. Measuring progress of an activity is important to learn if a project is being implemented as planned and to inform detailed decisions. Measuring change is important to learn if the goal and theory of the project is correct and to inform strategic decisions. Distinguishing between output, outcome, and impact indicators helps program teams determine whether they are measuring progress of an activity, or change resulting from the project. This distinction matters, particularly if contexts change rapidly and both detailed and strategic decisions need to be made to adapt the project to the context. Both quantitative and qualitative indicators can be used to measure these elements. There are some general tips and examples to guide the process:

- **Input indicators:** “This is a measure of all resources including human, financial, material, technological, and information resources”⁶⁶ that go into a project, program or intervention. These are often quantitative indicators.
  - Examples: Amount of money available in the budget for a training. Number of hours available for a trainer to prepare the training.

- **Output indicators:** These measure products and services produced (immediate or short-term results). One easy way to remember an output, is that this is something that the project team can often control, within a known range of variability. They are normally quantitative.
  - Examples: “# of people in the municipality attending facilitated events geared toward strengthening understanding among conflict-affected groups that were supported with USG assistance in the past three months, # of coaching sessions conducted in the 10 communities by end of the project.”⁶⁷

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• **Outcome/impact indicators:** Many peacebuilding projects rely on mixed methods approaches to collect outcome/impact level data. Impact indicators measure long-term results, whereas outcome indicators are assessing results in the short or medium term.
  
  o **Outcome example:** “Increased # of youth participating in a youth parliament and interacting with government parliament after participation in a SFCG program.”
  
  o **Impact example:** “Reconciliation facilitated between divided ethnic/religious groups in Côte d’Ivoire, reduction in community and regional tensions over territorial conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire.”

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**Group Exercise: Understanding Change Using ‘Baskets’ of Indicators**

**Purpose:** This exercise is meant to demonstrate that measuring change will often require a ‘basket’ of several indicators, that have been individually assessed against multiple quality criteria, for a team to truly feel they understand what is going on and can make detailed and strategic decisions to adapt a project. No single indicator will ever be perfect, no matter how much work has been done to make it ‘top quality’. Baskets of indicators are more helpful.

**Instructions:** Review the below proposed indicators and ask participants to critique them and/or propose adaptations or new indicators all together. Ask participants to use the SMART criteria since this common set of criteria has not been applied yet in the module (group could even “grade” each indicator). Discuss assumptions built into them, ideas on how to improve them, etc.

**Note:** In more advanced groups, you might want to ask participants to develop sample indicators themselves, and only give them the outcome statements.

**Outcomes:**

1. Increased trust between women and the police

  **Indicator 1:** # of conversations between women and police (CRITIQUE: Not sure which women or police, could be more specific. Not clear what change is being measured. Seems achievable. Seems it could provide reliable data given the right tool (accurate # of conversations) and is linked to the outcome as it assumes more conversations imply there is more trust, though M&E staff should make this assumption explicit. Not time bound. Grade: D)

  **Indicator 2:** % increase in women who feel police are necessary for protecting the community (CRITIQUE: Could be more specific (are these women in the general community, or program participants?). Clear the change being measured (though assumes a baseline exists). Seems achievable and could provide reliable data related to the outcome. Not time bound. Grade: C)

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Facilitation Note:

This would be best as a small group exercise. Ask groups to select one person to take notes. Give at least 20 minutes for small group work, and at least 15 minutes for plenary discussion.

In conflict and fragile contexts, due to data collection restraints or time/resource constraints (or both) there will inevitably be necessary data that cannot be collected using the most direct and relevant indicator. For example, the project team does not feel safe or comfortable asking explicitly for data on ethnic composition within a given community. In this case, indirect or proxy indicators become useful.

Proxy Indicators | when data is hard to access, or perhaps difficult to measure accurately, there are still ways to collect the information you need. However, it is important that project teams and evaluators remain realistic and embrace the challenges of collecting data in complex contexts. It is possible that you may need to be creative. One such way is to find good proxy indicators. A proxy indicator is “a symbolic or approximate change relating to the desired [intended] outcome.”
If a project’s intended outcome is ‘empowerment of women in national decision-making processes,’ an example of a possible proxy indicator to track could be: “the proportion of parliamentarians who are female as “proxy” for empowerment of women in national decision-making processes.” This is a proxy indicator regardless of whether or not the project is implemented in a conflict context; however, if for example there has been a 6-month lag in implementation given outbreak of violence, the proxy indicator could still be tracked.

- Do you have any proxy indicators that have served as good approximations of change in your peacebuilding program? Share them with us!

For more information on proxy indicators, refer to the UNDP handbook on Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluating for Development Results. Also, see Ernstorfer, Anita and Lillie Ris, “Borrowing a Wheel: Applying Existing Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Strategies to Emerging Programming Approaches to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism,” 2017.

“Wherever possible, indicators should be direct, meaning they describe the subject to be measured specifically, e.g. number of radio shows, number or percent of people listening, the percent of change from pre to post, etc. When this is not possible, an indirect or proxy indicator may be used. Normally this is used to demonstrate the change or results where direct measures are not feasible due to data collection constraints or time constraints. For example, Search of Common Ground (SFCG) often uses general listenership surveys to estimate the number of people who may hear an SFCG radio program, or, if ethnicity figures are unavailable, you might use data on how many speak the different languages spoken in a region.”

Annex K to this module will provide guidance and guiding questions on indicator development, and focus on the following aspects:
- How do you develop the indicator?
- How to set targets for indicators?
- How do we know the indicator will work and be useful?

Facilitation Note:
Training workshop facilitators might want to use Annex K as a hand-out during the workshop, depending on the types of exercises chosen and on the level of experience of the group.

What’s the Latest?
Sentinel Indicators: As mentioned in Module 4: MEL Plans, complexity aware monitoring approaches, highlight the application of more iterative and flexible ‘sentinel indicators’.

“Sentinel indicators are the most basic way to complement a Log Frame or results framework-based performance monitoring system with a complexity-aware approach. The concept of sentinel indicators is borrowed from ecology where it refers to an indicator which captures the essence of the process of change affecting a broad area of interest and

which is also easily communicated. For example, ecologists may designate a species as a sentinel of the overall health of an ecosystem. Plants or lichens sensitive to heavy metals or acids in precipitation may be used as indicators of air pollution. A sentinel indicator facilitates monitoring and communicating about complex processes that are difficult to study. As a proxy, however, this type of indicator provides incomplete information, and judgments about complex processes or entire social systems based on a single indicator can be dangerous. Therefore, a sentinel indicator should be used to trigger further observation or probes.”

A foundation for experimenting with complexity aware monitoring and sentinel indicators are strategies and programs that are based on systems approaches, and where teams are comfortable with moving away from a linear ‘logical framework’ type thinking to more qualitative, open-ended and experimental designs.

There is relatively limited practical experience and related learning processes on translating systems approaches during analysis and design into systemic monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field. To develop this type of thinking further, the peacebuilding community needs to gain and collect more practical experiences and also learn from systems thinking application in other fields.

Conflict Sensitivity Indicators: MEL plans for programs in complex contexts, as explained in Module 4, are designed to track progress towards intended outcomes and gather data on any unintended outcomes, so decisions can be made to respond to both. In conflict environments, research from decades of work in situations of war and violence leading to six core lessons of Do No Harm shows that once an intervention enters a context, it will have an impact on that context. Understanding these intended and unintended effects and creating options for responding (whether they are practice, process or policy options) is known commonly as a ‘conflict sensitive’ approach. As explained in the Faith Matters: A guide for the design, monitoring & evaluation of inter-religious action for peacebuilding: “in addition to setting out the plans for capturing data on the intended outcomes, the [MEL] plan should also set out how it will gather data on unintended outcomes (positive and negative), with particular attention to... conflict sensitivity.”

Many of the complexity-aware monitoring systems provided in Module 4 are designed to collect this type of information, particularly the approaches emphasizing open-ended inquiry (that may more easily capture unintended negative effects of a project on the context).

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70 USAID Learning Lab. Complexity Aware Monitoring, p. 8
72 See, for example Measure Evaluation’s work on System Thinking.
However, specific conflict sensitivity indicators can also be designed. For further guidance, reference the DFID resource, *Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity: methodological challenges and practical solutions*.

**Group Exercise: What Would You Decide?**

*Indicators in any project or program are seldom perfect, as they are often built on approximations. In complex environments, rapid changes to the context and program could render indicators irrelevant or unmeasurable as implementation progresses. To ensure indicators for peacebuilding programs remain of high quality for as long as possible, teams should feel comfortable designing indicators against common quality standards and then determining what to do when situations change. It is not advisable to significantly change indicators mid-course, as this renders your baseline data useless and could skew learning about progress already made toward certain results.*

**Materials:**
- Board or flipchart for key questions to guide the exercise
- A printed description of a participant’s program (if provided) OR Example Program Description (Annex F)
- Reference the S.M.A.R.T. quality criteria for indicators presented in this module.

Divide participants into small groups (3-4 people). At the front of the room, write the following questions for the group to answer (on the board or flipchart):

1. **How** would you go about designing indicators for this program? **Please provide a few key indicators you would design.** [If using Annex F, facilitators can provide a hint: look at context, theory of change, key areas of intervention, and challenges for achieving results].
2. Are there any other considerations for designing indicators?
3. What are some of the assumptions you have made to come up with these indicators? [For facilitators: reference the different types of assumptions given in Module 4].
4. What are initial considerations for data collection for these indicators? Are there conflict sensitivity concerns around any indicators you have designed?

Give the groups 20-30 minutes to read the case and work through these questions. Facilitators should closely monitor small group work to ensure S.M.A.R.T. criteria are being applied, and indicators for progress toward results, and tracking context, are developed. Troubleshoot any issues during this time. Indicators will not be presented in plenary.

Then, allow at least 30 minutes in plenary to discuss on-the-ground decisions about measurement adaptations:

- In your experience, have there ever been changes in the context that have directly affected your indicators? If so, what did you do?
- In this specific case example, what are some options to adapt your measurement approach if context shifts affect your ability to use the indicators you have developed?
- Did anyone start this exercise by first asking what elements of this program seemed to need information for the program to be effective? If so, (echoing the question above) with a change in context, how would you adapt your measurement approach based on the most urgent decisions needing information?
C. Key Readings

Baselines
International Alert. Sample Terms of Reference - Baseline Study. n.d.

Indicators
Saferworld. A vision of goals, targets, and indicators briefing. 2013.

Complexity Aware Monitoring
Measure Evaluation. Systems Thinking. n.d.
Module 6: Monitoring for Intended and Unintended Impacts and Adaptive Management

Purpose of This Module
To create awareness about the importance of monitoring for intended and unintended impacts, for the need for adaptive management in peacebuilding programming, and to provide practical insights on how to do so.

Facilitator Note: Required Resources
Hand-out Speculandia case (Annex M) the day before this session happens so that participants get a chance to read though the case.

A. What Types of Results and Impacts Are We Monitoring in Peacebuilding?
In peacebuilding programming, different types of monitoring are required on various levels:

- Ongoing monitoring of the overall context and of the conflict dynamics and how key drivers of conflict change over time
- Implementation monitoring: ‘Project or program effectiveness’
  - Results or Impact monitoring: “Peace effectiveness”
  - Implementation monitoring: “Project/Program effectiveness”

**Program Effectiveness** focuses on assessing whether a specific program is achieving its intended goals in an effective manner. This kind of evaluation asks whether the program is fulfilling its goals and is successful on its own terms. This might be or might not be linked to a change in the overall context. A project or program might achieve its intended goals, but not necessarily have an impact on the bigger picture. Even if the focus of an assessment targets the project/program level, it is important to keep the broader questions of context and peace effectiveness (see below) in mind.

**Peace Effectiveness** asks whether, in meeting specific goals, the program contributes to Peace Writ Large (PWL) and has a positive effect on the overall context by reducing the key driving factors of conflict. This requires assessing changes in the overall environment that may or may not result directly from the program. In most instances this requires identifying the contribution of the specific program to PWL, rather than seeking clear attribution of impacts from discrete peace initiatives. Impacts at the level of PWL typically cannot be achieved by single activities and projects, but rather are cumulative,
resulting from many different efforts happening simultaneously, especially when these efforts are deliberately designed to complement one another. Strategic linkages among efforts in a single context are therefore critical. This level of effectiveness might be best examined during assessments of larger portfolios and/or country strategies, or country level evaluations of various efforts by different organizations.

B. Monitoring Intended and Unintended Impacts

“I hope I'm wrong, but I am afraid that Iraq is going to turn out to be the greatest disaster in American foreign policy - worse than Vietnam, not in the number who died, but in terms of its unintended consequences and its reverberation throughout the region.”

Madeleine Albright

Many peacebuilding programs assume that they are necessarily conflict-sensitive given that there is a peace-relevant objective to the engagement. However, they require the same type of application of conflict sensitivity/Do No Harm principles like other development or humanitarian efforts as they have the same likelihood of unintentionally causing harm.

Many monitoring systems and evaluations only focus on intended outcomes and impacts but understanding positive or negative unintended results is equally important – especially from a conflict-sensitivity perspective. This means that the data collection systems in place need to remain open to capturing unintended results that were not anticipated by including open-ended questions in interviews and questionnaires, and by encouraging reporting of unexpected results.

74 See Ernstorfer, Anita, Isabella Jean, and Peter Woodrow, with Diana Chigas. Thinking Evaluatively in Peacebuilding Design, Implementation and Monitoring: Three Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and Do No Harm (DNH)-infused options to strengthen the effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies and programs. Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium, 2016, p. 7
Monitoring and Evaluation Conflict-Sensitivity and Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring for unintended negative impacts at the programmatic level and designing monitoring and evaluation processes in a conflict-sensitive way are two sides of the same coin and equally important. They also require donors, implementing organizations, and local partners to take a critical look at their internal organizational practices and how they can be more conducive to conflict-sensitive engagement.

Monitoring and evaluating conflict-sensitivity:
Assessing unintended negative impacts of your program on the context: "Programmatic M&E of CS"

Conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation:
Designing and implementing the M&E process in a way that is conflict-sensitive and does no harm

Group Exercise: A Quick Warm Up

Give groups 5-10 minutes at their tables to talk about their own experiences with M&E of conflict-sensitivity, and/or conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation. Ask guiding questions, such as:

- Who is doing it in the organization?
- How is it being done?
- What is the follow-up (corrective action taken) if unintended negative impacts are monitored and detected?
- What type of staff skills are available and required to do this right?
- How are local partners and external consultants (e.g. for evaluations) included in those discussions?

Note: Many organizations will likely not have a formal process in place for ‘M&E of conflict sensitivity’, but might monitor for risks, unintended impacts, etc. in their ongoing monitoring. It is important to understand where organizations come from right now.

M&E of Conflict Sensitivity

M&E of conflict sensitivity requires:

- Tracking the effects of the program on the conflict: This requires monitoring changes in the conflict that might be linked to specific activities, e.g. patterns of the distribution of resources, effects on local markets for goods and services, changes in levels of influence of local actors linked to the intervention, a decreased dependence on local systems, institutions, and
mechanisms that perform similar functions to those of the intervention, and changing rates of theft linked to the resources distributed by the intervention.

- **Tracking the effects of the conflict on the program**: These changes could be on a large scale (determining exit strategies, revised theories of change) or a small scale (adjusting details of the program to adapt to increased tensions or decreased capacities for peace).

M&E of the application of conflict sensitivity remains an operational challenge. Effective application of conflict-sensitivity and appropriate use of monitoring data in adaptive programming hinges on multiple institutional factors and capacities.

**Monitoring of Conflict-Sensitivity**

Having a conflict analysis or divider and connector analysis in place is a key requirement to understand how certain interventions impact the context positively and possibly negatively. During the inception phase, taking stock of existing conflict analyses, conflict-sensitivity analyses or more specific divider and connector analyses will be undertaken, analysis gaps identified, and possibly filled as part of this engagement.

**Key questions** to ask about the relationship between your intervention and the context include the following:

- How is the context changing (both positively and negatively)?
- How is the intervention contributing to those changes?
- How is the intervention responding to those changes?

‘Regular’ monitoring systems need to be adapted for tracking these changes.

An additional and complementary approach to context monitoring involves the use of **feedback mechanisms**. Feedback from stakeholders engaged in program activities as well as those that are not program participants often provides useful additional information when monitoring conflict sensitivity, as it draws in diverse viewpoints, potentially revealing useful unintended (or unanticipated) program effects. As much as possible, the active use of feedback mechanisms should be encouraged. This will include real-time information about unintended impacts of programs on group relations in the local context. Feedback mechanisms might be particularly useful in cases where over-reliance on indicator-based methodologies can result in oversight of dynamic changes in the context and program’s effects on that context.

Well-designed and context-appropriate feedback processes provide an opportunity:

- to regularly engage key program constituents in evaluative conversations about the assumptions that underpin interventions;
• to question the validity of these assumptions and programmatic choices; and
• to offer suggestions for program quality improvement during implementation and evaluation phases.

**Group Exercise: At Tables or In Plenary**

*How do you/does your program team currently collect formal and informal feedback from your program partners, participants AND donors [‘downwards’ and ‘upwards’]? How is feedback currently being used in your organization?*

*In debriefing, look for things that might work in different cultures and contexts and for a mix between formal mechanisms and informal mechanisms, such as: community meetings, drop-in office visits, home visit, feedback box, radio program/call-in, toll-free SMS, etc.*

**Facilitators:** Stress the importance of ‘closing the loop’ and following-up on feedback received. Sometimes this might involve smaller implementation ‘tweaks’, fundamental shifts in strategies or management decisions related to Human Resources, or financial or procurement decisions and adaptations to respond to critical feedback. This is at the core of adaptive management.

**Note:** Not many peacebuilding organizations use such mechanisms as systematically as for example larger humanitarian organizations, but it is still good to get a feeling for what people might already be using and where there might be potential to use more.

Systematically collecting feedback through formal M&E processes, additional accessible and confidential feedback channels appropriate to the context as well as participatory context monitoring is only useful if it leads to improvement in program quality. This information needs to be used to manage programs flexibly and adapt to changes in context, particularly if unintended negative impacts are being monitored. Such practices have become commonplace in many humanitarian operations, particularly the use of complaints response and grievance mechanisms.\(^{75}\)

CDA’s research on **effective feedback loops** and factors that enable **feedback utilization**\(^{76}\) has produced case studies and evidence-based practical guidance to assist donors and operational agencies in the humanitarian, development fields, and peacebuilding programs. CDA has identified several insights and good practices important for quality peacebuilding programs:\(^{77}\)

- There are frequently missed opportunities for engaging local people, not only through listening to their perspectives, but also by engaging them in analysis of feedback and identification of needed program changes;
- Staff and local partners often need enhanced individual skills in active listening, appreciative inquiry, and data analysis;

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\(^{75}\) See CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2011.
\(^{76}\) See CDA Collaborative Learning Projects: “Effectively Utilizing Feedback” project
\(^{77}\) PEC, Adaptive Peacebuilding Programming through Effective Feedback Loops, Case Study Lessons (Revised Summer 2018)
• Skills and processes are not enough; institutional structures, decision making that incorporates feedback, management support and incentives are necessary;
• Increased use of technology can support sustained and real-time feedback loops, often as one element of a M&E system. However, technology does not address literacy levels, culturally appropriate monitoring/feedback processes, language, and who is engaged and who is left out (by gender, age, elites vs. marginal/vulnerable status, etc.).  

Evaluation of Conflict-Sensitivity: Minimum Quality Criteria

Evaluation of conflict-sensitivity examines whether or not the intervention has worsened dividing factors in the context and/or contributed to strengthening local capacities for peace.

Possible lines of inquiry for evaluation of conflict-sensitivity:
• What unintended effects did the project/program have?
• How did the organization respond to those impacts as they arose? What changes were made to program plans and design to ameliorate negative impacts or amplify positive impacts?
• Did the organization’s response adequately address the changes in the conflict? Were tensions decreased? Were opportunities to build capacities for peace taken advantage of?
• Was the conflict analysis revised or updated in the course of the program?
• How regularly did this occur? What triggered an update of the conflict analysis?
• Has consideration of conflict been included in organizational practices: hiring, security, codes of conduct, etc.?

Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation: It Is All About the Process

“As a policy or programme should be conflict sensitive, so should the evaluation process itself. Evaluations carried out before, during, or after a violent conflict must be conflict sensitive because they are themselves interventions that may impact on the conflict. In this respect, it is important to understand that questions asked as part of an evaluation may shape people’s perception of a conflict. Evaluators should be aware that questions can be posed in ways that reinforce distrust and hostility towards the “other side”. Evaluators should keep in mind that the way they act, including both the explicit and implicit messages they transmit, may affect the degree of risk.”

Establishing clear ethical criteria for the design and implementation of evaluations is critical to ensure that programs not only do no harm but may actually have a positive impact themselves.

78 See Evaluative Options guide, p. 41 and following pages.
80 For extensive research on this topic, see Bush, Kenneth, and Duggan, Colleen: Evaluation in the Extreme, Research, Impact and Politics in Violently Divided Societies. SAGE Publication, September 2015
Facilitation Note: Conflict-Sensitive Evaluation – Sample Considerations

The evaluation team’s identities should be acceptable to all the major groups in the context. Ensure that those collecting data reflect the ethnicities/religions involved and are accepted by those communities. Also, ensure that the team has the capacity to take in all perspectives equitably.

In some contexts, the biggest conflict sensitivity issues are unspoken, and may even be implicit in the way that an evaluation is commissioned, hosted and implemented. Be alert to such issues and develop strategies to avoid them. For example: In the context of identifying potential interviewees, a local staff member says, “Oh, you don’t need to talk with X [minority] group, they really have not been involved and don’t seem interested in the project.”

Consider how data collection can avoid fueling tensions. For example, will the act of asking questions cause suspicion, rumors or fear? If focus group discussions are used, will it be better to meet with different ethnic/religious groups separately to avoid clashes of opinions over disputed events or results? Or does a mixed group provide more information?

In intensely conflicted contexts, prioritize the participants’ physical security, and the security of their data, dignity and reputation. Make careful choices about how security – the use of armed escorts – can foster mistrust or make the evaluation team a target.

In situations where marginalized groups feel unheard, they may see an evaluation as an opportunity to tell their story to the public. The evaluator needs to employ empathy and respect, and yet remain objective and truthful in reporting on the findings.\(^ {81}\)

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**Group Exercise: A Conflict-Sensitivity Approach in Speculandia Case**

*See Annex M for hand-out and facilitation note.*

**C. Monitoring and Evaluation Applied to Adaptive Management in The Peacebuilding Field**

Facilitation Note

Possibly have a short discussion about conflict-sensitivity needs for M&E processes, ethical dilemmas, and related practical experiences people have, before moving into the Speculandia exercise / Annex M.

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Many DM&E frameworks prioritize results-based management and linear logical frameworks over adaptive management, linear thinking over systems thinking, and rigidity over flexibility. Adopting adaptive management as a standard practice is paramount in the peacebuilding field to reflect the complex realities in which peacebuilders operate. However, the use of adaptive management and systems thinking, especially in combination, is still relatively new in peacebuilding, and documentation of that experience has started only recently. While some organizations have experimented with complexity aware monitoring, systematic analysis of the monitoring and evaluation experience in programs that apply adaptive management is yet to be done.

“If we truly strive for rapid feedback and learning cycles, peacebuilding staff need competencies and skills to be able to think more evaluatively, critically and curiously about what they do, see and hear. They need to be able: 1) to question the validity of assumptions that underpin interventions and programmatic choices; 2) to revise theories of change; and 3) to define the meaning of “results,” “outcomes,” “impacts,” and how to measure these in shifting and uncertain contexts.”

The Alliance for Peacebuilding’s (AfP) research on peacebuilding and adaptive management revealed three main categories of requirements that are conducive for adaptive management:

(i) Developing a program structure
   a. Adaptive management as a foundation component of M&E and not an add on
   b. Minimum degree of rigor (adaptive management cannot be a substitute to a solid program design framework)

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Adaptive management | a deliberate and repeated process of decision-making in response to new information and changes in context. It is particularly important in situations of considerable uncertainty, instability and where there are few or no proven solutions to a given problem.

Adaptive management involves three elements:

- understanding the necessity of experimentation to understand what works;
- creating mechanisms for collecting and sharing information about the context; and
- adjusting activities, operations, plans, and strategies based on this information.

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82 USAID Learning Lab, 2018
83 Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2018. *Snapshot of adaptive management in peacebuilding programs: What are the key challenges and recommendations for implementing adaptive management in peacebuilding programs?*
84 See, for example, USAID’s guidance note on *complexity aware monitoring* from 2016
87 Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2018. *Snapshot of adaptive management in peacebuilding programs: What are the key challenges and recommendations for implementing adaptive management in peacebuilding programs?* p. 10
c. Apply what has been learned in the past

(ii) **Securing buy-in to build an enabling culture**
   a. Clear role definition and keep roles as stable as possible
   b. Involve everyone: avoid M&E silo roles, and involve donors, Senior Managers, and operations
   c. Ensure an enabling culture: mindsets, competencies, crafting a group narrative for working adaptively and engaging with system.

(iii) **Defining technical requirements**
   a. Building capacities within the team, with partners and external experts (e.g. evaluators)
   b. Develop basic guidelines while not insisting on the exclusive use of specific tools
   c. Stagger timing: Adaptive management relies on cycles of learning and retooling.

**Note:** these categories are explained in much greater detail in the AfP report and it is recommended that the AfP report is included as one of the key documents for background reading for this training and shared with participants ahead of time.

The below figure\(^88\) emphasizes adaptation as an ongoing process that must be informed by constant feedback through a range of qualitative, participatory, and measurement driven data-gathering processes. Classic monitoring systems often miss important developments by focusing on a narrow set of indicators; adaptive management cannot afford to overlook emerging results.

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Group Exercise: Exercise Option 1

Ask people to work in small groups and articulate:

- 2-3 issues (content, process) that are conducive to adaptive management in their organizations at the moment, and
- 2-3 key challenges.

Record each idea on cards or post-it notes, then post centrally in the room and discuss.

In the debriefing, probe for the following issues:

- How to maintain accountability (to donors and communities) despite shifting goals and changing objectives?
- What are the best strategies to clearly document program adjustments, the evidence base for those adjustments, and the rationale for them? How are they communicated to donors, partners, and communities?
- How do you know you have the right type(s) of information available to make program adjustments? Especially in highly fluid contexts with often limited access to communities and beneficiaries. How to triangulate information in those settings, e.g. in cases of third-party monitoring?
- How to ensure the right staff skills, from senior managers to local implementers? Adaptive management for peacebuilding in highly fluid environments requires additional and different skills as compared to the average ‘project manager’ job description.
- How can donors and funders be brought on board if they are not on board yet with adaptive management? How to overcome bureaucratic hurdles impeding more flexible programming approaches?
- How can you ensure to embed or continue to embed an adaptive mindset into your strategy going forward?

Group Exercise: Exercise Option 2, Adaptive Management Clinic

This option requires prep work by the trainers and participants!

Ask participants before the workshop if they have a current project or program that is facing questions of change and adaptation and which could benefit from a peer review discussion during the training workshop. Ask the people who will volunteer their project and program to prepare a one-pager with the key challenges and questions they face to be distributed to workshop participants before the workshop or at least the day before the adaptive management clinic. Give people guiding questions for the clinic, but ask them to not be limited by these questions. Some of the questions can include the following:

- Why does your initiative need adaptation? What is prompting your thinking behind it? What is the overall rationale for change?
- What types of information do you have to support making program adjustments? Do you have sufficient information? And is it the right type of information, how was it
- Is there management buy-in at the appropriate levels to adapt your project or program?
• Are your local partners on board? Do they support changes to your strategy? How will they be involved as part of those changes? Will their roles change in any way?
• Have you or will you engage your donor(s)? Do they understand the rationale of why you are proposing strategy/project level changes?
• How can you ensure to embed or continue to embed an adaptive mindset into your strategy going forward?

D. Key Readings

Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2018. Snapshot of adaptive management in peacebuilding programs: What are the key challenges and recommendations for implementing adaptive management in peacebuilding programs?


USAID Office of Evaluation, Learning and Research: Complexity Aware Monitoring Discussion Note. 2016

Purpose of This Module

To provide an overview of the types of evaluations and evaluation approaches that might be most useful for peacebuilding programs. To provide an overview of a range of other evaluative options (that are not full evaluations) and when and how to use them. This module does not provide step-to-step guidance on how to conduct an evaluation.89

Facilitation Note: Input Required from Participants

As part of this module, participants will be asked to bring a program scenario to the table. Program scenarios could include an upcoming evaluation, or a program in a phase where some type of evaluative process might be useful. Giving more detail, ask participants to each prepare an example ahead of time. Ideally, these program examples should be provided to participants ahead of time. At the very least, a more detailed description should be given during the workshop.

A. What Do You Want to Evaluate?

Group Exercise: Quick ‘Pop Up Quiz’ In Plenary

Who remembers the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria? [Relevance, Effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact].

Probe the audience and ask very broad initial questions, such as:

- What does relevance mean in peacebuilding? [The program addresses at least one of the key drivers of conflict identified in the conflict analysis]

- What is the difference between effectiveness and efficiency? [Effectiveness asks about whether the objectives were achieved, Efficiency is about cost efficiency and value for money from a management perspective]

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• Does it make sense to evaluate all of these criteria at the same time? [Could be yes and no. It will depend on the purpose and scope of the evaluation, the budget and timeline for it]
• Are these the only criteria? [No!]

The five OECD DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance are **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **sustainability** and **impact**.\(^9\) Recognizing the attention conflict and fragile contexts warrant in international aid, OECD DAC has articulated these criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding, which are useful standards to aspire to when designing and implementing initiatives. From a conflict prevention and peacebuilding perspective, the criteria of ‘**coherence**’ has been added – and the guidance also stresses **conflict sensitivity** as a key element for successful peacebuilding.

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**Relevance** | Does the intervention relate in a meaningful way to key driving factors of the (potential) conflict? Are the assumptions on which the activity is based sensible in this context at this time? Are outputs consistent with the objectives of reducing or preventing conflict?

**Efficiency** | Are/were activities cost efficient? Is this the most efficient way to contribute to peace? Compare costs: what a war would have cost vs. the cost of a preventative approach.

**Impact** | What happened as a result of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity? Why? What were the positive and negative changes produced, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended? This focus may be on impacts on the conflict: how did the intervention impact key conflict actors or affect on-going conflict-creating or peace-promoting factors?

**Effectiveness** | To what extent were the objectives achieved? What factors contributed to achievements?

**Sustainability** | Will benefits be maintained after donor support has ended? Has the intervention addressed the role of “spoilers” (those who benefit from on-going conflict) or attempted to engage the “hard-to-reach” (combatants, extremists, men, etc.)? Do locals have ownership of the activity or program, where possible? Have durable, long-term processes, structures and institutions for peacebuilding been created?

**Coherence** | How does the activity relate to other policy instruments (trade, migration, diplomacy, military)? Are different efforts undermining each other? What are the costs or impacts of coordination?

*Note*: ‘Impact’ is probably one of the most challenging criteria to evaluate. It often happens after more time has elapsed and more macro-level progress can be assessed. There are considerable differences in approaches to impact evaluation, namely:
• Attribution of specific outcomes to an intervention
• Effects of interventions on drivers of conflict
• Sustained outcomes of an intervention

When planning for an evaluation or another type of evaluative process, it is critical to be clear about which of the criteria are most important for the specific program evaluation.

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\(^9\) At the time of writing, The DAC Network on Development Evaluation is exploring how the DAC Evaluation Criteria can be adapted to the new development landscape and the 2030 Agenda.
### B. Guidelines for Good Evaluation Design and How to Choose the Right Type of Evaluation

#### Group Exercise

*Ask participants to briefly discuss with their neighbor or at the small tables and debrief in plenary and write response on flip charts: In your experience, what are guidelines for good evaluations, both at the level of content as well as process?*

Watch for the following aspects:

- **Clarity of purpose of the evaluation:** Is it accountability (to participants, partners and donors), learning or both?

- **Clarity of scope of the evaluation:**
  - Is it project level, program level, sector level, country strategy level (that latter two involving other partners and donors)?
  - Is it focused on assessing process or impacts, or both?

- **Which OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (or other evaluation criteria, such as e.g. the Bond Evidence Principles\(^1\)) will be used?**

- **What type of evaluation is right for the purpose?**

- **Who is in charge of and involved with defining and deciding on the evaluation questions?**

Process of the evaluation, important guidelines are:

- **Clarity from the beginning on how the evaluation will be used by who**

- **Who leads the evaluation and what are the different roles of team members?**

- **What type of data collection processes will be used?**

- **How will local partners, participants and donors be involved?**

- **How will a conflict-sensitive evaluation process be ensured?**

- **Who is in charge of selecting the evaluator/evaluation team and providing internal quality control (without influencing the independence of the evaluation)?**

- **Who ensures that sufficient internal buy-in and budget is available to conduct the evaluation, involvement of various stakeholders, and practical follow-up on the recommendations of the evaluation?**

Different Evaluation Associations (AEA – American Evaluation Association, AfrEA- African Evaluation Association, or EES – European Evaluation Society) have their own guidelines for what a ‘quality evaluation process’ includes (e.g., in AfrEA guidelines: “Values Identification: The perspectives procedures, and rationale used to interpret the findings should be carefully described, so that the bases for value judgments are clear”).

*Ask participants: what kind of guidelines they are using?*

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\(^1\) Bond, 2013. *An introduction to the principles for assessing the quality of evidence.*
Facilitation Note
They might not be formal, but there might be unwritten ones that the organization adheres to implicitly.

| Summary of Key Steps for Preparing an Evaluation

- Define the purpose of the evaluation
- Analyse the conflict context
- Consider gender equality
- Determine the scope of the evaluation
- Decide on evaluation criteria
- Outline key evaluation criteria
- Select evaluation approach and method to fulfill purpose
- Take timing and logistical issues into consideration
- Co-ordinate with other actors
- Determine how the evaluation will be managed
- Select and contract the evaluation team
- Prepare to disseminate evaluation results
- Control quality

Planning evaluations in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is not business as usual. A conflict-sensitive approach to evaluation is extremely important, considering possible risks for staff and partners involved, as well as the possibility of the evaluation approach fueling and exacerbating existing tensions. Being aware of the political sensitivities involved, and as the below example illustrates, religion sensitivities in this case, is highly important.

Example: Sensitivity and Security

A national team, highly skilled in evaluation and relatively new to peacebuilding, recently evaluated a project on religion and public policy. The team found that the project was both relevant and effective – yet unanticipated security concerns arose during the evaluation process. While interviewing judges in a dissent-prone region of the country, the team discovered that officials were eager to speak off the record, to expose stories of individuals being falsely accused on charges of religiously-motivated terrorism. The team members, all of whom were citizens of the country in which the evaluation was taking place, began to fear for their personal security. They knew that exposing the false charges could make them a target for retribution.

The evaluation team consulted closely amongst themselves and with the locally-based staff of the commissioning organization. Together, they decided to include these important issues in

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92 OECD/DAC 2012, p. 40
the evaluation report, in a somewhat vague and generalized manner that was not identifiable or traceable. These experiences influenced the team’s recommendations on future legislation and government capacity building. The team also disclosed in the report’s methodology section that process adjustments had been made for security reasons. One team member’s name was left off the report – by request, as that person was particularly vulnerable due to religious identity, and the team supported this decision. Both the project and the evaluation were successful, but the team ended up wishing they had been more prepared for dealing with politically sensitive situations.93

Questions for Deciding Whether to Proceed with An Evaluation—Or Not

Organizations considering whether to commission an evaluation or decide on other evaluative processes can reflect on a set of basic questions as a way of testing support for the evaluation among key groups (staff, participants, partner organization, etc.) and determine whether the project is ready—or how it might become ready—for an evaluation. Basic questions include the following:

1. Who are the main project stakeholders/participants/partners, and are they well-informed about the nature of an evaluation and supportive of the process? The answer to this question will help identify what work needs to be done to prepare stakeholders for an evaluation.

2. Are the purposes/aims of the evaluation clear to all? Is the main purpose the accountability to an external party (such as a donor)? Or is it accountability to other stakeholders and/or the staff of the implementing organization? Or is the primary purpose about learning and project adaptation? The answers to these questions will help clarify the purpose and objectives of an evaluation.

3. Is this the right time for an evaluation of the project, in terms of important activities, milestones and results?

4. Are key locations and people accessible (season of the year/weather, road conditions, security, terrain, population movements)?

5. What forms of information are available that will be useful to an evaluation? This might include regular reports, information from monitoring systems, surveys, participant questionnaires from events or workshops, etc.

6. What is the political context, and what are the current sensitivities to any form of information gathering in the situation? Are people willing and able to talk? Are there issues regarding conflict, gender, faith or other dimensions of difference that would need to be considered or could impede an evaluation? Would asking questions put anyone at risk?

7. Was the project designed with a formal evaluation in mind? That is, did the implementers know that there would be an assessment of what they did and achieved?

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8. Does the project design include important elements, including problem or conflict analysis (and/or some form of baseline conditions), clear goals, expected changes, theory of change and ongoing feedback mechanisms? These elements are considered the necessities for an evaluation, but there are ways to get around them. If any of those are missing, how might an evaluation adjust to that reality? Can the project design be strengthened in anticipation of an evaluation to take place later?

9. Are the resources available to conduct the type of evaluation needed? This may include a budget for a skilled external evaluator or evaluation team, sufficient staff time for organizing the evaluation, and budget for travel, lodging, meals, and so forth, depending on the evaluation process.

10. What are the cost-benefits for conducting an evaluation, considering political risks (to the implementing partners, participating communities, other stakeholders), readiness of the parties in conflict to participate in an evaluation exercise, time and effort costs? That is, how much investment of time and effort will it take to carry out the evaluation and will the benefits meet or outweigh these costs?

11. Are there other options—other than a formal formative or summative evaluation—that would be more appropriate (or affordable) for the project in question (see above outlined options)?

12. Participatory and inclusive processes for consideration of these (and other) questions about a proposed evaluation can help educate and prepare partners, participants and staff—and build support for the evaluation itself. It may be particularly helpful to engage all stakeholders in discussion of the core purposes of the evaluation: what do we want from an evaluation and what will we do with the results?94

Note: it is not necessary that all questions are answered positively to move forward; there is still a judgement call to be made. Answers to these questions might dictate which kinds of evaluation would be the best, depending on the security of the situation, the access to stakeholders and partners, and the amount of monitoring data that exists. Or reflection on these questions might lead to consideration of alternative, internal evaluative processes, or any of the options outlined below (Section C).

Different evaluation options:

The Peacebuilding Evaluation Online Field Guide provides a great overview of different evaluation types and options that can be considered based on need and purpose. Those will not be repeated here and can be found under “Planning an Evaluation”.

Based on the specific needs of the workshop participants and their backgrounds (to be assessed during the pre-workshop survey mentioned in Module 2, see Annex N), the trainers might decide to spend time working with one or several of the actual evaluation options and then the content

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from the online field guide can be used.

In addition, or alternatively, it is recommended to conduct evaluative clinics, as described below, to have people help each other with an evaluative challenge to determine the right approach—conduct a full-fledged evaluation (what type?) or any of the evaluative options listed below (strategic reflection, program quality assessment or evaluability assessment).

**Facilitation Note**

This session requires significant preparation by trainers but also workshop participants. Different levels of knowledge in relation to evaluation options will become apparent. Hence, it should be stressed to participants before the workshop that they are expected to go through the key readings carefully and address any major gaps they have. It is important that they are at least familiar with different evaluation and evaluative options.

**C. Other Evaluative Processes Prior or Alternative to Formal Evaluations**

Formal evaluations might not always be what is needed or most helpful, and other types of ‘evaluative processes’ might be useful. This might be particularly the case when:

- A peacebuilding program is not ready for a formal evaluation—either because it is not designed with evaluation criteria in mind or because it is not prepared in other ways. While donors often impose a requirement that programs perform an “evaluation”, it is not always clear what standard they are applying and what the purpose of such an evaluation would be—nor are adequate funds provided for a full evaluation.

- The environment in which a peacebuilding program is being implemented is not sufficiently conducive to conduct a formal evaluation. In some situations, the conditions of conflict, violence and insecurity are not conducive to robust evaluation per the highest accepted standards of the American Evaluation Association or other international bodies, such as the OECD DAC. Data may not be available. Access to certain areas may be limited. Posing certain types of key questions may exacerbate conflict or put program staff in danger.

- The real and biggest need of the program team and partners is building design, monitoring, and evaluation capacities, which will not be the focus of an evaluation.

The Thinking Evaluatively Guide by the Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium uses lessons and findings from CDA’s Reflecting on Peace Practice Program as criteria for assessing peacebuilding program quality, which includes Do No Harm/conflict-sensitivity. The Guide includes those criteria in three evaluative processes and tailors them to peacebuilding programming: Program Quality Assessments, Evaluability Assessments, and Strategy and Program Reflection Exercises. The purposes, content, and processes related to each process are explained in detail in the Guide. In a nutshell, the main purposes and characteristics of these three options are summarized below:95

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95 Thinking Evaluatively Guide, p. 44
## Strategy and Program Reflection Exercise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose(s)</th>
<th>Program Quality Assessment (PQA)</th>
<th>Evaluability Assessment (EA)</th>
<th>Evaluation (not covered in the Guide)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ▪ Improve specific elements of program strategy or design  
▪ Maximize potential for program to contribute to Peace Writ Large  
▪ Contribute to a common understanding within the team (and possibly with partners) about key elements of effective and relevant peacebuilding programming. | ▪ Learn about quality of program design  
▪ Adapt/improve program design and implementation through application of a clear set of professional standards and criteria  
▪ Maximize potential for program to contribute to Peace Writ Large. | ▪ Assess whether a program is ready for a formal evaluation  
▪ Identify areas for improvement in (specifically) data collection, program logic, and support evaluation planning. | ▪ Identify and assess worth of results/outcomes of program  
▪ Learn about quality and value of program, including areas and options for improvement (if formative evaluation)  
▪ Fulfill obligations of accountability (to donors, to participants, communities, or organizations, etc.) |
| **Timing** | **Assessment Criteria** | **Data Needs** | **Monitoring & Evaluation System** |
| ▪ During program/design phase  
▪ At key moments during implementation. | ▪ Quality and use of conflict analysis in programming  
▪ Articulation of program goals  
▪ Theory/ies of change  
▪ Program strategy & logic  
▪ Strength of M&E system – relevance from a peacebuilding perspective  
▪ Application of conflict sensitivity. | ▪ Relies on knowledge and experience of participants  
▪ General understanding of the overall (conflict) context is important. | ▪ OECD DAC evaluation criteria (impact, relevance, sustainability, efficiency, and effectiveness)  
▪ Contextually-relevant standards of achievement set by program/project |
| ▪ Mid-term  
▪ Limited use at the beginning of program, but can be used to validate theories of change and program strategy with teams and program partners  
▪ Possibly useful at end of a project to draw lessons for future engagement. | ▪ Quality of program design  
▪ Conduciveness of context  
▪ Data availability. | ▪ Relies on program’s monitoring data, document review and some interviews with program team and partners.  
▪ Publicly available relevant data (e.g., violence statistics, or external conflict analyses). | ▪ Standards for data collection/methodology are followed  
▪ Triangulation of evidence sought.  
▪ Mixed methods where feasible. |
| ▪ Before a formal evaluation - ideally once it is known what type of evaluation will be conducted  
▪ Mid-term review stage to identify areas for improvement before conducting an evaluation. | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who conducts</th>
<th>Program Quality Assessment (PQA)</th>
<th>Evaluability Assessment (EA)</th>
<th>Evaluation (not covered in the Guide)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In most cases, internal facilitator</td>
<td>• In most cases, external facilitator with substantive knowledge of program area, program assessment experience, and facilitation skills.</td>
<td>• Ideally external facilitator in close coordination with program teams and Senior management.</td>
<td>• External evaluator with evaluation expertise and credentials and understanding of the program area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External facilitator recommended if no internal facilitation skills available.</td>
<td>• If internal facilitator (e.g. team member of program partner) is chosen (self-assessment), person needs a certain level of independence in addition to the right skill set.</td>
<td>• Internal facilitation possible.</td>
<td>• Self-evaluation using same skills, standards and techniques as other evaluations also possible depending on purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In most cases, external facilitator with substantive knowledge of program area, program assessment experience, and facilitation skills.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Blended external/internal evaluators: Program team; Senior management; Program participants; Subject matter experts; Program partners; Donors; Host government stakeholders; Spoilers; Other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If internal facilitator (e.g. team member of program partner) is chosen (self-assessment), person needs a certain level of independence in addition to the right skill set.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Who Participates in the process</td>
<td>Program team; Senior Management; Possibly program partners; Possibly an external facilitator; Donor(s).</td>
<td>Program team; External or internal facilitator; Senior Management; Program Partners; Donor(s).</td>
<td>Program team; Senior Management; Program Partners; Donor(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitator (external or internal); Program team; Senior Management; Program Partners; Donor(s).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge about basic RPP and DNH concepts required, and often built into process to some extent</td>
<td>Capacity building is an integral element—those implementing findings of quality assessments are supported on how to apply the assessment’s findings. Critical to determine how much capacity dev. is needed by the team and program partners as part of PQA. Some capacity building on approaches and tools for M&amp;E of peacebuilding might also be required.</td>
<td>Capacity building and knowledge transfer on RPP and DNH approaches not a required element but are often necessary to apply the assessment criteria in a process with the team and program partners. Some capacity building on approaches and tools for M&amp;E of peacebuilding might also be required.</td>
<td>Capacity building is not an element in most cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Capacity building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Learning is an important component of evaluations, ideally contributing to the capacities of staff. In many cases, there is not sufficient time built into evaluations to fulfil this purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>Limited: resources to cover staff time, venue and partner participation, and, where there is external facilitator, fees for his/her services.</td>
<td>Medium: resources to cover staff time + interviews, facilitator, venue</td>
<td>Capacity building component more pronounced in internal evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium as these are usually short duration: resources to cover staff time, and facilitator, resources for facilitation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium to High: resources for evaluator/evaluation team to design and implement rigorous data collection and analysis process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High for large external evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium for blended team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited - medium for self-evaluation depending on the evaluation questions and data collection methodology.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Strategy and Program Reflection Exercise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit of this modality versus others</th>
<th>Program Quality Assessment (PQA)</th>
<th>Evaluability Assessment (EA)</th>
<th>Evaluation (not covered in the Guide)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More informal process that can be conducted more frequently, is less expensive when external facilitation is omitted.</td>
<td>Strengthens the capacity of teams and program partners to improve program quality on an ongoing basis.</td>
<td>If findings are used and addressed, EA has the potential to significantly improve a future evaluation.</td>
<td>Independent evaluation and external assessment; credibility vis-a-vis donors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When teams are considering investing in another form of evaluative exercise, the below table\(^96\) can help to \textbf{make decisions} on which option to choose and why.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If your goal is to...</th>
<th>...you should...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...conduct an independent assessment of your program strategy reviewing conflict analysis, goals, theories of change, and program strategy...</td>
<td>→ ...choose a program quality assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...assess how ready your program is for an evaluation...</td>
<td>→ ...choose an evaluability assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...assess the performance of the interventions, review outputs, outcomes, and results, and assess implementation practices...</td>
<td>→ ...conduct an evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...facilitate an internal, fairly informal process of reflection and improve your team’s (and possibly your partner’s) understanding of what makes a peacebuilding initiative relevant and effective...</td>
<td>→ ...conduct a strategy/program reflection exercise – or possibly a program quality assessment (the latter applies the peacebuilding criteria more systematically).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...obtain an independent assessment of your program to show accountability(^97) to your donor and/or program partners...</td>
<td>→ ...conduct an evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...obtain an internal assessment of your work to show accountability to a donor and/or program partner...</td>
<td>→ ...conduct an internal evaluation or self-evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...analyze data availability, and understand the conduciveness of the context for your program’s effectiveness...</td>
<td>→ ...conduct an evaluability assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...develop a common understanding within the project team (and possibly amongst partners) about the context, overall goals, theories of change, and program strategy, as well as strengthen skills...</td>
<td>→ ...initiate a strategy/program reflection exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...strengthen the capacity of your team and partners in program strategy development and implementation by assessing your program based on RPP criteria...</td>
<td>→ ...plan for a program quality assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...to train your staff and/or partners in RPP and/or DNH tools and approaches...</td>
<td>→ ...not conduct any of these processes but develop a/RPP/DNH training program for staff and partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...to introduce basic M&amp;E frameworks and approaches...</td>
<td>→ ...not conduct any of these processes but develop an M&amp;E training program for staff and partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...analyze whether your initiative might need to be adapted if there are major changes to the context... (e.g. an election, or signing of a peace agreement) ...</td>
<td>→ ...consider any of these options. But a strategy and program reflection exercise will, in most cases, be the most appropriate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{96}\) Reference: \textit{Thinking Evaluatively Guide}, p. 17

\(^{97}\) Not all formal evaluations for donors only serve the purpose of accountability. Some donors also conduct learning evaluations.
Group Exercise: Evaluative Clinics

Practical scenario from workshop participants

This exercise needs to be prepared ahead of the workshop. Participants will be asked to bring a program scenario to the table (which can be in writing or clearly articulated at the beginning of the session). There needs to be a sufficient number of program scenarios to enable small group work with one resource per person. Program scenarios could include an upcoming evaluation, or a program in a phase where some type of evaluative process might be useful. Resource people will need to provide brief context on their program and what the current thoughts and possible struggles are as a foundation for the conversation.

Questions for group work (should be adapted in the group depending on the specific scenario chosen):

• What are the critical needs of the program at this particular point? E.g. re-articulating the theory of change, updating the analysis, revisiting the strategy, revising the MEL framework?
• What kind of evaluation or evaluative process would seem most useful?
• What would be the most appropriate process to plan and implement this option?
• Should it be an internal process or facilitated by someone externally?
• To what extent should donor(s) and partner(s) be involved?

If workshop participants want to engage with one of the evaluative options in more detail, more detailed guidance and key questions for each option are listed in the Guide (which is key background reading anyways, so participants should have a copy handy – at least electronically).

For this session, it is critical that resource people prepare their inputs and what they would like to get feedback on very carefully to ensure that they can pose clear questions to their workshop peer group and get the most out of this time.

D. Key Readings


Ernstorfer, Anita, Isabella Jean, and Peter Woodrow, with Diana Chigas. Thinking Evaluatively in Peacebuilding Design, Implementation and Monitoring: Three Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and Do No Harm (DNH)-infused options to strengthen the effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies and programs. PEC, 2016.

Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium. 2016. Online Field Guide to Peacebuilding Evaluation [The online field guide provides a wide range of additional resources on peacebuilding evaluation].


Annex A: Dominia At Risk: Preventing a Slide Towards Violence

What is included:

- Case Study
- Map and Legend

Facilitation Note:

The following pages provide a case study that can be duplicated and used as a handout for an analysis exercise. At the back of this annex is a completed 3-box analysis for your reference as the facilitator and is NOT designed to be a handout but is available for your reference as the group builds their own analysis of the case study.
Dominia at Risk: Preventing a Slide Towards Violence

Background

Dominia became an independent country in 1970, after a ten-year guerrilla war of independence against the Colonial Master. The independence movement originated among the Shono minority, led by Manu Bido. They were joined by the other minority groups (Kamo, Zazu, and Fala) who formed the Dominia Liberation Alliance (DLA). Minority groups were alienated from the colonial regime and were resentful of colonial favoritism shown to the dominant Blanku and Domo ethnic groups (who together make up 42% of the population).

The root of this favoritism arose from the colonial period practice among foreign administrators and officers from the Colonial Master of taking mainly Domo second “wives”. The result was the Blankus, a mixed-race Christian population favored by the colonial administration—by providing access to primary and secondary education, and selection for university education abroad, civil service jobs and military commissions. Although Blankus represent only 12% of the general population, they occupy nearly all positions of importance in government, military and other social institutions. The Blanku have generally worked in close alliance with the Domo, as most Blanku retain ties to Domo families (who are mainly Christian or animist). Other ethnic groups are essentially excluded from political, economic and educational opportunities.

Eventually, however, Domo and Blanku intellectuals and colonial troops switched to the DLA cause, assuring victory. Triumph over the Colonial Master is remembered each year during festive Independence Day celebrations across Dominia.

Manu Bido became President. However, the military rank-and-file and officer corps remained majority Blanku and Domo, and soon after, Blanku officers and Domo troops seized control of the military, ousted or massacred minority members of the armed forces, and formed the ruling Triumphant Liberation Party (TLP). Bido was assassinated and therefore replaced by General George Mindu, who remained a military dictator for 40 years, leading a one-party state dominated by the military, with weak parliamentary institutions.

Upon the death of General Mindu in 2011, General Albert Barza succeeded to the Presidency. Under international pressure, General Barza made a commitment to hold parliamentary and presidential elections within five years. Constitutional changes will be needed, as the current document enshrines one-party rule and lacks any guarantees of basic rights, but a hand-picked group loyal to TLP plans to produce a draft, with no consultation or input from others.

Dominia is known as “the land of the four great rivers.” These rivers have provided water, food and trade throughout the region for centuries and feature in traditional mythology and storytelling. Dominia is bordered by two countries, with whom it has traditionally enjoyed river-based trade: Big Neighbor and Middling Neighbor. Relations with Middling neighbor are good, with a thriving trade in coffee and tea from Dominia’s Fala Province. Fala Province is separated from most of Dominia by the Fala Mountains, which have allowed ethnic ties between the Fala
and the population of Middling Neighbor to remain strong. In the past, Dominia shared trade relations along the now-dry East River, though coastal trade in ocean fish and cultural ties around fishing continue. Dominia’s relationship with Big Neighbor is complex. There are ethnic ties between Big Neighbor and Dominia; Big Neighbor is majority Shono, though its Shono population is half Christian and half Muslim, whereas the Shono in Dominia are Muslim. There is ongoing small-scale trade along the Shono River. Yet, the government of Big Neighbor wants to dam the Shono River to build a hydro-electric power plant, which would exacerbate water scarcity in Dominia’s Shono Province.

Most Dominian agriculture is on a subsistence basis. The few larger plantations for cash crops have been in Domo areas, and there is a wealth differential between the dominant groups and minorities, although there are also many poor Domo farmers. While most farmers grow small quantities of nuts, cocoa, bananas, tea and coffee as cash crops, the systems for transport and export are extremely inefficient. Imports of staples, such as rice and exports of cash crops recently have come to be controlled by a group of foreign traders, widely believed to be paying off customs officials in the capital city, Minduville. Many small businesses in the capital and provincial cities are also owned by foreigners, although they are often run by locals.

Chronic unemployment and economic stagnation are prevalent throughout the country. Youth unemployment is at 44% in urban areas—and youth comprise 56% of the population. Recently youth are being recruited by strong men in emerging political parties. Several have created “youth wings” of the parties and there are rumors of training camps for mobilization and armed “protection.” At the same time, there is a burgeoning youth movement among minority groups whose advocacy campaigns regarding minority grievances have attracted the interest of international human rights groups.

After indications of change from President Barza’s administration, several donors started providing greater assistance, particularly for fledgling civil society groups (a small number of local development and relief organizations, plus the new independent radio station). Several donors are considering programs to improve education, health, and security sectors. Among international agencies, UNHCR has been working with Dominian drought refugees in Big Neighbor and, together with INGOs, have been addressing the needs of IDP women and children in Dominia and considering broader support to the health system. Even so, Regional Human Rights Organization recently placed Dominia on its Watch List of countries at risk for violence.

**Inside Dominia**

Dominia is small, about the size of Switzerland, and most of its tropical rainforest average an annual rainfall of 1,400 mm—with the exception of the semi-arid Shono region. Three of which are tributaries of the Shono River, which empties into the ocean at Minduville. Water is very important in Dominian culture, and the rivers are celebrated annually across the nation in a week-long Water Festival. The much-anticipated festival features food, palm wine, music, and dancing.
The climate for investment in Dominia is poor, due in large part to strict regulation and government oversight of all commercial activities, high import taxes, and the insistence by the regime that all commerce be funneled through the port city of Minduville. Until the discovery of oil reserves in 2002, there had been little recent investment, except a brewery and a palm oil processing plant established as joint ventures between the government and European firms.

Parliamentary elections take place regularly, but only the Triumphant Liberation Party has been allowed to field candidates. Most seats are uncontested. President Barza has promised to enact new laws by next year allowing other political parties to form and contest elections. The minority groups have been represented in Parliament, but the Representatives are handpicked by the TLP, and generally viewed with suspicion by minority groups. It is expected that one or more parties representing minority interests will emerge from currently existing “cultural associations.” Already, the granddaughter of Manu Bido has established, with representatives from other ethnic groups, the All Peoples’ Assembly, which intends to build unity across ethnic and regional lines.

Dominia once had many popular and prominent radio stations. Many of these stations were established by the Colonial Master but radio was adopted as a new medium for storytelling, and a new tool for Dominian oral traditions and community discussions. During the Mindu years, however, the media was tightly controlled and largely underfunded. Now, only one state radio network broadcasts throughout the country, and a state television channel is accessible in the capital, Minduville, and a few provincial cities. Three newspapers publish in the capital but have not challenged the official line until a few recent, subtle attempts. Under pressure, the Barza regime has permitted the establishment of a new independent radio station.

Until Mindu’s death, dissent was suppressed ruthlessly. Suppression continues more subtly, through intimidation and financial pressures from shadowy elements. Still, two components of civil society have emerged strongly: women’s groups and environmental organizations. Analysts suggest that the regime has allowed these because they do not directly challenge political power. A small human rights group has newly formed, allied with international organizations, and two new charities have applied for official registration, one headed by the wife of a prominent Blanku leader, the other by a man closely associated with a key Domo politician.

There are a few urban, faith-based programs to promote youth employment (offering skills training and microfinance credit). Programs include training in communication and tolerance skills. The All Peoples Assembly includes a strong youth group. The organization has sponsored retreats and “Unity Rallies” focused on diversity and tolerance.

Many thousands of people have migrated to the cities, where large informal settlements have grown rapidly, and unemployment, poor health, and high crime are major concerns. There is a tiny but visibly wealthy minority in the capital. The urban middle class has been increasing slowly, now estimated at less than 5% of the population. Most in this category are government workers and members of the small commercial class. Interethnic tensions are growing, especially in the
urban informal settlements, where there are reports regarding the emergence of ethnically-based gangs.

The Mindu regime did establish primary and secondary schools throughout Dominia, however the literacy rate remains at 39% (23% among women). Many rural areas do not have easy access to schools. Even where schools exist, parents must pay teachers’ salaries. The best government and private schools are in Minduville, generally accessible to the Blanu and Domo elites only. The regime has preferred to select candidates for higher education and to send them to universities in the former Colonial Master. A government university opened in 2007, with limited curriculum and a small enrollment.

Infant mortality rates rank Dominia at sixth worst in the world, while the birth rate is estimated at 35/1,000, among the highest. Health services are confined to urban areas, and quality of care is generally poor. Members of the elite seek care in Europe.

The majority of the country is Christian (Methodist, Catholic, and Evangelical and Pentecostal sects are on the rise). The Kamo and Shono minorities are predominantly Muslim. Starting even before the end of the Mindu years, there have been quiet attempts at inter-religious dialogue, under the leadership of Bishop Roland Gidong, a high official of the Methodist Church, and a spiritual advisor to the President, who has contacts with his Christian sects and among traditional chiefs and Shono and Kamo imams.

**Shono – Kamo, and Shono-Government Conflict Dynamics**

Shono Province is a semi-arid scrub area at the periphery of Dominia, adjoining Big Neighbor, where the Shono comprise a 40% plurality of the population (whereas they are only 21% of the population in Dominia). A revolution in the 1960s in Big Neighbor inspired the Shono independence uprising in Dominia and provided arms and training for the independence struggle. While the largely Muslim Shono have survived through a combination of subsistence agriculture and a tradition of skillful small trading, a recent five-year drought and the subsequent drying of the East River, has resulted in many deaths and internal displacement of Shono families to urban areas and into Big Neighbor through Kamo Province. Many Shono refugees remain in Kamo rather than travel on to Big Neighbor.

When Shono IDPs began to arrive in Kamo Province, they were welcomed by their Kamo neighbors. Many families have inter-married or have long-standing historical relationships, reinforced by trade in riverside marketplaces. The two groups share a religion and cultural practices. However, more recently, the Kamo have found their resources taxed by the Shono IDPs who have stayed in Kamo Province. Shono are traditionally farmers and small-scale fishermen. Kamo land has traditionally been used for grazing cattle, and the Kamo bring their cattle across the Shono River each year to access grazing lands. Seasonal disputes are common along the river basin. Kamo Province has not escaped the drought, and international aid agencies have established offices in Kamo to address the needs of Shono IDPs and resident Kamo populations.
Recently, a palm oil processing plant has been established in Kamo Province on the banks of the Shono River. The palm plantation is immediately across the river in Shono Province. Both the plantation and the processing plant provide jobs to Kamo and Shono people.

Meanwhile, oil has been discovered in Shono territory and off the Shono Coast, and the government has granted large concessions to three foreign oil companies, two of which have already started production. The Shono claim that the lands granted in the oil concessions were taken from large tracts of communally-held farm land under traditional/informal title and some private holdings, also lacking official deeds. The government asserts that it can allocate lands to “the highest and best use for the good of all” and needn’t compensate the Shono.

So far, the Shono have received few benefits from oil revenues or royalties. Government regulations require that the drilled oil be piped to Minduville for shipping overseas, instead of being shipped from the largest port in Shono. Government officials have put up their own candidates for the most lucrative oil jobs, so few local people have been hired for these.

International human rights groups have been working with Shono leaders regarding their land claims, as well as other human rights issues. All attempts to seek legal redress through the Dominican judicial system have been denied, as two major court challenges to the oil concessions were dismissed pre-trial. Shono leaders have consulted with the International Alliance of Indigenous and Minority Peoples, which provides legal services, and they are strongly considering filing a claim with the UN Human Rights Commission.

Similar land issues have arisen in other minority areas, but none are as acute as in Shono Province. Most local land conflicts are handled by traditional local authorities throughout Dominia, but there is no clear mechanism for addressing the Shono land claims. In rural areas, the main problems arise from informal communal holdings and lack of any recognized proof of tribal ownership. For centuries such disputes have been effectively managed by local authorities, usually clan elders, who determine the acceptable use of communal lands.

Between the drought and displacement and land expropriations for the oil concessions, the Shono are increasingly restive, with some early calls for secession. There is some evidence that local Shono leaders have initiated discussions with their counterparts in Kamo, Fala and Zazu areas. There are persistent rumors that the DLA has been revived, and that armed groups are forming in remote jungles and in Big Neighbor.
Dominia and Its Neighbors

Big Neighbor

Middling Neighbor

Dominia

Zazu Province

Kamo Province

Shono Province

Fala Province

Zazu River

Fala River

Fala Mountains

East River

Shono River

Minduville
Legend

- Country Border
- Provincial Border
- River
- Dry River Bed
- Oil Pipeline

- Farming territory
- Fishing territory
- Herding Territory

- IDP Migration Route

- Oil field
- Brewery
- Palm oil plant
- Coffee Plantation
- Tea Plantation

- Capitol City
- City
**FOR FACILITATORS ONLY**

Reference Sheet: Factors For/Against Peace and Key Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY ACTORS</th>
<th>KEY FACTORS FOR POSITIVE → CHANGE</th>
<th>KEY FACTORS AGAINST POSITIVE CHANGE</th>
<th>KEY ACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Roland Gidong</td>
<td>• Level of trade (formal and informal)</td>
<td>• Level of exclusion from decision-making</td>
<td>General/President Albert Barza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manu Bido’s Granddaughter</td>
<td>• Number of calls for tolerance and inclusion</td>
<td>• Degree of control over commercial activities by govt</td>
<td>Triumphant Liberation Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All People’s Assembly</td>
<td>• Ability of inclusive political bodies (e.g. APA) to attract membership</td>
<td>• Level of access to educational opportunities</td>
<td>High ranking government/military officials loyal to Barza (re-drafters of Constitution, MPs, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elder/traditional authority groups</td>
<td>• Level of political influence of inclusive political bodies (e.g. APA)</td>
<td>• Level of access to opportunities for economic advancement</td>
<td>Foreign traders/businesspeople?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organizations?</td>
<td>• Degree of trust and cooperation between ethnic groups</td>
<td>• Level of trust in government actors</td>
<td>Oil companies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International donors</td>
<td>• Level of media freedom</td>
<td>• Level of shared control over all branches and departments of govt.</td>
<td>Dominia Liberation Alliance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural associations (for minority representation)?</td>
<td>• Number of independent media outlets</td>
<td>• Amount of legal protection for freedom of expression</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil companies?</td>
<td>• Degree of legal protection for the formation of independent civil society organizations</td>
<td>• Level of real and perceived security</td>
<td>Domo/Blanku elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominia Liberation</td>
<td>• Level of public interest and participation in the political process</td>
<td>• Amount of legal protection for land ownership and usership</td>
<td>Strong men in emerging political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Legal protection of rights</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Size of middle class</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Number and influence of efforts to engage youth in violent or destructive ways</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Annex B: South Sudan Systems Map

Purpose of The Systems Analysis and How to Read This Document

How was this map produced – and related caveats?

The accompanying “map” of conflict dynamics in South Sudan was developed by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects in the spring of 2017, as part of CDA’s engagement in the multi-donor Conflict-Sensitivity Resource Facility in South Sudan. This work is based on a similar map produced in 2013, based on DFID and USAID conflict assessments from 2013. In updating the analyses, the map used existing research and analyses from 2005–2017, specifically drawing on published and internal analyses from the past four years, collated by the Conflict-Sensitivity Resource Facility Consortium.

From these existing analyses, the map extracted current significant conflict dynamics at the national level that contribute to conflict and violence and organized them into causal loops (in particular, reinforcing loops, which are the basic “grammar” of systems thinking), to allow users to understand the dynamic nature and interconnectedness of the factors at play. As such, this analysis did not include primary data collection, a participatory process, nor carry out systems-specific research in South Sudan. Additional caveats include that this systems map does not have balancing loops and was produced shortly after the outbreak of the 2016 violence in South Sudan, during a time when many internationals were evacuated from South Sudan. It therefore very much represents the situation in that particular moment – even though some of the dynamics remain the same.

It is made available for the PEC PB M&E Training Manual for strict training purposes and is not intended for circulation.

What is the purpose of this document and how could it be used?

This document is intended to demonstrate a complementary conflict analysis tool that can help donors and other international partners understand their position vis-à-vis the conflict as well as identify their potential role, areas of influence, and interactions with conflict dynamics through program and policy interventions. It needs to be updated on a regular basis, given the highly volatile situation in South Sudan or in other contexts where a systems approach is applied.

What is the unit of analysis?

This systems map and the accompanying narrative provides macro / national level conflict dynamics in South Sudan, highlighting the most important drivers and dynamics of conflict which include mostly the national dynamics (political, military, resources) as it is played out today, and to a lesser extent, regional factors that relate to Sudan. Therefore, this analysis is a summary and a macro-view of conflict dynamics. It does not provide a comprehensive overview of local level conflict dynamics such as the for Jonglei State which has seen considerable violent conflict over resources nor does it include a detailed stakeholder analysis. This analysis also does not provide a historical overview of the conflict – it is a snapshot in time of the situation as of today. However, it does indicate where historical factors and legacies are significantly feeding into the conflict.

A similar exercise could be performed at other levels of the country, and/or for specific sectors and thematic areas. Furthermore, such an analysis would reveal a different, though related, set of factors...
and core conflict dynamics of concern. Similarly, a heightened emphasis on international and regional influences will uncover factors and dynamics that are not fully revealed in this particular analysis. Therefore, donors and agencies that seek to influence conflict dynamics at the State or local level must not rely on the national-level mapping, which, while informative, is not sufficient for programming at those levels.

The national-level conflict map is useful for considering issues of relevance for the broad sweep of programming priorities and funding decisions or ‘big picture’ strategy development and planning at the country level. In other words, to what extent do donors’ efforts address any of the fundamental conflict dynamics depicted in the systems map? What are points of leverage for positive change – that is, if some of the key drivers of conflict that were identified were tackled, what would be the immediate and potential knock on (or ripple) effects through the conflict system?

**Important Note:** This map shows causal connections between various conflict factors organized in reinforcing loops. It focuses on the negative dynamics (reinforcing loops). Countervailing positive forces (balancing loops) and factors also exist albeit in limited ways at local levels. Because this exercise relied on existing analyses at national level, most of which primarily focused on driving factors for conflict and not significant factors for peace, the balancing factors are not included in this map.

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**What are the benefits and purposes of a systems approach?**

Conflict analysis from a systems perspective is a complementary approach to other types of conflict analysis. **Systems analysis** helps to understand the dynamic relationships and causalities between different conflict factors, and the interconnectedness between conflict factors and stakeholders. It operates based on an understanding of ‘feedback’ (causal connections) between conflict factors and helps to understand reinforcing and balancing dynamics in conflict systems. Systems analysis has the potential to help bridge the gap between analysis and programming by including analysis of points of leverage and approaches for changing the system. Applying a systems approach is particularly helpful for understanding overall conflict dynamics for the purposes of planning strategies and programs at macro-levels with diverse teams of policy makers and practitioners, also striving for greater collective impact beyond project levels.

**When might a systems analysis be particularly helpful for you?**

- To prompt questions about the overall impacts of an intervention on the conflict system – positively and negatively (key for conflict-sensitivity);
- To generate discussions about the context within teams and partners and to work towards a joint understanding of the context and main conflict dynamics;
- To determine the niche of one actor in relation to the impacts of other organizations;
- To develop sustainable entry points and avoid short-term and ‘quick fix’ solutions that often fail;
- To develop macro-level theories of change for programming;
- To support scenario development and monitor the impact of different scenarios on conflict dynamics.
A Systems View of Conflicts in South Sudan
Narrative Explanation of the South Sudan Systems Map

The systems map of conflict dynamics in South Sudan shows four interlocking vicious circles (“reinforcing loops” in systems terminology). These are marked on the map by R1, R2, R3 and R4. While this map is an updated version of the 2013 map, most of the key elements and dynamics remain the same. The recent spate of violence and instability in South Sudan is reflected in the changes to the R1 loop of political culture and power dynamics, which largely stems from SPLA/M dynamics.

R1: Political culture and power dynamics. This causal loop has roots in the long legacy of armed struggle the history of internal divisions and competition within the SPLA/M that result in an ongoing culture of personalistic politics and rivalries. This reinforces the tendency of the party to consolidate its power to the exclusion of opposition and minority voices, further augmented by the absence of separation between political and military apparatus of the government and shifting loyalties and alliances along ethnic/religious lines. These dynamics and ever-increasing fragmentations contribute to an increasingly authoritarian governance model in which effectiveness/competence is not a primary value. Authoritarian governance and the associated violence are contributing factors to deterioration in security which in turn feeds authoritarian governance and internal divisions within political parties and groups. The fundamental lack of effective accountability mechanisms and impunity support these dynamics. In such a political culture, based on patron-client relations with importance placed on family, clan and ethnic relations, corruption rises and becomes common currency for trading influence for benefits.

R2: Economic performance and competition over resources. A combination of unstable security and austerity measures (derived from the demands from the security sector) result in stalled growth and stagnation. In addition to declining oil revenue, the private sector is not generating jobs, leading to further dependence on government for employment. This is reinforced by systems of corruption, coupled with non-diversified households and national economies leading to increased tensions over resources of land, water, jobs and the ever-contentious cattle. Further reinforcing this dynamic is the associated local-level conflicts due to raiding/rustling, and young men attempting to attain bride price, and political violence and displacement. Competition over resources along with existing grievances and lack of progress in reconciliation efforts (R3 loop) leads back to the deteriorating security situation and aggravates relations among ethnic groups.

R3: Inter-group relations and cycles of violence. Over the past few years, the degree of internal division within SPLA/M has further bolstered the authoritarian nature of governance and the reluctance to engage in reconciliation efforts to address grievances generated by the war itself and/or ongoing perceptions of unfairness and bias. This perception of unfairness and bias is further fueled by patterns of SPLA experience (or rank) becoming a consideration for positions within SPLM and the Government. These factors degrade inter-ethnic relations, contributing in turn to instability / insecurity, in some cases leading to the establishment of militia and reinforcing authoritarian efforts to maintain control in the face of such challenges.

R4: Patterns of unfair distribution and exclusion. Widespread perceptions suggest that government resources are not distributed fairly. In addition to corruption, the state is ruled by elite families and clans, which has led to (perceived and felt) accusations of deliberate exclusion of minority groups. In other cases, local groups are increasingly concerned over the amount, quality and equitable distribution of basic services. Concerns over basic services further impacted by the disconnect between central and state governments (center-periphery disconnect) contribute to decreased trust and cooperation among ethnic groups.
Annex C: RPP (Reflecting on Peace Practice) Criteria of Effectiveness / Building Blocks for Peace

From analysis of the cases and practitioner reflection on their own experiences, the RPP process identified five intermediate Building Blocks that can support progress towards Peace Writ Large. These can be used to assess, across a broad range of contexts and programming approaches, whether a program is making a meaningful contribution to Peace Writ Large. The Building Blocks can be used in program planning to ensure that specific program goals are linked to the larger and long-term goal of “Peace Writ Large.” They can be used during program implementation to reflect on effectiveness and guide mid-course changes, and as a basis for evaluation after the program has been completed.

1. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict. A significant contribution to peace is the development or support for institutions or mechanisms that address the specific inequalities, injustices and other grievances that cause and fuel a conflict. This approach underlines the importance of moving beyond impacts at the individual or personal (attitudinal, material or emotional) level to the socio-political level. This idea must be applied in conjunction with a context analysis identifying what the conflict is NOT about and what needs to be stopped. To reform or build institutions that are unrelated to the actual drivers of a specific conflict would be less effective.

2. The effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis. Such analysis, and resulting programs, should address what needs to be stopped, how to reinforce areas where people interact in positive ways, and the regional and international dimensions of the conflict. This approach stresses the importance of “ownership” and sustainability of action and efforts to bring about peace, as well as creating momentum for peace, involving more people.

3. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence. One way of addressing and including Key People who promote and continue tensions (e.g., warlords, spoilers) is to help More People develop the ability to resist the manipulation and provocations of these negative key people. In most circumstances, one important aspect of Peace Writ Large is a significant and sustained reduction in violence. This Building Block is a stepping stone to that long-term goal.

4. The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security. This approach reflects positive changes, both at the socio-political level (in people’s public lives) and at the individual/personal level, as people gain a sense of security, an important element of PWL. Security and people’s perceptions of it contain many different aspects, which must be identified and attained based on the local context.

5. The effort results in meaningful improvement in inter-group relations, reflected in, for example, changes in group attitudes, public opinion, social norms, or public behaviors. Improved relationships between conflicting groups constitute an important Building Block for peace—often a preliminary step towards other initiatives. It entails transforming polarized (and polarizing) attitudes, behaviors and interactions to more tolerant and cooperative ones, as part of addressing underlying grievances and building the willingness and ability to resolve conflicts and sustain peace.

These Building Blocks can best be thought of as intermediate-level benchmarks of success applicable to the broad range of peace work being done.
Annex D: Reflecting on Peace Practice Matrix for Strategic Programming

CURRENT SITUATION:
Conflict Analysis
Key Driving Factors of Conflict and “Key People” or Actor Analysis

MORE PEOPLE

Healing/recovery
Perceptions
Attitudes
Skills

Behavior
Individual relationships

Programme Activities

Program Theory: How do the activities lead to the goal?

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE

Group behavior/relationships
Public opinion
Social norms
Institutional change
Structural change

Socio-political goal

Theory of Change: How does the goal contribute to Peace Writ Large?

VISION: A desired future
Societal change/Peace Writ Large

What is the gap between the current situation and the desired future? → “peace needs” and/or strategic space.

What needs to change and how?
Annex E: Organizational Identities- Dominia Case Study

For Option 1, the following identities could be used. They can also serve as a possible inspiration in case that option 2 is chosen.

1. A large, international NGO with a mission to support local, community-based peacebuilding efforts (faith-based or otherwise) with a particular expertise in dialogue processes. The charismatic founder of the organization is extremely enthusiastic about bringing the success of the agency’s community-building dialogues across the U.K. to developing countries. He is visiting the new Minduville chapter of the agency next month and expects to see his Dominia team’s plans for its inaugural program offering in Dominia.

   **Overall Goal:** to foster greater understanding across divides and promote peaceful intergroup relations within communities.

2. A Dominian private contractor that puts on shows at the local, government-owned radio station. The organization has won a contract from a U.S.-based NGO that supports and promotes local “vibrant media and public discourse” efforts around the world. This 3-year contract enables you to design your own radio program, or small suite of radio programs, “that meet your community’s need for healthy debate, public discourse, information sharing, and/or collaborative learning.”

   **Overall Goal:** to encourage civil discourse by providing an open platform for conversation about topics of concern to the residents of Minduville and beyond.

3. A small, brand new Dominian democracy building/good governance NGO that has been registered with Dominia’s Corporate and Non-Governmental Affairs Commission and approved by the National Planning Commission because your founder is the president’s cousin. The agency has secured two years of seed funding from a wealthy Dominian donor. It is in the program planning phase, and eager to begin work as soon as program plans are in place.

   **Overall Goal:** to offer civic and voter education programs to prepare the people of Dominia and the nation’s leaders for its transition to democratic governance.

4. You work for the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) department of a large international oil company. Your office is in Kamo Province. The Country Director is too busy to dictate what CSR should do. As long as you create CSR programs that “ensure that the community is happy with us,” she’ll be happy too.

   **Overall Goal:** to secure and maintain positive community relations with all of the communities around the company’s extraction sites.

5. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), working in Big Neighbor and with internally displaced people (IDPs) in Dominia’s Kamo Province. UNHCR is concerned about the well-being of all of these drought refugees and concerned with the potential for an outbreak of violence among Kamo and Shono groups, which could worsen the refugee crisis.
Overall Goal: to safeguard refugees and ensure that they have access to basic health care, shelter, sustenance, and education, as well as support toward either voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a new region.

6. An international NGO focused on supporting youth development and civic participation around the world has been closely following recent developments in Dominia and is preparing to write a grant proposal for work there. You are designing a 5-year program for working with youth across all ethnic groups.

Overall Goal: to support development and inter-ethnic harmony in Dominia.
Annex F: Example Program Description – The Peace Foundation / Kyrgyzstan

The Peace Foundation: Peace and Development Program in Kyrgyzstan 2014-2017

This is a fictitious project example for training and workshop purposes. The quality of this example is deliberately limited to be used in training settings (and learn how to improve it).

1. Context

Since Kyrgyzstan's independence in 1991 until 2005 the republic was ruled by President Askar Akayev. At first, Akayev was considered a liberal president, but his regime turned more authoritarian the longer he was in charge. In 2002 demonstrations against his rule broke out for the first time. Akayev promised to step down from office in 2005 after three presidential terms, but instead he tried to secure his power in other ways. Mass protests erupted, leading to what became known as the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005. In April 2010 thousands of demonstrators went out in the streets of the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek and other Kyrgyz cities to air their dissatisfaction with the regime, the high unemployment rate and the high energy prices. The protests turned violent in Bishkek, after President Akayev ordered the security forces to arrest some demonstrators. Consequently, protesters started attacking the police and tried to storm the government building by crushing its fences. The police reacted by shooting opposition demonstrators, killing an estimated 85 people and leaving many more injured. The violence continued for several days and at the end of the week President Akayev fled to the southern part of the country to seek the support of his followers mostly living there. Roza Otunbayeva was inaugurated as the official interim President on 3 July 2010, following the referendum that took place on 27 June 2010.

Tensions between the Kyrgyz and the ethnic Uzbek minority in the south of Kyrgyzstan came to a fore at the beginning of June 2010. Ethnic violence erupted in Osh and Jalalabad, following which about 400,000 Kyrgyz from Uzbek descent were forced to leave their homes and approximately 100,000 resided in refugee camps in Uzbekistan. According to official numbers over 400 people were killed, but the real number of casualties is estimated to be several times higher. Since then and until today, Kyrgyzstan has been facing a difficult transition and political reform process, with a number of conflict issues at its core. In March 2014, the Kyrgyz Government was dissolved. The Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party announced its withdrawal from the Kyrgyz government coalition. The ministers will remain at their posts until a new government is formed. Joomart Otorbaev will act as the interim Prime Minister.

The key conflict drivers in the country include the following:

- Socio-economic drivers of conflict
  Large-scale unemployment, inflation and the gap between a wealthy elite and a large poor population are well established root causes of tensions and overt conflict. Tensions over land continue to run high, culminating in organized land-grabs, often with ethnic overtones and manipulated by political interests. A significant deficit in the 2010 state budget could lead to cuts in economic and social programs.
• **Governance related drivers of conflict**
  Since independence from the former Soviet Union, there has not been any government strong enough to lead the country through difficult reform processes towards substantive democracy. Corruption is pervasive across different levels of government. This has undermined people’s confidence in government - the turnout of voters for the 2010 democratic parliamentary elections was around half of the eligible population. The government has been unable to provide justice and security for all or develop comprehensive policy to address the multi-ethnic make-up of the population. The security forces have been unable to prevent the violence in June 2010.

• **Minority-related tensions as drivers of conflict**
  Ethnic Kyrgyz make up 68% of the population, while Uzbeks form the largest minority at 26%. In addition, there are smaller Russian, Turkish, Dungan and other minorities. In the south, in some provinces and towns, the Uzbeks constitute the majority of the population. State institutions are dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz. In particular, the number of Uzbeks working in state agencies is not representative of their numbers in the population.

• **Regional/cross border drivers of conflict**
  Kyrgyzstan borders on the Republic of Kazakhstan in the North, Uzbekistan in the West, Tajikistan in the South and China in the East. In the Ferghana Valley area, these borders cut across various ethnic populations. In addition, there are enclaves in the south belonging to neighboring states, surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. The result has been conflict over water resources and pastures. A significant part of irrigated land in Uzbekistan depends on water from the Syr Darya river in Kyrgyzstan. The borders are porous, and the area is an important link in major drug trafficking routes.

2. **Overall Goal of the Program**
  Strengthen national capacities for conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstan at the level of national and local government institutions, as well as through cross-border initiatives.

3. **Theory of Change**
  *If [activity/ies] national and local Government institutions are supported to increase capacities for a constructive resolution of local level conflict;*
  *Then [the change we expect to see from the activity] local level conflicts are addressed more constructively, and less violence happens;*
  *Because [Rationale – why we think ‘then’ happens if we do ‘if’] capacity-building is at the core of a more peaceful society.*

4. **Key Areas of Interventions for The Peace and Development Program 2011-2016**
  • Conflict prevention-related support for parliament, the presidential apparatus and the ombudsman’s office.
  • Support the Ministry of inter-ethnic relations in the drafting and implementation of a new policy on inter-ethnic relations.
• Building the capacity of Oblast Advisory Committees at community and district level to facilitate the engagement of local actors in the monitoring of and responding to potential conflict escalation.
• Enhance cross-border cooperation to maximize the advocacy leverage that can be derived from this local level, and to work towards the sustainability of cross-border working groups with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan focused on the Fergana Valley.
• Establish a national platform of conflict prevention and peacebuilding best practice as a platform for various actors to develop a joint vision for peacebuilding.

5. Known Challenges
• Changing government counterparts, limited consistency with counterparts
• The Peace Foundation has a history and reputation of having been too close (in parts) with the previous post-Soviet governments, trust with new institutions and counterparts is limited
• Scattered international engagement on peacebuilding
## Annex G: Program Planning Chart

### Identification of Activities, Changes and Theories of Change and Assumptions

**Program Goal (determine timeframe):**

**Program Goal – Theory of Change:**

*If we do xxx [activities]*  
*Then* we achieve yyy [*the type of change you expect from the activity/ies]*  
*Because* zzz [*Rationale for why this change will be achieved: why does ‘then’ happen?]*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed program activity</th>
<th>Expected changes, due to the activity/ies</th>
<th>What assumptions do you make?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex H: Program Design Trouble Shooting Tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symptom: Activity Disharmony</th>
<th>May be a sign of: Differing Theories of Change</th>
<th>Potential fix: ToC Articulation Exercise</th>
<th>Other issues to watch: ‘All Aboard’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff are working toward an agreed upon goal in surprisingly different ways. More than just a difference in styles, they are using very different means to achieve the same overall end. Conflicts or disagreements may arise as a result; or, the team’s efforts may simply be so divergent that activities are at risk of not “adding up” to the program goal.</td>
<td>Even if we agree on the goal, we may have different or even competing ideas regarding how change happens within the context where we work. Among other factors, our actions are governed by our theory(ies) of change. Often, our theory(ies) of change are not articulated, but everyone works according to their own theory(ies) of change.</td>
<td>Consider taking the team through a review of the program’s core theory(ies) of change (also: double-check that the program’s theory(ies) of change links intended results to Peace Writ Large by addressing key driving factors of conflict). If disagreements, doubts or confusion arise, this may be the source of the underlying problem. Encourage the team to review and agree upon staff roles and responsibilities regarding program activities that will “add up” to the program’s intended results.</td>
<td>Do not forget to include all relevant staff in this process! In addition to underlying ToC, mandates and high-level agency priorities govern staff objectives and actions. If you find that the ToC seems to be widely shared, it could be that communication or operational breakdowns have led staff to “go their own way.” You might also find that your assumptions about how change happens vary widely across teams. This will be a good opportunity to ‘unpack’ the different ways colleagues think about change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom:</td>
<td>May be a sign of:</td>
<td>Potential fix:</td>
<td>Other issues to watch:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Moving Goal Post</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team members speak (very) differently about a program’s aims, even if there is agreement as to how to create change. These teams may get stuck in confusion/disagreement during longer-term planning. Members may “give up” and just hope that they are all aiming for the same thing.</td>
<td>Vague/Different Goal</td>
<td>All Eyes on the Same Prize</td>
<td>The Art of Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vague or overly broad goals/intended results leave too much room for interpretation. When a program’s aims are vague, staff may “silently” create more targeted intended results to work toward or may simply understand the intended result in surprisingly different ways, possibly without even realizing it…until disagreement surfaces.</td>
<td>The team may benefit from a reflection process regarding the program’s intended goals/results. If the intended results are revisable, it may be helpful to review the reasons the intended results were developed, including the problem analysis. Or, it may be most important to conduct a team building exercise to bring everyone on board with the current intended results.</td>
<td>Social change work attracts passionate individuals. Working in teams, including compromising on strategies and tactics regarding issues about which people care deeply, is hard! Team building, trust building, and built-in disagreement resolution mechanisms are essential to healthy working groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The RPP Criteria of Effectiveness/Building Blocks for Peace (Annex C) may be a useful tool to review the overall program regarding overall intended socio-political change.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom:</td>
<td>May be a sign of:</td>
<td>Potential fix:</td>
<td>Other issues to watch:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Talent Trap</strong>&lt;br&gt;Your program is really good at certain strategies and tactics. Staff enjoy and are well suited to certain types of work. The only problem: work has taken on a “cookie cutter” pattern, whereby different problems are all tackled via similar strategies and activities, rather than being addressed by interventions specifically tailored to the problems (guided by problem analysis).</td>
<td><strong>‘Favorite Solutions’ Bias</strong>&lt;br&gt;What has been done in the past tends to guide what is done in future (i.e. path dependency). Familiar work is comfortable, keeping teams in equilibrium, fitting current organizational culture, systems and priorities. Over time, program staff (or other program observers) may feel as though their work is predictable, almost “scripted,” causing fatigue and draining inspiration and creativity.</td>
<td><strong>Problem/Strategy Review</strong>&lt;br&gt;This program should start by ensuring that the problem analysis was accurate and complete, and that the team has a good understanding of the key driving factors of conflict and key actors. Additionally, the <strong>RPP Matrix (Annex C)</strong> will be helpful in reviewing overall program strategy and confirming that the tactics and activities planned are likely to “add up” to the program’s intended results.</td>
<td><strong>New Insights and Learning from Others</strong>&lt;br&gt;When possible, make these processes collaborative (e.g. with trusted partners) in order to bring in new voices and perspectives. Tactics and lessons learned can be gleaned from surprising sources. If not already done, the program team might benefit from reviewing scholarly research regarding effective social change processes, and/or from reviewing successful tactics used in other sectors (e.g. corporate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom: (Only) Positive Work</td>
<td>May be a sign of: The “Doing Good” Bias</td>
<td>Potential fix: Focus on Stopping the Bad</td>
<td>Other issues to watch: Seek out Success Stories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program feels like it is doing everything right. Great partners; great activities working toward positive change; the program is research/evidence-based using the latest change strategies and methodologies. So why is this not all ‘adding up’ to greater change?</td>
<td>Many programs find it easier to focus on doing good work (rather than stopping negative dynamics). “Doing good” is not reliably sufficient to make sustainable change. “Stopping the bad” – divesting negative actors of power; interrupting or transforming conflict drivers – are vital to creating positive, lasting social impacts.</td>
<td>Review the problem analysis. What key driving factors and key actors were identified? Be sure key driving factors have been accurately identified. Which of these is this program best situated to address (including through strategic partners)? How can this new work be integrated into ongoing programming (or built into future programming)? How can the program collaborate with others to address some of the more challenging aspects of “stopping the bad” more efficiently?</td>
<td>It can be inspiring and thought-provoking to learn about successes that earlier programs have had in addressing key driving factors of conflict or other negative dynamics. Seek these out and share them among program participants to spark fresh conversation or compare strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Success Without Change
The program achieved its intended results! Why is significant change **not** evident?

### Missing the Mark
Though it achieved its results, a program may be ‘missing the mark’ by working on issues not central to the most vital problems the context faces. In this case, programmatic success does not translate to widespread, sustainable change.

### Step by Step Review
What was missed? Whose perspective can be added to the problem analysis? If the original key driving factors of conflict and key actors seem valid, was the program (intended result) designed to truly address them? If so, were there faulty assumptions embedded in the theory of change? The *RPP Strategy and Program Reflection Exercise* is a useful step-by-step process for the program to go through at different stages of the program: early after the design phase, mid-way through, or towards the end in order to inform a next phase, etc. An RPP infused Evaluability Assessment or Program Quality Assessment might be another useful tool depending on the specific needs of the program teams.

### Beware the Copy/Paste Error
While we can learn from successes in other contexts, we should *always* design programs to fit the unique place where we are working. A program’s success in one place does not guarantee that a similar program will be successful in a different location. Lessons learned might be valid across contexts, but always design and implement from the ‘ground up’.

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99 Ibid.
Annex I: “What’s the Problem” Exercise

What’s the Problem? Doesn’t This Sound Familiar?

See the following exercise to work through day-to-day challenges of program teams.

You and your program support team at HQ have received an email from your colleagues in Fantasyland who work on a peace and social justice program in some of Fantasyland’s neighborhoods most affected by conflict and urban violence. The team is struggling and raises various issues. Given the complexity of the request, you suggest a phone call with the team in Fantasyland to better understand what the most important issues are. During the call, one colleague says, “The main result we are trying to achieve here is to create a local youth network to prevent violence in communities”, another says, “The focus of what we are trying to do is really to enhance partnerships with schools and universities”. A third says, “Independent of the exact focus, I am really more concerned about achieving and sustaining the types of changes we are working towards”. It becomes apparent that there are fundamentally different views about the overall program strategy between newer staff and colleagues who have worked in Fantasyland for a long time. The newer colleagues talk about their work more in terms of social change and preventing urban violence, others make constant reference to the unaddressed manifestations of the civil war in Fantasyland that ended 5 years ago – and which, according to them, are not featured sufficiently into programming. They feel that some of the most challenging issues from the past are being avoided, that programming is done ‘as usual’, and that too much focus is being put on ‘the low hanging fruit’ – working with children and youth, and those willing to work with the organization.

*Your colleagues request that you to propose a plan of action of how you can help them to work through some of these challenges.*

**Questions:**

1. What is the problem - what do you think is happening here? Please analyze the situation and point out specific areas that the program is struggling with. Please identify and briefly explain as many issues as you feel are relevant.

2. What steps do you feel that you and your team could take to help your colleagues in Fantasyland?

3. What kinds of processes would you recommend to work through some of the highlighted challenges with your colleagues? Which tools might be useful for you to use?
## Annex J: Developing a MEL Plan

**Exercise: Approach to Developing a MEL plan**

**Task:** As a group, use the template and guided questions below to create a simple MEL plan for the program you have been working on and outline how it will monitor, evaluate and use evidence to inform programming at country level.

**You have 30 mins to prepare your MEL plan and the group will be asked to present back.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What</th>
<th>How</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What process should the program follow to develop an effective Theory of Change (TOC) and Results framework/Log frame?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Which key elements should they focus on?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the priorities for monitoring in the program and what are some of the data sources you might use? How will information be collected, and by whom? From where? When? Is there baseline information?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think about:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring results of the program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring the context, conflict and unintended consequences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key conflict and gender sensitivity risks and key assumptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How will you use monitoring data to inform program decision making? E.g. Considered at Country Boards; fed into business plans; frequency and format of reporting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation, Review or Lessons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Commissioning reviews, lessons or evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Should the program commission a i) review, ii) lessons learnt or iii) evaluation? Why?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Key Definitions

**Reviews or lessons** | Unlike an evaluation which focuses on assessing the overall impact and outcomes of a program, reviews tend to focus on strategic or operational lessons. For example, a review could look at progress made so far, financial management, governance structures, value for money and cross-cutting issues such as conflict sensitivity and gender equality. A review is part of a program’s monitoring function.

**Independent evaluation** | Evaluations generate evidence that can be used to improve policies and programs. Decisions on whether to evaluate are based on factors such as the existing evidence base, program size and risk, demand and feasibility. If the evidence base for a program is limited, teams may wish to undertake an evaluation to assess whether interventions are contributing to the expected change set out in the program document and results framework.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. How should it ensure evaluations, reviews or lessons explicitly consider gender and conflict sensitivity?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. What other decisions may require further information? What further information is required to make these decisions?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identifying and Applying Lessons in Programming</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. What mechanisms (formal and informal) will the program use to ensure learning from its:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Annual reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Monitoring and results data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Evaluations/Reviews/Lessons learnt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex K: Indicators and Baselines

How Do You Develop an Indicator?

Processes for developing indicators must be tailored to the project/DME teams’ needs and the context. That said, see an example of an indicator design process below, taken from Search for Common Ground’s Module on Indicators (originally adapted from SFCG Designing for Results):

Example: Indicator Design Process

1. Preparation
   - Clarify goals, objectives and intended results for the project of interest;
   - Articulate the theory(ies) of change as well as the types of change specified in the objectives;
   - Check what indicators have already been developed, tested, and refined in your program and other programs with which you are in contact. Ask other practitioners in peacebuilding for their indicators.

2. Generation
   - Brainstorm all related things or dimensions that can be counted, measured, or sized and look for creative ways to combine some of those;
   - Consult the parties or stakeholders in the conflict what they consider to be significant signals of change;
   - Break issues into smaller components. Rather than measure reconciliation, consider its components: mercy, justice, truth, and peace. Try not to use vague “buzz” words. Be able to describe in operational terms what, reconciliation, mercy, etc. will look like; have some descriptive criteria. To measure capacity, focus on skills, technical knowledge, process, motivation, and opportunity. This practice also goes by the name of factor analysis where all factors that influence the change are identified and, where possible, weighed according to the degree of influence each factor has;
   - Develop a list of possible indicators.

3. Refinement and Selection
   - Modify the draft indicators to make them as specific and simple as possible;
   - Come up with at least one or two indicators for each key activity or objective;
   - Select no more than 10-15 indicators per area of significant program focus;
   - Select indicators that can realistically be collected with the resources available;
   - Use a mix of data sources so that indicators could be collected from different data sources.

4. Testing Indicators
   - Test the new and newly modified indicators for their utility in decision making as early as possible, preferably during the design phase while there is still time to make changes. This test is different from a test of the data collection method. The idea is to determine the utility of the indicators in the analysis and subsequent decisions. Pick hypothetical extremes using fictitious data and consider how the different extremes will influence decisions. If vastly different information has no influence over the decisions, the indicator is probably not useful and should be changed. Select the best indicators for your use;
   - Test both the most promising indicators and those which are also viable but not as ideal to ensure there is an alternative in the event that the ideal indicators don’t survive the test.

Tips for Setting Indicator Targets in Peacebuilding Projects

“How much change is enough?’ This is akin to the question, ‘What is success?’ While there are no hard and fast answers to these questions, there are some basic guidelines:

- Know the size or magnitude of the change you are aiming to catalyze at the beginning of the project (which is why it is important to conduct a baseline!).
- The amount of change you seek to catalyze needs to be large enough to be significant (as defined by the project team/donor/community).
- The amount of change needs to be small enough to be achievable within the means (i.e., budget, staff, and capacity) of the project.
- Review past records and reports for previous experience. Ask yourself, “What does that mean in real terms?” For example, it would not be useful to set an arbitrary target such as “50% increase in the number of adolescent boys and girls who complete a peace education course in the province during their fifth year.” In the first year of the project, an increase of 50% of zero would be meaningless.
- Alert the donor that you will need to adjust the targets following the baseline and as you gain experience.
- Adjust the targets after the baseline.
- Adjust the targets after you have experience”

How Do We Know the Indicator Will Work and Be Useful?

The decision-making process throughout indicator development is critical and requires consideration of several important elements: budget, context and who is making decisions.

Budget and Context: Be aware of choosing only as many indicators as you need to feel you can credibly measure changes taking place. “The fewer the indicators the better. Measuring change is costly so use as few indicators as possible. However, there must be indicators in sufficient number to measure the breadth of changes happening and to provide cross-checking.” You should actually be able to measure all of the indicators you have selected for your project! Some peacebuilding practitioners refer to this as the “Feasibility Test” for your indicator: “Feasibility: Ease in collecting the information.”

Who: The decision-making process when developing your indicators should include key stakeholders (from project and DME teams) and be participatory to ensure buy-in and quality data. “Who sets indicators is fundamental, not only to ownership and transparency but also to the effectiveness of the indicators.” This important consideration might, to some peacebuilders, qualify as passing the “Utility in Decision-Making Test”, meaning the information you agree to collect is seen by all as necessary for informing important programmatic decisions. And, also, the “Reliability Test” assuring those at the decision-making table there is an agreement

so that the findings for all indicators will be consistent “regardless of who makes the measurement.”

Another reason to include key stakeholders from project and DME teams (in particular) – is that any data that is to be useful for understanding outcome/impact level change will likely need to be intimately linked to the overarching project logic and theory of change. Indicators can actually be designed off of the project’s Theory of Change during the design stage (see example below), however when it comes time to select final indicators not all individuals implicated in data collection may have been involved in designing the original theory of change. Anyone involved in the project who is implicated in data collection for outcome/impact level needs to be familiar with the anticipated changes selected during initial design stages.

**Developing Indicators Off of The ToC**

“Once you have articulated, tested and refined the theory of change, you can develop indicators to monitor your assumptions, outputs, outcomes and sustainability in comparison with expectations informed by the design of the program. By breaking down the statements of the “if” (input), “then” (outputs and outcomes) and “because” (assumptions, logic), the theory of change can help you identify good indicators for activities/outputs, the expected changes resulting from each of the activities and the assumptions underlying the theories.”

**Using ToC to Create Indicators in School Trauma Healing Program**

In a trauma healing program for school children, an indicator that the project’s goal has been achieved may be the number of inter-religious conflict incidents at school in a month. Indicators could also be developed to assess whether the project is having the impact the theory of change anticipates—to reduce recruitment of school-age youth into armed groups. These could include the number of school-age youth associated with armed groups outside of school or the number of youth-perpetrated incidents of inter-religious violence. Finally, you can use the theory of change to develop indicators to monitor progress towards the goal and to monitor the assumptions underpinning the theory of change. For example, the theory of change assumes that if children are trained in conflict resolution skills, they will use the skills to resolve conflicts at school nonviolently. Several assumptions about the impact of training underpin this theory: 1) that training is relevant and an effective mechanism for knowledge and skill transfer; 2) that information and skills are understood and accepted as an alternative to violence.

Indicators for these assumptions might be:

- % of participating youth who demonstrate knowledge and skill acquisition and comprehension in pre/post-test;

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102 Church and Rogers, 2006, p. 48.
• % of surveyed youth who state they are confident in their ability to employ nonviolent conflict resolution techniques.

For a useful checklist to ensure your decision-making process leads to an indicator that works and is useful (that it is targeted, measurable, reliable, feasible, and useful for decision-making), refer to Church, Cheyanne, and Rogers, Mark M. *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Search for Common Ground, 2006, p. 49-50.
### Annex L: Matching Indicators Exercise

#### Matching Indicators Exercise - Electoral Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP policies and procedures on staffing and recruitment (relating to ethnic diversity etc.)</td>
<td>[Country] Violence and Crime observatory Police statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of levels of inclusion minority groups in national and local government</td>
<td>Qualitative Research by national NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of civil society organizations consulted in drafting of revised electoral policies (disaggregated by type of organization)</td>
<td>Partner policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents of Electoral violence</td>
<td>Partner reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population in target area who believe that women should be allowed to vote freely</td>
<td>Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trends in conflict drivers (conflict indicator)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case studies examining outcome of civil society consultation on content of new policies</td>
<td>Implementer reporting Third party monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% target population registered to vote (disaggregated by geography, ethnicity and gender)</td>
<td>UNDP Reporting Civil Society reporting by NGO Fair Votes Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict sensitivity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of days staff/implementing partners have been unable to travel to program areas due to implementing partner concerns</td>
<td>Case studies by independent evaluator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender sensitivity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of voter registration campaigns run (disaggregated by geography)</td>
<td>Voter registration statistics Monitors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Matching Indicators Exercise - Security and Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># reported cases of HR abuses by police (disaggregated by type)</td>
<td>Training feedback forms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources allocated by partners to conflict sensitivity (e.g. for context analysis, conflict sensitivity review and monitoring)</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of police capacity to investigate and effectively respond to HR abuses and GBV in target areas</td>
<td>Research by national NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># reports by state owned media aimed at discrediting the work of the new Independent Police Complaints Commission</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch reporting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends in conflict drivers (Conflict indicator)</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels of reported gender-based violence, conflict related sexual violence and religious violence</td>
<td>Country Violence and Crime Observatory Statistics Police records</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict sensitivity</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% level of trust in the police amongst men, women, boys and girls in the target community</td>
<td>NGO Media Monitoring Reports Embassy Reporting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Sensitivity</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback on relevance and quality of training received by police</td>
<td>Partner reporting Program Manager verification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex M: Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring / Speculandia Case Study

What is included:

- Case Study
- Monitoring and Evaluation Exercise

Facilitation Note:
Distribute the case study the day before you are planning to use it in the workshop, so that participants review the background before this session starts.
Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring in Speculandia\textsuperscript{107} - Case Study

Speculandia is a medium-sized, low-income country. It is recovering slowly but steadily from a 1990-99 civil war, in which a rebel movement drawn mainly from a socio-economically marginalized but majority ethnic group overthrew a ruling party drawn from a more advantaged minority ethnic group. Half a million lives were lost and there was large-scale displacement. The proportion of female combatants in the rebel group was high for the region, and there are several prominent female majority social justice advocates. The fighting ended with a 1999 peace accord, leaving the majority ethnic group in power, followed by a two-year deployment of UN peacekeepers. Since that time, the prominence of ethnicity in public debate has decreased significantly, but a recent macro-conflict analysis by The Agency shows that underlying ethnic tensions remain, with unequal access to resources and opportunities being a key point of grievance, and that citizens’ trust in the state is very low. Education and employment rates are low, and electricity infrastructure is spotty at best.

The Agency has been supporting development in Speculandia for three decades, though services were disrupted during the civil war. At the strategic level, The Agency considers Speculandia to be highly fragile, and is concerned about the status of state-citizen relations. Therefore, all Agency-funded programs are framed around the overarching goal of enhancing state capacity. Their theory of change posits that if the state is seen to improve governance and service delivery, then state-citizen relations will improve. Opinion research by a regional think tank indicates that citizen perceptions of government have improved slightly over the past few years. There is no data to indicate whether this small improvement correlates in any way with the presence of Agency-funded programming.

At the programmatic level, The Agency funds a significant development portfolio valued at $500 million this year. The Agency does not implement programs, but rather works through an established network of contractors and NGO partners. It has an office in the capital city staffed by 50% expatriates and 50% national hires. Approximately 75% of The Agency’s programmatic footprint is located in a special economic corridor that is populated almost exclusively by the majority ethnic group. Data is disaggregated by gender, but not by ethnicity, because ethnicity is rarely discussed these days. The portfolio includes:

- **Economic development** – Crop yield and food security support in widespread rural areas. Electrification infrastructure development within the special economic corridor.
- **Education** – Curriculum development support. Promotion of educational opportunities for girl children. Vocational training for youth at risk of unemployment.
- **Governance** – Capacity development for financial management and transparency within government. Large initiative on strengthening delivery of public health services. Capacity building for civil society to monitor and advocate on these areas of government endeavor.

Discussion Questions for Small Groups:

\textsuperscript{107} This case study was developed by CDA as part of a training package developed for DFID for M&E training for implementers of UK CSSF (conflict, stability and security fund) funded programs.
1. How would you monitor The Agency’s results at the **strategic level**, with conflict sensitivity in mind? Given the ToC, what would you want to monitor and what monitoring approaches might you use? What type of data would be useful (trends, dynamics, perceptions, etc.) and who should collect it?

2. How would you monitor the Agency’s results at the **programmatic level**, with conflict sensitivity in mind? What monitoring approaches might you use? What type of data would be useful? What types of indicators would be most relevant? Please suggest 1-2 indicators for tracking the effects of Agency’s programming on inter-group dynamics.
Facilitation Note: Not to Be Printed for Participants

At the strategic level, key considerations may include:

- The theory of change about state-citizen relations is not only fragility-related; it is also conflict-related. To begin to validate the theory of change, The Agency needs disaggregated public opinion data on the performance of the state, to determine whether opinions differ significantly between areas of Agency presence vs non-presence. (Note that for later evaluation purposes, this analysis could reveal correlation or possibly contribution. It cannot be used to claim attribution).

- Collecting public opinion data within The Agency’s primary geographic footprint will not be adequate, since that footprint overlaps with the special economic corridor representing mainly the majority ethnic group (which may also be the group most satisfied with current government performance). Thus, data probably needs to be collected by a third party (perhaps the regional think tank upon request), because The Agency may not have sufficient access/reach to collect data outside the special economic corridor.

- Note that the above considerations reflect not only geographic programming decisions but also implicit high-level ethnic targeting decisions. The Agency needs to review and possibly adapt its overall positioning vis-à-vis minority and majority ethnic groups, and the ethnically-based power of the current government.

- The case study implies that ethnicity may currently be a sensitive topic. People may be reluctant to discuss it and doing so may even exacerbate tensions. In this case, what kind of proxy indicators might be used to approximate ethnicity? (e.g. geography?)

At the programmatic level, key considerations may include:

- Monitoring data needs to be disaggregated by ethnicity as well as gender. Any disproportionate benefit to one ethnic group over the other implies a need to review targeting decisions in order to avoid exacerbating existing tensions over unequal access to resources and opportunities.

- The Agency needs to monitor the ethnic demographics among national staff and national NGO partners to ensure balanced access to opportunity. Likewise, participation in the civil society capacity building program should be ethnically balanced to avoid setting up or reinforcing an ethnically-based opposition.

- It is worth considering the fact that there are signs of significant female empowerment among the majority ethnic group. What might this mean? What additional information would we need in order to make sense of it (e.g. data cross-tabulated by gender and ethnicity)? What might this mean or imply for programs that promote educational opportunity for girl children?
**Group Exercise**

*There will be 5 small groups (adapt group size as appropriate for the team you are working with).*

**Assignments as follows:**

- **2 groups to discuss strategic level**
  - *One of these groups to focus on:* “What to monitor and what monitoring approaches?”
  - *Second group to focus on:* “Type of data and who should collect it?”

- **3 groups to discuss programmatic level**
- All groups to discuss monitoring approaches and types of data
- Groups to be assigned one of the programmatic areas for indicator development (1-2 examples)

*In the plenary, report on 1 area that group tackled with examples of suggested additional key considerations and approaches.*
Annex N: Pilot Training Pre-Survey Template

This survey is estimated to take participants between 15-20 minutes. This is not an entirely anonymous survey, given that organization affiliation is requested.

A. Welcome and Introduction to the Workshop

In order for the facilitators of this training to learn more about your current role and experience, and to make the pilot training most useful to you and to us, we request your responses to the following questions.

B. Background Information

Please provide us with some background information about your organization, and role.

Q1. What is your organization and the focus of its work? (open ended)

Q2. What is your role at this organization? (Multiple responses permitted)
   a) Management/executive
   b) Program/project director
   c) Program staff
   d) DM&E technical role
   e) Peacebuilding technical role (e.g., conflict analysis, peacebuilding program support/implementation, etc.)

Q3. Length of time in this position/in this organization? (open ended)

Q4. Do you conduct training for other staff in your organization or for staff in other organizations? (Y/N)

Q5. If yes, how many trainings do you conduct each year? (open ended)

Q6. How many people do you train in a typical workshop? (open ended)

Q7. Who do you train (co-workers, local partners, community members, other)? (open ended)

Q8. What substantive areas do you train in? (open ended)

Q9. Do you advise/mentor/coach colleagues in a particular area of practice? Please explain what you do and what this advisory/coaching/accompaniment process looks like. (open ended)

C. Organizational Context Information

In order for us to know more about your organization’s work and M&E culture, we request your responses to the following.

Q10. How would you describe your top management? (pick 1)
   a) Encourages change and new tools/processes
b) Does not seem to think much about changing the organization
c) Discourages change and new tools/processes
d) Other (open ended)

Q11. How often does your supervisor engage you and others to solve organizational problems? (pick 1)
   a) Frequently
   b) Sometimes
   c) Hardly ever

Q12. To what extent will the management of your organization encourage you to apply the ideas and skills you will learn in this workshop? (pick 1)
   a) To a large extent
   b) To some extent
   c) Very little
   d) Not sure

D. Workshop Expectations

The pilot training will cover the following training modules and content (we have also listed what it will not cover). Please tell us about your level of comfort and expertise with each training area and what particular aspects of each module would seem most relevant to you based on your background, experience and current role in your organization.

Q13. What is your level of comfort and expertise with Conflict Analysis? (This training will not focus on how to conduct a conflict analysis – participants are expected to have that knowledge – but how to use conflict analysis for effective design, monitoring, and evaluation of peacebuilding initiatives)
   a) What is your experience? Where do you feel comfortable, where do you see gaps?
   b) What aspects of this would be useful to you? [substantive areas, but also required skills for applying this effectively in your organization]

Q14. What is your level of comfort and expertise with Peacebuilding Program Design? (This training will focus on how to use program design strategically for effective M&E of peacebuilding initiatives. It is not an introduction to the basics of peacebuilding program design)
   a) What is your experience? Where do you feel comfortable, where do you see gaps?
   b) What aspects of this would be useful to you? [substantive areas, but also required skills for applying this effectively in your organization]

Q15. What is your level of comfort and expertise with Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Plans? (This session will be about how to design a MEL plan for effective peacebuilding work, but also on how to make decisions about the core MEL elements for effective peacebuilding)
a) What is your experience? Where do you feel comfortable, where do you see gaps?
b) What aspects of this would be useful to you? [substantive areas, but also required skills for applying this effectively in your organization]

Q16. What is your level of comfort and expertise with **Baseline and indicator Development**? (This training is tailored for a mid-level audience, familiar with the basics of baseline and indicator development, and will focus on elements most relevant for effective peacebuilding)

a) What is your experience? Where do you feel comfortable, where do you see gaps?
b) What aspects of this would be useful to you? [substantive areas, but also required skills for applying this effectively in your organization]

Q17. What is your level of comfort and expertise with **Monitoring for Intended and Unintended Impacts and Adaptive Management**? (This session will focus on conflict-sensitivity and M&E. It is expected that participants are familiar with the general concept of conflict-sensitivity).

a) What is your experience? Where do you feel comfortable, where do you see gaps?
b) What aspects of this would be useful to you? [substantive areas, but also required skills for applying this effectively in your organization]

Q18. What is your level of comfort and expertise with **Planning an Evaluation and Other Evaluative Processes**? (This will provide a macro-level overview of various evaluative and evaluation related processes that can be applied for peacebuilding, such as program quality assessments, evaluability assessments, outcome mapping, etc. The session will not teach you how to do an evaluation step-by-step)

a) What is your experience? Where do you feel comfortable, where do you see gaps?
b) What aspects of this would be useful to you? [substantive areas, but also required skills for applying this effectively in your org]

Q19. Are there other areas not listed above that you would like to see covered in the training? Please specify.
Annex O: Key Elements of a MEL Plan

Key elements of a MEL plan

Group Exercise: Key Elements of A MEL Plan

Engage training participants in table or plenary discussions around key elements of a MEL plan. Ask the group about their experiences with MEL plans and the key elements they use. Write key elements on flip chart. Then go through each element in more detail – see guidance/key elements below, and particularly discuss elements that were not highlighted by the participants.

It is important to note that there is no ‘universal template’ for a MEL plan, though many practitioners (in any sector) generally apply a matrix to pull the below elements together. However, most useful MEL Plans in the peacebuilding sector are set up to answer the following questions (for a basic exercise to demonstrate how to create a simple MEL plan, see Annex J):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Elements of A MEL Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A short summary of your project goal, objectives (with related theories of change) and activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What decisions need to be made (by implementing agency and by your donor)? What kind of information is required to make those decisions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the baseline?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators: What data will be collected to inform decisions? (and how much data needs to be collected,\textsuperscript{108} to remain “lite touch” when possible?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the information be collected? From whom? And who will collect the data?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where will it be collected from (what is the data source)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When (how frequently) will the information be collected? When do those decisions need to be made?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data interpretation: Who will make sense of the data?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{108} The Lean Research Framework: Principles for Human-Centered Research, Feinstein International Center, 2015
Group Exercise: What types of decisions might need information?

In small groups (3-5) ask teams to come up with a list of decisions that a manager might need to make over the course of a 2-year project. Then, ask them to identify what information would be needed to make that decision that they would then need to gather over the course of implementation. Present 1-2 of these questions during discussion in plenary.

Type of questions for the facilitator to look for:

- Questions about a process for developing (and testing) an effective theory of change. Who is involved from staff, local partners, beneficiaries, donors/funders?
- Questions about the most important elements of the program that need to be monitored (e.g., changes in the context, program indicators, conflict sensitivity concerns, whether results are being achieved...etc.).
- Questions about the context, and/or any adaptations needing to be made to the program in response.
- Questions about drawing lessons learned and sharing these across the team.

Facilitation Note

The purpose of this exercise is to help the group understand ways they might apply and use a basic MEL Plan, starting with the decisions they have to make on program design and M&E.